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Abstract	
Higher	education	(HE)	policy-making	in	England	has	features	which	make	it	distinctive.	An	
intermediary	body	between	government	and	institutions,	under	a	number	of	guises,	has	
endured	since	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	informed	by	new	liberalism	reforms:	
the	changing	role	of	the	state,	marketisation	and	new	public	management,	and	is	perhaps	
inimitable	in	having	played	a	central	role	in	policy-making.	This	thesis	is	a	study	of	HE	
policy-making	through	analysis	of	the	work	of	one	intermediary	body,	the	Higher	Education	
Funding	Council	for	England	(HEFCE).	The	thesis	contextualises	the	policy	work	of	HEFCE	
and	its	place	in	making	and	influencing	policy.			
Three	HEFCE	policy	episodes	(e-University,	CETLs	and	LLNs)	are	used	to	examine	notions	of	
policy	success	and	failure.	There	is	a	tendency	for	policy	to	be	seen	as	success	or	failure;	
this	thesis	aims	to	provide	a	more	nuanced,	less	binary,	approach,	which	captures	more	
dimensions	of	success	and	failure.	The	thesis	uses	a	framework,	‘three	dimensions	of	policy	
success’	(McConnell	2010),	to	illuminate	how	policy	success	and	failure	can	be	understood	
on	a	spectrum.	The	thesis	utilises	the	case	studies	to	examine	distinctions	and	
commonalities	of	success	and	failure	to	yield	insight	and	understanding	in	relation	to	policy	
learning.	Five	key	themes	arise	from	the	analysis:	enabling	a	strong	coalition,	trajectory	of	
policy-making	between	policy-makers	and	implementers,	approaches	to	policy	
sustainability,	the	role	of	monitoring	and	evaluation	in	ensuring	value	for	money	and	the	
role	of	policy-makers	in	preserving	policy	goals.		
The	contribution	of	the	research	is	the	application	of	a	theoretical	framework	to	articulate	
policy	success	and	failure	to	the	field	of	English	HE,	which	has	not	hitherto	been	examined	
with	this	framework,	and	to	articulate	policy	learning	as	a	result.		
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
1.1	Context	of	higher	education	
The	locus	of	policy-making	in	English	higher	education	(HE)	has	been	transformed	over	the	
last	century,	from	one	state	of	affairs,	where	universities’	autonomy	allowed	policy-making	
at	institutional	level,	to	facilitate	their	role	in	enhancing	social	good	-	defined	as	good	which	
does	not	depend	upon	public	policy	or	funding	(Mor	Barrak	2018)	-	to	present	day	policy-
making	where	government	is	the	focus	of	policy	formation	and	the	role	of	universities	is	
perceived	to	be	in	aiding	economic	good	-	as	defined	by	a	good	that	is	marketable	and	for	
which	there	is	an	opportunity	cost.	This	evolution	is	set	against	a	backdrop	of	wider	new	
liberalism	policy	reforms	(Shattock	2012)	in	the	role	of	the	state,	globalisation,	
marketisation	and	new	public	management	(Clark	2004).		
HE	is	perhaps	distinctive	in	English	policy-making,	in	having	had	an	intermediary	body	
between	government	and	institutions,	with	space	for	government’s	vision	for	HE	policy	to	
be	interpreted,	established	and	accomplished.	In	England	this	intermediary	body	has	had	a	
number	of	forms,	firstly	as	the	Universities	Grant	Committee	(UGC),	then	the	Universities	
Funding	Council	(UFC),	and	more	recently	(1992	-	2018),	the	HE	Funding	Council	for	England	
(HEFCE).	The	role	of	the	intermediary	body	has	undergone	significant	change	in	the	light	of	
evolving	ideologies	of	successive	governments	from	a	‘buffer’	representing	the	universities	
in	the	face	of	government,	to	mediator,	agent,	broker,	and	more	recently,	regulator.	The	
Office	for	Students,	HEFCE’s	replacement	from	2018,	has	terms	of	reference	that	class	it	as	
a	regulatory	body,	and	there	is	currently	hot	debate	about	the	organisation’s	apparent	lack	
of	role	in	policy-making	(Kernohan	2018).		
This	thesis	outlines	the	policy	work	of	HEFCE	in	detail,	bringing	together	a	timeline	of	policy	
initiatives,	and	illuminates	understanding	of	these	against	the	background	of	wider	new	
liberalism	policy	reforms,	the	changing	role	of	the	state,	globalisation,	marketisation	and	
new	public	management	in	HE	policy-making.		This	work	is	a	contribution	to	knowledge	in	
itself,	as	I	am	not	aware	of	any	such	thorough	analysis	of	the	breadth	and	depth	of	HEFCE	
policies.		
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1.2	Context	of	policy	analysis	(meanings	of	policy)	
The	meanings	attributed	to	‘policy’	have	evolved	over	time,	from	simple,	linear	definitions,	
where	policy	is	simply	formed	by	the	state	and	followed	by	implementation,	to	much	more	
cyclical	meanings,	where	policy	is	understood	as	a	much	more	social,	cultural	and	dynamic	
process,	‘deeply	imbued	with	values	and	ideology	‘	(Phillips	2007	p.37).	In	these	more	
complex	understandings	of	policy,	the	roles	of	different	actors	have	agency	to	interpret,	re-
interpret	and	mis-interpret	policy,	and	the	spaces	between	formation	and	implementation	
become	as	important	as	the	policy	itself,	as	do	‘policy	texts’	in	informing	an	interpretation	
of	policy	(Ball	1993,	2006,	2015).	In	more	contemporary	comprehensions	of	policy,	the	
local,	as	the	place	of	implementation	gains	more	credence	(Ayres	and	Marsh	2013,	
Newman	2013,	Lowndes	and	McCaughie	2013,	Van	der	Steen	et	al	2013)	and	the	context	of	
practice	(Ball	2006)	is	central	to	how	policy	is	understood.				
Approaches	to	analysing	how	governments	and	organisations	make	policy	decisions	and	
how	policies	are	developed,	implemented	and	evaluated	have	also	evolved	over	time.	The	
1960s	and	1970s	were	dominated	by	rationalist	theoretical	perspectives	and	positivist	
methodologies,	which	aligned	well	with	linear	understandings	of	policy,	and	drew	on	
quantitative	approaches	to	examine	policy-making	(Howlett	et	al	2009).	More	
contemporary	policy	analysts,	such	as	Fischer	and	Forester	(1993)	and	Ball	(2006)	take	a	
more	‘post	positive’	methodological	approach,	taking	account	of	the	dynamics	of	policy-
making	and	the	value	judgements	of	actors	in	the	policy	process.	Discourse	based	
approaches	to	policy	analysis	(Ball	1993,	Fairclough	2014,	Taylor	2004),	in	which	the	policy	
text	itself	becomes	central	to	a	semiotic	analysis,	have	also	played	a	part.	The	theoretical	
work	of	Michel	Foucault,	who	extended	discourse	analysis	beyond	linguistic	approaches	to	
those	of	notions	of	knowledge	and	power,	has	also	played	a	significant	role	in	how	policy	
analysis	is	accomplished.		
Many	different	frameworks	for	guiding	policy	analysts	have	been	developed,	and	some	of	
these	can	be	categorised	as	either	‘rational	stages’	or	‘systems’	methodologies.	The	work	of	
Laswell	(1971)	was	pioneering	in	this	respect,	as	he	breaks	down	the	policy	cycle	into	seven	
rational	stages	in	which	to	analyse	knowledge	of	and	in	the	policy	process,	in	order	to	
ascertain	how	governments	make	policy	decisions.	Others,	such	as	Hill	and	Hupe	(2006)	and	
Howlett	et	al	(2009),	have	drawn	on	Laswell’s	early	work	to	further	develop	policy	cycle	
analysis	to	take	account	of	more	complex	understandings	of	how	external	factors	influence	
government	policy	decisions.	However,	such	policy	cycle	approaches	take	both	positivist	
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and	linear	approaches	to	policy	analysis,	and	do	not	adequately	address	a	post-positivist	
approach	to	take	account	of	the	dynamics	of	policy-making.		Lindblom’s	(1959)	and	Herbert	
Simon’s	(1991)	influential	works	question	the	positivist	approach,	and	seek	to	embrace	the	
influences	of	other	actors	in	the	policy	process,	accepting	that	they	will	have	non-rationalist	
interventions	bounded	by	their	own	social	and	political	narrations.	For	Lindblom,	like	
Foucault,	power	also	becomes	an	important	influence	in	the	policy-making	process.	More	
recently,	analysists	have	begun	to	move	away	from	observing	policy	making	to	policy	
implementation,	since	it	is	in	the	spaces	of	implementation	that	policies	are	interpreted	and	
evolve.	Lewis	and	Flynn	(1978)	pioneered	a	‘policy-action’	framework	approach,	which	
views	the	behaviour	of	actors	and	their	actions	as	influenced	by	their	world	outside	their	
organisations	(Parsons	1995)	and	deLeon	and	deLeon	suggest	a	framework	which	examines	
‘different	types	of	accountability	under	varying	conditions	of	ambiguity	and	conflict’	
(deLeon	and	deLeon	2002)	in	policy	implementation.		
Whilst	all	of	these	approaches	are	worthwhile	in	terms	of	seeking	to	reach	an	
understanding	of	the	policy	process,	its	implementation	and	its	evolutionary	progress	
influenced	by	many	discourses,	interactions	and	interpretations,	what	is	omitted	is	any	
sense	of	policy	evaluation.	Policy	evaluation	is	an	important	step	in	the	policy	cycle,	if	policy	
makers	and	implementers	are	going	to	be	able	to	make	sense	of	policy.	David	Nachmias	
(1979)	is	considered	to	be	the	pioneer	in	articulating	evaluation	as	an	important	part	of	the	
policy	cycle.	Although	critiques	of	this	early	work	suggest	that	it	draws	too	heavily	on	a	
rationalist	theoretical	position	and	positivist	approaches,	more	recent	debate	around	policy	
evaluation,	such	as	Dryzek	(1993),	has	sought	to	address	this	by	observing	that	evaluation	
cannot	be	value	free.	There	is	a	choice	of	contemporary	analytical	approaches,	but	many	
current	policy	analysists	take	a	post-positivist	‘design	approach’,	(Bobrow	and	Dryzek	1987,	
Howlett	et	al	2009)	which	is	interpretative	in	nature	and	more	holistic,	where	the	policy	is	
considered	not	just	as	a	process	but	as	being	influenced	by	ideological	and	social	
constructs,	and	power	relations,	as	part	of	the	evaluation.	A	more	recent	development	in	
the	design	approach	to	evaluation	has	been	the	theorised	work	on	examining	policy	success	
and	failure.	‘Success’	and,	more	particularly,	‘failure’	are	emotive	terms,	but	are	served	well	
by	an	interpretative	approach	to	policy	analysis.	Taking	an	interpretative	view	of	success	
and	failure	is	a	constructive	step	in	engaging	with	policy	learning,	in	order	to	learn	lessons	
from	process,	programmatic	and	political	learning,		which	itself	has	become	a	theorised	
notion	in	recent	years	(Bennett	and	Howlett	1992,	May	1992).	Policy	success	and	failure	are		 	
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central	concepts	in	this	study,	since	it	is	through	an	analysis	of	a	nuanced	approach	to	these	
that	the	thesis	seeks	to	illuminate	understandings	of	policy	success	and	failure	in	English	
HE.		
1.3	Understandings	of	policy	success	and	failure	
Bovens,	‘t	Hart	(1998)	and	Bovens,	‘t	Hart	&	Peters	(2001)	are	considered	to	be	the	key	
contributors	to	theorisations	of	policy	success	and	failure,	advocating	an	anti-positivist	and	
interpretative	approach	to	developing	criteria	for	success	and	failure,	whilst	acknowledging	
that	such	concepts	are	contested	social	constructs	with	inherent	value	judgements.	Much	
has	been	written	on	policy	failure	in	recent	years,	Bovens,	‘t	Hart	(1998)	and	Bovens,	‘t	Hart	
&	Peters	(2001),	King	and	Crewe	(2013),	March	and	McConnell	(2010),	McConnell	(2015,	
2016),	Bovens	and	‘t	Hart	(2016),	and	the	use	of	empirical	studies	to	attempt	to	define	
policy	failure	is	a	common	theme	in	the	literature.	There	is	less	literature	on	policy	success,	
perhaps	because	it	does	not	provoke	such	an	emotive	response,	and	perhaps	there	is	a	
perception	that	there	are	fewer	lessons	to	be	learned.	Kerr	(1976)	sought	to	identify	what	
made	a	policy	successful,	and	she	suggests	a	set	of	formulaic	conditions	to	define	success.	
Bovens,	‘t	Hart	and	Peters	(2001)	developed	a	framework	for	locating	success	and	failure	in	
terms	of	the	programmatic	(a	technographic	approach)	and	political	(an	interpretative	
approach)	dimensions	of	policy.	Marsh	and	McConnell	(2010)	more	recently	determined	
that	the	work	of	Bovens,	‘t	Hart		(1998)	and	Bovens,	‘t	Hart		&	Peters	(2001)	had	missed	a	
key	dimension,	that	of	policy	process,	and	so	devised	a	theoretical	framework	to	address	
these,	‘three	dimensions	of	policy	success’.	
However,	these	earlier	works	polarise	the	notions	of	success	and	failure,	such	that	what	
does	not	succeed	logically	fails,	and	they	do	not	take	account	of	the	fact	that	success	is	not	
an	‘all	or	nothing	phenomenon’	(McConnell	2010	p.55).	McConnell	sought	to	articulate	
meanings	of	policy	success	and	crucially	for	this	study,	McConnell	formulates	a	framework	
for	policy	analysis	that	examines	policy	success	and	failure	in	a	more	nuanced	way,	and	
articulates	the	‘grey	areas	in	between’	on	a	spectrum	of	success	and	failure.	His	work,	
drawing	on	case	studies	as	empirical	examples,	seeks	to	address	the	‘three	dimensions	of	
policy’	as	‘process’,	‘programme’	and	‘politics’	and	to	position	them	on	a	continuum	from	
success	through	‘durable	success,	conflicted	success,	precarious	success’	to	‘failure’	
(McConnell	2010).	McConnell	also	takes	a	post-positivist	approach	in	recognising	the	
context	of	policy-making	and	the	influence	of	other	actors,	interventions	and	in	particular,	
the	role	of	policy	in	preserving	the	political	values	and	direction	of	government.	The	
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framework	draws	on	more	recent	policy	analysis	approaches	in	evaluating	policy	success	
and	failure,	and	has	been	a	major	contributor	in	recognising	that	success	and	failure	are	not	
binary	positions.	I	consider	that	the	McConnell	framework	is	a	useful	theoretical	and	
methodological	tool	to	examine	policy	episodes,	since	it	allows	for	an	approach,	which	
recognises	that	‘success	and	failure	are	not	mutually	exclusive’	(McConnell	2010)	and	where	
a	policy	might	‘fail	in	one	dimension’,	it	might	‘succeed	in	another’	(Bovens	and	t’Hart	1998	
p.35).	As	such,	examining	success	and	failure	in	this	nuanced	way	could	illuminate	clearer	
understandings	of	how	and	why	certain	policy	episodes	have	been	perceived	to	succeed	or	
fail.		
1.4	Contribution	to	knowledge	
This	thesis	seeks	to	apply	a	chosen	theoretical	framework	to	the	field	of	higher	education	
policy	studies	in	order	to	undertake	a	systematic	assessment	of	three	policy	episodes	and	
to	illuminate	how	policy	success	and	failure	can	be	understood	on	a	spectrum.	The	policy	
episodes	seek	to	examine	distinctions	and	commonalities	of	success	and	failure	to	yield	
insight	and	understanding	in	relation	to	policy	learning.			
Tight,	in	his	most	recent	reviews	of	research	in	the	field	of	HE	(2012,	2018)	argues	that	
whilst	there	is	a	plethora	of	studies	into	various	aspects	of	HE	policy,	and	in	particular	in	
system	policy	(p.7	2012),	many	HE	researchers	‘showed	little	or	no	engagement	with	
theory’	(p.7	2018),	although	the	inter-disciplinary	nature	of	HE	studies	lends	itself	well	to	
importing	theories	from	other	disciplines	-	for	example,	sociological,	psychological	and	
management	studies.	Tight	suggests	that	the	situation	is	improving	and	indeed,	there	are	
examples	of	education	theorists	employing	theoretical	approaches,	such	as	Ball	(1990)	
taking	a	sociological	approach	to	examining	policy	texts,	and	Taylor	(2004)	and	Cochran-
Smith	and	Fries’	(2001)	work	on	warrant	is	contextualised	through	language	and	semiotics.	
There	has	also	been	more	recent	work	in	using	theoretical	frameworks	from	other	
disciplines	in	examining	HE	policy,	such	as	Kogan	and	Hanney	(2000),	Taylor	(2004),	Bacchi	
(2009),	Hyatt	(2013)	and	Jungblut	(2015).	Whilst	these	frameworks	examine	different	
aspects	of	policy,	particularly	in	relation	to	texts,	policy	problems	and	systems,	what	is	
currently	less	well	articulated	in	HE	studies	is	a	framework	for	observing	policy	success	and	
failure,	and	in	particular	a	nuanced	approach	to	the	success/failure	spectrum.		
This	study	addresses	that	space	by	utilising	the	theoretical	framework	described	above	
(McConnell	2010).	McConnell	uses	case	studies	of	policy-making	from	all	over	the	world	in	
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his	own	work	to	illustrate	the	framework,	for	example	in	tax	reform	and	environmental	
policies,	and	there	are	examples	of	others	using	the	framework	to	illustrate	understandings	
of	policy	success	in	other	areas,	such	as	Kay	and	Boxwell’s	(2015)	review	of	health	care	
reform	in	Australia.	As	far	as	I	am	aware,	and	having	conducted	a	keyword	search	review	of	
the	British	Library	e-thesis	online	service,	as	well	as	a	Google	Scholar	search,	there	are	no	
other	examples	of	studies	using	McConnell’s	framework	for	an	analysis	of	policy	case	
studies	in	English	HE.		
The	context	of	English	HE	policy	lends	itself	well	to	the	application	of	a	framework	which	
recognises	that	success	and	failure	is	not	a	binary	distinction,	since	HE	policy	in	England	has	
some	distinctive	features,	particularly	the	presence	of	an	intermediary	body,	which	is	unlike	
government	policy-making	in	most	other	sectors.	As	such,	the	site	of	policy-making,	its	
implementation	and	the	actors	involved	adds	new	aspects	to	the	process,	programme	and	
political	dimensions	described	in	Section	1.3	(p.4)	above,	where	success	in	one	dimension	
may	be	a	failure	in	another.	This	distinctiveness	provides	a	helpful	test	of	the	framework’s	
usefulness.	Through	a	systematic	and	interpretative	thematic	analysis	of	policy	and	other	
related	texts,	this	thesis	seeks	to	produce	thick	descriptions	of	three	specific	HEFCE	policy	
episodes.	Using	these	descriptions	to	contextualise	the	theoretical	approach,	the	thesis	
draws	upon	the	analytical	framework	to	illuminate	and	articulate	a	position	of	success	or	
failure	in	relation	to	each	episode.		As	far	as	I	am	aware,	analysis	of	these	particular	
episodes	has	not	been	conducted	with	such	a	nuanced	approach	to	success	and	failure	in	
HE.	
Tight	(2017)	argues	that	small-scale	case	studies	are	useful	for	making	generalisations	and	
representativeness	but	he	also	asserts	that	one	of	the	difficulties	with	a	case	study	
approach	to	policy	analysis	is	that	they	are	often	time	bound	and	‘as	such	offer	little	to	
policy	learning’	(p.120	2012).	However,	I	suggest	that	by	adopting	insights	into	the	
particular	policy	episodes,	and	drawing	together	the	distinctions	and	commonalities,	it	is	
possible	to	yield	insight	into	future	HE	policy-making.	Yin	(2014)	attests	that	case	studies	
are	advantageous	in	research	requiring	comparisons	to	explain	causal	links,	and	the	
evaluation	criteria	proposed	by	Lincoln	and	Guba	(1985)	for	demonstrating	credibility	in	
qualitative,	interpretative	studies	suggests	that	the	ability	to	transfer	understandings	
between	different	domains	is	an	effective	technique	for	establishing	trustworthiness	of	the	
study.	The	thesis	draws	on	the	analysis	of	the	case	studies	to	illuminate	distinctions	and	
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commonalities,	to	gain	insight	into	future	policy-making,	drawing	on	some	of	the	theories	
of	‘policy	learning’	(Bennett	and	Howlett	1992	and	May	1992).				
Finally,	this	thesis	offers	a	critique	of	the	McConnell	(2010)	framework,	its	appropriateness	
and	limitations,	in	the	context	of	HE	and	contemporary	models	of	policy	analysis,	as	
outlined	in	1.2	and	1.3	above.			
1.5	Research	questions	
The	main	research	question	is:	
How	can	policy	success	and	failure	be	understood,	from	the	study	of	three	policy	episodes	
in	the	context	of	contemporary	HE	in	England,	by	applying	criteria	from	an	existing	
framework	for	success	and	failure?	
1.5.1	Supplementary	research	questions	
a) Does	the	evaluation	of	particular	policy	episodes	reveal	any	common	characteristics	
and	distinctions	in	relation	to	policy	that	could	usefully	be	considered	in	relation	to	
future	policy	setting	in	HE?	
	
b) What	can	an	analysis	of	HEFCE	policy-making	reveal	about	the	locus	of	power	in	
policy-making	in	HE?	
	
c) To	what	extent	is	the	chosen	theoretical	framework	sufficient	or	inadequate	in	
analysing	policy	success	and	failure	in	the	context	of	contemporary	theoretical	
approaches	to	policy	analysis?	
1.6	Theoretical	approach	and	research	methods	
The	theoretical	framework	for	the	study	is	adopted	from	the	fields	of	political	science	and	
policy	studies,	McConnell’s	‘three	dimensions	of	policy	success’	(2010)	as	described	above.	
This	framework	has	been	chosen	over	and	above	other	theorisations	because	of	its	
nuanced	approach	to	examining	aspects	of	success	and	failure,	and	for	applying	an	
interpretative	approach	to	observe	how	policies	might	both	succeed	and	fail	in	the	different	
dimensions.	As	the	researcher,	I	take	the	view	that	this	is	a	useful	approach	to	take	when	
analysing	policy	episodes	in	the	arena	of	HE	in	England,	where	there	are	distinctive	features	
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in	the	policy	relationship	between	government,	HEFCE	as	an	intermediary	body	and	
institutions	as	policy	receivers.	As	such,	this	context	of	practice	(Ball	2006)	is	distinctive	in	
policy-making.	It	is	my	view	that	this	distinctive	arena	for	policy	setting	opens	up	
possibilities	for	policy	episodes	to	succeed	or	fail	to	varying	degrees	in	the	three	dimensions	
of	process,	programme	and	politics.		
A	case	study	approach	is	used	to	inform	and	explain	the	specific	policy	episodes,	as	
empirical	enquiries	into	complex	social	phenomena	in	a	real	world	context	(Merriam	1988),	
to	assist	with	explanation,	description	and	illustration	of	particular	incidents.	Case	studies	
are	also	suitable	for	historical	research,	where	the	researcher	is	reliant	upon	methods	such	
as	documentary	analysis,	rather	than	direct	observation.	Research	that	requires	
comparisons	to	explain	causal	links	also	benefits	from	the	use	of	case	studies	as	a	method	
(Yin	2014),	and	thus	this	approach	is	used	in	seeking	to	identify	commonalities	and	
differences	in	each	episode.		
The	justification	for	the	selection	of	the	case	studies	is	further	explored	in	Chapter	3,	but	in	
brief	they	were	selected	from	a	period	in	HEFCE’s	history	in	which	New	Labour	(1997-2010),	
and	its	‘Third	Way’	centrist	approach	to	policy	was	the	adopted	ideological	position	of	the	
time.	As	such,	all	three	policy	episodes	were	in	place	between	2000	and	2010.	During	this	
time,	HEFCE	was	rich	with	policy	initiatives,	some	driven	by	government	and	some	by	
HEFCE	itself.	The	chosen	case	studies	also	had	to	meet	set	criteria	that	I	have	identified	in	
order	to	ensure	that	the	descriptions	were	sufficiently	robust.	Briefly	(but	described	in	
greater	depth	in	Chapter	3)	the	criteria	are	as	follows:	
a) They	were	sufficiently	time	bound;	
b) The	policy	episode	had	identifiable	objectives,	proposed	outcomes	and	benefits	to	
the	target	group;	
c) The	policy	episode	followed	a	typical	policy	approach	by	HEFCE;	
d) There	were	sufficient	sources	of	data	to	allow	for	a	‘thick	description’	(Geertz	
1973);	
e) There	were	sufficient	secondary	sources	of	data	to	allow	for	a	richer	and	more	
textured	analysis;	
f) The	choice	of	case	studies	allowed	for	‘replication’,	not	‘sampling’	(Yin	2014)	such	
that	phenomena	in	relation	to	policy	process,	programme	and	politics	are	likely	to	
produce	results	that	are	either	similar	or	contrasting,	but	for	predictable	reasons;	
	 9	
g) There	was	sufficient	documentary	material	available	to	test	for	trustworthiness	
(Lincoln	and	Guba	1985).		
These	criteria	were	chosen	because	the	first	three	yielded	sufficient	insight	to	meet	the	
requirements	of	the	McConnell	(2010)	framework	in	enabling	an	interpretation	of	success	
and	failure	in	relation	to	the	three	dimensions	of	success,	there	were	sufficient	data	sources,	
and	the	available	data	allowed	for	tests	of	robustness	and	trustworthiness,	as	described	in	
Chapter	3.	
The	research	approach	is	qualitative	and	takes	an	interpretive	approach	in	seeking	
illumination	and	understanding	in	relation	to	the	specific	policy	episodes.	An	interpretative	
approach	lends	itself	well	to	the	anti-foundationalist	approach	advocated	by	Bovens	and	
t’Hart	(1998)	in	articulating	policy	success	and	failure	through	the	ideologies,	social	and	
politics	value	judgements	and	the	contested	observations	of	the	many	policy	actors	
involved	in	English	HE	policy.	Such	an	interpretative	approach	also	lends	itself	well	to	the	
realism	position	advocated	by	McConnell	(2010b)	in	articulating	success	and	failure,	in	an	
‘arts	and	crafts’	(McConnell	2015)	interpretation	of	the	‘messy	realpolitik	of	types	and	
degrees	of	[success	and]	failure,	as	well	as	the	ambiguities	and	tensions	between	them’	
(McConnell	2015	p.221).		
A	historical	research	design	approach	is	used	as	a	descriptive	and	analytical	device	for	the	
interrogation	of	text	based	documents.	Thematic	analysis,	which	is	particularly	applicable	
to	qualitative	case	study	research	which	utilises	documents	as	the	sources	for	research	data	
(Bowen	2009)	is	used	as	a	method	which	lends	itself	well	to	the	theoretical	framework	for	
this	study,	in	being	interpretative,	and	understanding	texts	as	social	constructs	within	the	
social	and	historical	context	in	which	they	are	produced	(McCulloch	2004).	It	is	my	opinion	
that	a	thematic	analysis	approach	is	best	suited	to	this	type	of	research,	since	it	allows	for	a	
thick	description	of	policy	episodes	which	have	now	concluded	(and	thus	are	not	open	to	
direct	observation)	whilst	giving	voices	to	a	range	of	actors,	through	both	primary	and	
secondary	document	sources.	Whilst	interviews	with	some	of	the	actors	might	have	offered	
other	valuable	insights,	it	would	not	be	feasible	to	interview	all	actors	given	the	length	of	
time	that	has	passed	since	the	policy	episodes	were	operational.		Thus,	with	a	limited	
number	of	interviewees,	there	might	be	a	tendency	to	allow	the	views	of	one	or	two	actors	
to	influence	the	interpretation,	rather	than	the	critical	and	reflexive	analysis	of	the	data	by	
me,	as	the	researcher.					
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A	thematic	analysis	approach	allows	reading	of	the	texts	(Fereday	and	Muir-Cochrane	2006)	
in	order	that	emerging	themes	in	the	descriptions	become	the	premises	for	analysis.	Whilst	
the	approach	is	interpretative,	a	thematic	approach	allows	themes	to	emerge	from	the	
analysis,	rather	than	these	being	pre-judged	(Bowen	2009).	In	each	case,	the	dominant	
themes	identified	were	used	to	give	an	account	of	how	the	policy	episode	was	viewed,	
evaluated	and	judged	by	different	actors	at	different	times.	Within	the	context	of	the	
thematic	analysis,	I	have	chosen	to	take	a	content	analysis	approach	(Scott	1990),	which	
assesses	the	significance	of	particular	details	within	the	texts	to	measure	the	importance	of	
particular	concepts,	rather	than	other	document	analysis	approaches,	such	as	linguistic	(Ball	
1990)	or	metanarratives	(Roe	1994).	
This	study	uses	both	primary	and	secondary	source	materials.	Data	is	collected	through	
close	and	multiple	readings	of	a	range	of	primary	texts	which	include:	HEFCE	Board	papers,	
circulars	and	annual	reports,	policy	announcements,	consultations	and	evaluations,	to	
illuminate	an	understanding	of	the	background,	process	and	outcomes	in	relation	to	each	
case	study.	Further	reading	of	secondary	texts,	such	as	academic	commentaries,	
independent	evaluations,	parliamentary	questions	and	discussions,	and	media	reports,	is	
then	undertaken	in	order	to	identify,	cross	reference	and	codify	common	themes	in	relation	
to	each	case	study.		
The	scope	of	the	research	is	deliberately	limited	to	policy	episodes	within	the	learning	and	
teaching	strand	of	HEFCE’s	activity.	Selecting	from	one	category	allows	for	a	greater	
richness	in	identifying	common	themes	or	contradictions	arising	from	the	policy	episode,	
rather	than	selecting	from	more	than	one	category,	where	common	themes	may	be	more	
difficult	to	identify.	As	such,	this	limits	the	study	to	identifying	commonalities	and	
differences	in	learning	and	teaching	policy,	but	there	is	scope	for	transferability	(Lincoln	
and	Guba	1995)	to	other	contexts	and	other	HE	policy	areas,	such	as	widening	participation	
or	research.		
1.7	Organisation	of	thesis	
The	thesis	is	organised	into	three	parts.	The	first	provides	an	overview	of	the	fields	of	
enquiry	in	the	context	of	HE	studies,	policy	studies	and	policy	analysis,	describes	the	chosen	
theoretical	framework	and	provides	a	justification	for	the	chosen	research	methods.	The	
second	contextualises	the	study,	setting	out	a	historical	review	of	HE	policy-making	in	the	
early	twentieth	century	and	the	policy	work	of	HEFCE.	This	part	also	provides	a	thick	
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description	of	each	of	the	three	chosen	policy	episodes.	The	final	part	brings	together	the	
theoretical	framework	and	the	case	studies,	with	an	analysis	of	the	main	findings	in	each	of	
the	episodes,	to	establish	commonalities	and	differences	and	identify	areas	of	policy	
learning	for	future	policy	setting.	This	section	also	reviews	the	appropriateness	of	the	
theoretical	framework	in	the	context	of	HE	and	contemporary	approaches	to	policy	
analysis.			
1.8	Description	of	chapters	
Chapter	1	-	Introduction:	introduction	to	the	fields	of	enquiry	and	focus	of	the	research	
questions.	
Chapter	2	–	Situating	the	research:	situates	the	research	within	the	fields	of	enquiry:	HE	
studies	and	policy	studies.	The	chapter	includes	a	discussion	on	the	meaning	of	policy	(past	
and	contemporary),	the	evolution	of	policy	analysis	studies	and	theoretical	understandings,	
applied	policy	analysis,	policy	success	and	failure	and	an	introduction	to	the	methodological	
framework,	‘dimensions	of	policy	success’	(McConnell	2010).		
Chapter	3	–	Approach,	theoretical	framework,	research	methods:	outlines	the	approach	
and	theoretical	framework	chosen	for	the	study	and	provides	both	a	description	of,	and	
justification	for,	the	chosen	research	methods.		
Chapter	4	–	Contextualising	the	research:	describes	a	brief	history	of	policy-making	since	
the	early	twentieth	century,	documents	and	situates	the	policy	work	of	HEFCE	from	1992	–	
2018,	and	in	particular	the	changing	ideologies	for	policy-making	during	the	life	of	HEFCE,	
and	justifies	the	choice	of	policy	episodes	as	case	studies.	
Chapter	5	–	Case	study	1:	The	E-University.	
Chapter	6	–	Case	study	2:	Centres	for	Excellence	in	Learning	and	Teaching.	
Chapter	7	–	Case	study	3:	Lifelong	Learning	Networks.	
Chapter	8	–	Analysis	and	discussion	of	the	case	studies	against	the	theoretical	framework:	
draws	together	the	evidence	for	policy	success	and	failure	from	the	case	studies	and	using	
the	theoretical	framework,	applies	an	interpretative	approach	to	suggest	where	they	might	
lie	on	the	success/failure	spectrum.	This	chapter	also	uses	this	work	to	identify	
commonalities	and	distinctions	to	yield	insight	into	future	HE	policy-making.	Finally,	this	
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chapter	analyses	the	appropriateness	and	limitations	of	the	theoretical	framework	and,	
relating	back	to	the	discussion	in	Chapter	2	on	approaches	to	policy	analysis,	discusses	the	
framework’s	relevance	to	contemporary	understandings	of	policy.			
Chapter	9	–	Conclusions:	this	chapter	provides	a	summary	of	the	key	findings	and	relates	
the	work	back	to	Chapter	2	in	situating	the	research	within	contemporary	understandings	
of	policy.	This	chapter	outlines	the	contribution	of	the	thesis	to	policy	analysis	in	HE	and	
sets	out	the	limitations	and	constraints	of	the	work.	Finally,	this	chapter	outlines	some	
directions	for	future	work	that	could	add	richness	to	the	research.		
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Chapter	2:	Situating	the	research:	in	the	fields	of	higher	
education	and	policy	studies	
2.1	Introduction		
This	chapter	situates	the	research	within	the	relevant	fields	of	enquiry	and	literature.	This	
thesis	sits	within	two	fields	of	enquiry:	higher	education	(HE)	studies	and	policy	studies.	
This	chapter	firstly	examines	the	study	of	HE	as	a	field	of	research,	since	this	is	where	the	
work	of	this	thesis	is	contextualised,	in	order	to	establish	how	this	study	enhances	an	
understanding	of	policy	in	English	HE.	The	remainder	of	the	chapter	situates	the	research	
within	policy	studies,	and	introduces	the	theoretical	framework	used	to	theorise	the	
research.	This	is	done	through	a	historical	review	of	the	comprehensions	and	concepts	of	
policy,	the	historical	and	contemporary	approaches	to	policy	analysis,	and	an	exploration	of	
the	notions	of	policy	success	and	failure.	This	chapter	introduces	McConnell’s	(2010)	
framework	for	examining	policy	success	and	failure,	which	is	central	to	the	thesis.	Finally,	
this	chapter	examines	notions	of	‘policy	learning’	(May	1992),	which	is	also	significant	to	
the	part	of	the	thesis	which	explores	whether	lessons	for	future	policy	setting	in	HE	can	be	
learned	from	an	examination	of	the	chosen	case	studies.			
2.2	Higher	education	studies	
This	thesis	sits	right	at	the	heart	of	HE	studies,	in	terms	of	both	researching	policy	and	as	
the	space	where	the	fieldwork	has	been	conducted.	The	study	of	HE	has	become	an	
international	discipline	in	its	own	right	recently,	particularly	in	the	light	of	increasing	
globalisation	and	the	knowledge	economy.	As	such,	HE	has	become	‘big	business’	(Tight	
2012)	and	consequently	there	has	been	a	greater	interest	in	research.	Ozga	(2000)	asserts	
that	new	ways	of	researching	education	have	been	necessitated	by	the	new	order	of	
thinking	about	contemporary	education’s	place	in	society,	and	changes	in	the	social	and	
economic	contexts	which	shape	policy	have	become	an	important	part	of	that	research.	As	
such,	policy	analysis	has	become	a	critical	form	of	research	into	education	(Ozga	2000).	
Tight’s	recent	insights	(2012,	2018)	contextualise	current	HE	research.	He	divides	the	
current	debates	and	research	into	eight	schema,	or	categories,	one	of	which	he	calls	
‘system	policy’	(Tight	2012	p.7,	2018	p.95).	Within	that	broad	category,	Tight	identifies	a	
number	of	sub-categories:	‘the	policy	context,	national	policies,	comparative	policy	studies,	
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historical	policy	studies	and	funding	relationships’	(Tight	2012	p.117).	He	contends,	like	
Ozga,	that	policy	has	become	a	dominant	field	in	HE	studies	due	to	the	changing	nature	of	
the	state’s	role,	and	he	notes	that,	
‘With	government	remaining	the	major	funder	of	higher	education	in	most	countries,	
system	policy	remains	the	crucial	determinant	of	higher	education	practice.	It	naturally,	
therefore,	forms	a	key	focus	for	comment	and	research,	with	any	changes	in	policy	being	
subject	to	review	and	evaluation’	(2012	p.117).					
Of	those	sub-categories,	this	study	fits	well	within	policy	context,	national	policies	and	
historical	policy	studies.	The	policy	context,	and	in	particular	the	role	of	HEFCE	in	that	
context,	is	central	to	the	study.	This	study	examines	episodes	of	national	policy	and,	like	the	
vast	majority	of	those	that	focus	on	national	policy	(Tight	2012	p.120),	takes	a	historical	
case	study	approach.	Tight	argues	that	one	of	the	difficulties	with	case	studies	is	that	they	
are	often	time	bound	and	as	such	offer	little	to	policy	learning:	
‘While	these	studies	are	of	considerable	interest	and	topicality	about	the	time	they	are	
published	–	and	of	some	continuing	historical	interest	–	their	concerns	and	emphasis	
often	soon	date’	(Tight	2012	p.120).	
This	study	seeks	to	address	that	criticism	by	using	the	case	studies	to	illuminate	particular	
characteristics,	similarities	and	differences	in	relation	to	policy	episodes.	Although	a	
historical	approach,	the	thesis	then	seeks	to	apply	those	understandings	to	enlighten	future	
policy	positioning	by	government	and	the	Office	for	Students	(OfS)	under	a	new	policy	
setting	and	regulatory	regime.			
Tight	contends	that	many	HE	researchers	do	not	engage	explicitly	with	theory	(2018	p.7),	
although	the	inter-disciplinary	nature	of	HE	studies	lends	itself	well	to	importing	theories	
from	other	academic	disciplines.	However,	there	are	examples	of	inter-disciplinary	
theorisation:	for	example,	Ball	(1990)	takes	a	sociological	approach	in	theorising	how	policy	
texts	have	been	shaped	by	notions	of	power	and	discourse,	as	does	Taylor	(2004),	and	
Cochran-Smith	and	Fries’	(2001)	work	on	warrant	and	the	justification	for	policy	is	
contextualised	through	language	and	semiotics.		Busemeyer	and	Trampusch	(2011)	contend	
that	there	is	increasing	interest	in	the	use	of	political	science	in	the	study	of	education,	and	
they	provide	a	comprehensive	review	of	available	literature	in	this	respect.	However,	like	
Tight	(2012),	they	conclude	that	the	study	of	education	within	political	sciences	is	under-
theorised:	
‘Theoretical	frameworks	tend	to	be	borrowed	from	education	sociology,	organisation	
theory	or	management	studies	rather	than	political	science’	(Busemeyer	and	Trampusch	
2011	p.418).	
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There	have	been	few	examples	of	theoretical	frameworks	adopted	in	HE	studies,	although	
some	have	begun	to	emerge	in	recent	years.	Kogan	and	Hanney	in	their	(2000)	book	on	
‘Reforming	Higher	Education’	adopt	a	political	science	framework	for	their	theoretical	basis.	
Carol	Bacchi	(2009)	takes	a	discourse	analysis	approach	in	which	she	problematises	policy	
through	a	‘framing	mechanism’	(p.263)	in	developing	her	‘WPR	(What’s	the	Problem	
Represented)’	framework	to	address	policy	problems	through	the	application	of	six	
questions.	Although	not	specifically	aimed	at	HE	studies,	its	broad	policy	framework	
approach	is	easily	adaptable	to	education.	Taylor	(2004)	also	takes	similar	discourse	
analysis	approaches	to	policy	texts,	using	a	framework	adapted	from	the	work	of	Fairclough	
(2001)	to	examine	education	policy.	Hyatt’s	(2013)	framework	for	critical	analysis	of	HE	
policy	texts	(p.43)	is	a	more	recent	example,	consisting	of	two	elements,	one	for	
contextualising	texts	and	another	for	deconstruction.	Jungblut	(2015)	uses	a	two-
dimensional	analytical	framework	to	hypothesise	whether	different	political	parties	favour	
different	HE	systems,	and	consequently	policy	outputs,	and	how	these	differences	can	be	
conceptualised.		
Section	2.2	(p.13)	has	established	that	interest	in	the	study	of	policy	in	HE	has	grown	in	
recent	years,	and	that	there	are	examples	of	education	researchers	beginning	to	use	
theorisations	from	other	disciplines	to	inform	studies	of	HE	policy.	There	is	growing	interest	
in	using	theorisations	from	political	sciences,	although,	as	Busemeyer	and	Trampusch	
(2011)	attest,	it	is	an	area	of	research	that	is	currently	under-theorised.		From	an	analysis	of	
the	work	of	Busemeyer	and	Trampusch	(2011),	and	Tight	(2012,	2018),	in	summarising	
current	research,	I	have	concluded	that	the	use	of	a	theoretical	framework	from	political	
science	to	examine	policy	in	HE	and,	more	specifically,	policy	success	and	failure,	is	an	area	
which	is	currently	under-researched.		Policy	success	and	failure	is	explored	fully	in	Section	
2.5	(p.38)	and	my	justification	for	adopting	the	McConnell	framework	for	this	study	will	be	
explored	in	greater	detail	there.			
2.3	Comprehensions	and	concepts	of	policy	
This	section	takes	a	historical	look	at	the	changing	understandings	of	policy	over	time	and	
examines	the	work	of	sociologists	who	have	added	to	the	body	of	literature	in	defining	
what	is	meant	by	policy.	An	insight	into	how	conceptions	of	policy	have	changed	over	time	
will	assist	the	reader	in	appreciating	how	contemporary	theorists	understand	the	complex	
and	multidimensional	nature	of	policy	and	policy	actors.	This	understanding	is	important	to	
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the	thesis,	in	critiquing	the	usefulness	of	the	chosen	theoretical	framework	against	
contemporary	conceptions	of	policy	(Chapter	8).		
800	years	ago,	a	late	1300s	OED	definition	defined	policy	as	‘an	organised	or	established	
system	of	government,	such	as	a	constitution	or	a	state’.	From	the	mid-1400s,	the	OED	had	
developed	that	definition	further,	such	that	policy	was	for	the	public	good,	
‘a	particular	course	of	action	that	is	adopted	by	government,	party,	ruler,	politician	or	
their	representative;	more	generally,	any	particular	course	of	action	that	is	adopted	as	
advantageous	or	expedient’	(taken	from		Jenkins	2007	p.30).	
A	contemporary	dictionary	(The	Cambridge	Dictionary	2015)	defines	policy	as		
‘a	set	of	ideas	or	a	plan	of	what	to	do	in	particular	situations	that	has	been	agreed	
officially	by	a	group	of	people,	a	business	organisation,	a	government,	or	a	political	
party’.		
Whilst	there	have	been	subtle	changes	to	the	definition	over	the	last	800	years,	what	is	
clear	is	that	notions	of	organisation,	government	and	action	have	remained	a	constant	
feature	in	defining	‘policy’.	In	the	field	of	policy	studies,	however,	the	academic	literature	
on	the	meaning	of	policy	is	rich	with	evolution,	taking	this	broad	definition	to	greater	
depths.	Early	iterations	of	the	meaning	of	policy	were	very	linear	in	their	approach:	policy	
was	formed	and	‘done	to’	those	on	the	receiving	end.	Later	in	the	20th	century,	greater	
emphasis	was	placed	on	ideas	of	rationality,	legitimacy,	power	and	knowledge,	and,	more	
recently,	more	complex	comprehensions	have	moved	away	from	linear	definitions	of	policy	
to	more	dynamic,	cyclical	definitions,	where	the	actors	involved,	together	with	their	social	
and	cultural	values,	play	a	greater	part	in	how	policy	is	formed,	implemented,	re-formed	
and	re-addressed.	As	such,	there	has	been	a	shift	in	understanding	policy	from	being	a	
product,	to	that	of	a	process,	and	finally,	to	policy	as	practice.		
2.3.1	Linear	understandings	of	policy	
Most	of	the	early	and	mid	20thcentury	explorations	of	the	meaning	of	policy	were	linear	in	
their	description.	They	define	policy	very	much	in	terms	of	a	course	of	action,	where	an	
entity	such	as	government	has	a	legitimate	and	moral	right	to	alter	a	course	of	action	for	
the	benefit	of	the	people;	examples	of	these	understandings	are	given	in	2.2.4.3	below.	
More	importantly,	government	has	the	power	and	expert	knowledge,	in	the	Foucauldian	
sense	of	exercising	power	and	knowledge,	to	take	action	in	the	form	of	intervention.	This	
action	is	a	way	of	organising	life	for	a	country’s	citizens	and	as	a	means	of	imposing	order	
and	coherence.	Marshall,	in	his	consideration	of	social	policy	in	1965,	defined	it	as	the		
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‘policy	of	governments	with	regards	to	action	having	a	direct	impact	on	the	welfare	of	
citizens’	(Marshall	1965	p.7).		
These	comprehensions	of	policy	were	what	Colebatch	(2002)	refers	to	as	‘vertical	
approaches’,	top	down,	with	‘authorised	decision	making’	(p.39).	These	‘state	control’	(Dale	
1989)	explanations	assumed	that	the	process	of	generating	policy	was	undertaken	by	those	
with	expert	knowledge	(civil	servants,	agents	of	government)	and	that	was	followed	by	the	
process	of	implementation	as	a	‘separate	moment’	(Alford	and	Friedland	1988).		
The	imposition	of	order,	of	taking	action	for	the	benefit	of	citizens,	is	a	central	idea	in	these	
1950s	and	1960s	linear	attempts	at	making	meaning	out	of	policy.	Ginsberg,	(1953,	p24)	
took	the	position	that	policy	was	about	moral	order	and	progress	and	in	1957,	Macbeath	
continues	the	theme	of	order,	observing	that	
‘social	policies	are	concerned	with	the	right	ordering	of	the	network	of	relationships	
between	men	and	women	who	live	together	in	societies,	or	with	the	principles	which	
should	govern	the	activities	of	individuals	and	groups	so	far	as	they	affect	the	lives	and	
interests	of	other	people’		(Macbeath	1957	p.1).		
Lafitte,	in	1962,	continued	this	line	of	thought	in	relation	to	order,	defining	policy	as	an	
‘attempt	to	steer	life	of	society	along	channels	it	would	not	follow	if	left	to	itself’	(Lafitte	
1962	p.9).	
Hagenbuch	(1958)	continues	on	the	same	theme	but,	like	Ginsberg,	seeks	to	define	policy	in	
terms	of	progressing	the	lives	of	citizens:	
‘The	mainspring	of	social	policy	may	be	said	to	be	the	desire	to	ensure	every	member	of	
the	community	has	certain	minimum	standards	and	certain	opportunities’	(Hagenbuch	
1958	p.205).		
In	all	of	these	attempts	to	explain	policy,	there	is	strong	emphasis	on	the	aim	for	policy	to	
be	beneficial,	but	the	key	observation	is	that	there	is	a	definite	imposing	of	policy	by	
government,	by	an	elite	power,	and	that	policy	must	be	good	policy,	rational,	ordered,	to	
the	benefit	of	citizens.		
The	concept	of	policy	as	action	is	fundamental	to	mid-20th	century	policy	meanings.	In	
1968,	Bauer	defined	policy	as	‘parameter	shaping	acts’,	where	governments	are	
continuously	accepting	or	rejecting	a	course	of	action	in	order	to	optimise	decision	making.	
He	argues	that	
‘various	labels	are	applied	to	decisions	and	actions	we	take,	depending	in	general	on	the	
breadth	of	their	implications.	If	they	are	trivial	and	repetitive	and	demand	little	
cogitation,	they	may	be	called	routine	actions.	If	they	are	more	complex,	have	wider	
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ramifications,	and	demand	more	thought,	we	may	refer	to	them	as	tactical	decisions.	
For	those	which	have	the	widest	ramifications	and	the	longest	time	perspective,	and	
which	generally	require	more	information	and	contemplation,	we	tend	to	reserve	the	
word	policy’	(Bauer	1968	p.1-2).		
Titmuss,	considered	to	be	one	of	founding	fathers	of	social	policy	analysis,	defined	policy	as		
‘the	principles	that	govern	action	directed	towards	given	ends’	(Titmuss	1974	p.23).		
In	this	definition,	as	with	all	the	earlier	meanings,	there	is	the	implication	of	change	from	
one	state	to	another	in	a	one-way	linear	process,	with	policy-makers	having	the	power	to	
effect	change.	The	right	of	policy-makers	to	effect	change	is	not	questioned,	since	they	
have	legitimate	agency,	as	the	knowledge	experts,	to	do	so.	
Dearlove	(1973	p.2)	defined	public	policy	as	‘the	substance	of	what	government	does’,	but	
he	argues	this	from	a	point	of	view	that	sees	policy	as	being	defined	not	by	what	is	
intended,	but	by	what	can	be	committed	in	terms	of	resources	to	address	a	public	problem.	
Here	there	has	been	a	slight	shift	of	emphasis	from	government	simply	taking	action	to	
achieve	a	predetermined	result.	There	is	now	the	implication	that	other	factors,	such	as	
resources	(or	lack	of	them),	can	effect	a	change	of	course	which	might	result	in	delivery	of	
something	different	to	that	originally	intended	or	desired.	
In	summary,	there	are	some	key	themes	which	can	be	seen	in	these	early	linear	
characterisations	of	meaning	of	policy,	particularly,	that	government	has	the	power	and	the	
expert	knowledge	which	gives	it	the	legitimacy	in	taking	a	course	of	action	to	impose	order	
on	its	citizens	for	their	own	benefit.	These	definitions	do,	however,	make	an	assumption	
that	governments	are	rational	in	their	policy-making,	and	that	courses	of	action	are	taken	
to	the	benefit	of	citizens,	not	that	of	policy-makers	or	government.		This	review	of	early	
comprehensions	of	policy	contributes	to	the	thesis	in	situating	policy-making	in	HE	in	the	
twentieth	century,	and	provides	the	groundwork	for	exploring	how	the	locus	of	power	has	
shifted	with	changing	ideologies	of	different	governments	-	on	the	one	hand,	neoliberalism	
approaches	and	greater	marketisation	of	HE,	and	on	the	other	hand,	the	role	of	the	state	
and	new	public	management.		
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2.3.2	Theories	of	rationality	–	a	brief	digression		
In	order	to	aid	understanding	of	how	policy	has	more	recently	been	understood	in	terms	of	
policy	in	practice,	It	is	important	to	the	thesis	at	this	point	to	digress	slightly	from	
considering	meanings	of	policy	to	briefly	explore	theories	of	rationality,	and	rational-legal	
authority,	before	adding	more	complexity	to	the	evolution	of	understandings	of	policy.	This	
is	important	since	the	majority	of	modern	states	have	been	considered	to	be	rational-legal	
authorities,	and	hence	all	policy-making	needs	to	be	considered	within	that	context.	Those	
meanings	considered	so	far,	not	only	have	linearity	in	common,	but	they	all	have	an	implicit	
assumption	that	the	courses	of	action	undertaken	by	governments	in	their	policy-making	
are	rational.	Weber	(1978)	proposed	that	social	action	was	determined	by	four	types	of	
rationality,	the	two	most	important	for	this	study	being	Zweckrational,	where	action	is	
purposeful	and	related	to	the	expectations	of	others	beyond	the	author,	in	a	particular	
contextual	environment,	and	Wertrational,	where	action	is	taken	dependent	upon	an	
actor’s,	or	author’s,	values	and	beliefs.	In	either	case,	action	is	considered	to	be	driven	by	
being	rational,	based	on	facts,	knowledge	and	reason,	and	is	therefore	legitimate	in	its	
making.	Weber’s	assumptions	that	all	humans,	and	hence	governments,	will	behave	in	ways	
that	are	rational	has	been	criticised	by	other	sociologists,	for	not	taking	into	account	
emotions	or	other	factors	that	limit	people’s	ability	to	act	in	an	entirely	rational	manner.		
Weber,	in	his	essay	‘The	Three	Types	of	Legitimate	Rule	’	(1958),	goes	on	to	distinguish	
between	‘types	of	legitimate	political	leaderships	and	authority:	charismatic	authority,	
traditional	authority	and	legal	authority’.	For	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	I	shall	concentrate	
here	on	legal	authority,	since	Weber	argues	that	it	is	a	key	characteristic	of	the	majority	of	
modern	states	and	governance.	Weber	argued	that	rational-legal	authorities	are	able	to	
exercise	their	authority	and	take	action	because	they	legitimise	that	action	through	the	
organisation	of	the	officialdom,	monopolisation	of	central	administration	and	legislation,	
and	control	of	citizens	through	taxation	and	physical	force.	These	actions	are	seen	by	
citizens	as	being	both	rational	and	legitimate,	since	the	legal	order	that	sets	the	rules	is	in	
line	with	other	rules	that	govern	action.		Weber	suggests	that	‘rational	pursuit	of	efficiency’	
and	the	‘iron	caged	bureaucratisation’	(Weber	1958)	were	at	the	heart	of	modern	society.	
Like	the	linear	definitions	of	policy	already	considered,	this	view	of	rational	governance	is	a	
very	top	down,	power	elite	model.			
This	brief	divergence	into	rationality	is	important	here	since	it	is	clear	from	the	meanings	of	
policy	examined	thus	far,	that	in	linear	explanations	(decisions	–	action),	rationality	is	a	
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central	undisputed	notion.	In	more	contemporary	concepts	of	policy,	which	move	away	
from	these	linear,	rational	models,	the	notion	of	an	elite	power	becomes	very	much	a	
contested	notion.				
2.3.3	Adding	dimensions	of	complexity	to	comprehensions	of	policy	
Colebatch	begins	to	re-define	policy	in	a	more	complex	way.	He	concurs	with	earlier	writers	
that	policy	‘is	about	the	maintenance	of	order	through	the	exercise	of	legitimate	authority’	
(in	Jenkins	2007	p.24)	but	he	argues	that	our	previous	ideas	of	policy	rest	‘on	three	
assumptions	about	social	order,	instrumentality,	hierarchy	and	coherence’	(Colebatch	2002	
p.8),	where	public	organisations	exist	to	achieve	particular	objectives	(instrumentality),	that	
the	flow	of	power	is	from	governments	to	the	people	(hierarchy)	and	that	all	the	actions	fit	
together	into	a	single	system	that	steers	and	co-ordinates	progress	(coherence).	However,	
it	is,	he	asserts,	more	complex	than	this	notion	of	social	order,	since	action	does	not	simply	
follow	legitimised	decision	making.		Colebatch	introduces	a	new	hypothesis	in	contrast	to	
the	top	down	rational	view	constrained	by	more	linear	definitions	of	policy.	He	proposes	
the	concept	of	tension,	where	the	very	attributes	of	policy,	‘order,	authority	and	expertise’	
(p.9)	are	likely	to	embody	continuing	tensions	in	policy	outcomes	and	thus	questions	the	
legitimisation	of	those	concepts	as	rational	entities.	This	notion	of	tension	begins	to	be	
articulated	as	a	central	theme	in	more	contemporary	meanings	of	policy.	This	is	a	
particularly	important	concept	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	since	HEFCE	has	often	been	
described	as	a	‘buffer’	body	between	government	and	HEIs,	as	will	be	explored	later	in	
Chapter	4,	in	contextualising	policy	in	terms	of	HE.	HEFCE	is	perhaps	unique	in	acting	as	a	
buffer	body	in	public	policy,	and	as	such	the	locus	of	power	in	this	hierarchy	is	less	obvious.	
Colebatch’s	notion	of	tension	then	becomes	an	important	consideration	in	this	respect.		
Colebatch	also	argues	that	there	are	a	variety	of	actors	in	the	policy	process,	suggesting	
that	policy	is	‘socially	constructed’	in	a	continual	process	of	‘social	action	and	interaction’	
(p.13)	and	so	begins	to	question	notions	of	rational	elitist	power.		As	such,	the	failings	of	
Weber’s	constructions	of	rationalist,	identified	in	2.3.2,	begin	to	be	addressed.	Policy	begins	
to	be	defined	in	terms	of	a	more	social	and	cultural	process,	where	actors	may	not	share	
the	same	objectives	and	there	can	be	divergence	between	the	process	and	the	experience	
of	the	policy	by	the	actors	involved.	He	argues	that	
‘in	the	end,	it	is	what	policy	participants	do	with	the	idea	that	determines	what	policy	
means’	(Colebatch	2002	p.136).	
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So	to	take	these	additional	dimensions	into	consideration,	other	actors,	and	their	social	and	
cultural	histories	and	experiences,	can	influence	the	formation	of	policy,	negating	notions	
of	policy	as	equating	with	rationality.	This	work	also	draws	on	the	early	ideas	from	Lipsky,	
who	in	1976	argued	that	policy	also	needed	to	take	into	account	the	interaction	between	
policy-makers	and	those	at	‘street	level’.			
A	third	element	to	Colebatch’s	(2002)	definition	is	that	of	choice,	where	he	asserts	that	
policy	meanings	tend	to	assume	articulate	conscious	choice,	with	policy	being	the	natural	
action	taken	as	a	result	of	a	decision.	However,	he	argues,	there	is	a	tension	between	
choice	and	structure,	and	both	previous	actions	and	the	required	commitment	of	resources	
in	the	existing	system,	can	limit	choice	or	equally	open	up	opportunities	for	making	other	
choices	leading	to	different	actions:	
‘The	experience	of	the	policy	process	is	often	that	it	is	the	flow	of	action	which	throws	up	
the	opportunities	for	choice’	(p.17)….	‘making	choices	challenges	the	existing	structure	
and	having	this	structure	limits	the	opportunity	for	choice’	(p.18).		
Colebatch	accepts	that	the	meaning	of	policy	reflects	particular	values,	‘instrumental	
rationality’	and	‘legitimate	authority’,	but	he	describes	policy	as	a	‘concept	in	use’	(2002	
p.20)	whereby	the	meaning	of	policy	is	socially	constructed,	shaped	by	both	historical	and	
current	actions	and	choices	within	the	system,	and	the	variety	of	actors	and	their	
interaction	and	tensions,	which	result	in	the	pursuit	of	maintaining	order.		
This	progression	from	early	linear	meaning	demonstrates	that	social	science	disciplines	
begin	to	articulate	a	concept	of	policy	that	is	a	much	more	interactive	process,	with	
tensions	both	in	terms	of	process	and	action,	moving	away	from	ideas	which	focus	on	the	
centrality	of	change	and	deliberate	policy	process.	Jenkins	(2007)	goes	even	further	than	
Colebatch,	arguing	that	the	
‘policy	process	is	uncertain	in	its	outcomes,	limited	in	its	vision,	partial	in	its	scope,	as	
inefficient	as	one	might	expect	of	any	organisation	process,	and	to	some	extent	self-
defeating:	it	is	neither	iron	cage	nor	panopticon’	(p.32).		
This	harks	back	to	the	work	of	Dearlove	(1973)	above,	for	whom	policy	outcomes	are	not	
necessarily	those	intended	by	policy-makers,	and	that	of	Margetts,	6	and	Hood	(2010)	on	
the	unintended	effects	and	paradoxes	of	public	policy	reform	in	modern	societies,	where,	
for	example,	the	application	of	evidence	based	scientific	knowledge	or	New	Public	
Management	reforms,	which	sought	to	modernise	and	standardise	public	services	like	
universities,	resulted	in	effects	that	were	not	originally	planned.		
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Hill	(2009)	takes	this	a	stage	further,	arguing	that	policy	is	an	on-going	and	multi	stranded	
process,	where	the	separate	moments	between	policy	formation	and	implementation	are	
interlinked.	He	argues	that	policy	is	not	something	that	is	defined	only	by	its	process	from	
the	point	of	formation	by	one	entity,	making	one	decision	at	one	moment	in	time,	but	that	
‘policy-making	process	is	a	web	of	decisions	‘	(2009	p.16)		and,	like	Colebatch,	involves	
different	actors	at	different	levels	of	the	process.	Hill	introduces	a	new	element,	that	of	
time,	suggesting	that	the	web	of	decisions,	and	hence	the	policy	direction,	can	continue	to	
evolve	over	the	course	of	time,	beyond	the	initial	policy	process.	So	the	meaning	of	policy	
becomes	a	much	more	holistic	process,	where	policy	formation	is	not	‘done’	in	a	vacuum.		
Hill	also	considers	the	impact	of	other	policy	decisions,	such	that	they	influence	each	other,	
in	a	‘crowded	policy	space’	(Hill	2009	p.16).	Hill	continues	to	expand	this	holistic	notion,	
adding	a	further	dimension	to	the	matrix,	that	of	incrementalisation,	where	policy	may	not	
always	be	new,	but	may	be	an	incremental	change	to	an	existing	policy.		In	this	
understanding	of	policy,	implementation	may	also	influence	new	increments	in	the	policy	
process,	or	indeed	the	formation	of	new	policies.	As	such,	policy	informs	new	policy,	in	
what	Dery	(1999)	refers	to	as	‘policy	by	the	way’	(1999	p.165-6),	suggesting	that	policy	can	
also	be	incidental.		A	further	facet	to	add	to	this	already	complex	understanding	of	policy	is	
that	of	‘non	policy’	(Heclo	1972	p.85),	where	a	‘non	decision’	or	‘inaction’		is	a	deliberate	
act,	in	order	to	maintain	the	status	quo	or	to	give	the	appearance	of	coherence	and	order.		
These	comprehensions	move	away	from	the	early	linear	understandings,	to	one	which	is	
much	more	holistic,	taking	account	of	different	actors	in	the	policy	space,	both	policy-
makers	and	policy	participants,	and	accepting	that	policy	is	dynamic,	with	formation,	
process	and	implementation	as	part	of	a	cyclical	dimension	that	evolves	over	time.	Taking	
these	understandings	together,	this	more	complex	meaning	of	policy	could	be	pictorially	
represented	in	the	following	diagram,	whereby	policy	formation,	process	and	
implementation	are	not	linear,	but	conceptually	interlinked	and	influenced	at	all	points	by	
policy	architects	and	participants,	within	the	contexts	of	the	policy	space	(society)	and	over	
time:	
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Figure	1	–	PICTORIAL	REPRESENTATION	OF	UNDERSTANDINGS	OF	POLICY	
These	more	complex	understandings	begin	to	conceive	policy	as	more	cyclical,	which	
suggests	that	policy	is	not	a	linear	process	with	a	beginning	and	an	end,	and	as	such	it	has	
agency.	Bridgman	and	Davis’	(2003)	‘Australian	Policy	Cycle’	(p.100),	offers	a	diagrammatic	
description	of	the	policy	cycle,	although	it	has	to	be	noted	that	their	intention	was	to	offer	
a	practical	guide	to	policy-makers,	not	a	theoretical	framework	to	articulate	meaning	of	
policy.		Their	work	draws	on	that	of	Harold	Lasswell	(1951)	who	characterised	‘policy-
making	as	a	sequence	of	intelligence,	recommendation,	prescription,	invocation,	
application,	appraisal	and	termination’,	and	there	are	also	reflections	of	the	work	of	
Howlett	and	Ramesh,	who	drew	up	a	model	of	a	policy	cycle	for	use	as	an	analytical	tool,	by	
breaking	the	process	up	into	a	number	of	stages:	
• ‘Agenda	setting;	
• Policy	formulation;	
• Decision	making;	
• Policy	implementation;	
• Policy	evaluation’	(Howlett	and	Ramesh	1995).	
Bridgman	and	Davis	(2004)	draw	on	these	works	to	develop	a	policy	cycle	consisting	of	
eight	stages,	and	the	key	purpose	for	including	it	here	is	to	articulate	how	more	
contemporary	notions	of	policy	have	begun	to	understand	it	as	a	dynamic	course	of	action.	
Their	policy	cycle	comprises	a	‘stages’	approach,	that	has	informed	much	of	the	work	in	
policy	analysis	considered	later	in	this	chapter.	It	is	also	worthwhile	noting	at	this	point	that	
there	are	reflections	of	this	policy	cycle	approach	in	McConnell’s	framework	for	analysing	
policy	success	(Section	2.5,	p.38),	which	relies	heavily	on	the	notions	of	policy	process	and	
implementation,	which	will	be	explored	in	greater	detail	at	the	end	of	this	chapter.	
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Figure	2	–	BRIDGMAN	AND	DAVIS	‘POLICY	CYCLE’	(2004	p.26)	
More	contemporary	conceptualisations	take	a	post-structuralism	approach	to	
understanding	policy	and	have	sought	to	both	problematise	it	in	terms	that	emphasise	the	
dynamic	nature	of	policy	and	to	situate	it	within	historical	and	social	contexts,	focussing	in	
particular	on	how	policy	is	shaped	by	relations	of	power,	drawing	especially	on	Foucault’s	
work	on	knowledge	and	power.	Fairclough	(2014)	draws	on	Foucault’s	theories	in	relation	
to	language,	power	and	the	state	to	argue	that	language	and	power	are	intrinsically	
connected	and,	as	such,	the	way	in	which	policy	discourse	is	understood	and	interpreted	is	
influenced	by	social	and	political	structures.	‘Discourse’	in	this	sense	is	understood	to	be	an	
entity	or	sign	in	language	or	text,	such	that	the	sign	has	meaning	attached	which	is	
constructed	within	social	boundaries,	beliefs	and	practices	(Fairclough	2014).	
Ball	(1993,	2006,	2015)	also	draws	on	this	understanding	of	discourse	in	seeking	to	frame	a	
theoretical	approach	within	the	context	of	policy,	where	he	seeks	to	articulate	policy	as	
‘discourse’	and	‘policy	as	text’.	He	contextualises	much	of	his	work	on	policy	in	education,	
and	so	it	is	fitting	to	consider	his	work	in	this	thesis.	Ball,	in	his	1993	paper,	‘What	is	policy?	
Texts,	trajectories	and	toolboxes’	seeks	to	conceptualise	‘policy	as	discourse	and	text’	as	a	
way	of	getting	away	from	the	idea	of	policy	as	a	‘thing’	(p.11).					
Ball	(2006)	emphasises	the	importance	of	the	‘policy	receivers’	and	the	‘policy	texts’	in	
making	sense	of	policy,	and	it	is	the	agency	of	policy	that	is	important.	Lawton	(1984)	
describes	a	disconnect	between	policy-makers	and	receivers	in	the	policy	process,	but	Ball	
argues	that	policy	is	not	just	a	legislative	moment,	but	a	dialogue	and	a	continual	process.		
Ball	wants	to	
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‘approach	legislation	as	but	one	aspect	of	a	continual	process	in	which	the	loci	of	power	
are	constantly	shifting	as	various	resources	implicit	and	explicit	in	texts	are	re-
contextualised	and	employed	in	the	struggle	to	maintain	or	change	views’	(Ball	2006	
p.13).	
For	Ball,	how	power	and	subjectivity	frame	possibilities	for	thought	and	action	are	key	to	
understanding	what	policy	is,	and	argues	from	a	position	that		
‘we	need	to	appreciate	the	way	in	which	policy	ensembles,	collections	of	related	policies,	
exercise	power	through	a	production	of	'truth'	and	'knowledge',	as	discourses’	(Ball	1993	
p.14).	
In	his	view,	policy	texts	are	the	locus	where	such	discourses	are	translated	and	given	
expression	of	meaning,	and	are	
‘representations	which	are	encoded	in	complex	ways….and	decoded	in	complex	ways’	
(Ball	1993	p.11).	
So,	whilst	policy-makers	seek	to	ensure	that	their	policies	are	represented	in	a	particular	
way,	that	representation	itself	is	contextualised	within	a	myriad	of	interpretations,	
compromises	and	struggles,	and	when	a	policy	text	is	received,	it		can	be	re-interpreted,	
misinterpreted,	re-contextualised	and	transformed	in	‘policy	spaces’	by	receivers	to	suit	
their	own	agendas	and	meaning.	As	such,	a	policy	‘is	both	contested	and	changing’	(Ball	
1993	p.11)	and	‘implementation	may	be	driven	by	different	interpretations	of	change’	(Ball	
2006	p.9).	
Ball	argues	that	state	control	models	of	policy	attempt	to	present	texts	as	legitimised	fact,	
rather	than	the	context	and	implementation	in	practice,	as	central	to	the	interpretation	of	
the	meaning	of	policy.	Ball	(2006)	considers	that	there	are	three	contexts	of	policy-making:	
firstly,	the	‘context	of	influence,	where	policy	is	initiated	and	discourses	are	constructed’;	
secondly,	the	‘context	of	policy	text	production’,	where	texts	which	represent	policy	are	
generally	articulated	to	be	of	public	good,	and	can	include	other	second	hand	and	
intertextual	productions,	such	as	those	produced	by	the	media.	Often,	it	is	only	these	re-
productions	of	policy	text	that	are	publically	available,	and	so	the	general	populus	
formulate	their	understanding	based	on	these	texts.	The	third	context	is	the	context	of	
practice,	and	it	is	here	that	readers	of	the	text	draw	upon	their	own	social	and	historical	
context	to	make	sense	and	meaning	from	the	policy	text.	Ball	concludes	that	
‘Policy	makers	cannot	control	the	meanings	of	their	texts.	Parts	of	texts	will	be	rejected,	
selected	out,	ignored….	the	key	point	is	that	policy	is	not	simply	received	and	
implemented	within	this	arena	rather	it	is	subject	to	interpretation	and	then	‘recreated’’	
(Ball	2006	p.22).	
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In	being	re-created,	the	consequences	for	policy	cannot	be	controlled	by	policy-makers,	and	
hence	space	opens	up	for	further	discourses	to	be	constructed;	for	Ball,	it	is	this	that	is	the	
policy	cycle.		
Taylor	(2004)	also	draws	on	the	work	of	Fairclough	to	examine	discourse	and	its	
relationship	to	language	in	policy	texts	and,	like	Ball,	uses	education	as	a	field	of	study	in	
which	to	contextualise	her	research.	For	Taylor,	analysis	of	the	language	of	texts	helps	to	
highlight	competing	discourses,	but	she	also	seeks	to	examine	how	texts	highlight	
discourses	which	are	sidelined	in	policy	implementation.	Taylor	argues	that	discourse	
analysis		
‘can	be	used	to	explore	how	language	works	in	policy	texts,	and	in	particular	how	it	can	
be	used	to	document	hybrid	genres	and	discourses,	and	to	highlight	competing	
discourses	and	marginalized	discourses.	These	discursive	and	linguistic	issues	have	
implications	for	how	policy	texts	are	read,	implemented,	and	how	they	may	be	used	in	
emancipatory	ways…	it	is	possible	to	trace	a	subtle	discursive	shift	in	the	policy	
implementation	process,	where	social	democratic	discourses...	have	become	
marginalized’	(Taylor	2004	p.	444-445).	
Thus	far,	this	chapter	has	examined	how	comprehensions	of	policy	have	changed	over	time,	
moving	away	from	the	linear	definitions	which	implied	assumptions	about	the	power	of	
policy-makers,	and	suggested	that	policy	was	a	process	from	formation	to	implementation.	
Phillips	(2007	p.37)	notes	that	these	earlier	definitions	imply	that	policy	is	a	‘technical	
process’,	whereas	more	contemporary	views	regard	the	context	of	policy	as	central	to	both	
process	and	implementation,		a	space	where	policy	is	formed,	re-formed,	and	acted	out,	
and	is	‘deeply	imbued	with	values	and	ideology	‘	(Phillips	2007,	p.37).	For	contemporary	
theorists,	such	as	Ball,	Fairclough	and	Taylor,	policy	is	not	just	a	process,	policy	is	about	
practice.	As	such,	policy	can	be	represented	as:		
Figure	3	–	VISUAL	REPRESENTATION	OF	CONTEMPORARY	UNDERSTANDINGS	OF	POLICY,	THE	
‘CONTEXT	OF	PRACTICE’	
Locality	in	social,	historical	and	ideological	contexts	
Time	
policy	
context	
of	
practice	
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To	return	briefly	to	the	previous	diversion,	an	assumption	that	policy-making	is	knowledge-
based	and	rational;	this	‘policy	context	of	practice’	understanding	of	policy	challenges	that	
view	and	hence	Weber’s	(1958,	1978)	belief	that	‘rational	pursuit	of	efficiency	and	iron	
caged	bureaucratisation’	was	at	the	heart	of	modern	society.	In	this	comprehension,	policy	
becomes	much	more	fluid	and	unstable,	and	as	such,	it	becomes	more	difficult	to	pinpoint	
the	exact	point	of	policy	formation.		
Much	of	the	recent	debate	from	policy	theorists	has	delved	further	into	this	notion	of	policy	
context	of	practice,	with	particular	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	the	local	(Ayres	and	
Marsh	2013,	Newman	2013,	Lowndes	and	McCaughie	2013,	Van	der	Steen	et	al	2013)	in	
policy-making,	and	the	agency	which	individuals	and	local	leadership	have	for	influencing	
and	changing	policy	in	practice.	Ayers	and	Marsh,	reporting	on	the	work	of	Van	der	Steen	et	
al’s	analysis	of	schools’	policy	in	the	Netherlands	state	that	
‘Their	study	shows	that	contextual	factors	and	local	circumstances	can	have	a	
substantial,	and	sometimes	unintended,	impact	on	policy	implementation	and	
outcomes.	In	their	view,	only	local	actors	are	in	a	position	to	identify,	predict	and	
ultimately	manage	these	causal	influences	and	outcomes.	This	“moves	the	attention	of	
policy	makers	from	analysis	ex	ante	towards	the	local	knowledge	of	the	process	as	it	
emerges”’	(Ayers	and	Marsh	2013	p.656).		
Many	of	the	notions	identified	in	this	section	will	be	important	to	the	thesis	in	considering	
the	work	of	HEFCE.	The	loci	of	knowledge	and	power,	and	how	that	translates	into	
different,	and	competing,	discourses	will	be	considered	in	locating	HEFCE	within	HE	policy-
making.		The	locus	of	policy-making	has	become	one	of	the	most	contested	debates	in	
policy	studies	in	recent	years,	with	discussions	over	the	‘Quango	State’	(Flinders	2008)	and	
whether	organisations	such	as	HEFCE,	have	shifted	policy-making	from	government	to	
organisations	whose	roles	are	governance	(Ayres	and	Marsh	2013).		The	notion	that	HEFCE	
acted	as	a	buffer	body	opens	up	debate	about	Ball’s	context	of	influence,	and	whether	it	
was	able	to	re-contextualise	government	policy	within	its	own	ideological	values,	
influenced	by	its	own	unique	relationship	with	HEIs.	HEFCE	provides	additional	space	for	
government	policy	to	be	re-formed	before	it	is	acted	out	in	institutions	in	Ball’s	context	of	
practice,	which	is	explored	in	the	context	of	the	policy	case	studies.		The	notion	that	the	
‘local’,	where	local	can	be	understood	at	both	the	institutional	level	or	within	HEFCE	itself,	
as	significant	in	HE	policy	will	also	be	explored	through	an	analysis	of	HEFCE’s	work	and	
policy	relationship	with	HEIs.	
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2.4	Approaches	to	policy	analysis		
This	section	looks	at	policy	analysis	as	a	field	of	research	and	how	it	has	evolved	over	time	
as	comprehensions	of	policy	have	been	further	developed	by	sociologists.	This	section	is	
relevant	to	the	thesis	because	it	paves	the	way	for	understanding	how	the	chosen	
theoretical	framework	can	be	articulated	as	an	approach	to	analysing	policy	success	and	
failure,	explored	fully	in	Section	2.5	(p.38).	In	order	to	examine	policy	analysis	as	a	field	of	
enquiry	more	fully,	it	is	worth	making	a	short	historical	detour	into	the	changing	
conceptualisation	of	notions	of	public	and	private,	and	the	conflict	between	them,	since	
this	has	influenced	the	study	of	public	policy	in	the	latter	half	of	the	20th	century.		In	his	
textbook	of	Public	Policy,	Parsons	(1995)	asserts	that	the	relationship	between	public	and	
private	has	dominated	‘contemporary	arguments	about	the	role	of	‘public’	policy’	(p.4).	This	
discussion	is	particularly	pertinent	to	a	study	in	HE,	which	has	been	the	subject	of	
considerable	change	in	relation	to	understandings	of	the	public	and	the	private	roles	of	
universities	and	their	funding	in	recent	years.		
‘Public’,	as	an	idea,	can	be	seen	as	the	sphere	of	activity	that	is	‘held	in	common’	(Parsons	
1995	p.3)	and	requires	the	intervention	and	regulation	of	government	to	ensure	that	the	
needs	of	all	citizens	are	met	,	whereas	‘private’	comprises	activities	that	are	in	favour	of	the	
individual.	There	is	necessarily	a	tension	between	the	two,	and	conflict	between	which	
interests	should	dominate,	and	at	various	stages	of	20th	century	history	the	dominance	of	
one	or	other	standpoint	has	shaped	how	scholars	of	policy	have	viewed	policy	analysis.		
2.4.1	A	historical	account	of	the	public-private	
In	early	19th	century	England	there	was	a	very	clear	distinction	between	the	public	and	the	
private,	and	an	Adam	Smith	economist	perspective	dominated.	Economic	freedom	was	
considered	to	be	the	most	advantageous,	using	market	forces	for	the	maximisation	of	
individuals’	interests	which	in	turn	best	promoted	the	‘public	interest’	(Habermas	1989).	
Government’s	role	was	to	ensure	that	the	conditions	of	economic	freedom	were	such	that	
individual	interests	were	served.	This	meant	that	state	intervention	was	minimal,	since	
there	was	no	need	for	excessive	regulation.		
However,	the	distinction	between	the	public	and	the	private	began	to	be	less	clear	in	the	
late	19th	century,	where	it	became	apparent	that,	in	spheres	such	as	education	and	
housing,	there	was	a	need	for	more	state	intervention.	In	order	to	lift	a	good	proportion	of	
the	Victorian	population	out	of	continual	poverty,	there	needed	to	be	growth	in	the	skills	of	
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workers	and	greater	economic	development.	As	such,	there	needed	to	be	greater	policy	
direction	and	legislation	from	government.	Hence,	Britain	began	to	see	the	development	of	
a	new	liberalism,	with	a	greater	balance	between	the	public	and	the	private	interest.		This	
was	based	on	the	belief	that	promoting	the	public	interest	required	a	certain	level	of	
‘knowledge’,	and	public	administration	was	the	means	to	make	it	happen.	This	viewpoint	
drew	on	Weber’s	theories	of	rationality,	as	described	in	Section	2.3.2	(p.19),	where	
knowledge	is	rational	and	as	such	a	rationalist	approach	would	naturally	be	in	the	public	
interest.		
‘Ideas	about	the	purpose	of	public	policy-making	were	predicated	on	the	belief	that	the	
role	of	the	state	was	to	manage	the	‘public’	and	its	problems	so	as	to	deal	with	those	
aspects	of	social	and	economic	life	which	markets	were	no	longer	capable	of	solving.	
The	key	to	this	brave	new	world	was	the	development	of	a	policy	process	and	decision-
making	which	was	more	informed	by	knowledge	that	it	had	been	in	the	past’	(Parsons	
1995	p.6).			
After	the	Second	World	War,	post-war	liberalism	began	to	take	shape	and	this	period	saw	
the	rise	of	greater	public	policy	and	public	administration.	However,	this	rise	in	public	policy	
did	not	negate	the	tensions	that	still	existed	between	the	public	and	the	private,	and	by	the	
1970s	the	problems	of	using	public	policy	to	promote	the	public	interest,	whilst	still	
promoting	the	economic	rights	of	individuals,	were	becoming	apparent.	As	such,	there	was	
a	shift	back	to	what	became	known	as	the	‘new	right’,	with	the	appointment	of	a	
Conservative	government	at	the	end	of	the	1970s.	This	new	vision	of	the	public-private	was	
advocated	by	Friedrich	Hayek,	a	leading	economist	in	the	twentieth	century,	who	argued	
that	to	resolve	the	tension	between	the	two,	there	needed	to	be	a	reduction	in	the	public	
sector	and	an	expansion	of	market	mechanisms.	This	position	was	adopted	by	the	then	
Conservative	government.	However,	this	did	not	mean	that	the	public-private	had	turned	
full	circle,	because	in	addition	to	the	‘new	right’	was	the	rise	of	a	new	doctrine	in	public	
sector	management.	This	new	way	of	thinking	continued	through	the	1980s	and	1990s,	and	
into	the	21st	century:	
‘This	argument	that	the	demarcation	between	the	public	and	private	spheres	should	be	
left	to	the	market	has	formed	the	dominant	framework	within	which	the	theory	and	
practice	of	public	policy	has	taken	place’	(Parsons	1995	p8).		
This	brief	overview	of	the	tensions	between	the	public-private	spheres	and	notions	of	the	
market,	the	state,	public	policy	and	public	sector	management	are	important	to	the	thesis.	
HE	is	a	prime	example	of	how	these	differing	ideological	positions	have	been	borne	out	in	
one	sector	of	public	policy	over	the	last	one	hundred	years.	These	ideas	are	explored	more	
fully	in	Chapter	4,	in	contextualising	HE	policy.							
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2.4.2	Theoretical	conceptualisations	of	policy	analysis	
Policy	analysis	is	a	multi-disciplinary	approach	to	examining	how	governments	make	policy	
decisions,	how	policies	are	developed,	implemented	and	evaluated	and	what	influences	
and	behaviour	various	actors,	institutions,	structures	and	history	have	in	policy-making.	
How	such	analysis	has	developed	needs	to	also	be	considered	within	the	context	of	how	
policy	itself	is	conceptualised,	as	described	in	Section	2.3	(p.15).	Policy	analysis	draws	on	a	
range	of	other	disciplines:	political	science,	economics,	sociology,	psychology	and	history,	
as	well	as	many	other	applied	fields	of	study	such	as	health,	education	and	transport.	There	
has	been	a	wealth	of	studies	in	policy	analysis	and	many	theoretical,	conceptual	and	
analytical	frameworks	have	been	developed,	particularly	in	the	post-World	War	Two	era.		
This	section	examines	two	schools	of	theoretical	thought	which	have	been	dominant	in	
relation	to	approaches	to	policy	analysis:	positivism	and	post-positivism.	Most	policy	
analysis	will	follow	one	or	other	of	these	approaches	to	varying	degrees,	but	there	are	
other,	more	nuanced	schools	of	thought	as	well.	Positivism,	prevalent	as	a	position	in	the	
1960s	and	1970s,	is	considered	to	be	the	rationalist	theory,	and	draws	on	qualitative	
technographic	techniques	to	examine	public	policy,	particularly	from	disciplines	such	as	
economics	and	especially	in	welfare	economics,	which	expounds	‘the	notion	that	
individuals,	through	market	mechanisms,	should	be	expected	to	make	most	social	decisions’	
(Howlett	et	al	2009).		
Positivism	recognises	that	such	an	idealistic	position	is	not	always	possible,	and	so	
governments	have	to	step	in	with	policy	decisions	that	will	lead	to	better	social	welfare.	
However,	this	theoretical	position	is	very	much	a	top	down	approach,	and	is	closely	aligned	
to	both	the	early	nineteenth	century	views	of	the	public-private	relationship	and	the	linear	
conceptualisations	of	policy	considered	above.	Its	principle	failure	is	that	it	does	not	take	
into	account	the	chaos	of	policy-making	in	reality,	where	judgements	are	not	always	
rational,	and	can	be	political	or	value-laden.	As	such,	it	does	not	fit	with	more	
contemporary	conceptualisations	of	policy.		
A	post-positivist	theoretical	stance,	which	has	been	more	widely	accepted	since	the	1990s,	
still	recognises	the	value	of	qualitative	analysis,	but	takes	greater	account	of	the	normative	
and	social	behaviours	of	actors	in	the	policy	process,	as	well	as	the	chaos	of	policy-making	
in	reality.	For	post-positivists,	the	value	judgement	of	policy-makers	and	other	policy	
participants,	such	as	other	actors	and	interest	groups,	are	of	importance.	For	theorists	such	
	 31	
as	Fischer	and	Forester	(1993),	language,	action,	power	and	the	role	of	persuasive	
arguments	in	policy	decision-making	are	key	to	a	post-positive	approach.	‘Non-decisions’	
are	equally	as	important	as	decisions	for	analysis	in	this	approach.	Howlett	et	al	describe	
some	of	the	typical	questions	that	post-positivists	might	ask,	such	as	
‘does	the	program	fulfil	its	stated	objective(s)?,	does	the	program	fulfil	these	objectives	
more	efficiently	than	alternative	means	available?...	does	the	policy	goal	contribute	
value	for	the	society	as	a	whole?,	does	the	policy	goal	result	in	unanticipated	problems	
with	important	societal	consequences?’	(Howlett	et	al	2009	p.29).		
The	post-positivist	approach	is	much	more	in	line	with	the	contemporary	understandings	of	
policy	that	were	considered	in	the	later	descriptions	in	Section	1.2	(p.2)	(Ayres	and	Marsh	
2013,	Ball	1993,	2006,	2015,	Bridgman	and	Davis	2004,	Colebatch	2002,	Hill	2009,	Taylor	
2004).		
Many	approaches	to	policy	analysis	have	been	developed	in	the	last	half	century,	all	
drawing	to	some	extent	on	the	positivist	or	post-positivist	theoretical	positions	described	
above.	For	Howlett	et	al	(2009),	the	best	policy	analysis	approaches	have	certain	key	
elements:	they	must	have	some	knowledge	of	the	actors	involved,	an	appreciation	of	the	
ideas	that	shape	policy	decisions,	and	take	account	of	the	social	and	political	structures,		
‘actors,	ideas	and	structures	form	the	common	ground	where	all	policy	theories	
converge	–	from	different	directions,	and	with	distinctive	points	of	view.	It	is	in	adopting	
and	adapting	these	conceptual	particularities	that	the	potential	for	greater	insight	into	
policy-making	and	policy	outcomes	can	be	realised’	(2009	p.48).			
Bobrow	&	Dryzek	(1987)	concur	with	this	view	in	their	post-positivist	multi-disciplinary	
frames	approach,	where	they	advocate	using	more	than	one	framework	from	a	range	of	
disciplinary	perspectives	to	ensure	that	the	best	possible	analysis	can	be	accomplished.	This	
thesis	takes	a	post-positivist	stance,	and	the	multi-disciplinary	frames	approach	is	evident	in	
the	case	study	work,	which	sets	out	the	ideological	positions	of	government	at	the	time	of	
each	policy	intervention,	the	positions	of	policy-makers	and	other	actors	(HEFCE,	HEIs)	as	
well	as	the	views	of	secondary	actors	and	interest	groups,	in	order	to	develop	a	thick	
description	and	deep	insight	into	each	policy.	The	framework	proposed	by	McConnell,	
which	is	used	to	articulate	a	position	of	policy	success	and	failure	for	each	case	study,	is	
also	post-positivist	and	multi-disciplinary,	as	it	seeks	to	examine	policy	from	a	number	of	
perspectives,	which	at	the	top	level	consider	the	process,	implementation	and	political	
aspects	of	policy	and	at	a	more	nuanced	level,	the	desired	objectives	and	outcomes	and	the	
values	and	direction	of	government.		
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2.4.3	Applied	policy	analysis	
This	section	seeks	to	move	from	the	conceptual	and	theoretical	towards	an	applied	
framework	for	policy	analysis.	An	exploration	of	how	theoretical	concepts	can	be	
operationalised	to	aid	an	analysis	of	policy	will	assist	in	articulating	and	justifying	the	
chosen	framework	for	the	research	in	this	study,	as	the	theoretical	framework	is	also	the	
analytical	tool	applied	to	policy	success	and	failure	(Section	2.5,	p.38).	This	section	
examines	some	of	the	historical	and	more	contemporary	policy	analysis	approaches	
described	in	the	literature,	and	seeks	to	examine	them	in	the	context	of	HE	studies	and	this	
study.	Many	of	these	can	be	categorised	as	either	‘rational	stages’	or	‘systems’	approaches	
and,	equally,	as	‘top	down’	or	‘bottom	up’	approaches.	All	of	these	approaches	have	origins	
in	either	linear	or	more	cyclical	conceptualisations	of	policy,	and	are	either	positivist	or	
post-positivist	theoretical	understandings	to	some	extent.	‘Rational	stages’	approaches	
follow	much	the	same	line	of	thinking	as	the	linear	understandings	of	policy	as	considered	
in	Section	1.2	(p.2),	whereas	systems	approaches	take	a	more	post-positivist	stance,	which	
problematise	policy	in	terms	of	ideology,	interpretation	and	discourse.		
The	‘rational	stages’	hypothesis	is	common	in	approaches	to	policy	analysis	that	focus	on	
the	policy	cycle.	Lasswell	(1971)	is	considered	to	be	one	of	the	pioneers	of	policy	analysis	
and,	as	touched	on	in	Section	1.2	(p.2),	takes	a	rational	stages	approach.	He	developed	the	
policy	cycle	as	a	way	of	addressing	policy-making	analysis	and	for	looking	at	‘knowledge	of’	
and	‘in’	the	policy	process.		The	policy	cycle	in	Lasswell’s	terms	is	divided	into	seven	rational	
stages:	‘intelligence,	promotion,	prescription,	invocation,	application,	termination	and	
appraisal’	(in	Howlett	et	al	2009)	and	it	focusses	on	how	government	makes	decisions.	It	
allows	the	policy	scholar	to	consider	the	policy	process	in	bite	size	chunks,	but	what	is	
missing	from	Lasswell’s	framework	are	any	external	influences	on	government	decision	
making.	Many	other	political	analysts	have	drawn	on	Laswell’s	work	to	develop	variations	
of	the	policy	cycle,	for	example	Hupe	and	Hill	(2006),	who	argue	that	‘policy	stages	need	to	
be	replaced	with	a	more	complex	model	of	the	way	in	which	policy	decisions	are	inter-
related	or	‘nested’’	(p.557),	which	they	describe	as	still	embodying	the	idea	of	stages,	but	
more	loosely.		
Parsons	(1995)	and	Howlett	et	al	(2009)	use	the	policy	cycle	as	a	way	to	examine	the	critical	
stages	of	the	policy	process	in	order	to	consider	the	relationships	between	actors,	ideas	and	
structures,	although	in	both	cases	they	acknowledge	that	this	is	also	taking	a	‘stagist’	
viewpoint.	The	stages	are	identified	by	Howlett	et	al	(2009)	as:	‘agenda-setting,	policy	
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formation,	public	policy	design-making,	policy	implementation	and	policy	evaluation’	and,	
similarly,	as:	‘meso,	decision	and	delivery	analysis’	by	Parsons	(1995).	All	of	these	
approaches	have	one	thing	in	common	-	they	all	contain	different	descriptions	of	the	
notions	of	policy	decision,	implementation	and	appraisal	as	part	of	the	cycle.	These	are	
important	considerations	for	this	thesis,	since	these	elements	are	evident	in	McConnell’s	
framework	for	examining	policy	success	and	failure	(Section	2.5,	p.38).	Equally,	the	
approach	for	the	formation	of	the	case	studies	follows	similar	lines,	examining	the	context	
for	the	formation	of	policy,	how	it	was	implemented	and	how	it	was	evaluated.	Indeed,	it	
can	be	argued	that	HEFCE	itself	pursued	a	stagist	approach	to	policy,	and	that	these	
elements	can	be	strongly	observed	in	its	policy	initiatives,	as	will	be	considered	in	later	
chapters.		
2.4.3.1	Decision	making		
The	decision	making	element	of	the	policy	stage/cycle	is	a	much	considered,	and	much	
contested,	area	for	discussion	by	policy	analysts.	Early	pioneers,	such	as	Ward	Edwards	
(1954)	took	a	highly	positivist,	top-down	approach,	influenced	by	the	work	of	Weber,	in	
arguing	that	decision	making	by	government,	and	hence	policy,	is	rational,	and	decision-
makers	will	make	a	choice	that	maximises	the	outcome:		
‘The	second	requirement	of	rationality	and	in	some	ways	the	more	important	one,	is	
that	economic	man	must	take	his	choices	in	such	a	way	as	to	maximise	something.	This	
is	the	central	principle	of	the	theory	of	choice’	(Edwards	1954	p.	381).	
In	this	model,	government	policy-making	is	seen	to	be	adjacent	to	the	market,	and	assumes	
that	policy-makers	will	operate	in	the	same	way	as	decision	makers	in	the	private	sector.			
Herbert	Simon’s	work	(1991),	which	was	also	very	influential	in	policy	analysis,	and	was	also	
a	stagist	and	top-down	approach,	challenged	some	of	these	early	assumptions	about	the	
way	in	which	policy	decisions	are	made.	Simon	advocated	that	individuals,	and	hence	
policy-makers,	do	not	make	wholly	rational	decisions,	they	exhibit	‘bounded	rationality’	
influenced	by	their	own	history,	abilities	and	time,	and	so	they	seek	to	make	decisions	that	
are	reasonable	rather	than	optimal.		
Charles	Lindblom	was	also	very	influential	in	the	early	development	of	policy	analysis,	and	
was	perhaps	the	first	to	acknowledge	that	policy-making	was	more	‘system’	like,	without	
beginning	or	end.	Lindblom’s	work	begins	to	look	like	the	more	dynamic	conceptualisations	
of	policy,	seeking	to	explain	the	influence	of	wider	factors	on	decision	making,	the	
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discourse	of	other	actors	in	the	process,	negotiation	between	actors	and	less	tangible	
influences	such	as	power.	Lindblom	advocated	‘incrementalism’	in	policy	analysis,	where	
policy	is	made	and	moved	by	increments,	with	internal	and	external	interactions	impacting	
on,	and	distorting,	the	policy	process.	He	labelled	his	approach	‘The	Science	of	Muddling	
Through’	(1959).	Lindblom’s	framework	looks	less	rational,	less	top	down	and	closer	to	a	
post-positive	approach.	However,	one	of	the	criticisms	of	this	model	is	that	is	assumes	that	
decision	making	will	always	refer	back	to	the	status	quo,	since	decisions	will	always	be	
compared	with	earlier	decisions,	and	policy	progress	will	be	slow	and	never	radical.	In	
examining	these	early	approaches	to	policy	analysis	in	which	the	locus	of	the	decision-
making	is	the	focus	of	the	analysis,	it	is	possible	to	trace	parallels	with	the	evolution	of	how	
policy	was	conceptualised	from	linear	understandings	to	more	contemporary	theories,	
where	policy	is	seen	as	highly	dependent	upon	ideology	and	different	discourses,	and	can	
be	chaotic	in	its	making.	This	is	an	important	reflection	for	this	thesis,	since	the	locus	of	
policy-making	and	the	ideological	positions	of	both	successive	governments	and	
intermediary	bodies	such	as	HEFCE	play	a	key	role	in	how	HE	policy	has	been	articulated	
and	systematised	in	the	last	one	hundred	years,	and	will	be	explored	in	later	chapters.		
2.4.3.2	Implementation	
The	second	‘stage’	of	the	policy	cycle	to	consider	is	policy	implementation,	since	a	focus	on	
implementation	was	an	important	pivotal	moment	in	policy	analysis.	Early	top-down	
models	assumed	that	implementation	was	unproblematic,	with	decisions	simply	executed	
as	expected.	Jeffrey	Pressman	and	Aaron	Wildavsky	(1984)	are	considered	to	be	pioneers	of	
the	study	of	policy	implementation,	connected	with	their	work	in	the	1970s	on	economic	
policy	in	the	USA	Economic	Development	Agency.	They	found	that	there	could	be	multiple	
goals	and	decision	paths	for	policy-makers,	and	that	often	implementation	was	
compromised	since	it	was	not	always	‘carried	out	in	the	manner	intended	by	policy-makers’,	
and	often	involved	a	certain	amount	of	‘bargaining’.	The	work	of	Ball	(1993)	reflects	this	
understanding,	in	his	articulation	of	the	context	of	practise.				
Scholars	such	as	Lipsky	(1980)	took	policy	implementation	as	the	key	to	policy	analysis	and	
turned	the	top-down	approach	on	its	head,	considering	that	this	was	not	the	key	point	of	
decision-making.	Lipsky	advocated	a	‘street	level’	approach,	in	which	the	‘policy	making	
community’	was	dominant	in	terms	of	policy	power.	This	bottom-up	approach	is	also	
reflected	in	the	work	of	Ball	(1993),	as	considered	in	Section	2.1	(p.13),	in	which	the	policy	
receivers	are	key	to	understanding	policy.	
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More	recent	approaches	by	policy	analysts	have	moved	away	from	top-down	or	bottom-up	
analysis,	such	that	a	‘third	generation’	of	models	has	come	to	the	fore.		One	of	the	earliest	
methods	to	consider	how	both	approaches	might	be	combined	as	part	of	a	framework	for	
policy	analysis	was	devised	by	Lewis	and	Flynn	(1978),	as	a	policy-action	framework,	which	
considers	implementation	to	be	an	evolutionary	process.	They		
‘put	forward	a	behavioural	model	which	views	implementation	as	‘action’	by	individuals	
which	is	constrained	by	the	world	outside	their	organisations	and	the	institutional	
context	within	which	they	endeavour	to	act’	(Parsons	1995	p.	471).		
In	this	model,	it	is	recognised	that	the	analysis	of	policy	at	the	stage	of	implementation	is	
key,	but	it	also	recognises	that	the	approach	taken	by	individuals	in	implementation	is	
constrained,	both	within	their	own	organisations	and	by	external	influences,	including	
externally,	policy-makers.	Goggin		et.	al.	(1990)	took	a	similar	approach,	but	with	reference	
to	game	theory,	looking	at	multiple	variables	such	as	policy	changes	over	time	and	over	
different	governments,	and	developed	a	complex	model	to	attempt	to	predict	how	polices	
are	implemented.		
deLeon	and	deLeon	(2002)	consider	an	alternative	approach	to	the	top-down	or	bottom-up	
approach	to	policy	implementation,	arguing	that	implementation	should	be	more	
democratic:		
‘It	does	require	that	policy	makers	do	more	than	listen	to	themselves,	their	in-house	
analysts,	and	extant	interest	groups.	It	requires	that	they	make	a	participatory	
orientation	more	than	a	theoretic	talisman	and	more	realised	in	operations’	(2002	p.	
483).		
deLeon	and	deLeon	(2002)	suggest	a	framework	‘to	describe	different	types	of	
accountability	under	varying	conditions	of	ambiguity	and	conflict’	in	policy	implementation,	
and	suggest	that	implementation	should	follow	democratic	procedures.	However,	they	do	
acknowledge	that	their	democratic	framework	does	not	take	account	of	a	number	of	other	
variables,	such	as	resources,	other	government	priorities	or	how	policy	might	change	over	
time.				
For	this	thesis,	the	implementation	stage	is	an	important	consideration.	The	way	in	which	
HEFCE	implements	policy	will	be	explored	in	greater	detail	in	Chapter	4,	but	it	is	worth	
noting	here	that	HEFCE	attempts,	at	least	on	the	face	of	it,	to	avoid	a	simple	top-down	
approach.	There	is	an	element	of	consultation	with	policy	receivers	(HEIs)	such	that	there	is	
some	discourse	in	addressing	potential	problems	of	implementation,	and	small	
amendments	to	policies	are	made	as	a	result.	The	implementation	stage	is	also	critical	to	
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the	framework	adopted	in	this	thesis,	since	McConnell	(2010)	takes	this	stage	to	be	one	of	
the	three	dimensions	by	which	policy	success	is	evaluated,	albeit	in	the	guise	of	
‘programme’	(Section	2.5,	p.38).	To	some	extent,	the	McConnell	(2010)	framework	is	an	
extension	of	the	work	of	Goggin		et.	al.	(1990),	and	deLeon	and	deLeon	(2002),	in	seeking	to	
address	a	number	of	variables	which	include	examining	a	policy	intervention	beyond	the	
programme	itself,	to	take	account	of,	amongst	other	things,	government	ideological	
position,	its	goals	and	instruments,	preserving	reputation	and	electoral	prospects.	
2.4.3.3	Evaluation	
The	third	stage	of	the	policy	cycle,	evaluation,	considers	how	the	policy	has	met	its	goals	
and	how	it	works	in	reality.	Nachmias	(1979,	1983)	is	considered	to	be	one	of	the	earliest	
scholars	to	articulate	evaluation	as	an	important	part	of	policy	analysis.		Much	of	the	work	
in	policy	evaluation	draws	heavily	from	the	positivist	and	rationalist	movements,	where	
evaluation	is	seen	to	be	objective,	systematic	and	empirical.	As	Nachmias	points	out,		
‘the	dominant	paradigm	of	current	evaluation	research	is	goal-directed,	views	its	role	in	
decision	making	in	a	narrow	sense,	and	is	in	the	logical	positivistic	tradition’	(1983	p.77).	
Parsons	(1995)	also	notes	that	
‘The	analysis	of	evaluation	and	the	techniques	and	methods	used	in	evaluation	has,	like	
so	much	else	in	public	policy,	been	framed	by	positivist	assumptions	about	knowledge	
and	methods’	(p.563).		
For	Nachmias,	the	problem	with	such	a	positivist	view	is	that,	whilst	evaluation	analysis	
might	follow	the	traditions	of	social	sciences,	it	fails	to	account	for	the	reality	of	the	policy	
process	or	the	‘political-bureaucratic	estate‘(p.77).	He	suggests	that	policy	evaluation	needs	
to	be	much	more	loosely	coupled	and	harmonious	with	the	policy	process,	and	needs	to	go	
beyond	simply	seeking	a	‘continue	or	terminate’	approach	to	evaluating	policy.	
More	recent	approaches	to	evaluation	have	also	acknowledged	that	evaluation	itself	tends	
to	be	subjective	and	not	value-free,	and	so,	as	Parsons	concludes,	evaluation	is,	
‘more	fragmented	and	more	alive	to	the	political,	value-based	nature	of	the	activity.	The	
analysis	of	a	programme	or	a	problem	is	seen	by	many	critics	of	the	dominant	paradigm	
as	essentially	a	political	process,	full	of	values	rather	than	some	kind	of	scientific	quest	
for	truth	or	an	objective	answer’	(1995	p.	563).		
A	number	of	post-positivist	approaches	to	evaluation	have	been	devised;	one	of	those,	
pertinent	to	this	study,	is	the	‘design	approach’.	In	this	approach,	the	political	process,	
reality	and	the	values	surrounding	the	policy-making	process	are	considered	as	part	of	the	
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evaluation,	as	are	the	values	of	the	analyst.	As	such,	it	is	recognised	that	a	subjective	
approach	is	actually	desirable,	such	that		
‘The	myth	of	neutrality	is	exploded.	Analysts	cannot	avoid	taking	sides	on	very	basic	
issues	of	political	structure’	(Dryzek	1993	p.229).		
Parsons,	too,	argues	for	such	an	approach.	Like	Nachmias,	he	suggests	that	evaluation	
needs	to	go	beyond	simply	seeking	to	evaluate	facts	and	establishing	whether	or	not	a	
policy	has	worked.	The	process,	he	argues,	
‘is	not	to	‘evaluate’	in	the	textbook	sense…	the	focus	is	on	the	construction	of	arguments	
and	the	improvement	of	the	‘quality	of	debate’…	frameworks	are	tools	for	discussion	
and	critical	dialogue	rather	than	techniques	to	generate	or	provide	‘answers’,	‘facts’,	
costs	or	benefits’	(1995	p.	566).	
The	evaluation	stage	of	the	policy	cycle	is	central	to	this	thesis.	The	McConnell	(2010)	
framework	is	firmly	embedded	in	evaluation	analysis,	but	is	not	set	in	the	positivist	
traditions.	Like	Nachmias	(1979),	McConnell	(2010)	articulates	a	need	to	examine	policy	
evaluation	beyond	simply	asking	‘did	it	work	or	didn’t	it?’	and	to	evaluate	the	policy	
process,	the	programme	and	its	place	in	politics	as	a	whole.		The	construction	of	the	
research	for	this	thesis	takes	the	post-positivist	design	approach	advocated	above	in	
examining	the	given	government	ideology	and	the	context	of	the	policy	intervention.	
Following	the	design	approach,	in	Chapter	3,	I	argue	for	an	interpretative	approach	to	
policy	analysis,	and	as	such,	my	values,	as	the	researcher,	are	inherent	in	the	research.		
Evaluation	is	also	a	key	mechanism	by	which	HEFCE	examines	its	own	policies.	The	vast	
majority	of	policy	initiatives	followed	a	similar	pattern,	with	both	summative	and	formative	
evaluation	phases,	frequently	conducted	by	external	agencies.	The	use	of	this	technique	by	
HEFCE	is	explored	further	in	Chapter	4.		
A	key	area	of	policy	analysis	evaluation	that	has	begun	to	gain	more	credence	since	the	
mid-1990s	is	that	of	success	and	failure,	which	has	not	been	explicitly	address	in	the	above	
discussion.	Such	notions	are	central	to	the	work	of	this	thesis,	and	central	to	the	McConnell	
(2010)	framework.	This	next	section	considers	the	scholarly	literature	on	policy	success	and	
failure,	before	situating	the	work	of	McConnell	(2010)	both	within	the	literature	and	the	
context	of	this	study.	
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2.5	Notions	of	policy	success	and	failure	
Understandings	of	policy	failure	and	success,	as	part	of	the	evaluation	stage	of	the	policy	
cycle,	are	relatively	new	ideas	in	the	field	of	policy	studies.	The	last	twenty	years	or	so	have	
seen	a	rise	in	studies	on	failure,	although	more	frequently	in	the	form	of	case	studies	as	a	
response	to	particular	policy	episodes,	rather	than	a	systematic	comprehension	of	how	
failure	might	by	defined	and	analysed.	A	recent	example	of	this	is	the	book	by	King	and	
Crewe	(2013),	‘The	Blunders	of	Government’	which	looks	specifically	at	examples	of	policy	
failure	by	UK	governments.	Although	interesting	case	studies,	King	and	Crewe	have	been	
criticised	(Bovens	and	‘t	Hart	2016)	for	failing	to	fully	define	what	they	mean	by	blunder.	An	
articulation	of	what	is	meant	by	success	and	failure	is	an	omission	in	many	recent	studies,	
and	the	emotive	language	used	to	describe	failure	in	such	studies	is	noteworthy:	from	
‘human	error’,	‘blunders’,	‘disasters’,	‘tragedies’,	‘crises’	and	‘fiascos’.	There	is	less	work	on	
policy	success,	perhaps	because	success	does	not	provoke	such	a	strong	reaction	as	failure,	
or	perhaps	because	there	is	a	perception	that	less	learning	is	to	be	had	from	examining	
success.	There	has	been	even	less	scholarly	work	on	comprehending	degrees	of	success	and	
failure.	This	section	examines	how	policy	success	and	failure	have	been	described	in	the	
scholarly	literature	and	introduces	analytical	frameworks	for	examining	failure	and	success.	
Finally,	this	section	takes	a	detailed	exploration	of	the	McConnell	(2010)	framework	and	his	
descriptions	of	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure.	This	section	is	central	to	the	work	of	
the	thesis,	since	the	construction	offered	by	McConnell	(2010)	is	adopted	as	the	theoretical	
framework	for	examining	policy	success	and	failure	in	English	HE.	
2.5.1	Comprehending	policy	success	and	failure:	opposite	ends	of	a	spectrum	
One	of	the	earliest	attempts	to	define	policy	success,	and	to	develop	criteria	to	determine	
success,	was	developed	by	Kerr	in	1976.	In	‘The	Logic	of	‘Policy’	and	Successful	Policies’,	she	
identified	three	types	of	success:	‘goal	attainment,	implementation,	and	justificatory	
success’,	and	suggests	a	set	of	formulaic	conditions	that	define	success,	where	a	‘policy	fails	
when	it	cannot	achieve	its	goals’	or	be	implemented	under	the	given	conditions.	She	makes	
a	distinction	between	success	and	failure:	‘a	policy	that	does	not	fail	is	successful’	(Kerr	
1976	p.362).			
Elements	of	this	early	work	can	still	be	seen	in	more	contemporary	understandings	of	policy	
success,	particularly	in	comprehending	the	importance	of	determining	outcomes	and	the	
policy	programme	(implementation).	However,	Kerr	does	not	address	issues	such	as	the	link	
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between	the	formulation	of	policy	and	its	implementation,	or	the	differing	perspectives	of	
different	actors,	which	later	theorists	begin	to	challenge.	For	this	study,	the	link	between	
the	locus	of	policy	formation	and	implementation	is	key,	since	it	can	be	argued	that	HEFCE	
has	been	unique	in	acting	as	an	intermediary	between	government	and	HEIs	and,	as	such,	
how	and	where	policy	is	formed	and	implemented	is	of	particular	interest	in	articulating	
success	and	failure	in	this	study.			
McConnell	(2010)	suggests	that	there	are	three	ways	of	looking	at	determining	the	nature	
of	policy	success:	the	foundationalist	position,	which	articulates	policy	success	as	a	‘fact’,	
based	on	rational,	positivist	and	technocratic	interpretations	(such	as	that	advocated	by	
Kerr),	the	anti-foundationalist	position,	where	success	is	an	anti-positivist	matter	of	
interpretation	and	judgement	(such	as	that	advocated	by	Bovens	and	‘t	Hart	below),	and	a	
position	based	on	realism.	McConnell,	in	advocating	a	realism	approach	suggests	a	
definition	of	policy	success	thus:	
‘A	policy	is	successful	insofar	as	it	achieves	the	goals	that	proponents	set	out	to	achieve.’	
(McConnell	2010	p.39).	
However,	there	is	a	conflict	here,	since	the	perception	of	success	is	positioned	favourably	
with	the	proponents	of	the	policy.	Those	opposed	to	the	original	goals	will	see	this	success	
as	failure.		
Policy	failure	has	proved	equally	difficult	to	define.	Bovens	and	‘t	Hart’s		‘Understanding	
Policy	Fiascos’	(1998)	suggests	that	‘there	is	an	absence	of	fixed	criteria	for	success	and	
failure’	(p.4)	and	like	McConnell	(2010)	they	argue	that	previous	attempts	at	definition	have	
been	drawn	from	a	positivist	stance	that	relies	on	rational,	technocratic	and	qualitative	
approaches	and	
‘the	predominantly	positivist	mode	of	theory	formation	in	fiasco	analysis	had	conduced	
to	a	proliferation	of	adhoc	hypotheses	and	incomplete	frameworks’	(p.151).	
Like	Kerr,	Bovens,	‘t	Hart	and	Peters’	earlier	work	(2001)	defines	failure	as	a	position	
entirely	opposed	to	success.		In	a	more	recent	contribution,	McConnell	(2016)	has	
attempted	a	more	nuanced	definition	of	failure,	suggesting	that		
‘a	policy	fails,	even	if	it	is	successful	in	some	minimal	respects,	if	it	does	not	
fundamentally	achieve	the	goals	that	proponents	set	out	to	achieve,	and	opposition	is	
great	and/or	support	is	virtually	non-existent’	(McConnell	2016	p.671).			
It	is	clear	from	these	attempts	to	define	policy	success	and	failure	that	it	is	difficult	to	
determine	a	positivist	approach	and	conclude	a	definition	that	is	entirely	objective.	Equally,	
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it	is	challenging	to	define	success	or	failure	as	anything	other	than	its	opposite;	that	is	to	
say,	what	is	not	a	success,	is	a	failure	and	vice	versa.	
2.5.2	Dimensions	of	success	and	failure:	process,	programmatic	and	political	
The	work	of	Bovens,‘t	Hart	and	Peters,	although	still	viewing	success	and	failure	as	
opposing	positions,	takes	a	more	anti-positivist	and	interpretative	stance	in	developing	a	
more	nuanced	approach.	Bovens,	‘t	Hart	and	Peters	introduce	a	framework	for	analysis	
(2001,	2016)	which	distinguishes	between	programme	and	political	dimensions	of	success	
and	failure,	which	they	define	as	the	‘two	logics	of	evaluation’.	
																				Reputation:	Political	assessment	
	
Performance:	
Programmatic	assessment	
++	 --	
++	 Success	 Tragedy	
--	 Farce	 Fiasco	
(Adapted	from	Bovens	&	‘t	Hart	(2016	p.657)	
Figure	4	-	TWO	LOGICS	OF	EVALUATION	
In	this	framework,	programme	is	defined	in	the	rationalist	scientific	tradition	as	the	‘world	
of	facts’	(Bovens	&	‘t	Hart	2016	p.	256)	where	there	are	measureable	outcomes,	and	
political	is	defined	as	the	‘world	of	impressions’	(p.256)	where	the	historical	and	cultural	
positions	and	perceptions	of	stakeholders	are	relevant	to	the	perception	of	success	and	
failure,	and	particularly	how	these	are	played	out	in	holding	policy-makers	to	account.	
This	notion	of	programme	is	a	key	concept	for	this	study.		Under	this	definition,	evaluation	
is	based	on	facts,	and	a	policy	will	fail	where	it	does	not	succeed	in	meeting	its	proposed	
outcomes.	In	HEFCE	policy-making,	the	programme	element	is	central	to	HEFCE’s	and	
government’s	evaluations	of	policy	initiatives,	where	facts,	measurable	outcomes,	
determine	success	or	failure.	However,	as	an	analysis	of	the	case	studies	will	demonstrate,	
success	and	failure	at	the	programme	level	is	not	a	binary	concept.	This	is	particularly	
conspicuous	in	the	case	study	on	the	CETLs,	which	was	a	success	in	many	respects	at	a	local	
level	but	a	failure	at	sectoral	level	(see	Chapter	6).	This	concept	of	degrees	of	success	or	
failure	will	be	explored	later	in	this	section.			
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The	work	of	Marsh	and	McConnell	(2010)	draws	to	some	extent	on	the	work	of	Kerr	in	
recognising	different	types	of	success,	and	more	heavily	on	the	work	of	Bovens	and	‘t	Hart	
(2001)	in	distinguishing	between	programme	and	political	dimensions,	but	also	begins	to	
develop	a	more	multifaceted	framework.	For	Marsh	and	McConnell,	what	is	missing	from	
the	two	logics	of	evaluation	is	the	dimension	of	process	in	policy	analysis.	They	argue	that	
this	is	a	crucial	omission,	and	must	be	separated	from	the	implementation	stage,	since	a	
policy	may	be	regarded	as	successful	once	it	has	emerged	from	the	policy-making	stage	of	
the	policy	cycle,	but	a	failure	later	at	the	programme	stage.	In	addition,	McConnell	later	
argues	that	examining	process	is	critical	for	examining	failure,	since	
‘after	extraordinary	events	and	episodes,	societal	and	institutional	reflections	on	‘what	
went	wrong’,	typically	focus	on	processes	that	weren’t	followed	properly’	(McConnell	
2011	p.	67).			
The	‘process	dimension	refers	to	the	stages	of	policy-making	in	which	issues	emerge	and	are	
framed,	options	are	explored,	interests	are	consulted	and	decisions	are	made’	(Marsh	and	
McConnell	2010	p.	572).	The	‘programmatic’	dimension	strongly	reflects	the	work	of	
Bovens,	‘t	Hart	and	Peters	(2001)	in	recognising	the	‘world	of	facts’	and	describes	the	
success	of	a	programme	(the	implementation	stage)	based	on	meeting	objectives	and	
producing	outcomes	and	evidence.	The	political	dimension	describes	government’s	
retention	of	the	capacity	to	govern,	and	reflects	the	political	logic	developed	by	Bovens	and	
‘t	Hart.			
Marsh	and	McConnell	propose	a	framework	which	outlines	the	‘three	dimensions	of	policy	
success’	(2010)	and	go	further	than	Bovens	and	‘t	Hart	in	identifying	indicators	to	measure	
success	in	each	dimension:	
Table	1	-	MARSH	AND	McCONNELL’S	DIMENSIONS	OF	SUCCESS	
Dimensions	of	
success	
Indicators	of	success	
Process	 § Legitimacy	in	the	formation	of	choices:	produced	through	due	processes	
§ Passage	of	legislation:	legislation	passed	with	no	amendments?	
§ Political	sustainability:	did	the	policy	have	the	support	of	a	sufficient	coalition?	
§ Innovation	and	influence:	was	the	policy	based	on	new	ideas	or	policy	
instruments?	
Programmatic	 § Operational:	was	it	implemented	as	per	objectives?	
§ Outcome:	did	it	achieve	the	intended	outcomes?	
§ Resource:	was	it	an	efficient	use	of	resources?	
§ Actor/interest:	did	the	policy/implementation	benefit	particular	groups/	
interests?	
Political	 § Government	popularity:	is	the	policy	politically	popular,	did	it	help	government	
re-election	chances,	boost	government	credibility?	
	
Adapted	from	Marsh	&	McConnell	(2010)	p.571	
	42	
This	framework	is	not	without	its	critics,	and	Bovens	and	‘t	Hart	(2016)	are	critical	of	
separating	out	process,	since	they	argue	that	the	indicators	of	process	success	are	too	
similar	to	those	for	political	success,	since	they	are	both	about	reputation	and	legitimacy	of	
the	policy.	For	them,	the	‘technocratic	side	of	process’	(p.659)	is	missing.	In	addition,	
Bovens	(2010)	suggests	that	Marsh	and	McConnell	treat	all	three	dimensions	as	equal	in	
analysing	policy	success,	but	in	fact	they	are	not,	since	the	programmatic	and	political	
dimensions	are	about	outcomes,	whereas	process	is	concerned	with	what	leads	up	to	the	
adoption	of	the	policy.		
Bovens	(2010)	suggests	that	in	incorporating	process,	the	locus,	object	and	focus	of	policy	
become	more	relevant	than	the	dimensions	(p.584).		Bovens	suggests	that	the	original	
model	might	then	be	adapted,	such	that	the	technocratic	element	of	process	is	articulated	
separately	from	the	programmatic	and	political,	which	are	redefined	as	policy	outcomes,	
such	that	the	logics	of	evaluation	become	represented	as:	
		 Programmatic	
++/--	
Political	
++/--	
Policy	process	 	 	
Policy	outcome	 	 	
(Adapted	from	Bovens	(2010	p.585)	
Figure	5	–	REVISED	LOGICS	OF	EVALUTION	
In	defence,	Marsh	and	McConnell	are	not	suggesting	that	all	three	dimensions	can	be	
considered	in	isolation;	they	are	indivisibly	linked	and,	as	such,	there	is	scope	for	
considering	the	technocratic	in	all	aspects	of	the	framework	where	that	aids	the	analysis.	
‘Our	contribution	here	is	to	blend	programme,	political	and	process	in	a	way	which	
allows	analysts	and	practitioners	to	approach	the	issue	of	success	within	a	useful	
heuristic	framework,	as	well	as	helping	to	develop	a	dialogue’	(Marsh	and	McConnell	
2010	p.581).	
However,	McConnell	(2016)	also	suggests	that	viewing	the	process,	programme	and	
political	as	separate	elements	is	beneficial.	
‘It	is	useful	to	separate	them	analytically	because	doing	so	helps	develop	our	
understanding	of	some	of	the	internal	tensions	of	policy	failure,	with	governments	
failing	in	some	respects	but	not	others’	(McConnell	2016	p.236).	
The	notion	of	process,	as	separate	from	programme	for	the	purposes	of	analysis,	is	also	an	
important	one	for	this	study.	HEFCE’s	unique	position	as	a	body	between	government	and	
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institutions	warrants	discussion	later	in	the	thesis,	in	relation	to	the	indicators	of	success	
identified	in	Table	1	above	(p.41),	and	particularly	in	relation	to	the	way	in	which	HEFCE	
‘does’	policy.	Typically,	policy	is	driven	by	government’s	ideological	visions	for	educational	
and	economic	priorities,	and	manoeuvred	through	funding	initiatives.	The	notion	of	
coalition	is	particularly	noteworthy	in	relation	to	the	way	in	which	HEFCE	seeks	to	gain	
support	for	policy	interventions,	often	through	a	process	of	consultation	with	institutions.	
Boven’s	view	that	the	policy	process	and	policy	outcomes	can	be	evaluated	in	
programmatic	terms	also	aids	an	understanding	of	HEFCE’s	position	as	an	intermediary	
body,	seeking	to	implement	government	policy	whilst	acting	on	behalf	of	HEIs,	and	adding	
an	additional	component	to	both	policy	process	and	outcomes.	These	themes	will	be	
explored	in	later	chapters.			
The	second	logic	of	evaluation	advocated	by	Bovens	and	‘t	Hart,	the	political,	allows	for	a	
much	more	interpretative	approach	to	policy	analysis,	and	the	‘world	of	impressions’	
creates	the	space	for	policy	analysts	to	take	account	of	value	judgments,	power	relations	
and	the	impressions	of	different	actors.	They	conclude	that	
‘Failure	is	not	inherent	in	policy	events	themselves.	‘Failure’	is	a	judgement	about	
events’	(Bovens	and	‘t	Hart	1998	p.21).	
It	is	in	the	political	arena	that	socially	constructed	labels	of	success	and	failure,	which	are	
not	neutral	concepts,	are	‘constructed,	declared	and	argued	over’	(Bovens	and	‘t	Hart	2016	
p.654).	McConnell	(2015),	too,	observes	that	understandings	of	failure	need	to	
accommodate	the	differing	views	of	what	failure	is	and,	as	such,	there	will	not	be	
agreement	on	what	success	or	failure	means.		
‘Understanding	failure	would	be	straightforward	if	there	was	universal	agreement	on	
failures	being	defined	by	breach	of	a	universally	agreed	benchmark	of	X,	but	this	is	
simply	not	possible,	given	the	existence	of	multiple	and	often	conflicting	evaluation	
measures	and	also	the	propensity	of	policy	opponents	to	emphasise	those	aspects	that	
have	failed	to	be	achieved,	and	for	policy	supporters	to	emphasise	those	that	have’	
(McConnell	2015	p.227).		
Such	uncertainty	over	how	to	articulate	success	or	failure	begs	the	related	question,	
‘success	for	whom?’	(McConnell	2011	p.65).	Success	can	be	a	contested	issue,	and	what	
might	be	a	success	for	some	could	be	a	failure	for	others.	Bovens	and	‘t	Hart	(2016)	
acknowledge	that	a	study	of	success	and	failure	is	also	a	study	of	the	dynamics	of	political	
reputation,	since	this	will	be	bound	up	in	perceptions	of	‘success	for	whom’.	For	McConnell,	
success	and	failure	can	also	be	a	politically	constructed	act,	bound	up	with	
conceptualisations	of	power:		
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‘Failure	is	bound	up	with	issues	of	politics	and	power,	including	contested	views	about	
its	existence,	and	the	power	to	produce	an	authoritative	and	accepted	failure	narrative’	
(McConnell	2015	p.	222).			
So	for	Marsh	and	McConnell	(2010)	this	dimension	in	their	framework	is	an	important	
element	in	achieving	a	holistic	approach	to	policy	analysis,	concluding	that,	
‘We	need	a	framework	which	allows	us	to	identify	different	indicators	of	success,	while	
acknowledge	that	the	internal	and	relational	aspects	of	our	criteria	may	reflect	power	
relations	and	be	perceived	differently	by	different	individuals/groups	while	remembering	
that	some	would	claim	policy	success	to	be	nothing	more	than	a	social	construct	
reflecting	power	relations’	(Marsh	and	McConnell	2010	p.	570).					
These	notions	in	the	political	sphere	reflect	the	contemporary	understandings	of	policy	in	
the	post-positivist	sense	identified	earlier	in	the	chapter,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	work	
of	Ball	(1993,	2006)	and	that	of	Ayres	and	Marsh	(2013)	in	identifying	the	context	of	
practice	as	being	critical	to	understandings	of	policy.			
The	political	dimension	is	also	important	to	this	thesis	in	examining	policy	in	HE.		The	
existence	of	HEFCE	suggests	that	there	are	multiple	stakeholders,	from	government	to	
HEFCE	and	institutions	with	multiple	perceptions	of	what	constitutes	policy	success.	At	
institutional	level,	there	are	other	vested	interests,	including	students,	researchers	and	
other	agencies,	sometimes	in	other	policy	arenas,	that	might	engage	with	institutions,	
including	colleges	and	businesses,	to	name	just	a	few.			
The	notion	of	a	favourable	political	outcome	is	curious	in	terms	of	HE	policy	as	will	become	
evident	from	the	application	of	the	case	studies	to	McConnell’s	(2010)	framework	that	
HEFCE	policies,	apart	from	those	concerning	fees	and	maintenance,	rarely	capture	the	
public	interest.	As	such,	the	question	of	success	to	whom	becomes	an	important	one,	since	
HEIs	effectively	become	the	‘public’	receivers	of	HEFCE	policy.			
HE	is	a	good	example	of	where	there	might	be	a	degree	of	tension	between	the	dimensions	
of	process,	programme	and	political.	Where	Bovens	and	‘t	Hart	(1998,	2001,	2016)	and	
Marsh	and	McConnell	(2010,	2011,	2016)	all	recognise	a	degree	of	tension	between	the	
dimensions	of	programme	and	political,	and	in	particular,	as	observed	in	the	preceding	
paragraph,	that	success	in	one	sphere	could	equally	be	a	failure	in	the	other.	
‘the	dynamic	(dis)equilibrium	between	performance	and	reputation	that	may	result	are	
always	the	result	of	two	different	and	only	weakly	related	evaluation	processes:	the	
deterioration	or	improvement	of	its	programme	accomplishments	as	measured	in	
technical	assessment	exercises;	and	the	political	waxing	and	waning	of	the	coalitions	of	
actors	lending	it	support	or	criticizing	it’	(Bovens	&	‘t	Hart	2016	p.	258).	
	 45	
‘the	inclusion	of	‘politics’	is	important	here,	because	it	alerts	us	to	the	possibility	of	a	
disjunction	between	political	and	programme	outcomes’	(McConnell	2015	p.223).	
2.5.3	The	‘grey	areas	in	between’	(McConnell	2015)		
Thus	far,	notions	of	policy	success	and	failure,	and	the	theoretical	frameworks	examined	
above	(Kerr	1976),	Bovens	‘t	Hart	and	Peters	(2001),	Marsh	and	McConnell	(2010),	have	
portrayed	success	and	failure	as	being	opposite	ends	of	the	spectrum,	with	failure	being	the	
logical	conclusion	where	success	is	not	achieved.	However,	as	McConnell	points	out,	
‘one	vital	part	of	the	equation	has	still	to	be	considered;	namely,	the	fact	that	success	is	
not	an	‘all	or	nothing’	phenomenon’	(McConnell	2010	p.55).		
The	notion	of	tension	between	the	evaluative	dimensions	described	above	further	suggests	
that	success	and	failure	cannot	simply	be	seen	as	opposing	states.	In	specifically	attempting	
to	redefine	a	definition	for	failure,	McConnell	argues	that	failure	is	never	as	clear	cut	as	
outright	failure.	The	main	thrusts	of	his	argument	are	not	only	that	failure	for	one	set	of	
interest	groups	can	be	a	success	for	others,	but	also	there	is	a	further	challenge	in	
‘that	there	are	multiple	points	in	the	policy	cycle	when	an	evaluation	may	occur,	leading	
potentially	to	different	outcomes.	For	example,	projections	of	failure	at	the	policy	
making	stage	may	differ	from	an	evaluation	of	outcomes	after	implementation’	
(McConnell	2015	p.229).		
In	addition	to	the	differing	perceptions	of	success	or	failure	for	different	interest	groups,	
and	variations	over	the	policy	lifecycle,	there	can	be	multiple	competing	goals	for	any	policy	
intervention,	and	as	such,	success	or	failure	can	be	multifaceted.	For	McConnell,	analysing	
policy	is	very	much	a	study	of	‘art	and	craft’	and	consequently	analysts	need	to	reject	the	
foundationalist	and	anti-foundationalist	positions,	in	order	to	adopt	a	position	that	accepts	
that	policy	is	a	messy	activity	that	may	succeed	or	fail,	or	succeed	and	fail,	for	reasons	
which	may	be	both	practical	and	ideological.		
‘Once	we	conceive	of	studying	policy	failure	as	‘art	and	craft’,	we	are	better	placed	to	
navigate	the	messy	realpolitik	of	types	and	degrees	of	failure,	as	well	as	ambiguities	and	
tensions	between	them.	The	groundwork	for	doing	so	is	based	on	a	working	definition	of	
failure,	namely	that	a	policy	fails,	even	if	it	is	successful	in	some	minimal	respects,	if	it	
does	not	fundamentally	achieve	the	goals	that	proponents	set	out	to	achieve,	and	
opposition	is	great	and/or	support	is	virtually	non-existent’	(McConnell	2015	p.221).		
McConnell	adapts	his	earlier	work	with	Marsh	to	suggest	a	new	framework	for	policy	failure	
that	still	evaluates	the	process,	programme	and	politics	dimensions,	but	considers	failure	in	
a	more	nuanced	way.	As	such,	this	model	attempts	to	deal	with	some	of	the	tensions	that	
exist	for	different	interest	groups	and	how	success	or	failure	may	occur	at	different	stages.		
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Table	2	–	DEGREES	OF	POLICY	FAILURE	
Criteria	 Tolerable	Failure	
(=	resilient	success)	
Conflicted	Failure	
(=Conflicted	success)	
Outright	failure	
(=marginal	success)	
Process,	
programme,	
politics	
Failure	is	tolerable	when	
is	does	not	
fundamentally	impede	
the	attainment	of	goals	
that	proponents	set	out	
to	achieve,	and	
opposition	is	small	
and/or	criticism	is	
virtually	non-existent.		
Failures	to	achieve	goals	
are	fairly	evenly	matched	
with	attainment	of	goals,	
with	strong	criticism	and	
strong	defence	in	roughly	
equal	measure.		
A	policy	fails,	even	if	it	is	
successful	in	some	minimal	
respects,	if	it	does	not	
fundamentally	achieve	the	
goals	that	proponents	set	out	
to	achieve,	and	opposition	is	
great	and/or	support	is	
virtually	non-existent.			
McConnell	2015	p.237.	
McConnell	attests	that	using	this	framework,		
‘helps	us	grasp	the	realpolitik	of	failure,	that	some	failures	are	survivable	and	others	
not,	while	failure	in	some	realms	may	actually	be	a	consequence	of	success	in	others’	
(McConnell	2015	p.237).		
As	well	as	beginning	to	understand	failure	in	a	more	nuanced	way,	McConnell	suggests	that	
‘success	can	co-exist	with	failure’	and	as	such,	‘evaluators	need	a	typological	framework	to	
help	group	different	types	of	outcomes	with	broadly	shared	characteristics’	(McConnell	
2011	p.71).		
Thus,	a	framework	that	turns	the	nuances	of	failure	on	its	head	to	demonstrate	nuances	of	
success	begins	to	emerge	as:	
	
Success	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 Failure	 	
Durable	Success	 	 Conflicted	Success	 	 Precarious	Success	
(successes	outweigh		 (successes	and	failures	 (failures	outweigh	
failures)	 	 	 fairly	equally	balanced)	 successes)	
Adapted	from	McConnell	(2011	p.	71).	
Figure	6	–	DEGREES	OF	POLICY	SUCCESS	
These	two	framework	examples	in	Table	2	(p.46)	and	Figure	6	(p.46)	demonstrate	how	
policy	success	and	failure	can	be	articulated	in	a	more	nuanced	way.	McConnell	explores	
the	spectrum	of	outcomes,	the	‘grey	areas	in	between’	policy	success	and	failure.	He	
suggests	that		
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‘policy	has	multiple	dimensions,	often	succeeding	in	some	respects	but	not	in	others’	and	
‘policies	may	succeed	and/or	fail	in	each	of	these	[process,	programme	and	politics]	and	
along	a	spectrum	of	success’	(McConnell	2010	p.345).				
McConnell	introduces	a	more	complex	and	nuanced	spectrum	of	success	and	failure,	
adding	more	detail	to	the	three	dimensional	categories	of	process,	programme	and	politics,	
viz:	‘success,	durable	success,	conflicted	success,	precarious	success	and	failure’	(McConnell	
2010).	In	addition,	McConnell	provides	a	justification	for	each	dimension	on	the	spectrum	
to	aid	the	analyst	in	seeking	to	determine	a	position.	Although	the	visuality	of	the	matrix	
suggests	distinct	division	between	each	category,	he	acknowledges	that,	
‘there	is	no	clear	line	dividing	durable	success	and	conflicted	success	(and	between	the	
latter	and	the	next	category,	precarious	success).	Rather,	they	should	be	seen	as	broad	
positions	on	a	continuum’	(McConnell	2010	p.60).		
The	spectrum	of	success	and	failure	is	represented	thus:	
Table	3	-	SPECTRUM	FROM	SUCCESS	TO	FAILURE	
Policy	as	process:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Process	success	 Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	success	 Process	failure	
Preserving	
government	policy	
goals	and	
instruments.	
Policy	goals	and	
instruments	
preserved,	despite	
minor	refinements.	
Preferred	goals	and	
instruments	proving	
controversial	and	
difficult	to	preserve.	
Some	revisions	
needed.	
Government’s	goals	
and	preferred	policy	
instruments	hang	in	
the	balance.	
Termination	of	
Government	
policy	goals	and	
instruments.	
Conferring	
legitimacy	on	a	
policy.	
Some	challenges	to	
legitimacy,	but	of	little	
or	no	lasting	effect.	
Difficult	and	contested	
issues	surrounding	
policy	legitimacy,	with	
some	potential	to	taint	
the	policy	in	the	long	
term.	
Serious	and	
potentially	fatal	
damage	to	policy	
legitimacy.	
Irrecoverable	
damage	to	policy	
legitimacy.	
Building	a	
sustainable	
coalition.	
Coalition	intact,	
despite	some	signs	of	
disagreement.	
Coalition	intact,	
although	strong	signs	
of	disagreement	and	
some	potential	for	
fragmentation.	
Coalition	on	the	brink	
of	falling	apart.	
Inability	to	
produce	a	
sustainable	
coalition.	
Symbolising	
innovation	and	
influence.	
Not	ground-breaking	
in	innovation	or	
influence,	but	still	
symbolically	
progressive.	
Neither	innovative	nor	
outmoded,	leading	(at	
times)	to	criticisms	
from	both	progressives	
and	conservatives.	
Appearance	of	being	
out	of	touch	with	
viable	alternative	
solutions.	
Symbolising	
outmoded,	insular	
or	bizarre	ideas,	
seemingly	
oblivious	to	how	
other	jurisdictions	
are	dealing	with	
similar	issues.		
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Policy	as	programme:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Programme	success	 Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	success	 Programme	failure	
Implementation	in	
line	with	objectives.	
Implementation	
objectives	broadly	
achieved,	despite	
minor	refinements	or	
deviations.	
Mixed	results,	with	
some	successes,	but	
accompanied	by	
unexpected	and	
controversial	
problems.	
Minor	progress	
towards	
implementation	as	
intended,	but	beset	
by	chronic	failures,	
proving	highly	
controversial	and	very	
difficult	to	defend.	
Implementation	fails	
to	be	executed	in	
line	with	objectives.	
Achievement	of	
desired	outcomes.	
Outcomes	broadly	
achieved,	despite	
some	shortfalls.	
Some	successes,	but	
the	partial	
achievement	of	
intended	outcomes	is	
counterbalanced	by	
unwanted	results,	
generating	substantial	
controversy.	
Some	small	outcomes	
achieved	as	intended,	
but	overwhelmed	by	
controversial	and	
high-profile	instances	
of	failure	to	produce	
results.		
Failure	to	achieve	
desired	outcomes.		
Meets	policy	
domain	criteria.	
Not	quite	the	desired	
outcome,	but	
sufficiently	close	to	
lay	strong	claim	to	
fulfilling	the	criteria.	
Partial	achievement	of	
goals,	but	
accompanied	by	
failures	to	achieve,	
with	possibility	of	
high-profile	examples,	
eg.	on-going	wastage	
when	the	criterion	is	
efficiency.	
A	few	minor	
successes,	but	
plagued	by	unwanted	
media	attention;	eg.	
examples	of	wastage	
and	possible	scandal	
when	the	criterion	is	
efficiency.	
Clear	inability	to	
meet	the	criteria.	
Creating	benefit	for	
a	target	group.	
A	few	shortfalls	and	
possibly	some	
anomalous	cases,	but	
intended	target	group	
broadly	benefits.		
Partial	benefits	
realised,	but	not	as	
widespread	or	deep	as	
intended.	
Small	benefits	are	
accompanied	and	
overshadowed	by	
damage	to	the	very	
group	that	was	meant	
to	benefit.	Also	likely	
to	generate	high	
profile	stories	of	
unfairness	and	
suffering.	
Damaging	a	
particular	target	
group.	
	
Policy	as	politics:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Political	success	 Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	success	 Political	failure	
Enhancing	electoral	
prospects	or	
reputation	of	
governments	and	
leaders.		
Favourable	to	
electoral	prospects	
and	reputation	
enhancement,	with	
only	minor	setbacks.	
Policy	obtains	strong	
support	and	
opposition,	working	
both	for	and	against	
electoral	prospects	
and	reputation	in	
fairly	equal	measure.	
Despite	small	signs	of	
benefit,	policy	proves	
an	overall	electoral	
and	reputational	
liability.	
Damaging	to	the	
electoral	prospects	
or	reputation	of	
governments	and	
leaders,	with	no	
redeeming	political	
benefit.	
Controlling	policy	
agenda	and	easing	
the	business	of	
governing.	
Despite	some	
difficulties	in	agenda	
management,	capacity	
to	govern	is	
unperturbed.	
Policy	proving	
controversial	and	
taking	up	more	
political	time	and	
resources	in	its	
defence	than	was	
expected.	
Clear	signs	that	the	
agenda	and	business	
of	government	is	
struggling	to	suppress	
a	politically	difficult	
issue.		
Policy	failings	are	so	
high	and	persistent	
on	the	agenda,	that	
it	is	damaging	
government’s	
capacity	to	govern.	
Sustaining	the	
broad	values	and	
direction	of	
government.	
Some	refinements	
needed	but	broad	
trajectory	unimpeded.		
Direction	of	
government	very	
broadly	in	line	with	
goals,	but	clear	signs	
that	the	policy	has	
prompted	some	
rethinking,	especially	
behind	the	scenes.		
Entire	trajectory	of	
government	is	being	
compromised.		
Irrevocably	
damaging	to	the	
broad	values	and	
direction	of	
government.		
Adapted	from	McConnell	(2010)	
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This	framework	is	helpful	in	allowing	the	analyst	to	determine	a	position	that	is	more	subtle	
than	outright	success	or	failure.	McConnell	suggests	that	there	is	often	conflict	between	
different	types	of	success,	because	there	can	be	some	success	in	one	dimension,	but	less	
success	in	another,	and	what	is	perceived	to	be	a	success	for	one	interest	group,	could	be	a	
failure	for	another.	McConnell	argues	that	in	the	‘realism’	position	of	defining	success,		
‘there	is	often	trade-off	for	policymakers	between	the	three	realms	of	policy	which	at	
times	sit	uneasily	alongside	each	other.	Striving	for	success	in	one	realm	can	mean	
sacrificing,	intentionally	or	through	lack	of	foresight,	success	in	another.	Such	trade-offs	
and	tensions	are	at	the	heart	of	the	dynamics	of	public	policy’	(McConnell	2010	p.357).		
He	identifies	these	as	contradictions	which	can	result	in	a	successful	process	but	
unsuccessful	programme,	successful	politics	but	unsuccessful	programmes,	or	successful	
programmes	but	unsuccessful	politics	(McConnell	2010).		
I	have	chosen	this	framework	as	the	theoretical	approach	to	analysing	success	and	failure	
because,	for	me,	it	recognises	that	success	and	failure	in	policy	is	a	messy	business,	where	
success	and	failure	can	be	multi-dimensional,	succeeding	or	failing	for	practical	as	well	as	
ideological	reasons.	Success	and	failure	can	be	differently	interpreted	by	actors	at	different	
times,	and	as	such	can	be	conflicted.	The	distinctive	nature	of	policy-making	in	HE	in	
England,	and	in	particular	the	existence	of	an	intermediary	body,	needs	an	analytical	
framework	that	is	able	to	recognise	these	many	facets	and	in	particular	the	potential	for	
conflict	between	the	interest	groups	and	the	process,	programme	and	political	dimensions.			
That	is	not	to	say	that	the	McConnell	framework	is	without	its	critics,	or	that	there	have	not	
been	other	theorists	who	have	attempted	to	improve	on	the	perceived	inadequacies	of	the	
framework.	A	critique	of	the	framework	is	offered	in	Chapter	8,	but	for	completeness	this	
section	briefly	observes	some	of	those	criticisms.		
It	has	already	been	noted	above	that	Bovens	(2010)	is	critical	of	McConnell’s	treatment	of	
the	three	dimensions	as	equal	in	analysing	policy	success,	suggesting	that	it	needs	to	
acknowledge	that	there	is	a	distinction	between	the	process	which	leads	to	policy	and	its	
outcomes	(programme	and	political).	Gray	(2011)	also	takes	issue	with	McConnell’s	
emphasis	on	a	realism	approach	and,	in	his	view,	an	analysis	of	success	does	not	work	for	
all	contexts,	where	it	might	be	more	appropriate	to	examine	other	aspects	of	policy,	such	
as	an	examination	of	resources,	to	understand	how	different	actors	identify	issues.	Gore	
(2011),	whilst	acknowledging	that	the	framework	is	useful	in	helping	to	illuminate	enquiries	
around	policy	development	and	implementation,	suggests	that	it	has	some	omissions,	in	
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particular	that	the	framework	is	unable	to	take	account	of	implementation	gaps,	and	more	
importantly	for	this	study,	it	assumes	a	one	dimensional	view	of	government,	and		
‘ignores	the	key	role	of	sub-national	units	and	inclusive	partnerships	in	influencing	and	
implementing	policy…..little	attention	is	paid	to	how	policy	filters	between	different	tiers	
in	a	national	(or	even	supranational)	policy’	(Gore	2001	p.48).	
This	criticism	in	particular	is	extremely	relevant	to	this	study,	given	the	focus	on	HEFCE	as	
an	intermediary	body,	and	this	will	be	explored	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	8.		
More	recently,	Newman	(2014)	suggests	that	the	framework	is	lacking	in	that	it	does	not	
explicitly	determine	who	benefits	from	a	policy	and	its	interpretations.	He	suggests	re-
framing	the	dimensions	into	four	categories:	‘process,	goal	attainment,	distributional	
outcomes	and	political	consequences’.	
‘By	evaluating	these	aspects	of	a	policy	separately,	it	is	possible	to	provide	an	
assessment	of	policy	success	that	can	account	for	different	aspects	of	success	and	
differing	interpretations’	(Newman	2014	p.203).		
What	is	interesting	about	the	perspective	on	this	framework	is	that	the	spectrum	of	success	
to	failure	is	not	‘defined’	in	the	style	of	a	sliding	scale,	as	shown	in	the	adaptation	below.	To	
some	extent,	the	adoption	of	a	sliding	scale	tackles	one	of	the	criticisms	of	Gore	(2011),	
who	suggests	that	the	McConnell	framework	‘does	bring	with	it	a	certain	rigid	stylisation’	
(p.49).	However,	it	is	my	view	that	whilst	the	sliding	scale	might	allow	for	more	fluidity,	it	
makes	articulating	choices	for	the	extent	of	success	or	failure	less	defendable,	and	as	such,	I	
rejected	this	as	an	option	for	the	chosen	framework.		
	
Adapted	from	Newman	(2014	p.202).		
Figure	7	–	MEASURING	POLICY	SUCCESS	
	 Process	 Goal	attainment	 Distributional	
Outcomes	
Political	
Consequences	
Success	
	
	
Partial	Success	
	
	
Failure	
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2.6	Policy	learning	
This	section	briefly	considers	theoretical	approaches	to	policy	learning.	Policy	learning,	in	
this	context,	is	understood	to	be	the	way	in	which	governments	and	organisations	use	
knowledge	of	policy	processes,	programmes	and	outcomes	to	view	problems	and	solutions	
to	inform	future	policy	decisions	(IPP	2018).	This	is	significant	to	the	study,	since	it	helps	to	
answer	the	research	question	‘does	the	evaluation	of	particular	policy	episodes	reveal	any	
common	characteristics	and	distinctions	in	relation	to	policy	that	could	usefully	be	
considered	in	relation	to	future	policy	setting	in	higher	education?’.	Whilst	this	question	will	
be	explored	in	detail	in	Chapter	8,	it	is	helpful	here	to	briefly	articulate	some	of	the	
theoretical	approaches	understood	in	the	literature.	This	study	does	not	seek	to	add	to	the	
body	of	literature	on	policy	learning,	but	to	adopt	an	approach	to	operationalise	it	in	
seeking	to	answer	this	specific	research	question.		
Policy	learning	has	become	a	significant	step	in	the	evaluation	stage	of	the	policy	cycle,	and	
in	a	sense	completes	the	policy	cycle,	where	theorists	have	attempted	to	problematise	how	
governments	are	able	to	learn	from	their	own	policy	episodes,	or	from	observing	policy	in	
other	jurisdictions.	An	understanding	of	policy	learning	is	particularly	pertinent	to	this	
study,	since	the	case	studies	have	been	chosen	from	a	very	specific	ideological	period,	that	
of	New	Labour,	a	government	keen	to	instil	evidence-based	policy-making	in	government,	
as	Sanderson,	writing	during	that	period	argues:	
‘the	notion	of	evidence-based	policy	making	has	gained	renewed	currency	in	the	UK	in	
the	context	of	the	current	Labour	Government’s	commitment	to	modernise	government’	
(Sanderson	2002	p.4).	
Much	of	the	early	literature	on	policy	learning	concentrated	on	conflict-based	theories	
(Bennett	and	Howlett	1992),	where	it	was	understood	that	governments	learned	from	how	
their	previous	policies	had	fared	and	amended	their	future	actions	in	the	light	of	the	
consequences	and,	as	such,	learning	is	concerned	with	conflict	and	power.		These	
theorisations	held	strong	rationalist	assumptions	about	policy	learning.	However,	for	
theorists	such	as	Helco	(1972),	such	an	approach	fails	to	take	into	account	knowledge	
acquisition,	political	learning,	not	just	by	governments,	but	other	actors	and	society	as	a	
whole.	Bennett	and	Howlett	(1992)	also	argue	that	the	‘object	of	learning’	(p.288),	what	is	
being	learned	about,	is	not	well	theorised.	They	contend,	then,	that	policy	learning	is	not	
just	about	resolving	conflict,	it	is	in	fact	three	highly	complex	processes:	‘government	
learning,	lesson-drawing	and	social	learning’	(p.289).	For	them,	it	is	important	to	
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conceptualise	policy	learning	in	this	way,	in	order	to	be	able	to	operationalise	policy	
learning	for	analysis.		Rose	(1991)	contends	a	further	conceptualisation	of	lesson-drawing,	
where	policies	in	one	jurisdiction	are	observed	by	other	governments,	and	the	perceived	
successes	emulated.		
May	(1992)	draws	on	these	theorisations	in	conceptualising	two	alternative	forms	of	policy	
learning,	‘instrumental	learning’	and	‘social	learning’,	where	
‘Instrumental	learning	entails	lessons	about	the	viability	of	policy	instruments	or	
implementation	designs.	Social	learning	entails	lessons	about	the	social	construction	of	
policy	problems,	the	scope	of	the	policy,	or	policy	goals’	(p.331).	
May	(1992)	also	suggests	that	these	two	types	of	learning	can	be	contrasted	with	‘political	
learning’	which	examines	‘lessons	about	policy	processes	and	the	political	prospects	of	a	
policy’	(p.332).	May’s	constructs	allow	for	a	more	interpretative	approach	to	policy	
learning.	This	conceptualisation	of	policy	learning	has	a	strong	relationship	to	McConnell’s	
(2010)	three	dimensions	of	policy	success,	particularly	in	articulating	policy	‘process,	
programme	and	politics’	and	in	articulating	the	importance	of	examining	policy	instruments	
and	goals,	the	benefits	for	different	interest	groups	and	the	sustaining	of	a	government’s	
political	reputation	to	maintain	their	broad	direction	and	values.	Indeed,	May	(1992)	
asserts	that	his	conceptualisation	of	policy	learning	offers	much	for	examining	policy	
success	and	failure,	where	
‘policy	failures	are	useful	to	consider	since	failure	serves	as	a	trigger	for	considering	
policy	redesign	and	as	a	potential	occasion	for	policy	learning…	policy	success	might	be	
said	to	provide	a	stronger	basis	for	learning	by	making	it	possible	to	trace	conditions	for	
success’	(p.341).		
More	recently,	Howlett	(2012)	has	used	McConnell’s	three	dimensions	of	process,	
programme	and	politics	to	link	his	conceptualisations	of	policy	learning	as	‘thin	(technical-
strategic)	and	thick	(political-experiential)’	(p.539)	to	learn	from	policy	failure.	There	are	
also	echoes	of	the	work	of	Sanderson	(2002),	who,	like	McConnell,	advocates	a	‘realist’	
(p.8)	approach	to	policy	learning	with	a	multi-method	approach.		
May	(1992)	articulates	his	distinctions	in	the	forms	of	learning	and	the	sources	of	evidence	
that	might	be	considered	for	each	approach	in	order	to	conceptualise	and	operationalise	
his	method	(Table	4,	p.53).	Since	May’s	approach	to	policy	learning	is	so	strongly	aligned	to	
McConnell’s	dimensions	of	policy	success,	I	consider	that	it	is	a	worthwhile	approach	to	
examining	policy	learning	in	the	context	of	this	study.	This	approach	will	be	used	in	Chapter	
8	to	articulate	what	might	be	learned	from	the	three	policy	episodes	to	illuminate	future	
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policy-making	in	HE.	The	thesis	does	not	proposed	to	critique	this	theorisation	as	adequate	
for	policy	learning,	merely	to	use	it	as	an	instrument	to	aid	understanding	of	learning	from	
the	policy	episodes.	
Table	4	-	POLICY	AND	POLITICAL	LEARNING	
	 Policy	Learning	 Political	Learning	
	 Instrumental	 Social	
Entails	
learning	
about:	
Viability	of	policy	
interventions	or	
implementation	designs.	
Social	construction	of	a	policy	
or	problem	
Strategy	for	
advocating	a	given	
policy	idea	or	problem.	
Foci:	 Policy	instruments	or	
implementation	designs.	
Policy	problem,	scope	of	
policy,	or	policy	goals.	
Political	feasibility	and	
policy	processes.	
May	lead	to:	 Understanding	of	source	of	
policy	failure,	or	improved	
policy	performance	in	
reaching	existing	goals.		
Changed	expectations	
concerning	existing	goals,	or	
redefinition	of	policy	goals.	
More	sophisticated	
advocacy	of	a	political	
idea	or	problem.	
Requisite	
conditions:	
Improved	understanding	of	
policy	instruments	or	
implementation	based	on	
experience	or	formal	
evaluation.	
Improved	understanding	or	
alteration	of	dominant	causal	
beliefs	about	a	policy	problem	
or	solution	within	the	relevant	
policy	domain.	
Awareness	of	political	
prospects	and	factors	
that	affect	them.	
Prima	Facie	
Indicators:	
Policy	redesign	entailing	
change	in	instruments	for	
carrying	out	the	policy	–	eg.	
inducements,	penalties,	
assistance,	funding,	timing	of	
implementation,	
organisational	structures.		
Policy	redefinition	entailing	
change	in	policy	goals	or	scope	
–	eg.	policy	direction,	target	
groups,	rights	bestowed	by	the	
policy.	
Policy	advocates	
change	in	political	
strategy		-	eg.	shifting	
arenas,	offering	new	
arguments,	employing	
new	tactics	for	calling	
attention	to	a	problem	
or	idea.	
Potentially	
confused	with:	
Superstitious	learning	
involving	presumed	
superiority	of	a	given	
instrument;	mimicking	
behaviour.		
Policy	redefinition	unrelated	
to	change	in	dominant	causal	
beliefs	within	a	policy	domain.		
Haphazard	change	in	
political	strategy,	
unrelated	to	
understanding	of	
political	dynamics.	
Requires	
evidence	of:	
Increased	understanding	of	
policy	instruments	or	
implications.	
Change	in	dominant	causal	
beliefs	within	the	relevant	
policy	domain.	
Awareness	of	
relationship	between	
political	strategy	and	
political	feasibility	
within	a	given	
advocacy	coalition.		
	(adapted	from	May	1992	p.336).		
2.7	Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	sought	to	situate	the	study	within	the	fields	of	enquiry,	HE	studies	and	
policy	analysis.	The	study	adds	to	previous	work	in	examining	HE	system	policy,	a	stream	of	
HE	research	that	has	gained	credence	in	the	UK	in	recent	years,	as	the	locus	of	policy-
making	has	shifted	with	the	changing	ideological	positions	of	successive	governments.	The	
existence	of	an	intermediary	body	between	government	and	institutions,	unique	to	English	
HE,	adds	an	interesting	dimension	to	the	study	of	HE	policy-making.	HE	studies	is	less	well	
theorised	than	other	disciplines	(Tight	2012,	2018)	and	whilst	theorists	are	beginning	to	
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adopt	theoretical	positions	from	other	disciplines	to	illuminate	an	understanding	of	policy	
and	policy-making,	what	has	not	been	well	articulated	is	a	theorised	approach	to	policy	
success	and	failure	and,	in	particular,	a	more	nuanced	approach	to	examining	degrees	of	
success	and	failure.	This	study	adds	to	the	field	of	enquiry	in	this	respect	by	utilising	a	
theoretical	framework	from	political	sciences	to	illuminate	characteristics	of	English	HE	
policy	success	and	failure	by	considering	three	particular	episodes.	
This	chapter	has	also	situated	the	work	within	the	field	of	policy	studies,	and	has	sought	to	
articulate	both	historical	and	contemporary	understandings	of	policy.	Historical	
conceptualisations	of	policy	were	rationalist	and	linear	in	their	approach,	with	a	strong	
emphasis	on	rationalist	state	control.	More	contemporary	understandings	recognise	that	
policy	is	historically	and	socially	constructed	and	that	many	actors	in	the	process	bring	with	
them	their	own	constructs,	values	and	ideology.	As	such,	policy	is	less	linear	and	more	
dynamic,	and	can	be	articulated	as	a	‘concept	in	use’	(Colebatch	2002).	Contemporary	
understandings	recognise	the	power	relationships,	the	influence	and	behaviours	of	actors	
and,	as	such,	that	policy	has	agency,	within	a	‘context	of	practice’	(Ball	1993,	2006).	More	
recent	theorisations	have	sought	to	understand	policy	in	terms	of	discourse,	often	
competing	discourses	(Ball	2006,	Taylor	2004),	and	the	value	of	the	policy	text	becomes	
central	to	its	construction,	and	even	deconstruction,	within	the	context	of	practice.	These	
contemporary	understandings	of	policy	are	central	to	this	thesis,	since	the	location	of	
policy-making	and	the,	often	competing,	ideologies	and	constructs	of	the	actors	in	HE	
policy,	whether	government,	HEFCE	or	institutions,	are	central	to	how	policy	might	be	
viewed,	implemented,	contested	and	evaluated	within	the	context	of	HE.		
This	chapter	also	examined	the	changing	understandings	of	policy	analysis,	and	considered	
in	particular	three	stages	of	the	policy	cycle:	policy	setting,	implementation	and	evaluation.	
Early	approaches	to	policy	analysis	were	considered	before	moving	to	more	contemporary	
post-positivist	conceptualisations,	which	take	a	less	technocratic	approach	in	articulating	a	
qualitative	and	interpretative	approach	to	policy	analysis,	where	the	behaviours	and	value	
judgements	of	actors	take	a	central	role.		This	work	then	considered	a	more	recent	
development	in	the	understanding	of	policy	evaluation,	that	of	policy	success	and	failure.	
Early	conceptualisations	considered	success	and	failure	to	be	binary	distinctions	(Kerr	1976,	
Bovens,‘t	Hart	and	Peters	2001)	but	began	to	theorise	programme	and	political	success	as	
key	concepts	in	understanding	policy	success	and	failure.	More	recent	work	by	Marsh	and	
McConnell	(2010)	added	a	third	dimension,	policy	process,	to	these	concepts.	Finally,	the	
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work	of	McConnell	(2010)	was	explored,	in	developing	a	theorised	framework	approach	to	
a	more	nuanced	spectrum	of	success	and	failure,	and	the	‘grey	areas	in	between’	
(McConnell	2010).	This	approach	recognises	that	success	or	failure	can	be	differently	
interpreted	by	different	actors	at	different	times,	and	an	analysis	of	policy	needs	to	take	
account	of	the	temporal,	spatial,	cultural	and	political	interpretations,	as	well	as	recognising	
that	there	will	be	conflict	between	these	on	the	three	dimensions	of	process,	programme	
and	politics.	This	understanding	of	success	and	failure	is	central	to	the	work	of	this	thesis.	
The	work	of	HEFCE,	and	the	locus	of	policy-making	within	its	jurisdiction,	is	tempered	by	its	
relationships	with	successive	government	ideologies	and	often	competing	ideologies	of	
HEIs.	The	McConnell	framework	was	utilised	to	articulate	a	position	of	success	and	failure	in	
these	respects	for	the	chosen	policy	episodes.	
Finally,	this	chapter	considered	theorisations	of	policy-learning	to	aid	an	illumination	of	
characteristics,	similarities	and	differences	in	the	chosen	HE	policy	episodes,	in	order	to	
offer	insight	into	future	policy-making.	The	work	of	May	(1992)	was	used	to	operationalise	
a	theoretical	position	in	this	respect.		
Chapter	3,	in	discussing	the	overall	research	approach,	provides	more	detail	on	using	
McConnell’s	framework	as	a	tool	for	analysing	policy	success	and	failure,	and	describes	the	
chosen	research	methods	for	adopting	the	framework.		
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Chapter	3:	Approach,	theoretical	framework	and	research	
methods	
3.1	Approach	to	the	research		
This	study	takes	a	qualitative	methodological	research	approach,	as	is	common	with	much	
social	science	research.	Methodology	within	this	context	of	social	science	research	is	
understood	to	be	the	‘systematic,	theoretical	analysis	of	the	methods	applied	to	a	field	of	
study’	(Berg	and	Lune	2012).	The	study	adopts	a	‘post-positivist	paradigm’	(Guba	and	
Lincoln	2005)	common	in	qualitative	research,	in	recognising	that	policy	analysis	requires	
more	than	a	technographic	approach,	in	which	solely	scientific	methods	are	utilised	in	the	
analysis,	and	in	accepting	that	the	knowledge,	values	and	histories	of	both	the	observed,	
and	the	researcher	as	observer,	are	not	independent	of	the	research.	This	aligns	well	with	
contemporary	interpretations	of	policy	and	policy	analysis,	as	described	in	Chapter	2,	which	
also	adopt	a	post-positivist	approach	in	asserting	that	policy	is	bounded	by	cultural	and	
societal	values.		
The	study	adopts	an	inductive	reasoning	approach	in	identifying	patterns	and	observations	
in	the	case	study	data	in	order	to	develop	some	hypotheses	in	relation	to	the	success	or	
failure	of	the	chosen	policy	episodes,	and	from	this	I	propose	to	draw	some	conclusions	in	
relation	to	HE	policy-making.		In	line	with	a	‘grounded	theory	approach’,	as	advocated	by	
Guest	el	at	(2014	p.11)	the	treatment	of	the	case	studies	is	such	that	the	first	part	of	each	is	
a	summary	of	‘what	happened,	when	and	what	were	the	outcomes’	with	supporting	data,	
in	order	to	provide	the	initial	data	collection,	before	moving	on	to	an	identification	of	
themes	and	an	analysis	of	interpretations	supported	by	the	data,	linked	to	a	theoretical	
model.			
Identification	of	the	research	approach	is	an	important	part	of	the	research	design	process,	
in	order	to	ensure	that	the	approach	is	appropriate	for	the	study	in	question	and	to	develop	
knowledge	in	relation	to	the	chosen	field,	and	this	study	aligns	itself	well	to	an	
interpretative	approach.	Interpretative	approaches	attest	that	human	beings	make	sense	of	
their	world	and	attach	meanings	to	it	through	context	and,	as	such,	contextualisation	is	
important	in	making	sense	of	particular	phenomena.	This	is	particularly	appropriate	in	
seeking	to	understand	policy	and	the	socially	constructed	and	subjective	nature	of	policy	
analysis.	Fischer	and	Forester	(1993)	assert	that	‘interpretive	policy	analysis’	is	an	
	 57	
academically	recognised	method	in	the	analysis	of	governing,	and	Colebatch	(2014)	argues	
that	interpretation	is	an	essential	element	in	policy	analysis:	
‘taking	an	interpretative	approach	to	policy	should	not	be	seen	as	a	methodological	
option…but	as	an	integral	element	of	policy	analysis’	(p.349).	
Yanow	(2011)	also	advocates	an	interpretative	approach	to	policy	analysis,	and	attests	that	
‘local	knowledge’	is	key	in	understanding	how	policy	actors	make	context	specific	sense	of	
policy	and	its	implementation.	She	stresses	the	importance	of	the	contextual	nature	of	
knowledge,	and	as	such	argues	strongly	for	an	interpretative	approach:		
‘this	focus	on	interpretation	of	meanings	made	by	actors	in	policy	and	agency	contexts	
lies	at	the	heart	of	an	interpretive	ontological,	epistemological	and	methodological	
stance’	(p.16).	
This	notion	of	local	context	in	an	interpretative	approach	is	particularly	important	for	this	
study,	given	the	unique	position	of	HEFCE	in	acting	as	an	intermediary	body.	Yanow	attests	
that	the	position	of	agencies,	such	as	HEFCE,	are	just	as	key	in	making	sense	and	meaning	of	
policy	and	hence	the	locus	of	organisation	is	equally	important	to	process	in	interpreting	
policy:		
‘The	acts	of	legislators	and	decision	makers,	and	the	actions	of	implementing	agencies	
[are]	potentially	as	central	in	communicating	policy	meanings	as	the	enabling	legislation	
itself.	In	including	agency	actions,	policy	analysis	draws	on	ideas	from	organisational	
studies	(including	that	aspect	of	public	administration)	as	much	as	it	does	on	ideas	
about	policy	processes	developed	within	political	science’	(Yanow	2011	p.8).			
This	concept	of	context	is	key	to	answering	the	research	question,	‘what	can	an	analysis	of	
HEFCE	policy	making	reveal	about	the	locus	of	power	in	policy	making	in	higher	education?’	
which	will	be	explored	through	the	case	studies	and	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	8.		
Interpretative	approaches	can	be	open	to	the	criticism	that	the	evaluation	is	not	sufficiently	
robust.			I	have	observed	Lincoln	and	Guba’s	(1985)	evaluative	criteria	to	establish	
‘trustworthiness’	in	the	study	of	the	‘credibility’	of	the	data	and	chosen	texts,	the	
‘transferability’	of	my	illuminations	and	observations	to	HE	policy	beyond	the	case	studies,	
the	‘dependability’	of	the	findings	in	being	able	to	repeat	the	study	by	application	of	the	
framework	to	draw	the	same	conclusions	and	‘confirmability’	of	the	study	in	declaring	my	
own	position	in	relation	to	it.	These	criteria	are	explicitly	addressed	in	3.6	below,	and	are	
implicit	throughout	the	research	design	as	described	throughout	this	chapter.		
For	my	theoretical	approach,	I	have	adopted	the	framework	‘three	dimensions	of	policy	
success:	spectrum	from	success	to	failure’	established	by	McConnell	(2010).	This	framework	
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is	discussed	in	detail	in	2.5.3,	and	the	rationale	for	this	theoretical	approach	is	discussed	in	
3.2	below.	
I	have	chosen	case	studies	as	an	appropriate	research	method	for	articulating	success	and	
failure	in	policy	episodes,	since	they	are	distinctive	in	supporting	an	interpretative	approach	
(Stake	1995)	and	for	aiding	the	development	of	a	thick	description	(Geertz	1973b).	The	
rationale	for	this	method	and	a	justification	for	the	chosen	cases	is	explored	in	3.3	and	3.5	
below.	I	have	also	taken	a	thematic	analysis	approach	(Clarke	and	Braun	2017,	Guest	2014,	
Nowell	et	al	2017)	to	the	case	studies,	since	thematic	analysis	is	an	appropriate	research	
method	to	use	in	qualitative	and	interpretative	research	approaches,	‘can	be	applied	across	
a	range	of	theoretical’	frameworks	(Clarke	and	Braun	2017),	and	has	‘theoretical	freedom’	
(Nowell	et	al	2017	p.2).	The	rationale	for	this	approach	and	a	description	of	the	design	
approach	is	discussed	in	detail	in	3.3.	The	data	set	used	for	the	case	studies	comprises	
relevant	historical	documents,	which	include	primary	and	secondary	sources,	and	these	are	
described	in	detail	in	3.5.		
3.2	Theoretical	framework	
Malterud	(2001)	describes	a	theoretical	framework	as	follows:	
‘The	theoretical	framework	can	be	equated	with	the	reading	glasses	worn	by	the	
researcher	when	she	or	he	asks	questions	about	the	material’	(p.486).	
The	theoretical	framework	adopted	for	this	study	is	McConnell’s	(2010)	‘three	dimensions	
of	policy	success:	spectrum	from	success	to	failure’.	The	fundamental	assumption	of	
McConnell’s	framework	is	that	policy	success	and	failure	is	not	a	binary	position,	and	
success	or	failure	is	possible	in	any	and	all	of	the	dimensions	of	the	policy	process,	
programme	or	politics.	Equally,	success	and	failure	itself	is	more	nuanced	and	policies	are	
rarely	a	complete	success	or	an	outright	failure,	with	some	elements	of	the	policy	enjoying	
some	degree	of	success,	with	others	being	conflicted	and	heading	towards	some	degree	of	
failure.	The	detail	of	the	framework	is	described	in	Table	3	(p.47).	As	McConnell	points	out,		
‘There	is	no	clear	line	dividing	durable	success	and	conflicted	success	(and	between	the	
latter	and	the	next	category,	precarious	success).	Rather,	they	should	be	seen	as	broad	
positions	on	a	continuum’	(McConnell	2010	p.60).	
My	premise	in	this	study	is	that,	like	other	policy	domains,	HE	policies	are	not	outright	
successes	or	failures	and	that	by	using	the	McConnell	framework	as	the	looking	glass	
through	which	to	enquire	into	historical	policy	episodes,	it	is	possible	to	illuminate	patterns	
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and	observations	in	relation	to	the	extent	of	success	and	failure	in	the	dimensions	of	
process,	programme	and	the	politics	to	develop	some	conclusions	for	policy-making	in	HE.			
McConnell	recognises	that	his	framework	is	interpretative	and,	as	a	consequence,	there	are	
many	methodological	challenges	to	be	overcome,	both	in	the	data	and	in	articulating	the	
values	of	the	analyst	in	making	interpretative	judgements	that	must	be	recognised:		
‘Assessing	policies	is	riddled	with	ambiguities,	information	deficits,	and	value	conflicts	
rendering	it	necessary	for	judgements	and	different	choices	to	be	made’	(2010	p.95).	
However,	he	is	unapologetic	in	recognising	the	‘arts	and	craft’	nature	of	such	an	
interpretative	approach:	
‘Locating	the	outcomes	of	[success	and	failure]	in	any	particular	category	is	not	an	exact	
science.	There	will	always	be	differences	of	interpretation	and	complex	methodological	
issues	to	be	recognised,	as	well	as	judgements	and	rationales	for	placing	outcomes	in	
any	particular	category’	(McConnell	2011	p.71).		
‘Placing	aspects	of	failure	in	these	categories	should	be	considered	something	of	an	
intellectual	mapping	exercise	involving	judgement	in	order	to	get	sense	of	the	forms,	
strengths	and	interconnections	of	failure.	Very	few	policies	will	fit	neatly	into	the	same	
category	but	the	weighing	up	what	factors	are/are	not	important,	is	part	of	the	‘art	and	
craft’	of	analysis’	(McConnell	2015	p.237).		
As	such,	the	policy	evaluator	is	open	to	criticism	for	making	particular	value	judgements	in	
using	McConnell’s	framework.	More	detail	on	how	I	ensured	trustworthiness	in	the	
research	design	and	decisions	is	further	explored	in	3.3	and	3.6,	but	for	the	purposes	of	
describing	the	theoretical	framework,	it	is	helpful	to	note	that	McConnell	provides	a	ten-
point	scheme	to	offer	guidance	on	‘weighing	up	different	outcomes	when	there	is	conflict	
between	them’	(McConnell	2010	p.96)	and	the	consequences	of	issues	(Table	5,	p.60),	in	
order	to	address	such	a	criticism.	He	suggests	that	analysts	need	to	think	about	these	in	
working	through	the	criteria	for	assessing	success	and	failure.	These	questions	form	the	
basis	for	generating	the	coding	for	the	study,	which	is	explained	in	3.3.		
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Table	5	-	SUMMARY	OF	MCCONNELL’S	10-POINT	SCHEME	TO	HELP	GUIDE	RESEARCHERS	IN	
ASSESSING	THE	SUCCESS	OR	OTHERWISE	OF	A	POLICY		
1	 Do	you	want	to	assess	process,	programme	and/or	politics?	
2	 What	time	period	do	you	want	to	assess?	
3	 What	benchmark	will	you	use	to	ascertain	success:	Government	objectives,	Benefit	to	target	
group,	Before-and-after,	Policy	domain	criteria,	Who	supports	the	policy,	Another	jurisdiction,	
Balance	sheet,	Newness	and	innovation,	Ethics,	morality	and	the	law?	
4	 Are	you	confident	that	sufficient	and	credible	information	is	available	in	order	to	reach	a	
conclusion?	
5	 Are	you	confident	that	you	can	isolate	the	policy	outcomes	from	all	other	influences	on	these	
outcomes?	
6	 To	the	best	of	your	knowledge	and/or	instincts,	do	you	consider	a	hidden	agenda	to	be	at	work?	
7	 Does	the	sphere	of	policy	you	are	assessing	(process,	programme,	politics)	have	more	than	one	
goal?	
8	 Are	there	any	unintended	consequences,	including	success	being	greater	than	planned?	
9	 Does	the	policy	fall	short	of	meeting	the	targets	that	were	set?	
10	 Are	you	assessing	more	than	one	policy	realm	(process,	programmes	and	politics)?		
(McConnell	2010	p.96-101)	
In	choosing	this	framework,	it	is	not	to	say	that	I	am	unaware	of	other	conceptual	
frameworks	that	might	have	been	adopted	instead.	For	example,	in	Chapter	2,	other	
frameworks	were	acknowledged,	particularly	those	that	specifically	take	a	HE	policy	
analysis	approach,	such	as	Hyatt’s	(2013)	‘framework	for	critical	analysis	of	HE	policy	texts’,	
Bacchi’s	(2009)	WPR	model,	in	which	she	takes	a	discourse	analysis	approach	to	examine	
‘What’s	the	Problem	Represented	(WPR)’	through	a	framework,	and	Jungblut’s	(2015)	two-
dimensional	analytical	framework	used	to	hypothesise	whether	different	political	parties	
favour	different	HE	systems	and	therefore	policy	outputs.	However,	these	approaches	have	
very	different	conceptual	frameworks;	for	example,	Hyatt’s	discourse	analysis	approach	
examines	contextualisation	of	the	meaning	of	policy	texts	and	allows	for	‘investigation	of	
the	relationship’	between	‘language,	power	and	processes,	and	actors’,	and	the	framework	
recognises	that	
	
‘systems	of	power	affect	people	by	the	meanings	they	construct	and	represent	in	policy	
texts	and	processes’	(Hyatt	2013	p.843).	
	
Jungblut’s	framework,	whilst	helpful	in	examining	the	politics	dimension	and	addressing	HE	
as	a	system,	does	not,	for	me,	help	to	address	the	policy	process	or	programme	elements	of	
a	policy	episode.	
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As	such,	these	frameworks	do	not	explicitly	offer	an	instructive	lens	for	examining	success	
and	failure	in	a	nuanced	way	in	relation	to	the	three	dimensions:	process,	programme	and	
politics.	The	framework	proposed	by	Newman	(2014),	described	in	Figure	6	(p.46),	draws	
on	that	of	McConnell,	but	proposes	a	sliding	scale	of	success	and	failure,	rather	than	a	
spectrum	with	clearly	articulated	categorisations.	I	contend	that,	whilst	this	model	allows	
for	a	greater	interpretative	methodology,	rather	than	the	rigidity	(Gore	2011)	of	the	
McConnell	categorisations,	in	my	opinion	it	lays	the	analyst	open	to	being	less	able	to	
defend	their	interpretative	positions	on	the	scale	because	it	loses	the	nuanced	and	more	
illustrative	categorisations	of	‘success,	durable	success,	conflicted	success,	precarious	
success	and	failure’	(McConnell	2010),	in	favour	of	the	less	defined	success,	partial	success	
and	failure.			
3.3	Research	design:	methods	of	reading	and	recording	analysis	
The	two	main	research	methods	used	in	this	study	are	case	studies	and	thematic	analysis,	
using	documents	as	the	data	to	inform	a	thick	description	of	the	policy	episodes	and	
thematic	analysis	to	systematically	capture	interesting	features	from	the	data.	The	
theoretical	framework	described	above	is	then	applied	to	each	case	study,	in	order	to	
provide	an	interpretative	narrative	and	evidenced	justification	for	positioning	the	policy	
episode	under	each	dimension	on	the	framework	for	an	analysis	of	success	and	failure.	The	
approach	taken	is	used	to	ascertain	whether	there	are	any	similarities	and	contradictions	to	
be	understood	from	the	analysis	of	those	episodes,	to	illuminate	recommendations	for	
future	HE	policy.	Since	this	study	is	contextualised	within	the	field	of	contemporary	HE,	
these	case	studies	have	been	chosen	from	policy	episodes	formulated	by	HEFCE,	as	the	key	
agency	in	policy	formation.			
3.3.1	Case	studies	
Case	studies	are	central	to	the	study	and	have	been	chosen	as	an	appropriate	research	
method	because	one	of	their	most	distinctive	characteristics	is	their	emphasis	on	
interpretation	(Stake	1995),	and	hence	they	fit	well	with	the	chosen	epistemological	
orientation	(Yin	2014)	for	this	study.	Case	studies	are	empirical	enquiries	which	allow	the	
researcher	to	examine	complex	social	phenomena	within	a	real	world	context	(Yin	2014,	
Merriam	1988)	and	are	used	to	explain,	describe,	illustrate	and	illuminate	particular	
incidents.	Hence,	they	lend	themselves	well	to	the	examination	of	policy	episodes.	Case	
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studies	are	also	particularly	useful	for	historical	research,	where	the	researcher	is	reliant	
upon	methods	such	as	documentary	analysis,	rather	than	direct	observation	or	
experimentation.		
Case	studies	are	also	a	useful	tool	when	the	research	requires	an	element	of	comparison,	as	
in	this	study,	which	seeks	to	identify	commonalities	and	distinctions	between	the	policy	
episodes.	Yin	suggests	that	they	are	useful	
‘to	explain	the	presumed	causal	link	in	real	world	interventions	that	are	too	complex	for	
survey	or	experimental	methods’	(Yin	2014	p.19).	
Equally,	Tight	(2017)	suggests	that	small-scale	case	studies	are	helpful	when	they	are	
‘triangulated..	for	example	by	comparison	with	other	similar	case	studies’	(p.30).	Chapter	2	
established	contemporary	understandings	of	policy	to	be	historically	and	socially	
constructed,	which	recognises	power	relationships,	the	influence	and	behaviours	of	actors,	
and	the	agency	of	policy	within	a	context	of	practice	(Ball	1993,	2006).	All	of	these	
complexities	can	be	understood	in	contemporary	HE	policy-making,	which	recognises	the	
multifaceted	relationship	between	government,	HEFCE	and	institutions	and,	consequently,	
the	context	within	which	policy	formulation	and	implementation	is	played	out.	Case	study	
research	in	this	context,	then,	is	beneficial	in	making	comparisons	between	policy	episodes	
and	in	trying	to	answer	the	research	question	‘does	the	evaluation	of	particular	policy	
episodes	reveal	any	common	characteristics	and	distinctions	in	relation	to	policy	that	could	
usefully	be	considered	in	relation	to	future	policy	setting	in	higher	education?’	
3.3.2	Thematic	analysis	
Thematic	analysis	is	a	common	research	method	in	qualitative	analysis,	and	is	used	to	
identify	and	examine	patterns,	called	themes,	within	the	data	which	help	to	explain	a	
particular	phenomenon	by	producing	thick	descriptions.	This	method	is	particularly	useful	
for	interpretative	methodologies	and	for	undertaking	documentary	research,	which	
examines	themes	in	texts.	Guest	et	al	(2014),	note	that	
‘A	thematic	analysis	is	still	the	most	useful	in	capturing	the	complexities	of	meaning	
within	textual	data’	(Guest	et	al	2014	p.10).	
Thematic	analysis	uses	either	an	inductive	or	a	deductive	approach	(Clarke	and	Braun	
2017).	This	particular	study	uses	an	inductive	approach,	since	the	analysis,	as	with	
grounded	theory,	is	driven	by	a	theoretical	framework,	and	it	is	the	use	of	the	framework	
that	helps	to	identify	particular	phenomena	within	the	data.	Clarke	and	Braun	(2017)	and	
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Nowell	et	al	(2017)	advocate	that,	since	thematic	analysis	demonstrates	high	levels	of	
flexibility,	it	has	theoretical	freedom	and	thus	can	be	applied	to	many	different	theoretical	
positions.	
There	are	many	different	schemas	for	undertaking	a	thematic	analysis;	for	example,	Guest	
et	al	(2014)	advocate	an	applied	thematic	analysis	approach	which,	whilst	being	
interpretative,	has	a	strong	emphasis	on	positivist	assumptions	about	the	thematic	nature	
of	the	data.	One	of	the	most	common,	and	fitting	well	with	the	interpretative	nature	of	the	
chosen	theoretical	framework,	is	that	developed	by	Braun	and	Clarke	(2006),	who	divide	
the	research	plan	into	six	distinct	phases.	I	have	used	these	six	phases	as	the	basis	for	my	
research	design.	The	phases	proposed	by	Braun	and	Clarke	are:	
1) ‘Becoming	familiar	with	the	data	
2) Generating	codes		
3) Searching	for	themes	
4) Reviewing	themes	
5) Defining	and	naming	themes	
6) Report	(thick	description)’	
	
For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	phases	3,	4	and	5	in	relation	to	themes	have	been	
condensed	into	one	section	below.	
3.3.2.1	Becoming	familiar	with	the	data	
The	sources	of	texts	and	data	for	each	case	study	and	the	rationale	for	their	selection,	are	
described	in	3.5,	but	here	it	is	important	to	establish	how	the	texts	were	read,	and,	in	
particular,	what	techniques	were	used	in	establishing	the	credibility	of	the	texts,	using	
Lincoln	and	Guba’s	(1985)	evaluation	criteria	to	ensure	trustworthiness	in	the	research.	The	
notion	of	trustworthiness	is	explored	more	fully	in	4.6.		
The	reading	of	texts	is	central	to	the	research	design	of	the	study,	since	they	are	historical	
and	social	documents,	which	lend	themselves	to	an	interpretative	study	of	the	context	of	
policy-making	in	each	case	(Bowen	2009).	For	Atkinson	and	Coffey	(1997)	and	McCulloch	
(2004),	documents	are	‘social	facts’	and	as	such	for	historical	research,	they	attest	that	
documentary	analysis	may	be	the	only	reliable	approach.		
In	the	first	instance,	each	document	was	classified	as	either	a	primary	or	secondary	text	and	
was	given	a	unique	identification	number.	I	then	undertook	an	‘analytic	strategy’	(Yin	2014)	
as	the	research	approach	to	the	data,	in	which	there	are	multiple	readings	of	the	content	of	
the	texts.	The	first	reading	of	the	texts	used	an	analytical	technique	called	‘explanation	
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building’	(Yin	2014,	Stake	1995)	to	develop	a	descriptive	account	of	the	policy	episode,	
identifying	the	origin,	chronological	timeline,	organisations,	actors,	decisions,	activities	and	
outcomes	of	the	episode.	This	explanation	building	provides	the	contextual	richness	to	
create	an	account	of	the	policy	episode.	Much	of	the	data	for	this	reading	of	the	texts	
comes	from	the	primary	data	sources,	such	as	HEFCE	circulars,	consultations	and	evaluation	
reports.	Then	I	undertook	multiple	readings	of	the	texts	in	order	to	establish	the	codes	and	
identification	of	the	themes	as	described	below	and	summarised	in	Appendix	B.	These	
multiple	readings	are	established	techniques	of	prolonged	engagement,	which	seek	to	
establish	credibility,	as	defined	by	Lincoln	and	Guba	(1985).		
It	is	also	important	to	declare	the	use	of	another	technique	used	to	establish	credibility	of	
the	data	sources	at	this	point,	which	is	triangulation.	This	technique	uses	multiple	data	
sources	as	a	method	of	validation	and	verification	(Patton	1999)	of	the	data	and	is	a	
commonly	used	technique	for	establishing	trustworthiness	in	the	phase	of	familiarising	
oneself	with	the	data	(Nowell	et	al	2017).	Triangulation	is	also	used	as	a	technique	to	
‘increase	the	understanding	of	complex	phenomena’	(Malterud	2001	p.487).		In	the	context	
of	this	particular	study,	triangulation	was	established	through	the	sampling	of	a	range	of	
both	primary	and	secondary	data	sources,	such	that	the	contextual	richness	was	achieved,	
not	just	from	HEFCE’s	own	documents	and	reports,	but	from	others	such	as	government	
texts,	independent	evaluations,	media	reports	and	academic	commentaries.	These	are	
listed	in	Appendix	A	for	each	case	study.		
3.3.2.2	Generating	codes	
The	second	phase	of	thematic	analysis	is	the	generation	of	codes	(Scott	1990,	Scott	2000,	
Bowen	2009),	where	‘codes	are	the	building	blocks	for	themes’	(Clarke	and	Braun	2017).	
‘Qualitative	coding	is	the	process	of	reflection	and	a	way	of	interacting	with	and	
thinking	about	the	data…	coding	allows	the	researcher	to	simplify	and	focus	on	specific	
characteristics	of	the	data’	(Nowell	et	al	2017).	
Fereday	and	Muir-Cochrane	(2006)	advocate	developing	an	‘priori	template	of	codes’	(p.82)	
in	order	to	complement	the	research	questions	of	the	study	in	question,	and	it	is	while	
generating	these	codes	that	the	adoption	of	the	theoretical	framework	is	established,	since	
‘codings	are	essentially	a	way	of	operationalising	theoretical	concepts’	(Scott	1990	p.9).	
To	develop	the	coding	for	this	study,	I	used	the	ten	research	questions	proposed	by	
McConnell	(Table	5,	p.60),	in	order	to	provide	a	lens	to	focus	on	the	relevant	characteristics	
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of	the	data.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	questions	proposed	by	McConnell	are	intended	
to	be	broad	and	applicable	across	a	range	of	policy	domains	and,	as	such,	some	questions	
held	more	relevance	in	the	context	of	HE	than	others.	The	codes	were	then	cross-matched	
against	the	framework	‘three	dimensions:	a	spectrum	from	success	to	failure’	(McConnell	
2010)	to	ensure	that	the	coding	addressed	the	categories	on	the	matrix.	This	ensured	that	
the	coding	was	sufficiently	rich	to	provide	both	themes,	and	a	suitably	thick	description	to	
demonstrate	a	justification	for	where	on	the	spectrum	I	considered	each	case	study	to	be	in	
relation	to	success	and	failure.	The	coding	is	described	in	Appendix	B.	Each	document	was	
then	analysed	to	see	where	relevant	codes	could	be	identified.	Not	every	code	was	evident	
in	every	document,	but	the	frequency	with	which	they	were	referenced	was	noted.	In	
addition,	key	sections	of	text	were	highlighted	where	they	demonstrated	important	
referencing	to	the	coding.				
3.3.2.3	Searching	for	themes,	reviewing	themes,	defining	and	naming	themes	
Following	Braun	and	Clarke’s	(2006)	approach	to	thematic	analysis,	the	next	stage	was	
identifying	themes	from	the	texts	that	had	arisen	as	a	result	of	the	multiple	readings	to	
collate	and	code	the	data.	Fereday	and	Muir-Cochrane	(2006)	describe	the	search	for	
themes		
‘as	being	important	to	the	description	of	the	phenomenon’	and	involves	‘careful	reading	
and	re-reading	of	the	data.	It	is	a	form	of	pattern	recognition	within	the	data,	where	
emerging	themes	become	the	categories	for	analysis’	(p.82).	
The	coding	is	an	important	stage	of	the	process,	in	illuminating	data	of	relevance	to	the	
research	questions	and	the	theoretical	framework,	and	the	coded	data	is	extracted	into	the	
themes.	The	identification	of	themes	helps	to		
‘bring	meaning	and	identity….	A	theme	captures	and	unifies	the	nature	or	basis	of	the	
experience	into	a	meaningful	whole.	Themes	are	identified	by	bringing	together	
components	or	fragments	of	ideas	and	experiences,	which	often	are	meaningless	when	
viewed	alone.	A	theme	is	not	necessarily	dependent	upon	quantifiable	measures	but	
rather	on	whether	it	captures	something	important	in	relation	to	the	overall	research	
question’	(Braun	and	Clarke	2006).				
Following	the	advice	of	Nowell	et	al	(2017),	I	produced	a	matrix	in	relation	to	the	coding	
identified	in	Appendix	B		in	order	to	explore	themes	relevant	to	each	case	study.	In	line	with	
Braun	and	Clarke’s	(2006)	phases,	these	were	then	reviewed	in	order	to	accommodate	the	
theoretical	framework	and	hence	articulate	a	position	of	success	or	failure	in	relation	to	
each	dimension.	Concurrent	with	an	inductive	thematic	analysis	approach	in	identifying	
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patterns,	the	themes	for	each	case	study	were	identified	in	part	by	the	degree	to	which	
they	assumed	importance	in	both	the	primary	and	secondary	texts,	but	also	by	their	
significance	in	relating	to	the	theoretical	framework.	As	such,	my	centrality	as	the	
researcher,	and	my	interpretation,	are	significant	to	the	choice	of	themes.	My	position	in	
relation	to	the	study	is	further	described	in	4.6.1.	This	also	means	that	the	account	of	the	
episodes	and	selected	themes	are	biased	towards	the	research	study,	and	so	there	is	a	
caveat	that	the	description	of	the	episodes	will	concentrate	on	particular	aspects	of	the	
data	in	relation	to	identifying	success	and	failure	as	opposed	to	other	aspects	of	how	the	
policy	might	be	viewed.		Nowell	et	al	(2017)	suggest	that	this	is	acceptable	in	inductive	
thematic	analysis.	In	line	with	Braun	and	Clarke’s	(2006)	phasing	approach,	the	themes	
were	given	names,	which	are	reflected	in	the	subheadings	in	the	case	study	chapters.		
3.3.2.4	Report	
The	case	studies	are	described	in	Chapters	5,6,7,	in	the	form	of	a	thick	description.	In	each	
case	the	first	part	of	the	chapter	is	an	account	of	the	episode,	including	a	description	of	the	
origin,	the	context	within	English	policy-making,	a	timeline	of	events,	the	organisations	and	
actors	involved	in	both	the	policy	formation	and	implementation,	the	activities	and	the	
outcomes.	The	second	part	of	the	chapter	examines	how	the	policy	was	viewed,	both	from	
‘official’	primary	sources,	such	as	formative	and	summative	evaluations,	and	secondary	
texts,	such	as	academic	commentaries	and	media	reports.	The	themes	identified	in	the	
analysis	are	reflected	in	this	section.	This	section	includes	data	and	quotes	from	the	texts	in	
order	to	demonstrate	the	identified	themes,	as	advocated	by	Nowell	et	al	(2017):	
‘Extracts	of	raw	data	need	to	be	embedded	within	the	analytic	narrative	to	illustrate	the	
complex	story	of	the	data,	going	beyond	a	description	of	the	data	and	convincing	the	
reader	of	the	validity	and	merit	of	the	analysis’	(p.11).	
Most	of	the	interpretative	nature	of	the	work	is	conducted	in	Chapter	8,	which,	for	each	
case	study,	provides	a	mapping	of	the	description	of	the	policy	episode	against	the	
theoretical	framework,	to	seek	to	establish	a	position	on	the	success/	failure	spectrum	in	
relation	to	each	of	the	‘three	dimensions	of	policy	process,	programme	and	politics’	
(McConnell	2010).	Chapter	8	also	seeks	to	identify	any	commonalities	and	differences	
between	the	policy	episodes,	drawing	on	these	to	yield	insight	into	future	HE	policy-
making.	As	such,	this	chapter	seeks	to	meet	Lincoln	and	Guba’s	(1985)	second	
trustworthiness	evaluation	criteria,	‘transferability’,	to	demonstrate	that	the	findings	can	
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be	equally	appropriate	in	other	policy	contexts.	They	conclude	that	thick	descriptions	are	a	
valuable	technique	for	establishing	transferability:	
‘[they	act]	as	a	way	of	achieving	a	type	of	external	validity.	By	describing	a	phenomenon	
in	sufficient	detail,	one	can	begin	to	evaluate	the	extent	to	which	the	conclusions	drawn	
are	transferable	to	other	times,	settings,	situations	and	people’	(Lincoln	and	Guba	
1985).		
3.4	Selection	of	case	studies	
Chapter	4	provides	the	context	for	the	research	in	terms	of	the	history	and	features	of	
policy-making	in	England	and,	importantly,	the	role	of	HEFCE	since	1992	and	situates	the	
chosen	cases	within	the	work	of	HEFCE.	For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	it	is	necessary	to	
justify	the	choice	of	case	studies,	and	this	section	describes	the	process	and	motivation	for	
the	particular	selection.	The	first	stage	of	research	for	this	thesis	was	to	undertake	a	
comprehensive	review	of	the	policy	work	of	HEFCE	since	its	inception	in	1992	and	to	
develop	as	full	a	picture	of	policy-making	as	possible,	through	the	construction	of	a	timeline	
of	policy	episodes	and	revisions.	This	timeline	is	included	in	Appendix	C.	Policy	episodes	
were	categorised	according	to	HEFCE’s	own	classifications	of	its	work,	which	it	tended	to	
replicate	in	the	structures	of	both	their	annual	reports	and	on	their	website.	These	were:	
Learning	&	Teaching;		
Widening	Participation;	
Research,	Economy	&	Society;	
Leadership	and	Management	and	Governance.		
	
I	added	a	further	category,	‘Finance,	Estates	&	Assurance’,	to	capture	policy	episodes	that	
did	not	fit	within	the	other	categories.	Data	on	policy	episodes	was	gathered	through	a	
triangulation	of	the	reading	of	HEFCE	annual	reports,	circular	letters,	reports	from	-	or	
commissioned	by	-	HEFCE	and	HEFCE	Board	minutes.	The	Board	minutes	mostly	served	to	
provide	context	for	policy	decisions,	partly	because	minutes	are	not	available	on	the	
website	before	2003,	and	after	2003,	minutes	were	in	part	missing	where	discussion	was	
either	commercially	sensitive	or	referred	to	individual	institutions.		
The	composition	of	the	timeline	established	the	extent	and	range	of	policy	activity	
conducted	by	HEFCE	throughout	its	history,	and	also	revealed	a	pattern	for	how	policy-
making	tended	to	be	formulated	and	addressed.	As	might	be	expected	for	a	funding	
council,	the	vast	majority	of	policy	episodes	were	driven	through	the	establishment	of	
funding	made	available	to	institutions	over	a	specified	period	of	time.	These	were	
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formulated	in	order	to	drive	the	behaviour	of	institutions	towards	particular	strategies,	
identified	by	government	and	HEFCE	as	important	for	furthering	HE.		A	typical	pattern	
suggests	that	policy	was	driven	by	government	through	particular	education	acts	and	
comprehensive	spending	reviews,	which	then	established	the	policy	direction	for	HEFCE.	
The	locus	of	policy-making,	as	either	being	driven	by	government,	or	HEFCE	itself,	is	a	
notable	feature	of	HE	policy-making,	which	is	explored	through	the	case	studies.		Typically,	
funding	would	be	made	available	for	an	initiative	and	HEFCE	would	launch	a	consultation	
with	institutions	prior	to	seeking	bids	for	funding.	Policy	episodes	would	typically,	but	not	
always,	be	reviewed	through	a	formative	evaluation,	before	being	concluded	with	a	
summative	evaluation,	usually	commissioned	by	HEFCE	and	conducted	by	independent	
researchers.	That	is	not	to	say	that	all	policy-making	followed	this	‘project’	approach,	since	
HEFCE	also	sought	to	drive	behaviour	through	regular	modifications	to	recurrent	funding	
policies.	For	this	study,	I	established	that	the	selection	of	case	studies	needed	to	offer	
sufficient	depth	and	breadth,	particularly	in	the	availability	of	document	data,	to	allow	for	a	
full	description	and	interpretation	against	the	theoretical	framework.	In	addition,	there	
needed	to	be	sufficient	data	available	to	allow	the	conditions	of	the	ten-point	scheme	(as	
described	in	Table	5,	p.60)	to	be	met.	As	such,	the	criteria	for	choosing	case	studies	were	
that:	
a) They	were	sufficiently	time	bound,	since	bounding	the	case	is	important	in	case	
study	research,	but	also	the	ten-point	scheme	suggests	that	identifying	an	end	
point	is	beneficial	in	applying	the	theoretical	framework.	As	such,	I	chose	not	to	
select	recurrent	policies,	such	as	funding	formulas	based	on	student	numbers,	as	
they	are	subject	to	constant	amendments	and	re-iterations.	The	time-bound	nature	
of	the	theoretical	framework	is	an	important	topic	that	I	will	return	to	in	the	
critique	of	the	framework	in	Chapter	8;	
b) The	policy	episode	had	clear	objectives	and	proposed	outcomes,	particularly	in	
allowing	benchmarking	for	the	benefit	target	group.	This	was	important	in	being	
able	to	address	point	three	in	the	ten-point	scheme;	
c) The	policy	episodes	followed	a	‘typical’	policy	approach	by	HEFCE,	such	that	they	
were	launched,	sought	consultation	with	institutions,	sought	bids	for	funding	and	
were	evaluated	in	terms	of	meeting	objectives	and	benefits	for	the	target	group;		
d) There	were	sufficient	‘sources	of	data	to	allow	for	a	thick	description’	(Geertz	
1973b)	from	primary	sources	of	data	such	as	archival	records	in	the	form	of	HEFCE	
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circulars,	consultations,	other	government	documents	and	independent	evaluation	
reports	to	HEFCE,	in	order	to	develop	proposed	themes	for	analysis;		
e) There	were	sufficient	secondary	sources	of	data	to	allow	for	a	richer	and	more	
textured	analysis	from	sources	such	as	newspaper	articles,	parliamentary	questions	
and	reports	and	scholarly	articles	which	explored	the	identified	themes	of	the	
chosen	case	studies;			
f) The	choice	of	case	studies	allowed	for	‘replication’,	not	‘sampling’	(Yin	2014)	so	that	
they	either	produced	a	similar	analysis	(‘literal	replication’)	or	contrasting	results	
(‘theoretical	replication’)	(Yin	2014	p.57)	in	order	to	help	answer	the	supplementary	
research	question	seeking	to	identify	similarities	or	contradictions	in	the	process,	
programme	or	politics	dimensions	of	chosen	policy	episodes;	
g) There	were	sufficient	documentary	data	available	to	allow	the	application	of	Yin’s	
(2014)	‘case	study	tactics’	to	test	for	the	quality	of	the	research	design:	‘construct	
validity’	(using	‘multiple	sources	of	evidence	and	establishing	a	chain	of	evidence’),	
‘internal	validity’	(pattern	matching,	explanation	building,	addressing	rival	
explanations),	‘external	validity’	(‘using	replication	logic	in	multiple-case	studies’),	
and	‘reliability’	(‘using	case	study	protocol’)	(Yin	2014	p.45);	
h) The	availability	of	data	also	needed	to	be	sufficient	to	ensure	that	the	case	studies	
were	sufficiently	robust	to	meet	Lincoln	and	Guba’s	(1985)	evaluation	criteria.							
Time	boundedness	was	a	key	consideration	in	selecting	case	studies	from	a	particular	
timeframe	of	HEFCE	policy	episodes.	The	Dearing	report	in	1997	had	proposed	that	mass	
HE,	whilst	desirable,	was	not	financially	sustainable,	and	so	a	funding	mechanism	needed	to	
be	established	whereby	students	contributed	to	the	cost	of	their	education.	This	was	swiftly	
followed	in	1998	by	the	Teaching	and	Higher	Education	Act,	and	the	establishment	of	a	
means	tested	fee.	The	Higher	Education	Act	in	2004	established	an	increase	in	fee	to	£3,000	
per	annum	and	fee	increases	continued	to	be	a	recurring	trend.		1997	also	saw	the	New	
Labour	government	elected,	with	an	election	pledge	to	ensure	that	there	was	a	50%	
participation	rate	in	HE	by	2010.	Funding	for	HE	was	a	priority	for	the	new	government	and	
a	comprehensive	spending	review	in	1998	saw	the	introduction	of	additional	funding.		In	
2001,	HEFCE	received	an	additional	10%	(£1bn)	in	funding	over	three	years	to	tackle	future	
expansion	and	widening	participation.	One	of	the	key	features	of	the	New	Labour	
government	was	an	ideology	dominated	by	a	‘Third	Way’,	characterised	by	market-based	
reforms	and	wider	policy	aims	around	technology,	e-government	and	new	managerialism.		
In	response	to	both	the	additional	funding	to	support	growth	and	widening	participation,	
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and	a	need	to	ensure	that	HE	institutions	were	offering	value	for	money	in	an	increasingly	
marketised	area	of	policy,	HEFCE	introduced	a	plethora	of	new	policy	initiatives	between	
2000	and	2006	(see	timeline	in	Appendix	C),	many	of	which	were	in	supporting	learning	and	
teaching.	2006	saw	a	step	change	in	policy-making,	with	a	new	Chief	Executive	for	HEFCE	
and	a	change	in	focus	as	HEFCE	became	the	chief	regulator	for	HE	under	the	Charities	Act	
2006.	This	was	swiftly	followed	in	2008	by	the	global	financial	crisis	and	a	further	change	of	
focus	for	HE	amid	considerable	funding	cuts	and	the	introduction	of	variable	fees.		For	
these	reasons,	I	chose	to	select	case	studies	that	were	launched	within	the	period	2000-
2006,	since	this	was	a	period	rich	in	HEFCE	policy	episodes	which	reflected	New	Labour’s	
‘Third	Way’	ideology.	This	ideological	position	is	important	as	it	is	explored	through	the	
contextualisation	of	each	case	study.		
In	recognition	of	the	focus	of	this	period‘s	policy-making	in	supporting	learning	and	
teaching	initiatives,	I	chose	to	select	three	case	studies	from	that	particular	policy	category:	
learning	and	teaching.	Selecting	from	one	category	allows	for	a	greater	richness	in	
identifying	common	themes	or	contradictions	arising	from	the	policy	episode,	rather	than	
selecting	from	more	than	one	category,	where	common	themes	may	be	more	difficult	to	
identify.	As	such,	this	would	meet	Lincoln	and	Guba’s	(1985)	evaluation	criteria	in	
establishing	transferability.	
The	selected	case	studies	shown	in	Table	6	(p.71)	were	chosen	in	meeting	the	selection	
criteria.	That	is	not	to	say	that	other	policy	episodes	would	not	also	have	met	the	criteria,	
but	for	me	these	stood	out	as	offering	sufficient	opportunities	to	demonstrate	enough	
similarities	and	differences	in	order	to	illuminate	insights	into	HEFCE	policy-making.	As	the	
researcher,	I	have	to	admit	to	a	slight	bias	towards	choosing	the	e-University	as	one	of	the	
chosen	case	studies,	as	it	has	been	perceived	to	be	an	outright	policy	failure,	and	as	such	it	
serves	as	an	excellent	test	for	examining	success	and	failure	in	a	more	nuanced	way.		
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Table	6	-	MATCHING	OF	CHOSEN	CASE	STUDIES	AGAINST	SELECTION	CRITERIA	
Policy	episode	 Time	
boundedness	
Clearly	identified	
proposed	outcomes	
and	benefit	to	target	
group	
Typical	pattern	of	policy	
process	
Sufficient	
sources	of	
primary	and	
secondary	
documentation	
The		
e-University	
ü	
2000	–	2004	
ü	
Target	numbers	
identified	
Expected	increased	
funding	for	institutions	
Target	group:	home	
and	overseas	students		
ü	
Launch	
Consultation	
Bids	for	funding	
Formal	enquiry	
(evaluation)	
ü	
See	Appendix	A	
Centres	for	
Excellence	in	
Learning	&	
Teaching	
	
ü	
2005	–	2010	
ü	
Enhance	
professionalisation/	
reputation	of	L&T	
through	infrastructure	
and	technology,	
rewarding	staff	
Target	group:	staff	and	
students	
ü	
Launch	
Consultation	
Bids	for	funding	
Formative	evaluation	
Summative	evaluation	
ü	
See	Appendix	A	
Lifelong	
Learning	
Networks	
ü	
2004	–	2010	
ü	
Increased	numbers	of	
students	undertaking	
vocational	
qualifications	to	meet	
50%	participation	
Increased	HE/FE	
engagement	
Target	group:	widening	
participation	
ü	
Launch	
Consultation	
Bids	for	funding	
Formative	evaluation	
Summative	evaluation	
ü	
See	Appendix	A	
	
3.5	Sources	of	data	and	documents	
The	primary	and	secondary	documents	used	for	each	case	study	are	listed	in	Appendix	A.		
3.5.1	Selection	of	the	texts	
In	selecting	the	documents	for	analysis,	I	followed	the	selection	criteria	noted	by	John	Scott	
(1990),	Hart	(2001)	and	McCollach	(2004).	They	contend	that,	in	the	first	instance,	selected	
documents	must	be	authentic	in	their	source	and	authorship,	the	material	must	be	credible	
and	reliable,	and	any	potential	bias	on	behalf	of	the	authors	acknowledged.	In	addition,	the	
selected	texts	must	be	representative	of	all	the	likely	documents	that	might	be	available,	
and	so	sampling	is	a	key	issue.	Scott	(1990)	attempts	to	classify	types	of	documents	in	
terms	of	authorship	and	access	to	generate	a	typology	of	modern	documents,	and	in	Scott’s	
terms,	documents	selected	for	this	study	tend	to	form	type	11,	(governmental	papers	to	
which	there	is	open	access	through	archives)	and	type	12,	(British	official	publications)	such	
as	Acts	of	Parliament	and	the	Hansard	record	of	parliamentary	debates.	Some	are	type	8,	
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(published	documents	of	a	private	source),	such	as	newspaper	articles.	In	selecting	the	
relevant	documents	and	ensuring	a	manageable	sample,	the	primary	texts	were	taken	to	be	
critical	to	the	analysis,	and	secondary	texts	were	selected	on	the	basis	of	either	being	
commonly	referenced	in	the	bibliographical	analysis	of	primary	texts,	or	that	they	offered	
insights	of	particular	interest	to	the	case	study,	and	in	particular	the	analytic	themes	
identified	as	a	result	of	the	analysis	of	the	primary	data	sources.	
The	main	reference	tools	used	to	select	the	primary	texts	for	each	case	study	were	the	
HEFCE	website	(http://www.hefce.ac.uk/)	for	circular	letters,	consultations	and	evaluation	
reports.	The	parliamentary	website	(www.parliament.uk)	was	used	in	key	word	searches	for	
acts,	bills,	committee	and	other	governmental	reports	and	Hansard	for	the	report	of	official	
proceedings	of	the	Houses	of	Commons	and	Lords.	The	primary	texts	were	also	very	often	
used	as	sources	for	identifying	other	primary	and	secondary	texts,	and	these	were	
identified	through	a	process	of	cross-checking	bibliographies	in	a	‘bibliographical	analysis’	
(Hart	2001).	The	Times	Higher	Educational	Supplement		(THES)	electronic	archive	was	also	
used	in	key	word	searches	for	media	reports.		The	University	of	Sheffield	Library	electronic	
resources	and	Google	Scholar	were	also	used	in	a	second	level	search	for	identifying	
learned	journal	and	other	media	contributions	as	secondary	texts.			
I	did	consider	using	interviews	with	key	actors	who	would	have	been	involved	in	the	
development	of	the	policy	episodes	at	that	time,	as	a	supplementary	source	of	data,	and	to	
increase	triangulation	as	a	technique	for	further	establishing	credibility.	However,	I	rejected	
this	approach,	since	many	of	those	key	actors	would	have	moved	on	and	might	be	difficult	
to	contact,	given	the	length	of	time	since	the	policy	episode,	and	hence	the	number	who	
could	be	interviewed	would	necessarily	be	small.	In	addition,	their	judgements	may	also	
have	been	clouded	by	time,	by	their	level	of	involvement	and	by	subsequent	events,	which	
might	significantly	sway	the	documentary	findings.	This	approach	was	also	rejected	for	
pragmatic	reasons	considering	the	time	it	would	have	taken	to	travel	to,	and	conduct,	the	
interviews,	which	would	have	been	difficult	given	the	nature	of	my	full-time	employment.			
3.5.2	A	note	about	authoritative	texts	and	evaluation	reports		
The	researcher	is	aware	that	many	of	the	chosen	documents	central	to	the	findings	for	each	
case	study,	such	as	HEFCE	circulars	and	commissioned	evaluation	reports,	may	be	seen	as	
having	a	particular	bias.	Scott	(2000)	in	his	book	‘Reading	Educational	Research	and	Policy’	
cautions	that	‘authoritative	documents’	(p.19)	are	constructed	to	give	the	impression	that	
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the	truth	is	represented,	and	it	is	important	to	acknowledge	the	‘directiveness’	of	any	given	
text.	Scott	also	cautions	researchers	that			
‘readers	of	policy	texts	need	to	be	aware	of	the	need	to	read	between	the	lines	and	
understand	that	reading	as	framed	by	assumptions	held	by	the	writer(s)	of	the	text’	
(p.19).		
For	Silverman	(1997)	it	is	important	to	acknowledge	the	audience	for	each	text,	as	this	too	
will	affect	the	construction	and	content	of	that	text.	Scott	also	cautions	researchers	against	
the	perils	of	reading	and	analysing	research	reports,	particularly	in	terms	of	their	internal,	
external	and	objective	validity,	and	notes	that	it	is	important	to	articulate	that	such	reports	
are	positioned	by	a	set	of	social	markers	and	power	relations	(p.48),	as	do	Cochran	Smith	
and	Fries	(2001)	in	their	work	on	warrant.		
Barnett	and	Parry	(2014)	contend	that	some	actors	in	the	policy	process	(such	as	HEFCE)	
may	act	as	gatekeepers	in	order	to	influence	or	control	findings	and	consequently	this	is	
challenging	to	the	researcher	in	accepting	the	neutrality	of	their	work:	
‘Policy	research,	especially	in	a	situation	freighted	with	ideological	conflict	is	a	site	of	
challenges:	is	there	available	a	position	of	value	neutrality	to	the	research	team?’	
(Barnett	&	Parry	2014	p.82).		
As	the	researcher,	I	acknowledge	that	these	considerations	are	particularly	important	to	my	
approach	to	the	study,	since	HEFCE	documents	form	a	substantial	part	of	the	data	upon	
which	the	thematic	analysis	is	constructed.	I	concede	that	in	each	case,	the	particular	
authors	of	evaluations,	regardless	of	their	assumed	independence,	would	have	been	aware	
of	different	ideological	positions	in	play	between	government,	HEFCE	and	institutions,	and	
the	differing	power	relationships	between	them.	As	such,	they	may	present	their	reports	in	
a	way	that	favours	a	dominant	power	relationship.	This	issue	will	be	explored	further	in	
4.6.2	below	in	articulating	the	trustworthiness	of	the	study.	
3.6	Issues:	the	researcher	and	trustworthiness	of	the	study	
3.6.1	Positionality	of	the	researcher	
As	has	been	explored	more	fully	in	Chapter	2,	policy-making	is	very	much	a	constructed	
phenomenon,	being	historically,	socially	and	culturally	situated,	and	consequently	policy	
analysis	is	equally	recognised	as	being	socially	constructed.	As	such,	it	is	impossible	to	
ignore	the	position	of	the	researcher,	as	a	social	being,	as	central	to	the	interpretative	
methodology	adopted	in	this	study.	I	recognise	that	my	own	frames	of	meaning	and	
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positionality	will	influence	the	way	in	which	the	research	has	been	framed.	As	Scott	(1990)	
asserts,	‘no	researcher	can	escape	the	concepts	and	assumptions	of	his	or	her	own	frame	of	
meaning’	(p.31).	Malterud	(2001)	asserts	that	‘reflexivity’	is	an	important	consideration	in	
qualitative	research		
‘at	every	step	of	the	research	process	and	reflexivity	starts	by	identifying	preconceptions	
brought	into	the	project	by	the	researcher,	presenting	previous	personal	and	
professional	experiences’	(p.484).		
In	the	spirit	of	openness,	I	recognise	that	my	own	professional	background	as	a	manager	in	
an	academic	department	of	a	Russell	Group	university	over	the	last	eighteen	years	will	have	
influenced	those	frames	of	meaning	and	interpretations.	I	myself	am	part	of	the	policy	cycle	
process	at	a	very	local	level,	as	receiver	and	interpreter	of	many	policy	episodes	instigated	
by	HEFCE	although,	it	has	to	be	noted,	not	directly	by	those	chosen	as	case	studies.	I	
recognise	that	the	research	methodology	and	research	design	were	not	the	only	viable	
approach,	and	that	they	have	been	influenced	by	my	own	preconceived	ideas,	knowledge	
and	understanding.	
I	equally	recognise	that	the	chosen	research	methods	will	exemplify	the	framing	and	
positionality	of	the	researcher.	Case	Studies	themselves,	whilst	seeking	to	establish	a	thick	
description,	will	embody	the	interpretative	stance	of	the	researcher.	As	Merriam	notes,		
‘The	importance	of	the	researcher	in	qualitative	case	study	cannot	be	overemphasised.	
The	researcher	is	the	primary	instrument	for	data	collection	and	analysis.	Data	are	
mediated	through	this	human	instrument,	the	researcher…..	The	researcher	as	
instrument	is	responsive	to	context’	(Merriam	1988	p.19).			
Equally,	the	selection	of	texts	and	particularly	the	approach	to	the	thematic	analysis	will	
embody	the	positionality	of	the	researcher.		However,	I	would	argue	that	since	the	chosen	
theoretical	framework	adopted	for	this	study	is	itself	interpretative	in	nature,	it	is	
appropriate	to	select	research	methods	which	are	also	interpretative.		
It	is	also	relevant	to	note	that	I	recognise	that	my	own	background	in	HE	administration	has	
influenced	the	way	in	which	I	interpret	the	analysis	of	the	case	studies	against	the	
theoretical	framework,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	‘three	dimensions	of	process,	
programme	and	politics’	(McConnell	2010).	As	a	professional	administrator,	I	have	to	
declare	a	bias	towards	areas	in	which	I	have	the	greatest	interest	and	therefore	the	process	
and	programme	implementation	aspects	of	the	framework	are	of	greater	interest	to	me	
professionally	than	the	politics	dimension.	
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Finally,	I	have	to	declare	that,	as	a	result	of	the	study	and	delving	into	the	work	of	HEFCE,	I	
have	developed	a	deep	respect	for	the	work	of	policy	makers	within	the	organisation	and	
thus	HEFCE’s	recent	demise	saddens	me.		
3.6.2	Ensuring	trustworthiness	in	the	study		
In	order	to	mitigate	against	criticism	that	the	interpretative	nature	of	the	theoretical	
underpinning	and	research	methods	used	in	this	study	suggest	that	it	is	not	robust,	or	
trustworthy,	it	is	beneficial	to	apply	Lincoln	and	Guba’s	evaluative	criteria	to	establish	
‘trustworthiness’	in	the	study:	‘credibility,	transferability,	dependability	and	confirmability’	
(Lincoln	and	Guba	1995).	
They	suggest	that	to	establish	credibility	in	the	study,	triangulation	is	an	acceptable	
technique.	As	described	in	3.5	above,	triangulation	was	achieved	through	a	thematic	
analysis	of	sources	of	data,	using	both	primary	and	secondary	texts,	which	gave	a	voice	to	
different	actors	in	the	policy	episode,	as	well	as	commentators	such	as	academic	scholars	
and	the	media.	It	was	noted	in	3.5.2	that	I	recognised	the	power	relationship	of	HEFCE	in	
relation	to	primary	evaluative	texts	and	the	challenges	that	such	data	sources	pose	to	the	
researcher.	However,	I	would	advocate	that	the	triangulation	of	data	through	the	inclusion	
of	secondary	texts	helps	to	mitigate	the	accusation	that	HEFCE	acted	as	gatekeeper	in	the	
construction	of	primary	texts,	since	the	data	sources	present	a	multi-dimensional	view	of	
the	episode.		
A	further	criticism	of	this	study	might	be	that	I	did	not	triangulate	the	documentary	analysis	
with	other	research	methods	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	data	collection	and	findings	were	
robust.	This	would	be	a	legitimate	criticism,	but	I	maintain,	as	Bowen	(2009)	argues,	that		
‘the	rationale	for	document	analysis	lies	in	its	role	in	methodological	and	data	
triangulation,	the	immense	value	of	documents	in	case	study	research,	and	its	
usefulness	as	a	stand-alone	method	for	specialist	forms	of	qualitative	research.	
Understandably,	documents	may	be	the	only	necessary	data	source	for	studies	designed	
within	an	interpretive	paradigm,…	or	it	may	simply	be	the	only	viable	source,	as	in	
historical	and	cross-cultural	research’	(p.29).	
Lincoln	and	Guba	(1985)	suggest	that	it	is	important	to	show	that	the	study	has	
transferability	to	other	contexts	and	that	thick	descriptions	are	a	useful	technique	for	
demonstrating	this.	This	study	demonstrates	transferability	by	using	the	thick	descriptions	
of	the	case	studies	to	articulate	commonalities	and	differences	between	the	studies,	in	
order	to	yield	some	insight	into	future	HE	policy-making.	This	is	the	basis	for	answering	one	
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of	the	supplementary	research	questions.	The	third	criterion	for	Lincoln	and	Guba	(1985)	is	
dependability,	‘where	the	findings	are	consistent	and	could	be	repeated’.	I	would	suggest	
that	the	theoretical	framework,	and	the	consistent	application	of	the	ten-point	scheme	for	
assessing	success	and	failure	against	the	‘three	dimensions	of	process,	programme	and	
politics’	(McConnell	2010),	should	ensure	that	the	application	of	the	framework	at	different	
times	would	produce	the	same	results.	
Finally,	the	study	should	show	confirmability,	or	the	degree	to	which	the	findings	are	
moulded	by	the	position	of	the	researcher.	Techniques	for	demonstrating	confirmability	
include	reflexivity.	I	have	argued	for	an	interpretative	approach	to	this	study,	since	policy	
research	is	socially,	culturally	and	historically	constructed,	and	as	such	warrants	an	
interpretative	approach.	I	have	also	declared	my	own	positionality	in	relation	to	this	study.			
3.7	Summary	
This	chapter	has	described	the	overall	approach	to	the	research	design	for	this	study,	in	
being	qualitative	and	interpretative.	The	rationale	for	the	choice	of	theoretical	framework,	
McConnell’s	(2010)	‘three	dimensions	of	policy	success:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	
failure’	has	been	articulated,	and	the	chosen	research	methods,	case	studies	and	a	thematic	
analysis	of	documentary	sources	have	been	rationalised.	My	positionality	as	the	researcher,	
as	a	social	being	in	the	interpretative	approach,	is	recognised	as	being	central	to	the	
research	design	and	conclusions.	This	chapter	has	also	sought	to	evidence	how	the	research	
design	techniques	meet	Lincoln	and	Guba’s	(1985)	trustworthiness	evaluation	criteria.				
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Chapter	4:	Contextualising	the	Research:	An	historical	
commentary	on	higher	education	policy-making	in	England	
and	the	role	of	the	intermediary	bodies,	the	work	of	the	
HEFCE	(1992	–	2018)	and	situating	the	case	studies	as	
examples	of	HEFCE’s	role	in	policy-making		
4.1	Introduction	
This	chapter	contextualises	the	research	by	firstly	providing	an	historical	account	of	English	
HE	policy-making,	with	Sections	4.2	(p.78)	to	4.6	(p.84)	describing	policy	development	since	
the	start	of	the	twentieth	century	and	a	discussion	on	the	role	of	the	intermediary	bodies	
between	government	and	institutions	(UGC,	UFC,	HEFCE).	This	discussion	informs	the	
research	by	illuminating	the	changing	nature	of	those	intermediary	bodies	and	their	
influence	on	the	locus	of	HE	policy-making,	through	shifts	in	successive	governments’	
political	ideological	standpoints	and	policy	agendas.	This	is	important	for	the	thesis	because	
in	Section	4.9	(p.120),	I	return	to	the	idea	of	a	relationship	between	the	role	of	the	
intermediary	body	and	the	locus	of	influence	of	policy-making	since	this	is	helpful	in	
addressing	the	research	question,	’what	can	an	analysis	of	HEFCE	policy-making	reveal	
about	the	locus	of	power	in	policy-making	in	higher	education?’,	which	is	discussed	in	
Chapter	8.	Sections	4.7	(p.86)	and	4.8	(p.89)	provide	an	account	of	the	work	of	HEFCE	from	
1992	–	2018,	informed	by	wider	government	policy	agendas	and	reforms.	The	HEFCE	policy	
data	gathered	for	the	timeline	in	Appendix	C	is	used	to	enrich	this	account	and	to	highlight	
particular	policy	episodes	to	demonstrate	the	breadth	and	scale	of	HEFCE	policy-making	
during	different	phases	of	its	existence.	This	is	important	to	the	research	since	it	provides	
the	data	set	from	which	I	selected	the	chosen	case	studies,	and	illuminates	the	way	in	
which	HEFCE	has	implemented	governments’	HE	policy	agendas,	how	it	has	influenced	and	
implemented	policy-making	and	how	it	has	had	to	adapt	its	own	ideological	position	to	
accommodate	shifts	in	its	role.	This	helps	to	address	the	research	questions	by	identifying	
policy	episodes	that	indicate	success	and	failure,	as	well	as	common	characteristics	and	
differences	in	the	way	in	which	HEFCE	has	articulated	and	addressed	them.		
This	thesis	concentrates	on	HEFCE,	rather	than	the	work	of	the	other	UK	Funding	Councils	
(Northern	Ireland	Higher	Education	Council,	Higher	Education	Funding	Council	for	Wales,	
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Scottish	Higher	Education	Funding	Council)	,	although	I	recognise	the	importance	of	all	four	
funding	councils	in	shaping	the	landscape	of	HE	since	1992.	As	the	researcher,	I	have	to	
declare	an	interest	in	HE	policy	in	England,	since	my	professional	history	is	entirely	
contextualised	within	English	HE	institutions.		
This	chapter	makes	reference	to	a	number	of	HEFCE	circulars,	reports	and	other	published	
documents.	These	are	referenced	by	their	identification	number,	eg.	14/2006	(circulars)	
and	2006/14	(reports	and	other	documents).	These	are	listed	in	the	references	under	
‘HEFCE’.		
4.2	Inside	outwards	policy	
Before	the	twentieth	century,	there	were	a	very	small	number	of	universities	in	England,	
and	the	majority	of	funding	came	from	private	endowments.	The	notion	of	a	‘system’	of	
higher	education	(Tight	2009)	did	not	exist	and	policy-making	was	at	an	institutional	level.	
The	autonomous	roles	of	universities	were	more	cognisant	of	the	regional	and	industrial	
associations	of	the	business	elite,	rather	than	the	state	(Cochrane	and	Williams	2010).	
Shattock	describes	this	phase	of	university	history	as	inside	outwards	driven	policy	
(Shattock	2006).	Although	HE	did	expand	in	the	nineteenth	and	early	part	of	the	twentieth	
centuries,	with	newly	formed	universities	such	as	the	University	of	Durham,	new	
institutions	tended	to	establish	themselves	in	the	mould	of	the	ancient	institutions,	Oxford	
and	Cambridge,	and	consequently	HE	was	still,	for	the	most	part,	for	the	elite.	The	
establishment	of	the	civic	universities	in	the	twentieth	century	sought	to	more	evenly	
spread	HE	throughout	the	country,	with	a	strong	focus	on	the	regional	industrial	need	to	
train	workers,	which	Tight	(2009)	describes	as	‘a	Victorian,	private	sector	version	of	the	
contemporary	UK	widening	participation	policies’	(p.	14).		Alongside	the	establishment	of	
more	universities,	there	was	also	an	expansion	of	a	range	of	colleges,	aligned	to	particular	
professions	and	focussed	on	vocational	training,	such	as	art	and	design,	and	teaching	
training,	and	an	establishment	of	technical	colleges.	This	divide	in	universities	and	colleges,	
and	the	polarisation	of	university	education	and	vocational	training	was	to	continue	to	be	a	
contested	issue	throughout	the	history	of	English	HE.	As	Tight	(2009)	describes:	
‘the	liberal/	vocational	tension	was	deeply	embedded	in	the	emergent	UK	higher	
education	system	before	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	and	has	remained	a	key	
issue	ever	since’	(p.11).		
At	this	point	in	history,	government	and	institutions	operated	under	the	Haldane	Principle,	
whereby	researchers	chose	how	to	spend	research	funds,	rather	than	as	a	result	of	
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decisions	motivated	by	political	ideologies.		Following	the	First	World	War,	there	was	a	
decline	in	private	funding	of	universities,	but	equally	a	greater	appreciation	of	how	
universities	might	be	able	to	contribute	to	the	economy,	particularly	through	training	in	
sciences	and	technology.	Thus,	the	state	began	to	take	a	role	in	funding	HE	and,	in	1919,	
the	University	Grants	Committee	(UGC)	was	established.	It	had	no	statutory	basis,	and	its	
primary	role	was	to	distribute	grants	to	institutions	and	to	act	as	an	advisory	committee,	
establishing	the	financial	needs	of	universities	and	making	recommendations	to	
government	(directly	to	the	Treasury).	It	received	income	as	grant-in-aid,	where	public	
funds	came	directly	from	central	government,	but	decisions	on	its	use	were	independent	of	
the	state.	Taggart	suggests	that:	
‘The	UGC	established	itself	as	an	enabling	organisation	that	supported	rather	than	
planned	the	activities	and	direction	of	the	universities.	And	this	is	an	important	
distinction.	The	fact	that	the	UGC	allocated	government	funding	did	not	lead	the	UGC	to	
move	to	the	conclusion	that	it	had	the	right	or	responsibility	to	manage	the	higher	
education	sector’	(Taggart	2003	p.39).	
The	Committee	established	itself	as	an	intermediary	between	universities	and	government,	
as	‘an	ideal	‘buffer’	body’	(Tight	2009	p.24)	and	from	the	universities’	point	of	view,	
maintaining	this	relationship	was	considered	crucial	if	their	autonomy	was	to	continue.	
However,	government	warned	universities	that	if	they	wanted	to	maintain	that	autonomy,	
they	needed	to	retain	a	large	element	of	private	funding	and	not	look	to	the	state	to	
provide.	In	1936,	Neville	Chamberlain,	as	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer,	warned	universities	
that			
‘if	this	[autonomous]	character	is	to	be	maintained….	this	condition	places	a	limit	upon	
the	extent	to	which	the	universities	should	look	to	the	state	as	a	principal	source	of	
revenue’	(TES	March	1936	-	in	Salter	&	Tapper	1994	p.106).		
4.3	A	system	of	higher	education	
Despite	the	government	warning,	by	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War	the	state	had	
become	the	principal	funder	of	HE.	The	1944	Education	Act,	and	the	first	post	war	Labour	
government,	saw	an	increased	interest	in	social	reform	and,	consequently,	a	greater	
percentage	of	the	population	completing	a	secondary	education.	Therefore,	there	were	
more	young	people	suitably	qualified	to	enter	HE.	In	addition,	the	state	required	more	of	
the	population	to	develop	relevant	skills	to	undertake	new	forms	of	work	to	expand	the	
economy	which	had	suffered	during	the	war.	Hence,	there	was	an	expectation	that	
universities	would	increase	student	numbers	and	undertake	more	scientific	research	to	
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address	the	economic	situation.	To	meet	this	new	demand,	state	funding,	which	prior	to	
WW2	had	been	£2.25m	annually,	increased	to	£8m	in	1945-6	and	£16.6m	by	1950-51	(Tight	
2009	p.60).		
The	Barlow	Report	(1946)	acknowledged	that	if	universities	were	to	meet	the	economic	
needs	of	the	nation,	then	greater	guidance	from	government	would	be	expected	(Salter	&	
Tapper	1994).	Consequently	there	was	a	change	to	UGC’s	terms	of	reference,	gaining	a	
greater	role	in	planning,	with	funding	directed	at	particular	activities.	Institutions	were	
expected	to	respond	to	government	priorities,	which	brings	into	question	the	commitment	
of	government	to	maintain	the	Haldane	Principle.		
‘Thus	by	1947,	the	UGC	had	already	changed	its	role	from	a	distributor	of	money	to	an	
agent	of	planning,	even	though	the	planning	was	of	the	simplest	kind,	depending	on	
collecting	estimates	from	universities	and	comparing	them	with	‘targets’	set	out	in	
official	papers’	(Tight	2009	p.125).			
This	increased	role	in	central	planning	is	a	critical	step	change	in	the	history	of	HE,	since	the	
notion	of	HE	as	a	‘system’,	with	a	national	provision	and	priorities,	begins	to	be	given	
greater	credence.	The	relationship	between	the	state	and	HE	had	shifted	and	there	was	the	
potential	for	policy	to	become	a	contested	area,	with	institutions	feeling	a	loss	of	autonomy	
and	greater	state	control.	However,	in	reality	there	was	little	conflict,	since	institutions	
were	content	to	expand	student	numbers	and	invest	in	research,	and	the	state	was	content	
to	fund	it.	UGC	therefore,	despite	its	change	of	focus,	was	still	able	to	act	out	its	role	as	a	
buffer	body.	As	Taggart	points	out:	
‘Within	the	framework	of	a	post-war	consensus,	the	UGC	did	not	need	to	play	the	role	of	
mediator	between	government	and	the	university	sector.	There	was	nothing	to	mediate:	
the	Government	was	willing,	within	the	constraints	of	the	budgetary	process,	to	provide	
ever	increasing	funding	to	the	universities’	(Taggart	2003	p.40).	
4.4	Massification	whilst	maintaining	the	unit	of	resource	
During	the	1950s	and	1960s,	with	a	return	to	a	Conservative	government,	there	was	a	rapid	
expansion	in	the	number	of	HE	institutions,	with	a	number	of	regional	colleges	achieving	
university	status.	In	1955,	the	National	Council	for	Technological	Awards	(NCTA)	was	
established,	followed	by	a	growth	in	the	number	of	Colleges	of	Advanced	Technology	
(CATs),	offering	technical	diplomas	in	HE.	The	1960s	saw	the	establishment	of	the	Council	
for	National	Academic	Awards	(CNAA)	and	the	creation	of	more	than	30	polytechnics	across	
the	UK,	with	degrees	validated	by	CNAA.	The	development	of	the	polytechnics	saw	the	
creation	of	the	binary	divide	between	polytechnics	and	universities	(Parry	2001,	Tight	
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2009).	This	expansion	of	HE	institutions	was	matched	by	an	expansion	in	student	numbers	
and	the	massification	of	HE	(Tight	2009).	Critically,	this	expansion	of	student	numbers	was	
matched	by	an	expansion	of	both	academic	staff	numbers	and	government	funding	and,	
consequently,	the	unit	of	resource	was	maintained.	
There	continued	to	be	pressure	from	government	for	universities	to	take	more	account	of	
the	scientific	and	economic	needs	of	the	country,	resulting	in	a	number	of	reports	and	
policy	reforms,	such	as	the	1951	White	Paper,	Higher	Technological	Education,	the	1956	
White	Paper,	Technical	Education	and	the	1961	White	Paper,	Better	Opportunities	in	
Technical	Education	(Tight	2009).	In	response	to	such	reports,	there	were	policy	
interventions	by	the	state	to	control	the	student	population	in	subject	areas	beneficial	to	
economic	expansion.	HE’s	ideological	standpoint,	that	policy	direction	should	be	for	the	
social	good,	where	social	good	is	defined	as	a	good	which	does	not	depend	upon	public	
policy	or	funding	(Mor	Barak	2018),	began	to	be	called	into	question:	‘the	fading	power	of	
the	traditional	ideal	in	this	arena	is	matched	by	the	irresistible	rise	of	the	economic	ideology	
of	education’	(Salter	&	Tapper	1994	p.125).	
In	1960,	the	Anderson	Report,	Grants	to	Students,	proposed	a	means	tested	maintenance	
system	for	supporting	students	through	their	studies,	paving	the	way	for	the	
recommendations	of	the	subsequent	Robbins	Report,	Higher	Education	(1963),	to	be	a	
viable	proposition.	The	Robbins	Report,	considered	to	be	a	further	watershed	moment	in	
HE,	articulated	a	need	for	a	more	equitable	HE	system,	whereby	those	who	were	qualified	
to	enter	HE	should	be	given	the	means	to	do	so	by	removing	barriers	to	entry.	Robbins	
proposed	an	expansion	in	student	numbers	from	c.200,000	in	1962/3	to	more	than	500,000	
by	1980/1	(Tight	2009),	to	be	met	by	new	institutions,	expansion	of	existing	institutions	and	
enabling	the	CATS	to	become	universities.	Robbins	principally	recommended	expansion	of	
numbers	in	science	and	technology	subjects	to	meet	the	demands	of	the	economy,	
although	in	practice	this	period	saw	a	huge	expansion	of	social	sciences	subjects	(Tight	
2009).	Some	critics	have	subsequently	argued	that	Robbins	did	not	go	far	enough	in	the	
proposed	expansion,	and	that	government	projections	already	took	account	of	it	
(Greenbank	2006).		
While	growing	student	numbers	was	matched	by	an	expansion	of	state	funding	to	maintain	
the	unit	of	resource,	this	period	also	saw	a	crucial	change	for	the	UGC.	Shattock	argues	that	
the	Robbins	Report	‘proved	to	be	a	watershed	in	determining	the	future	structure	of	the	
policy-making	machinery’	(Shattock	2012	p.90),	since	it	was	instrumental	in	a	review	of	how	
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the	Treasury	allocated	public	funds.	This	review	meant	that,	by	1964,	UGC	no	longer	had	a	
direct	relationship	with	the	Treasury,	coming	instead	under	the	new	Department	of	
Education	and	Science	(DES),	and	thus	the	Committee	was	firmly	within	the	remit	of	
education	policy-makers.	For	the	first	time,	UGC	had	to	compete	with	other	sectors	of	
education	for	funding.	The	relationship	between	the	two	bodies	could	often	be	tense,	as	
the	DES	had	‘values	which	conflicted	with	those	of	the	UGC’	(Salter	and	Tapper	1994	p.120).	
Consequently,	the	locus	of	policy	formation	began	to	shift,	with	UGC	having	to	make	
decisions	about	where	to	put	resource,	potentially	putting	it	in	conflict	with	institutions	and	
their	autonomy	in	pursuing	their	own	policy	decisions.				
4.5	A	policy	of	efficiency		
The	1970s	began	with	a	Conservative	administration,	but	this	was	followed	by	a	minority	
Labour	government	from	1974.	The	decade	saw	the	beginnings	of	the	pursuit	of	HE	policy	
with	a	focus	on	more	with	less,	increased	student	numbers	with	less	unit	of	resource.	The	
economic	crisis	of	1974-75	gave	the	DES	the	opportunity	to	introduce	greater	control	over	
institutions,	setting	target	student	numbers	for	individual	institutions,	initiating	greater	
efficiency	in	the	use	of	resources	and	cuts	to	grant.	A	2%	reduction	in	grant	between	1972	
and	1977,	and	30%	inflation,	saw	real	terms	funding	cuts	for	UGC	and	institutions	(Taggart	
2003).			
The	election	of	a	Conservative	government	in	1979	saw	a	change	in	policy	direction	that	
was	directly	in	accordance	with	monetarist	economics	and	new	public	management.	There	
was	greater	state	control	over	university	standards,	with	government	introducing	
regulation	as	a	way	to	improve	quality	whilst	facilitating	increased	efficiency.	It	was	during	
this	period	that	the	fee	subsidy	for	international	students	ended,	resulting	in	them	paying	
full	economic	cost,	and	funding	for	home	students	was	reduced	by	8.5%	by	1983-4	(Tight	
2009).	
The	continued	economic	crisis	in	the	early	1980s	led	to	an	ideological	shift	and	a	rise	in	the	
influence	of	neo-liberal	thinking,	as	well	as	further,	and	more	drastic,	cuts	to	public	
expenditure.	Incremental	increases	had	meant	that	by	1980,	more	than	two-thirds	of	HE	
income	came	in	the	form	of	a	single	block	grant	from	UGC	(Williams	1992),	thus	
government	felt	justified	in	drastically	reducing	it	by	15%.	UGC	however,	went	against	
government	wishes	and	cut	student	numbers,	rather	than	the	unit	of	resource	(Parry	2001).	
In	1983	the	NAB	was	formed	to	control	funds	and	student	numbers	in	polytechnics	and	
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colleges.	The	mid	1980s	began	to	see	more	government	rhetoric	on	efficiency	with	further	
reports	such	as	the	1984	National	Advisory	Board	(NAB)	Report,	A	Strategy	for	Higher	
Education,	UGC’s	own	report	on	a	strategy	for	HE	and	the	1985	Green	Paper,	The	
Development	of	Higher	education,	recommending	greater	efficiency	and	management	of	
HE.	In	1985,	the	Jarratt	report,	Efficiency	Studies	in	Universities,	was	published,	
recommending	a	review	of	UGC	and	proposing	that	institutions	began	to	take	a	more	
managerial	approach	to	strategy.	This	was	swiftly	followed	by	the	1987	White	Paper,	Higher	
Education:	Meeting	the	Challenge,	which	consolidated	the	economic	purpose	of	HE	and	
further	strengthened	the	need	for	improved	quality	and	efficiency.	The	report	also	
committed	the	government	to	increasing	student	numbers	and,	indeed,	participation	
between	1988	and	1994	increased	from	15%	to	30%	(Tight	2009).	Much	of	this	growth	was	
achieved	through	driving	down	the	cost	of	the	unit	of	resource,	and	through	increased	
student	numbers	in	the	polytechnics	and	colleges.		Shattock	(2008)	argues	that	it	is	in	the	
1980s	that	the	policy	drivers	for	HE	began	to	change		
‘from	being	self-governed	to	state-governed,	and	are	derived	from	a	set	of	policies	
designed	for	the	reform	and	modernisation	of	the	public	sector	for	the	economy’	
(p.181).		
Throughout	the	1980s,	UGC	continued	to	act	as	a	buffer	between	the	universities	and	the	
state,	putting	forward	the	views	of	the	sector	and	negotiating	block	grant.	It	was	during	the	
latter	half	of	the	1980s	that	block	grant	separated	funding	for	teaching	from	that	for	
research,	and	UGC	introduced	an	element	of	driving	funding	through	formula,	although	the	
formula	was	not	published.	As	a	result	of	the	change	of	constitutional	arrangements	within	
the	DES,	and	the	continued	economic	crisis	putting	pressure	on	public	finances,	the	buffer	
relationship	was	being	called	into	question.	Critics	questioned	‘Whose	side	is	the	University	
Grants	Committee	on?’	(Taggart	2003	p.42)	and	UGC	was	ultimately	forced	to	re-examine	
its	role:	
‘from	the	moment	the	UGC	accepted	responsibility	for	managing	the	cuts	in	recurrent	
grant	in	1979-80,	it	implicitly	accepted	responsibility	for	actively	managing	and	for	re-
shaping	the	university	system	to	cope	with	the	cuts	in	government	funding’	(Taggart	
2003	p.47).		
This	subtle	shift	in	UGC’s	role	begins	to	see	a	move	from	Shattock’s	‘inside	outwards’	
(2006),	where	institutions	were	the	locus	for	HE	policy	development,	to	the	now	familiar	
‘outside	inwards’	policy	approach	to	HE,	where	the	state	has	a	greater	role	in	developing	
and	implementing	policy.		
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4.6	Quasi	market	policy	
A	further	turning	point	came	with	the	1988	Education	Reform	Act,	which	abolished	UGC,	
and	replaced	it	with	a	statutory	body,	the	Universities	Funding	Council	(UFC).	The	
Conservative	government	wanted	to	move	away	from	a	position	where	block	grant	was	the	
major	funding	mechanism	for	institutions,	proposing	instead	that	both	students	and	
industry	played	a	greater	role,	and	sought	to	achieve	this	through	the	establishment	of	a	
new	funding	council	without	the	legacy	of	UGC.	Block	grant,	which	had	represented	more	
than	two-thirds	of	HE	funding	in	1979-80,	was	continuously	reduced	such	that,	by	2010-11,	
it	represented	just	31.4%	of	income	(Brown	and	Carasso	2013).	The	UFC	was	matched	with	
the	Polytechnics	and	Colleges	Funding	Council	(PCFC),	replacing	the	NAB,	which	removed	
polytechnics	and	colleges	from	the	control	of	local	authorities,	whilst	still	retaining	the	
binary	divide	with	universities.	The	mechanism	for	the	distribution	of	block	grant	for	both	
councils	was	through	formula	funding,	where	funds	were	allocated	on	a	competitive	basis.	
It	was	PCFC	that	created	the	‘core	plus	margin’	approach	to	the	allocation	of	funding	(Parry	
2001),	whereby	the	majority	of	funds	was	allocated	on	the	basis	of	previous	student	
numbers,	with	bidding	for	additional	numbers.	There	was	a	subtle	difference	in	the	purpose	
of	these	new	Councils	from	previous	regimes,	and	hence	the	relationship	between	HE	and	
the	state:		
‘their	function	is	to	provide	funds	in	exchange	for	the	provision	of	specific	academic	
services	[teaching	and	research]	rather	than	to	subsidise	institutions’	(Williams	1992	
p.13).		
Taggart	(2003)	argues	that	this	was	an	important	step	change:	
‘The	funding	body	became	a	purchaser	on	behalf	of	the	Government.	And	the	role	of	
purchaser	was	an	important	step	in	the	transformation	of	the	funding	body	from	a	
provider	of	grant	(UGC)	to	a	regulator	and	manager	of	the	higher	education	system’	
(p.57).	
The	introduction	of	competition	for	funding	was	the	starting	point	for	HE	to	be	perceived	as	
a	‘quasi	market’	(Parry	2001).	A	1989	speech	by	the	then	Secretary	of	State,	Kenneth	Baker,	
is	purported	to	be	the	first	time	that	‘market’	was	linked	to	HE	(Brown	and	Carasso	2013),	
and	policy	reforms	which	followed	were	aligned	with	market	economics,	including	a	rise	in	
fees	for	fee	paying	students	and,	in	1990,	the	introduction	of	top-up	loans,	which	would	in	
time	replace	maintenance	grants.	The	Conservative	government	saw	the	market	as	the	way	
forward	for	both	raising	competition	within	HE	and	introducing	greater	student	choice	
alongside	expanded	student	numbers.		
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This	was	a	momentous	moment	in	the	history	of	HE	policy-making,	since	it	represents	a	
point	at	which	there	is	a	moment	of	conflict	between	the	outside	in	approach	to	policy	
(where	the	state	had	significant	control	over	the	policy	agenda	for	HE,	and	was	responsible	
for	the	majority	of	its	funding,	with	controls	over	student	numbers	and	efficiency	of	
delivery)	and,	in	a	sense,	a	return	to	inside	out,	where	institutions	are	subject	to	market	
conditions	and	reliance	on	public	funding	begins	to	diminish.	However,	as	noted	below,	any	
return	to	inside	out	conditions	was	quashed	by	an	increase	in	regulation	of	the	market.		
The	1992	Further	and	Higher	Education	Act	introduced	one	of	the	biggest	changes	in	the	HE	
sector,	with	the	short-lived	UFC	and	PCFC	abolished	in	favour	of	four	regional	funding	
councils	in	England,	Scotland,	Wales	and	Northern	Ireland.	The	new	Councils	introduced	a	
single	funding	structure	for	teaching	in	all	institutions	and	a	national	system	for	assessment	
of	quality.		As	a	consequence,	the	binary	system	for	universities	and	polytechnics	was	
removed,	polytechnics	became	universities	overnight,	and	universities	and	colleges	were	
now	open	to	competition	between	each	other.	Thus,	HE	evolved	into	a	‘fully	market	
orientated	system’	(Parry	2001	p.124).	However,	as	noted	above,	this	market	was	also	
highly	regulated,	both	in	student	numbers	and	quality	assurance.	The	increase	in	
intervention	and	regulation	by	the	state	was	firmly	in	line	with	the	new	public	management	
rhetoric,	and	the	‘outside	inwards’	approach	(Shattock	2012,	Coffield	and	Williamson	1997)	
that	had	become	a	dominant	feature	of	the	1980s	and	1990s	under	the	Thatcher	
Government.	
The	1992	Act	represents	a	turning	point	that	threatened	the	autonomy	of	institutions	and	
changed	the	nature	of	the	intermediary	body	from	a	buffer	to	one	that	acted	as	an	agent	of	
government,	despite	the	guarantee	that	the	funding	councils	had	constitutional	
independence	from	government.	The	1992	Act		
‘was	to	place	these	various	inputs	into	a	statutory	context	which,	besides	extending	
them,	greatly	reinforced	the	hand	of	the	Minister	and	Department	against	the	funding	
councils	and	universities’	(Salter	&	Tapper	1994	p.205).		
For	Shattock,	this	move	firmly	established	‘outside	in’	policy-making:	
‘We	have	in	my	view	staggered	almost	unknowingly	to	a	situation	where	the	state	has	
taken	over	policy	making	because	the	insider	organs	that	once	generated	policies	have	
been	weakened	or	no	longer	exist.	The	UGC,	whatever	its	shortcomings,	has	been	
replaced	by	Funding	Councils	who	make	policy	through	adjusting	funding	formula’	
(Shattock	2006	p.138).	
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This	commentary	has	provided	an	insight	into	the	development	of	HE	policy	and	the	
changing	role	and	influence	of	the	intermediary	bodies	against	the	political	and	economic	
conditions	over	the	last	century.	This	is	useful	in	informing	an	understanding	for	the	
creation	of	the	HEFCE	and	other	funding	councils,	and	in	order	to	articulate	the	work	of	
HEFCE	in	the	forthcoming	sections.	The	sections	below	are	significant	for	this	research	since	
they	seek	to	both	illuminate	and	articulate	the	policy	work	of	HEFCE	against	the	backdrop	
of	changing	government	ideologies	and	policy	agendas,	and	situate	the	chosen	case	studies	
within	those	contexts.		
4.7	The	Higher	Education	Funding	Council	for	England	
The	four	Funding	Councils	were	established	on	6th	May	1992,	under	the	Department	for	
Education	(DfE),	and	they	assumed	responsibility	for	funding	from	PCFC	and	UFC	on	1st	April	
1993.	The	core	functions	of	the	Funding	Councils	were:	to	act	as	a	funding	and	intermediary	
body	between	government	and	institutions;	the	allocation	of	recurrent,	capital	and	special	
funding;	assessment	of	the	quality	of	research;	assessment	of	the	quality	of	teaching,	and	
monitoring	the	financial	health	of	the	sector	and	individual	institutions.		
The	Act	sets	out	the	role	formally	as:	
• ‘To	administer	funds	to	support	education	and	research	in	higher	education	
institutions;	
• To	administer	funds	to	support	prescribed	higher	education	courses	in	further	
education	colleges;	
• To	provide	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Education	and	Skills	with	information	relating	
to	all	aspects	of	higher	education	teaching	and	research,	including	the	financial	
needs	of	the	sector;	
• To	secure	the	assessment	of	the	quality	of	education	at	institutions	that	receive	
HEFCE	funding’.	(Source	HEFCE	Annual	Report	and	Accounts	2005-06).			
The	Act	gave	the	Secretary	of	State	greater	control	over	the	Funding	Councils	in	terms	of	
appointing	the	board	and	the	terms	and	conditions	of	funding.		
4.7.1	Structure	of	HEFCE	
HEFCE	was	overseen	by	a	Board	of	15	members,	with	all	members	appointed	by	the	
Secretary	of	State	for	Education.	The	Board	consisted	of	a	Chair,	HEFCE	Chief	Executive	as	
chief	operating	officer,	a	number	of	members	selected	from	higher	education	institutions	(a	
minimum	of	eight),	and	other	interested	publicly	funded	bodies,	such	as	the	NHS,	industry	
and	the	professions.	All	appointments	were	made	under	the	guidance	of	the	Office	of	the	
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Commissioner	for	Public	Appointments	(OCPA).	Government	was	represented	by	an	
assessor	from	the	relevant	government	department	and	a	small	number	of	observers	from	
other	funding	bodies	and	the	National	Union	of	Students	(NUS).	In	the	interests	of	
transparency,	papers	and	minutes	of	the	Board,	other	than	institutionally	or	commercially	
sensitive	discussions,	have	been	published	on	the	HEFCE	website	since	2003.		
Below	the	Board,	there	were	a	number	of	strategic	advisory	committees	which	related	
directly	to	the	policy	work	of	HEFCE:	Teaching	excellence	and	student	opportunity;	
Research	and	knowledge	exchange;	Leadership,	governance	and	management;	quality,	
accountability	and	regulation.	There	were	also	joint	advisory	committees	with	the	other	
Funding	Councils.	
The	work	of	HEFCE	was	split	into	a	number	of	directorates,	introduced	in	2002	and	revised	
in	2012,	which	reported	directly	to	the	Chief	Executive,	as	summarised	in	Figure	8	(p.87).	
Within	each	directorate,	there	were	a	number	of	heads	of	functions,	such	as	
communications,	funding,	quality,	and	governance.	Reporting	to	the	Director	of	Universities	
and	Colleges,	there	were	eight	regional	consultants,	introduced	from	1999,	who	liaised	
directly	with	the	senior	management	of	institutions.	From	2000,	HEFCE	also	had	a	small	
number	of	national	teams,	focussing	on	particular	policy	areas:	disability,	action	on	access,	
innovations,	and	enhancing	student	employability,	although	these	were	lost	under	a	re-
structure	in	2012.			
	
	
Figure	8	–	HEFCE	DIRECTORATE	
	 	
	 HEFCE	Chief	Executive	
Directorate	
Regulation	and	Assurance	
Directorate	
Research	and	Knowledge	Exchange	
Directorate	
Universities	and	Colleges	
Directorate	
Finance	
Directorate	
Policy	
Directorate	
Analytical	Services	
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Melville	(2018)	notes	that	this	structure	has	been	an	important	feature	in	determining	the	
locus	of	policy-making:	
‘a	key	feature	of	HEFCE	has	been	that	the	development	of	HE	policy	has	resided	almost	
entirely	with	the	council	and	its	executives,	rather	than	with	civil	servants	and	ministers.	
Notably,	while	it	was	the	general	view	that	in	the	UGC	days	of	the	1980s	and	1990s	
many	‘special’	funding	decisions	were	made	personally	by	Peter	Swynnerton-Dyer	[then	
Vice	Chancellor	Cambridge	University],	the	UFC	and	HEFCE	have	developed	open	and	
transparent	funding	models.’	(Melville	WONKHE	2018).		
4.7.2	HEFCE	mechanisms	for	distributing	funding,	enabling	policy	
The	approach	taken	by	HEFCE	to	form	and	implement	policy	is	an	important	part	of	the	
policy	process.	Government	informed	HEFCE	of	its	available	grant	through	the	annual	grant	
letter,	which	morphed	from	the	letter	of	guidance	established	in	1988	for	UGC.	Taggart	
(2003)	notes	that	this	was	the		
‘primary	mechanism…	for	ensuring	that	the	Government	has	been	able	to	link	its	
overarching	framework	for	higher	education	policy	with	the	funding	bodies’	policies’	
(p.58-9).		
The	annual	grant	letter	set	out	the	funding	to	be	provided	for	core	activities,	teaching	and	
research,	and	established	particular	funding	priority	areas.	In	turn,	HEFCE	used	the	available	
funds	to	steer	policy	and	priorities	through	the	financial	memorandum	with	institutions.	
This	point	is	an	important	one	for	this	study,	and	in	particular	for	a	discussion	on	the	locus	
of	policy-making.		As	will	be	further	explored	later	in	this	chapter,	and	further	in	relation	to	
the	case	studies,	there	were	moments	where	it	was	HEFCE	itself	that	influenced	the	
government’s	annual	grant	letter.			
Funding	was	distributed	through	three	distinctive	mechanisms:	recurrent	funding	(generally	
based	on	formula),	capital	funding	and	special	projects	funding,	with	some	policy	areas	
funded	in	a	multitrack	approach	of	combined	formula	and	special	initiative	funding.	Both	
capital	and	special	projects	funding	generally	required	institutions	to	bid	for	time-limited	
funds,	and	in	competition	with	each	other.	The	special	projects	initiative	mirrored	the	
Enterprise	in	Higher	Education	initiative,	set	up	in	the	late	1980s	by	UGC,	where	institutions	
bid	for	funding.	Selby	(2018)	notes	that	this	was	a	classic	HEFCE	approach:	
‘this	initiative	followed	a	classic	HEFCE	approach	to	policy-making	in	an	area	in	which	
there	was	little	prior	knowledge	–	identify	a	problem,	offer	some	financial	opportunities,	
with	the	parameters	broadly	defined,	and	seek	proposals	from	HEIs’	(Selby	WONKHE	
2018).	
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The	mechanism	by	which	policy	was	enacted	within	HEFCE	is	important	to	this	study.	All	
three	of	the	case	studies,	in	order	to	meet	the	criteria	set	out	in	Chapter	3,	can	be	
categorised	as	special	project	funded	initiatives.	
One	of	the	chief	mechanisms	by	which	HEFCE	formulated	and	implemented	initiatives	to	
drive	forward	policy	interests	was	through	a	consultation	process	with	the	sector.	Typically,	
consultations	were	held	for	large	scale	policy	changes,	such	as	the	introduction	of	the	
Research	Assessment	Exercise	(RAE),	later	called	the	Research	Excellence	Framework	(REF),	
but	also	on	smaller,	time	limited,	special	funding	initiatives,	particularly	where	a	bidding	
process	was	required.	Minor	changes	to	recurrent	funding	methodologies	did	not	generally	
result	in	a	consultation.	The	consultation	process	typically	involved	some	re-negotiation	of	
elements	of	the	policy	process	or	programme,	based	on	the	views	of	those	in	the	sector.	
Taggart	suggests	this	is	an	important	part	of	the	policy-making	process:	
‘every	HEFCE	policy	has	a	peer-review	input	either	through	the	advice	of	the	HEFCE	
strategic	committees	[or]	through	sector	wide	consultation’	(Taggart	2003	p.89).			
Kernohan	(2018)	agrees,	contesting	that	
‘HEFCE,	historically,	has	been	pretty	good	at	setting	policy	transparently	and	openly.	It	
publishes	its	board	minutes,	consults	widely	with	the	sector,	and	even	where	decisions	
are	made	that	go	against	a	consensus,	it	is	clear	around	its	rationale	for	doing	so’	
(Kernohan	WONKHE	2018).		
Shattock	is	more	sceptical	about	the	consultation	approach,	suggesting	that	it	is	more	top	
down	than	genuine	consultation:	
‘While	the	rhetoric	of	higher	education	policy	making	is	dominated	by	the	word	
‘consultation‘	it	is	neither	on	an	agenda	created	in	Government	nor	in	the	universities	
themselves’	(Shattock	2006	p.139).		
Initiatives	which	were	categorised	as	special	funding	were	typically	subjected	to	an	
independent	formative	and	summative	evaluation,	with	the	formative	evaluation	
occasionally	leading	to	some	changes	in	approach,	dependent	upon	recommendations.	
Formative	and	summative	evaluations	were	funded	by	HEFCE,	and	whilst	HEFCE	set	out	the	
aims	and	objectives,	evaluations	were	typically	carried	out	by	independent	consultants.		
4.8	Policy	phases	in	HEFCE’s	history	
I	have	consolidated	the	policy	work	of	HEFCE	into	five	separate	time	periods,	where	the	
change	in	period	represents	a	distinct	change	in	the	policy	direction	or	the	role	of	HEFCE,	
informed	by	changing	government	ideologies,	Acts	of	Parliament	and	economic	pressures	
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(summarised	in	Table	7,	p.90).	I	contend	that	there	is	a	strong	relationship	between	these	
distinct	phases	and	the	changing	relationship	between	government,	the	intermediary	body	
and	institutions,	which	will	be	explored	later	in	this	chapter.	This	section	provides	some	
historical	context	to	each	time	period,	and	then	uses	the	timeline	of	policy	episodes	and	
initiatives	detailed	in	Appendix	C	to	provide	a	synthesis	and	commentary	on	the	evolving	
policy	agenda,	clustering	policy	endeavours	and	highlighting	particular	episodes	to	
articulate	the	work	of	HEFCE.	The	research	methods	for	developing	the	timeline	of	policy	
episodes	are	explained	in	3.4.	Where	data	has	been	drawn	specifically	from	circulars,	letters	
or	HEFCE	Board	minutes,	these	are	referenced	in	the	narrative.	
Table	7	–	SUMMARY	OF	POLICY	PERIODS	FOR	HEFCE	
Time	
period	
Prevailing	government	 Principle	acts	and	events	instigating	change		
	
1992-1997	 Conservative	 1992	Further	and	Higher	Education	Act	(end	of	binary	
system,	Funding	Councils	established)	
1997	Dearing	Report	(recommends	student	contribution	to	
funding	HE)	
1998-2006	 Labour	(Blair	
government)	
1998	Teaching	and	Higher	Education	Act	(introduction	of	
means	tested	fees)	
2004	Higher	Education	Act	(variable	top	up	fees	£3k	from	
2006)		
2006	Charities	Act	(HEFCE	becomes	principle	regulator	for	
HE)	
2007-2010	 Labour	(Brown	
government)	
2007	Further	Education	and	Training	Act	(formation	of,	and	
investment	in,	companies	and	charitable	incorporated	
organisations	by	HE)	
2008	Global	recession	
2009	A	New	Framework	for	Higher	Education	(‘consumer	
revolution’)	
2010	Browne	review,	Securing	a	Sustainable	Future	for	
Higher	Education	(greater	choice,	student	finance	plan,	part-
time	variable	fees)	
2010	spending	review	cuts	of	more	than	£300m	to	HEFCE	
2011-2016	 Conservative/Liberal	
Democrat	coalition	(to	
2015)	
Conservative	(from	2015)	
2011	White	Paper	–	Students	at	the	Heart	of	the	System	
(variable	fees	to	£9k,	promotion	of	interests	of	students)	
2012	Change	of	focus	for	HEFCE,	invest	on	behalf	of	students	
2013	HEFCE	greater	regulatory	insight	
2015	Nurse	review	of	research	councils	(proposes	UKRI)	
2016	Brexit	
2017-2018		 Conservative	 2017	Higher	Education	and	Research	Bill	
HEFCE	closes	
Office	for	Students	established	
Research	and	Innovation	UK	established	
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4.8.1	1992	-	1997	
4.8.1.1.	Further	growth	
The	early	years	of	HEFCE	from	1992	to	1997	saw	continuing	growth	in	student	numbers,	
with	an	expectation	that	one	third	of	18-21	year	olds	would	have	attended	HE	by	2000.	
However,	growth	was	also	met	with	the	introduction	of	the	Maximum	Aggregate	Student	
Number	(MASN)	in	1994,	in	order	to	control	student	numbers	to	contain	public	
expenditure.	This	effectively	ended	‘market	led	growth’	in	favour	of	a	‘highly	regulated	
market’	(Parry	2001	p.125).	HEFCE’s	role	in	administering	funding	under	a	regime	of	cuts	
and	tight	public	spending	meant	a	greater	role	in	allocating	funding	to	assist	institutions	in	
financial	crisis,	and	echoed	the	change	in	ethos	for	UGC	in	the	1980s,	where	it	had	to	take	a	
greater	role	in	managing	the	university	system	during	a	period	of	cuts.	This	period	saw	a	
continuation	of	policies	begun	in	the	1970s	with	a	steer	towards	underpinning	HE’s	role	in	
the	economy	as	well	as	driving	down	the	cost	of	the	unit	of	resource,	with	government	
imposing	efficiency	gains	on	the	sector	of	7.5%	over	three	years	from	1996.	Whilst	student	
numbers	had	doubled	since	the	1970s,	and	public	funding	for	HE	had	increased	by	45%	
overall,	the	unit	of	resource	had	decreased	by	40%	(NCIHE	1997).		
4.8.1.2.	Targeted	funding	
Up	until	1997,	much	of	HEFCE’s	policy	work	was	concentrated	on	recurrent	funding	for	
teaching,	based	on	the	core-plus-margin	funding	formula	introduced	by	PCFC,	and	HEFCE’s	
teaching	funding	methodology	remained	broadly	similar	until	1998.	Policy	interventions	
focussed	on	establishing	clarity	in	teaching	funding,	initially	for	Additional	Student	Numbers	
(ASNs),	continuing	education	and	minority	subjects	(2/94,	10/94,	29/94)	as	well	as	specific	
discipline	areas	in	science,	engineering	and	technology	(6/95)	to	drive	forward	
government’s	agenda	in	concentrating	efforts	in	science	based	disciplines.	A	further	
example	of	targeting	teaching	funding	to	drive	economic	interests	was	targeted	funding	for	
former	Soviet	and	East	European	subjects	(32/95),	which	were	seen	as	countries	likely	to	
experience	considerable	economic	growth	with	the	downfall	of	communism	in	the	eastern	
bloc.		
In	1994,	HEFCE	began	to	dedicate	special	project	funding	in	what	could	be	described	as	the	
beginnings	of	a	widening	participation	policy.	Notably,	HEFCE	revised	its	policy	on	access	
funds,	allocating	£3m	for	projects	which	supported	special	educational	needs	students.	In	
response	to	the	Disability	Discrimination	Act	1995,	£6m	was	allocated	from	1996-1999	for	
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projects	which	expanded	the	quality	of	‘provision	for	students	with	learning	difficulties	and	
disabilities’	(9/96,	23/96).	HEFCE	also	directed	recurrent	funding	towards	non-traditional	
learners	such	as	part-time	and	mature	students	(19/96,	21/96).	This	is	an	example	of	where	
HEFCE	sought	to	drive	its	own	policy	agenda	outside	of	government,	since	widening	
participation	was	not,	at	that	stage,	part	of	HEFCE	objectives.		
Special	project	funding	was	also	introduced	to	enhance	the	development	of	best	practice	in	
learning	and	teaching,	with	phases	one	and	two	of	the	Development	of	Teaching	and	
Learning	in	1995	and	1996	(29/95,	22/96),	and	a	focus	on	technology	from	1997	with	the	
introduction	of	special	project	funding	of	£3.5m	over	three	years	in	the	Teaching	and	
Learning	Technology	Programme	(14/97).	Special	project	funding	for	enhancing	learning	
and	teaching	was	a	strategy	pursued	by	HEFCE	throughout	its	existence.			
One	of	the	consequences	of	greater	participation	in	HE	was	‘credential	inflation’	(Tight	2009	
p.82)	with	more	of	the	labour	market	seeking	to	gain	postgraduate	qualifications.		In	1996,	
HEFCE,	the	Committee	of	Vice-Chancellors	and	Principals	of	the	Universities	of	the	United	
Kingdom	(CVCP)	and	the	Standing	Conference	of	Principals	(SCOP)	commissioned	a	report	
into	postgraduate	education.	Chaired	by	Professor	Martin	Harris,	The	Harris	Review,	made	
recommendations	mostly	in	relation	to	standards	and	funding	(Hogan	1997),	which	were	
implemented	in	1998.	Institutions	had	already	been	asked	in	1995	to	identify	allocation	of	
teaching	funding	for	undergraduate	and	postgraduate	separately,	which	for	critics	like	
Shattock	(2012)	represented	a	further	deterioration	of	institutional	autonomy.		
Teaching	quality	was	also	a	major	area	of	policy	for	HEFCE	which	continued	to	2018,	but	
unlike	recurrent	research	funding,	HEFCE	resisted	any	attempt	to	link	teaching	quality	to	
funding.	Until	1997,	and	the	establishment	of	the	Quality	Assessment	Agency	(QAA),	quality	
assessment	of	teaching	was	undertaken	in-house	by	HEFCE.	Policy	on	the	teaching	quality	
assessment	method,	which	included	self-assessment	by	disciplines	and	the	provision	of	
data	sets,	was	introduced	in	1993	(3/93)	and	a	framework	for	quality	assessment	was	
introduced	in	1994	(33/94).	HEFCE	also	led	on	policies	which	influenced	the	national	system	
of	teaching	in	HE,	with	policies	on	the	organisation	of	the	academic	year	(6/94)	and	the	
length	of	degree	courses	(1/94).	
4.8.1.3.	Research	funding		
Research	funding	continued	in	much	the	same	terms	as	it	had	under	UGC	and	UFC,	with	
research	quality	recurrent	funding	(QR),	having	been	introduced	in	1986	with	the	
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establishment	of	the	RAE.		The	first	RAE	under	HEFCE	was	concluded	in	1992,	which	was	
considered	to	be	more	robust	and	rigorous	than	that	conducted	in	1989	(Tight	2009).	RAE	
1992	saw	a	reduced	number	of	units	of	assessment	and	greater	emphasis	on	transparent	
definitions	of	quality.	The	policy	on	the	dual	funding	of	research,	where	recurrent	quality	
funding	was	allocated	by	HEFCE	and	the	Research	Councils	fund	specific	projects	(7/93)	was	
introduced	sector	wide,	including	post	1992	institutions,	in	1993.	There	were	few	special	
funding	initiatives	for	research	in	the	early	years,	other	than	the	Joint	Research	Equipment	
Initiative,	which	continued	until	1999	(09/96).			
4.8.2.	Dearing	–	a	turning	point	in	funding		
The	turning	point	for	this	period	was	the	publication	of	the	Dearing	Report	(NCIHE	1997),	
following	an	inquiry	into	HE	commissioned	by	the	then	Conservative	government,	with	
backing	from	the	Labour	shadow	cabinet.	It	recognised	that	a	continuing	expansion	of	
student	numbers	and	high	levels	of	state	provision	of	funding	was	not	sustainable	and	so,	
unlike	the	Robbins	report,	Dearing	explicitly	addressed	the	issue	of	funding.		Dearing,	which	
was	a	reflection	on	the	marketisation,	massification	and	regulation	(Parry	2001)	of	HE,	
recognised	that	HE	was	underfunded,	but	that	to	meet	the	funding	gap	there	would	need	
to	be	a	shift	from	the	public	to	the	private	(Tight	2009),	and	more	specifically	a	greater	
contribution	from	graduates:	
‘the	costs	of	higher	education	should	be	shared	amongst	those	who	benefit	from	it.	We	
have	concluded	that	those	with	higher	education	qualifications	are	the	main	
beneficiaries,	through	improved	employment	prospects	and	pay.	As	a	consequence,	we	
suggest	that	graduates	in	work	should	make	a	greater	contribution	to	the	costs	of	
higher	education	in	future’	(NCIHE	1997	p.28-29).	
As	Wager	(1995)	points	out,	this	enabled	government	to	change	the	cash	flow	to	
universities	instead	of	increasing	public	expenditure.		Although	funding	was	the	key	
recommendation	to	come	from	the	Dearing	report,	there	were	other	recommendations	in	
relation	to	widening	participation	and	exploitation	of	technologies	in	learning	and	teaching,	
themes	which	continued	through	the	work	of	HEFCE,	as	will	be	explored	later	in	this	
chapter.	The	end	of	this	period	also	saw	a	change	of	government,	with	New	Labour	taking	
office	and	assuming	the	responsibility	of	implementing	the	recommendations	of	the	
Dearing	Report.		
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4.8.3	1998	–	2006	
4.8.3.1.	New	Labour	rhetoric	-	growth,	inclusivity	and	New	Public	Management		
New	Labour	brought	new	rhetoric	on	expanding	student	numbers	to	provide	skilled	
workers	in	the	emerging	globalised	knowledge	economy,	and	a	more	inclusive	social	
mobility	agenda.	These	principles	became	New	Labour’s	‘Third	Way’	and,	as	this	section	will	
demonstrate,	became	the	key	drivers	for	much	of	HEFCE’s	policy	work	up	to	2006.	New	
Labour’s	election	manifesto	promised	500,000	Additional	Student	Numbers	by	2010,	
increasing	the	participation	rate	to	50%.	Institutions	were	able	to	bid	for	ASNs	year	on	year,	
particularly	in	targeted	disciplines	or	those	that	encouraged	greater	diversity	of	intake	such	
as	sub-degree	level	courses.	As	such,	there	was	a	steer	towards	funding	policies	which	
favoured	widening	participation.	Vocational	education	and	reform	of	qualifications	became	
key	policy	initiatives,	and	hence	a	greater	focus	on	HE	in	colleges	and	an	emphasis	on	
employer	engagement	and	the	regional	economy.	Selby	(2018)	notes	that		
‘the	period	around	the	turn	of	the	century	was	a	time	of	great	development	in	HEFCE	
policy,	most	particularly	in	the	area	of	widening	participation,	but	also	in	the	
development	of	policy	towards	HE	in	Further	Education	Colleges’	(Selby	WONKHE	2018).	
Following	Dearing,	the	1998	Teaching	and	Higher	Education	Act	saw	the	introduction	of	
means	tested	top	up	fees,	with	a	£1,000	fee	introduced.	Six	years	later,	the	2004	Higher	
Education	Act	saw	a	further	step	change,	with	variable	top-up	fees	up	to	£3,000	introduced	
from	2006.	Consequently,	by	2006,	institutions	were	receiving	only	60%	of	the	former	block	
grant	for	teaching	(Brown	and	Carasso	2013).		In	1998,	the	student	maintenance	grant	was	
replaced	with	loans,	thus	further	shifting	the	costs	of	study	towards	individuals,	although	
they	were	re-introduced	for	some	student	groups	again	in	2004.	The	introduction	of	tuition	
fees	is	seen	by	many	(Shattock	2012,	Tight	2009)	as	the	point	at	which	a	real	market	was	
created	for	HE,	as	it	moved	further	away	from	a	solely	state	funded	supplier	to	a	part	
privately	funded	enterprise,	where	supply	was	influenced	by	demand.	The	shift	away	from	
state	funding	meant	that	the	role	of	HEFCE	as	the	funding	body	had	begun	to	alter.	In	2004,	
Sir	Howard	Newby,	then	HEFCE’s	Chief	Executive,	announced	that	with	the	introduction	of	
variable	fees,	HEFCE’s	role	would	be	to	secure	the	public	interest	and,	in	HEFCE’s	2003-04	
annual	review,	it	is	noted	that	‘the	focus	on	the	learner	in	higher	education	will	become	
even	more	critical	once	variable	fees	are	in	place’	(p.3).	
Despite	the	shift	towards	a	greater	contribution	from	students,	considerable	funding	still	
came	from	the	public	purse,	and	the	period	1998-2006	could	be	described	as	the	golden	
	 95	
years	for	HEFCE,	under	the	Blair	government.		There	was	an	additional	£1.4b	of	research	
funding	over	three	years	from	1998	and	an	additional	10%	in	real	terms	for	additional	
student	numbers	and	increasing	access.	The	Spending	Review	(1998)	announced	additional	
funding	for	science,	engineering	and	technology	subjects,	and	investment	in	staff.	Also	
receiving	targeted	funding	were	specialist	areas	such	as	Chinese	Studies	(1999),	performing	
arts	institutions	(1999),	Former	Soviet	and	Eastern	European	Studies	(2000)	and	two	new	
medical	schools	with	1,000	additional	places	for	medicine	(1999,2000).		Thus,	despite	the	
move	towards	a	full	market,	the	state	was	still	highly	influential	in	controlling	the	supply	of	
HE.		
Under	the	Blair	government,	HEFCE	continued	to	apply	its	long	standing	methodologies	to	
recurrent	funding	for	teaching	and	research,	maintaining	fundamental	principles	but	with	
adjustments	and	changes	along	the	way.	A	large	number	of	special	funding	initiatives	were	
also	introduced	which	sought	to	embed	change	within	the	sector.	Using	funded	projects	to	
drive	certain	policy	agendas	became	a	common	approach	by	HEFCE,	maintained	right	
through	to	2018.	Taggart	(2003)	notes	that	
‘The	financial	levers	of	the	HEFCE	are	arguably	seen	at	their	most	extreme	in	the	case	of	
earmarked	funding	for	special	initiatives….	HEFCE	was	increasing	the	proportion	of	
funding	through	the	more	closely	monitored	and	regulated	special	initiatives…	special	
funding	represents	18%	of	the	total	HEFCE	budget	[for	2003-04]’	(p.100).	
Another	strong	theme	to	emerge	during	New	Labour	governance	was	New	Public	
Management	practices,	particularly	public	sector	reform,	which	built	on	the	managerialism	
approaches	of	the	previous	Conservative	government.	This	ideological	position	taken	by	the	
New	Labour	government	was	to	dominate	not	just	HE	policy,	but	all	government	policies	
and	reforms,	in	all	policy	arenas,	such	as	health	and	education	(Shattock	2012,)	and	was	
characterised	by	increased	performance	management	in	the	public	sector	and	the	
commercialisation	of	public	services,	with	elements	of	competition	(Cutler	&	Waine	2002).	
HEFCE	introduced	a	raft	of	guidance	for	institutions	in	relation	to	financial	assurance,	and	
leadership	and	governance,	where	there	had	been	less	focus	in	the	early	years.	In	1988,	the	
annual	strategic	plans	required	of	institutions	were	replaced	by	three	year	corporate	plans	
with	a	focus	on	financial	strategy	(98/13),	and	a	special	fund	of	£2.5m	was	made	available	
for	three	years	to	implement	strategies	for	costing	and	pricing	activities	(98/32).	HEFCE	was	
concerned	to	ensure	effective	use	of	its	funding	and,	following	the	government’s	
Transparency	and	Accountability	Review	in	2000	(17/00),	implemented	the	Value	for	
Money	Steering	Group’s	recommendations	for	improving	facilities	management	and	
	96	
support	services	(00/14).	The	implementation	of	a	framework,	Transparent	Approach	to	
Costing	(TRAC)	for	institutional	reporting	came	into	effect	in	the	same	year.	Accountability	
continued	as	a	strong	theme	following	the	Spending	Review	in	2004,	which	focussed	on	
achieving	efficiencies	in	the	public	sector.	Consequently,	new	codes	of	practice	for	audits	
and	accountability	were	introduced	in	2004	and,	in	2006,	changes	to	the	financial	
memorandum	provided	for	greater	accountability	whilst	reducing	the	cost	burden	of	
financial	reporting	(12/2006).	The	launch	of	the	HEFCE	sustainable	development	initiative	in	
2005	aimed	to	tackle	long-term	sustainability	in	institutions	(28/2005)	with	HEIs	being	
asked	to	consider	the	use	of	shared	services	in	2006	(20/2006).	As	such,	efficiency	in	
relation	to	the	unit	of	resource	was	still	very	much	on	the	agenda.	It	is	noteworthy	that	
there	is	a	subtle	change	to	HEFCE’s	mission	in	2003,	as	recorded	in	the	annual	reports,	with	
cost-effectiveness	being	introduced	as	a	focus.	
Closely	linked	to	New	Public	Management	rhetoric	and	greater	financial	accountability	was	
a	focus	on	special	funding	initiatives	to	improve	governance	and	leadership.	The	Spending	
Review	of	2000	granted	£50m	for	investment	in	staff	in	institutions,	and	HEFCE	set	up	an	
Equal	Opportunities	Action	Group.	In	1999,	HEFCE	invested	£10m	over	three	years	to	
develop	good	management	practices	programmes	(99/54)	and	£330m	over	three	years	
from	2001	funded	the	development	of	human	resources	strategies	in	institutions	(01/16).	
The	Leadership,	Governance	and	Management	Fund	was	set	up	in	2004,	with	£10m	over	
three	years	(2004/26).	As	well	as	special	initiatives	funding,	HEFCE	also	consolidated	the	
fund	for	‘rewarding	and	developing	staff’	into	the	core	teaching	grant	(2004/03),	thus	
establishing	staffing	policy	within	recurrent	funding.	These	initiatives	culminated	in	2006	
with	the	publication	of	the	Higher	Education	Workforce	Framework	(2006/21).	
The	introduction	of	fees	meant	that	there	was	greater	public	interest	in	teaching	standards	
and	value	for	money,	and	so	HEFCE	continued	to	invest	heavily	in	learning	and	teaching	
development,	such	as	the	Teaching	and	Learning	Development	Programme,	implemented	
in	1997	with	£3.5m	over	three	years	(14/97)	and	£7m	in	2003.	The	Teaching	Quality	
Enhancement	Fund	also	received	considerable	levels	of	funding:	£26m	in	2000,	£32m	in	
2001,	£31m	in	2002	(99/26)	and	a	further	£158.5m	over	three	years	from	2006	(2006/11).	A	
task	group	chaired	by	Sir	Ron	Cooke	reported	on	quality	and	standards	of	learning	and	
teaching	in	2002	(02/15)	and,	in	2003,	HEFCE,	Universities	UK	(UUK)	and	SCOP	
recommended	that	there	should	be	a	single	institution	responsible	for	standards	in	
teaching	development	in	HE.	The	Institute	for	Learning	and	Teaching	in	Higher	Education,	
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which	had	only	been	established	in	2000	on	the	recommendation	of	the	Dearing	Report,	
the	Learning	and	Teaching	Support	Network	(with	24	subject	discipline	centres)	and	
HEFCE’s	National	Coordination	Team	for	the	Teaching	Quality	Enhancement	Fund	were	
merged	to	form	the	Higher	Education	Academy	(HEA).	In	the	following	year,	the	Leadership	
Foundation	was	established	by	UUK	and	SCOP,	with	an	affiliation	to	HEFCE.	Both	these	
organisations	survived	funding	cuts	and	mergers	for	many	years,	before	finally	being	
merged	into	Advance	HE	in	2018.	
In	response	to	the	2003	White	Paper’s	commitment	to	reward	and	enhance	excellence	in	
teaching,	the	creation	of	Centres	for	Excellence	in	Learning	and	Teaching	(CETLs)	(2004/05)	
was	launched	in	2005.	This	policy	episode	was	HEFCE’s	largest	funded	learning	and	teaching	
initiative,	with	£335m	over	the	five	years,	and	it	also	followed	a	typical	special	project	
process,	with	institutions	competing	for	funding.	The	purpose	of	the	initiative	was	to	raise	
the	profile	of	‘teaching	and	learning	as	a	professional	activity’	(DFES	2003)	in	line	with	the	
status	of	research,	in	order	to	justify	the	charging	of	fees	and	to	prove	value	for	money,	in	
line	with	both	marketisation	of	HE	and	new	public	management	policies.	What	was	of	
particular	interest	about	this	initiative	was	that	HEFCE	had	been	deliberately	hands-off	by	
not	defining	what	it	meant	by	‘excellence’	and	not	requiring	strong	accountability	measures	
to	be	met	by	institutions,	and	as	such	was	atypical	of	HEFCE’s	initiatives	at	that	time.	The	
success	of	CETLs	was	very	much	contested,	with	some	pointing	to	a	range	of	individual	
institutional	successes,	but	others	questioning	the	legacy	of	the	£335m	invested.	For	me,	
this	represents	an	interesting	study	in	terms	of	perceptions	of	success	and	failure	and,	
consequently,	I	have	chosen	this	as	one	of	the	case	studies.		
4.8.3.2.	Teaching	funding	to	drive	economic	development,	social	inclusion	and	value	for	
money	
Much	of	the	focus	of	HEFCE	learning	and	teaching	policy	during	this	period	was	on	driving	
New	Labour’s	agenda	in	meeting	economic	needs,	particularly	in	science	and	technology,	
with	formula	funding	attracting	additional	funds	and	ASNs	for	specific	disciplines,	and	
special	funding	initiatives	such	as	the	New	Technology	Institutes,	which	received	£25m	of	
capital	funding	in	2002	(01/47).	ASNs	were	targeted	at	Science,	Technology,	Engineering	
and	Mathematics	(STEM)	high	cost	laboratory	based	subjects,	dental,	medical	and	medicine	
related	courses,	and	also	subjects	which	were	considered	strategically	important	but	
vulnerable	to	closure,	such	as	modern	languages	and	Islamic	studies.	By	2003,	participation	
in	higher	education	had	increased	to	43%,	but	a	further	250,000	ASNs	were	required	if	the	
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government	was	to	meet	it’s	target	of	50%	participation	in	HE	by	2010.	The	recurrent	
funding	methodology,	which	had	been	in	place	since	1992,	with	relatively	minor	
modifications,	was	subject	to	a	full	review	in	2005,	with	implementation	set	for	2007-08.	
Aligned	with	a	policy	agenda	to	improve	teaching	standards,	HEFCE	continued	to	assert	a	
strong	presence	in	teaching	quality	assurance.	Following	a	period	of	in-house	quality	
assurance	by	HEFCE,	it	was	sub-contracted	in	1997	to	the	QAA,	although	HEFCE	remained	
active	in	providing	policy	and	guidance,	particularly	in	setting	benchmarks	for	performance.	
This	decision	was	made	in	part	to	ensure	that	funding	was	entirely	separate	from	quality	
assurance,	a	position	which	HEFCE	sought	to	maintain	throughout	its	history.	A	framework	
for	qualifications	based	on	national	standards	came	into	effect	in	2001,	and	a	new	
framework	for	quality	assurance	in	2002	saw	the	abolition	of	subject	reviews,	and	the	
introduction	of	independent	institutional	audits	conducted	by	the	QAA.	The	QAA	had	its	
contract	renewed	in	2004	to	deliver	the	revised	quality	assurance	framework	(2005/35).	
Concurrent	with	a	drive	to	ensure	value	for	money,	the	New	Labour	government	was	keen	
to	ensure	that,	with	greater	access	to	HE	and	more	choice	of	courses,	data	should	be	
provided	to	help	students	make	those	choices.	Consequently,	the	provision	of	public	data	
started	to	become	a	key	feature	of	HEFCE	policy	work,	in	line	with	their	revised	remit	to	
secure	the	public	interest,	and	a		website	for	national	teaching	quality	information	was	
established	in	2003	(2003/52,	04/2005)	with	the	first	pilot	of	the	National	Student	Survey	
(NSS)	that	same	year.	The	NSS	was	launched	nationally	in	2005	and,	with	minor	
modifications	to	the	data	set	over	the	years,	continues,	now	under	the	remit	of	the	OfS.	It	is	
noteworthy	that	many	of	these	policy	themes	have	continued	to	date,	with	the	
development	of	the	Teaching	Excellence	Framework	(TEF)	being	the	focus	of	teaching	
quality	and	value	for	money.		
Social	inclusion	and	widening	participation	became	a	significant	strand	of	policy	work	for	
HEFCE	right	up	until	2018,	although	it	was	not	explicitly	one	of	the	original	aims	of	the	
Funding	Council.	It	is	noteworthy	that	Greenbank	observes	that,	prior	to	the	Deering	
Report,	HEFCE	had	little	interest	in	widening	participation:	
‘Prior	to	the	Deering	Report,	HEFCE	was	unenthusiastic	about	the	idea	of	HEIs	playing	an	
active	role	in	widening	participation….	Yet	in	response	to	the	Dearing	Report,	HEFCE	
changed	its	position.	It	stated	that	while	it	still	believed	that	many	of	the	causes	of	
under-representation	originated	from	outside	the	HE	system,	it	felt	that	‘higher	
education	can	make	a	contribution	to	redressing	particular	imbalances’	(HEFCE,	1997,	
para	24).	Moreover,	within	a	few	years	social	class	and	widening	participation	had	
become	a	‘major	priority’	for	HEFCE’	(Greenbank	2006	p.148).		
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In	the	early	part	of	the	period,	widening	participation	initiatives	only	accounted	for	around	
2%	of	teaching	funds	(Stiles	2002)	but	there	was	an	increasing	amount	of	activity	and	policy	
steer.	In	2000,	the	Action	on	Access	Team	was	created,	and	institutional	behaviour	was	
influenced	by	incentivising	formula	recurrent	funding	with	special	premiums	for	part-time	
and	mature	students	(10/97,	98/09,	2003/48),	special	funding	incentives	including	£1.5m	in	
1998	and	£7.5m	in	1999	for	regional	widening	participation	(98/35,	99/24),	and	increased	
access	funds	in	1998.	Institutions	were	encouraged	to	move	away	from	the	deficit	model	
(Apperley	2014)	approach	favoured	by	Dearing,	whereby	the	onus	is	put	on	the	learner	to	
bridge	the	HE	gap,	to	one	where	institutions	were	encouraged	to	accommodate	widening	
participation.	Participation	rates	for	students	from	specific	neighbourhoods	became	one	of	
the	widening	participation	drivers	in	1999,	with	enhanced	funding	from	2001	(01/29),	and	
widening	participation	target-setting	for	institutions	became	a	condition	of	grant	from	2002	
(02/22,	2002/49).	
By	2003,	the	government’s	social	mobility	agenda	was	firmly	established,	not	just	within	
HEFCE	and	the	institutions,	but	beyond,	with	both	regional	and	national	organisations	
supporting	widening	participation.	HEFCE	was	successful	in	a	£9.4m	European	Social	Fund	
(ESF)	bid	under	Objective	3,	Lifelong	Learning,	which	resulted	in	the	development	of	the	
Partnerships	for	Progression	Initiative.	In	2004,	HEFCE	and	the	DfES	formed	Aimhigher,	by	
merging	the	Partnerships	for	Progression	Initiative	and	Excellence	Challenge	funding,	to	be	
a	regionally	based	umbrella	organisation	for	widening	participation	activities.	Summer	
schools,	which	had	been	a	special	funding	initiative	since	2000,	were	also	integrated	into	
Aimhigher	in	2004.	The	Schwartz	review	into	fair	and	transparent	admissions	to	reduce	
barriers	to	HE	reported	in	2004,	setting	out	principles	for	fair	access,	and	the	Office	For	Fair	
Access	(OFFA)	was	established,	as	an	independent	regulator	of	fair	access	to	HE	in	England	
(subsumed	into	the	OfS	from	2018).	OFFA	worked	closely	with	HEFCE	in	ensuring	that	all	
institutions	that	charged	fees	had	an	access	agreement	and,	consequently,	widening	
participation	strategies	were	no	longer	required	as	a	condition	of	grant	from	2004,	since	
additional	strategic	requirements	were	imposed	on	institutions	by	OFFA	(21/2004).	For	
critics	like	Shattock	(2008),	the	creation	of	OFFA	presented	an	opportunity	for	government	
to	intervene	further	into	universities’	autonomous	selection	of	students.	
Disability	was	a	key	area	into	which	funding	was	directed,	and	HEFCE’s	National	Disability	
Team	was	created	in	2000.	£6m	of	special	funding	was	provided	to	develop	quality	
provision	for	disabled	students	in	1999	(99/08),	and	a	further	£5.4m	in	2002	(02/21).	
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Additional	funding	for	disabled	students	also	became	part	of	the	recurrent	funding	formula	
(98/66).			
In	2000,	the	New	Labour	government	announced	two	new	initiatives	that	sought	to	address	
the	‘Third	Way’	agenda,	in	using	HE	as	a	driver	for	both	increasing	global	economic	
competiveness	and	social	inclusion,	by	addressing	the	skills	gap	and	widening	participation.	
In	a	landmark	speech	by	David	Blunkett	(then	Secretary	of	State	for	Education	and	
Employment),	the	e-University	(00/43,	00/44)	was	announced.	HEFCE	was	to	allocate	£62m	
in	funding	to	encourage	institutions	to	develop	on-line	programmes	as	part	of	a	national	e-
University	brand	which	would	attract	both	international	students,	and	hence	substantial	
income,	and	home	students	unable	to	attend	HE	in	its	traditional	form.	Blunkett	saw	the	e-
University	as	a	major	‘dot.com’	competitor	to	the	successful	on-line	programmes	being	
developed	in	the	USA.	What	was	novel	about	the	e-University	initiative	was	that	it	was	to	
be	a	public-private	enterprise,	with	private	companies	as	partners.	The	e-University,	UKeU,	
launched	its	first	on-line	courses	in	Autumn	2003	but,	just	one	year	later,	after	a	succession	
of	difficulties,	it	was	wound	up,	resulting	in	a	House	of	Commons	Education	and	Skills	
Committee	inquiry	in	2004.		
This	particular	policy	episode	is	of	interest,	as	there	is	some	debate	about	whether	the	
initiative	was	driven	by	government	or	HEFCE	in	the	first	instance.	It	was	also	firmly	
established	within	New	Labour’s	‘Third	Way’	as	an	initiative	which	used	a	private	enterprise	
business	model	to	drive	both	widening	participation	and	maintain	the	UK’s	market	position	
in	the	global	knowledge	economy.	It	was	unique	in	this	respect,	not	a	model	previously	
pursued	by	HEFCE,	although	in	all	other	respects	the	initiative	followed	the	typical	HEFCE	
format	in	requiring	institutions	to	bid	for	special	project	funds.	Although	generally	
considered	to	be	an	outright	failure,	the	e-University	initiative	is	interesting	in	that	it	can	be	
used	to	use	to	determine	a	more	nuanced	level	of	success	or	failure	in	relation	to	the	‘three	
dimensions	of	process,	programme	and	politics’	(McConnell	2010).	As	such,	I	have	also	
chosen	this	policy	episode	as	a	case	study.		
In	the	same	2000	speech,	David	Blunkett	announced	the	creation	of	the	Foundation	Degree	
(13/00),	which	would	drive	the	social	mobility	and	skills	agenda.	Foundation	Degrees	would	
be	developed	in	the	traditional	HE	institutions,	but	also	as	HE	level	qualifications	in	Further	
Education	Colleges	(FECs).	Like	UKeU,	there	was	an	expectation	of	public-private	
partnership,	in	this	case	from	regional	employers.	For	New	Labour,	there	was	a	strong	
correlation	between	economy	and	society,	and	a	persuasive	narrative	was	coming	from	
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government	around	the	development	of	skills,	the	region	and	local	employers,	as	well	as	
social	mobility	through	regional	FECs	and	HE	institutions.	The	relationship	between	HE	and	
FECs	had	become	a	core	part	of	the	HEFCE	agenda,	particularly	with	the	transfer	of	
responsibility	for	funding	HE	provision	in	FECs	from	the	Further	Education	Funding	Council	
(FEFC)	to	HEFCE	in	1999	and	a	code	of	practice	in	the	same	year	(99/63).	In	2003,	HEFCE	
stated	that	
‘The	development	of	a	wide	range	of	collaborative	arrangements	between	higher	
education	institutions	(HEIs),	and	between	HEIs	and	colleges	from	the	further	education	
sector,	is	likely	to	be	an	important	feature	in	the	coming	years.	Supporting	such	
arrangements	will	be	a	key	priority	for	the	SDF	[Strategic	Development	Fund].	In	this	
context,	we	are	interested	in	exploring	the	potential	for	multi-partner	collaborations,	
piloting	new	arrangements,	and	providing	incentives	for	institutions	to	develop	
innovative	and	flexible	programmes	of	study,	particularly	in	regional	and	sub-regional	
contexts’	(2003/28).	
Foundation	Degrees	were	funded	through	the	recurrent	funding	methodology,	attracting	
ASNs	(2003/48)	and	a	10%	premium	from	2004.	Foundation	Degrees	met	their	proposed	
target	numbers	in	2010,	and	continue	to	this	day,	although	there	has	been	a	decline	in	
interest	in	recent	years,	both	from	potential	students	and	from	government	in	supporting	
the	qualification.		
A	strong	feature	of	HEFCE	policy	had	been	in	relation	to	encouraging	HEI	collaboration	with	
other	regional	institutions,	almost	since	its	inception.	The	Restructuring	and	Collaboration	
Fund	had	been	set	up	in	1997,	to	provide	non-competitive	funds	to	help	institutions	which	
required	major	restructures	or,	more	particularly,	assistance	with	merging	with	other	local	
institutions.	By	1999,	an	additional	£10m	had	been	provided	under	the	fund,	which	was	
now	extended	to	support	collaborative	activities	involving	multiple	HEIs	(99/34).		By	2003,	
this	fund	had	been	superseded	by	the	Strategic	Development	Fund,	which	provided	£90m	
of	special	funding	over	three	years	(2003/28).	This	fund	focussed	specifically	on	
collaboration	with	FECs	and,	despite	the	continued	divide	between	the	liberal	and	
vocational	providers	of	HE	observed	by	Tight	(2009)	and	noted	in	4.2	above,	HEFCE	
continued	to	pursue	policies	throughout	its	history	which	addressed	this	divide.		
One	of	HEFCE’s	major	special	funding	initiatives	was	collaboration	between	HEFCE,	the	
Learning	Skills	Council	(LSC)	and	the	DfES,	to	fund	Lifelong	Learning	Networks	(LLNs)	
(12/2004)	as	networks	between	HEIs,	FECs	and	regional	employers	to	facilitate	vocational	
progression	to	HE.	Aligned	with	the	emphasis	on	collaboration	between	HEIs	and	FECs,	the	
government	was	prioritising	the	review	of	skills	required	to	meet	changing	economic	
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demands,	and	increase	participation	in	vocational	training.	The	Leitch	Review	of	Skills,	
commissioned	in	2004	and	reporting	in	2006,	aimed	to	‘maximise	economic	growth,	
productivity	and	social	justice’	(HM	Treasury	2006)	through	an	optimisation	of	the	UK’s	
skills	mix,	and	culminated	in	the	2006	White	Paper	‘Further	Education:	Training	Skills,	
Improving	Life	Chances’.			
LLNs	were	very	much	in	line	with	‘Third	Way’	rhetoric,	requiring	HEIs	to	work	together	with	
FECs	to	facilitate	vocational	progression	to	HE,	but	also	having	strong	connections	to	
employers	at	a	regional	level	and	key	sector	agencies.	The	initiative,	although	strongly	
aligned	to	government’s	agenda	was	widely	thought	to	have	been	initiated	by	the	then	
Chief	Executive	of	HEFCE,	Sir	Howard	Newby.	What	was	also	distinctive	about	this	policy	
approach	was	that	it	was	the	first	time	that	HEFCE	had	tried	a	‘bottom	up’	approach,	where	
the	exact	structure	and	terms	for	LLNs	were	not	prescribed,	unlike	the	majority	of	HEFCE	
policy	initiatives	which	conformed	to	the	very	prescriptive	bidding	process.	In	this	case,	
there	was	no	bidding	process	as	such;	proposed	LLNs	would	develop	business	plans	in	
consultation	with	HEFCE	regional	consultants,	as	well	as	FECs,	HEIs,	SSCs	and	RDAs.	The	
rationale	for	developing	such	a	policy	approach	was	that	the	initiative	was	purported	to	be	
sector	driven,	rather	than	prescribed	by	HEFCE.	LLNs	joined	a	plethora	of	government	
initiatives	aimed	at	the	skills	agenda	with	multiple	partnerships	and,	as	such,	the	dynamics	
of	a	bottom	up	approach	and	engagement	with	other	sector	agencies	makes	it	an	
interesting	choice	of	study	to	determine	whether	these	factors	contributed	to	its	success	or	
failure	in	respect	of	the	process,	programme	or	political	dimensions.	I	have	chosen	LLNs	as	
the	final	case	study.	
4.8.3.3.	The	birth	of	‘third	stream’	
New	Labour’s	rhetoric	around	economy	and	society,	and	particular	focus	on	the	regional	
economy,	established	a	strand	of	HEFCE	policy	work	that	was	a	dominant	feature	during	
the	Blair	administration.	RDAs	were	created	in	1998,	primarily	for	the	economic	
development	of	nine	English	regions	and,	in	the	same	year,	the	Learning	Age	Green	Paper	
recommended	the	development	of	regional	structures	to	accommodate	links	between	HE	
and	communities.	Thus,	the	link	between	regional	economies	and	HE	was	established.	In	
response,	HEFCE	introduced	regional	consultants	in	1999,	whose	remit	was	to	liaise	with	
regional	institutions.	The	link	to	the	regional	economy	instigated	what	became	known	as	
‘third	stream’	funding	and	became	a	core	part	of	HEFCE	policy	in	1999,	through	the	Higher	
Education	Reach-Out	to	Business	and	the	Community	Fund	(HEROBC),	with	£22m	per	
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annum	(99/16).	In	2001,	Business	Fellowships	(01/06,	01/25)	and	the	Higher	Education	
Innovation	Fund	(HIEF)	(00/22,	00/34)	were	introduced,	building	on	the	activities	of	
HEROBC,	with	£80m	over	three	years.	In	2003,	HEIF	was	consolidated	as	permanent	third	
stream	funding	with	£187m	over	three	years	(2003/34)	and	a	further	£238m	over		two	
years	from	2006	(2005/36,/46,	2006/30).	A	key	feature	of	HIEF	funding	was	the	
requirement	for	collaboration	between	regional	institutions.		
By	2004,	Government	had	announced	a	ten	year	Science	and	Innovation	Investment	
Framework,	which	sought	to	improve	the	country’s	global	competitiveness	in	science	and	
technology	by	investing	in	scientific,	engineering	and	technological	intellectual	and	research	
capabilities,	and	promoting	innovation	directly	to	companies.	As	a	result	of	the	Lambert	
Review	on	business-university	collaboration,	which	recommended	a	50%	increase	in	third	
stream	funding,	HEFCE	committed	to	third	stream	as	a	permanent	strand	of	funding	for	HE.	
Consequently,	£12m	of	special	funding	was	made	available,	with	financial	support	from	the	
Office	for	Science	and	Technology	(OST),	for	the	Knowledge	Transfer	Capability	Fund	for	
two	years,	which	supported	institutions	in	meeting	the	needs	of	local	businesses	through	
research	and	knowledge	exchange	(2005/05).	The	pilot	Beacons	for	Public	Engagement	
Initiative	was	launched	in	2006,	with	£8m	over	four	years	(2006/49)	to	support	centres	
based	in	institutions	with	public	engagement	activities.		
4.8.3.4.	Research	–	aligned	to	the	economy	
Research	received	substantial	funding	under	the	Blair	Government,	as	it	sought	to	ensure	
that	the	research	interests	of	universities	were	aligned	with	the	economic	needs	of	the	
country,	particularly	in	science	and	technology	and	the	emerging	global	knowledge	
economy,	under	the	Science	and	Innovation	Framework.	Funding	was	channelled	through	a	
range	of	special	funding	initiatives,	such	as	the	£23.5m	Joint	Research	Equipment	Initiative	
(4/97)	and	the	Science	Research	Investment	Fund	(SRIF)	with	£600m	in	2001	(26/2002),	
£845m	in	2003	(2003/06)	and	£903m	in	2006	(2006/30).	The	Research	Capability	Fund	was	
announced	in	2003,	which	would	continue	until	2009	(29/2005)	with	£20m	in	2003,	and	a	
further	£17.5m	in	2004,	to	support	emerging	research	in	targeted	discipline	areas	such	as	
social	work,	arts	based	subjects,	media	and	cultural	studies,	performing	arts	and	sport.		
Recurrent	grant	remained	mostly	unchanged	in	the	early	part	of	the	period,	with	only	
minor	alterations	to	the	funding	methodology.	However,	postgraduate	research	was	a	
focus	of	policy	interventions,	with	postgraduate	research	students	removed	from	the	
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teaching	funding	methodology	and	included	as	a	single	support	stream	within	recurrent	
research	funding.	Revisions	to	the	QAA	code	of	practice	in	2004	included	minimum	
standards	for	postgraduate	research	degree	programmes	(18/2004)	and,	in	2005,	a	new	
element	of	recurrent	funding	for	research	was	introduced	for	undertaking	research	funded	
by	charities	(16/2005),	which	continued	until	2018.		
The	Roberts	review	of	the	RAE	was	published	in	2003,	and	this	resulted	in	a	number	of	
recommendations	with	regards	to	expert	judgements	and	panel	structures,	the	best	fit	for	
subjects	and	the	assessment	burden	(2003/22).	HEFCE	undertook	a	review	of	the	QR	
recurrent	methodology,	agreeing	a	more	formulaic	approach	(2003/38)	and	new	criteria	for	
RAE2008	was	announced	in	2006.	
Continuing	the	agenda	to	ensure	value	for	money,	the	costs	of	research	were	considered	by	
HEFCE,	with	the	publication	of	a	report	describing	the	method	for	recovering	the	Full	
Economic	Cost	of	research	and	other	activities	(05/2003).	As	such,	‘FeC’	became	the	
standard	method	of	costing	research	within	the	sector.	
4.8.3.5.	Capital	funding	driven	by	key	priorities			
Provision	of	capital	funding	for	estate	was	a	substantial	funding	stream	during	the	period,	
with	both	special	funding	initiatives	and	the	incorporation	of	capital	funds	within	recurrent	
grant	from	1997	(6/97).	Over	four	years	from	1998,	£135m	was	provided	to	improve	poor	
estate	(97/22,	98/50).	Capital	funding	was	also	used	to	support	learning	and	teaching	
priorities,	with	£90m	of	formula	based	funding	from	1999-2002	to	support	learning	and	
teaching	infrastructure	(99/26)	and,	in	2003,	a	sizeable	amount	was	invested	through	
special	funding	to	improve	capital	and	IT	provision,	with	£494m	between	2004-06	
(2003/26).	Of	that	£494m,	HEFCE	sought	to	drive	spending	towards	certain	policy	priorities,	
with	£117m	used	to	improve	provision	for	students	with	special	educational	needs,	and	
£60m	to	improve	science	and	engineering	laboratories.	Additional	capital	funding	by	
formula	for	learning	and	teaching	(£95m	over	three	years)	was	announced	in	2006	
(2006/12).	With	a	greater	focus	on	the	provision	of	HE	within	FECs,	£22m	was	provided	in	
2006	to	support	capital	projects	in	FECs	(11/2005).	
In	line	with	government	priorities	in	investing	in	science	and	technology	research,	£30m	
was	allocated	for	refurbishing	research	laboratories	(97/23),	an	additional	£7m	for	
Metropolitan	Area	Networks	(98/17)	and	£150m	of	formula	funding	from	1999-2002	to	
support	research	capital	projects	(99/52).	As	with	other	funding	priorities,	value	for	money	
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and	driving	down	the	unit	of	resource	became	a	key	consideration	for	HEFCE	in	relation	to	
the	estate.	In	2005,	a	Space	Management	Group	was	created	to	review	efficiency	and	
sustainability	in	space	management,	resulting	in	the	introduction	of	space	cost	drivers	
within	institutions.		
4.8.3.6.	The	locus	of	policy-making		
It	is	evident	from	the	HEFCE	policy	initiatives	and	funding	methodologies	highlighted	above	
that	the	New	Labour	government’s	priorities	in	the	‘third	way’	policy-making	were	a	key	
focus	within	HEFCE	in	prioritising	funding	for	driving	regional	skills	development,	business	
collaboration,	science	and	technology,	and	social	mobility	through	widening	participation.	
Another	key	theme	underlying	much	of	the	policy	work	was	a	focus	on	value	for	money	and	
efficiency,	evident	within	all	the	main	policy	areas	of	learning	and	teaching,	research	and	
capital	funding.	For	Shattock,	this	focus	on	cost	efficiency	was	the	driver	behind	the	locus	of	
policy-making	lying	with	government,	not	HEFCE:	
‘This	was	a	body		[HEFCE]	set	up	to	monitor	and	encourage	institutional	competition	to	
promote	the	most	cost	effective	use	of	resources	within	an	imperative	to	contain	public	
spending;	policy	was	pushed	‘upstairs’	to	the	Department	to	be	delivered	through	
annual	letters	of	guidance	from	the	Secretary	of	State’	(Shattock	2012	p.83).	
Analysis	by	Stiles	(2002)	supports	this	hypothesis,	in	suggesting	that	
‘over	the	1990s,	HEFCE	funding	methods	evolved	to	reflect	government	aims	of	
expanding	student	places	and	reducing	unit	costs,	while	increasing	equity,	access	and	
competition	as	well	as	teaching	and	research	quality…	development	of	Funding	Council	
allocation	methods	over	the	1990s	reflected	a	spirit	of	conservatism	that	served	to	
perpetuate	higher	education	structures	in	a	hostile	public	funding	environment’	(Stiles	
2002	p.711/730).	
However,	despite	these	assertions,	there	is	some	evidence	during	New	Labour	years	
suggesting	that	HEFCE	did	have	some	influence	over	broad	policy	direction,	which	perhaps	
demonstrates	the	strong	relationship	between	government	and	HEFCE	at	that	time,	as	
HEFCE	found	opportunities	to	develop	and	steer	policy.	Taggart	points	to	instances	where	
this	is	demonstrated:	
‘There	are	areas	where	the	HEFCE	has	effectively	developed	its	own	policies	without	the	
obvious	impetus	from	Government’	(Taggart	2003	p.90).	
One	such	instance	was	a	correlation	between	funding	and	teaching	quality,	which	had	been	
desired	by	governments	since	1988.	HEFCE	had	strongly	resisted	this	approach	and	in	1997	
outsourced	one	of	its	key	functions	in	assessing	quality	to	the	QAA	as	described	above,	in	
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order	to	disconnect	funding	from	quality.	By	1998,	the	expectation	of	linking	funding	to	
quality	had	been	abandoned	(Taggart	2003)	and	this	is	a	good	example	of	where	HEFCE	was	
able	to	exercise	control	in	order	to	protect	the	sector.				
The	2003	White	Paper,	The	Future	of	Higher	Education,	also	demonstrates	an	instance	
where	HEFCE	appeared	to	influence	government	policy	thinking.	Taggart	(2003)	recounts	a	
situation	where	HEFCE	chose	to	delay	publication	of	its	2003	strategic	plan,	in	order	to	
await	the	publication	of	the	White	Paper.	Government	had	already	had	sight	of	the	draft	
strategic	plan,	and	when	the	White	Paper	was	published	many	of	the	key	themes	were	a	
reflection	of	the	HEFCE	strategic	plan:	
‘When	the	White	Paper	was	published	in	January	2003	there	was	a	remarkable	measure	
of	symmetry	between	the	Autumn	2002	draft	HEFCE	strategic	plan	and	the	chapter	
headings	in	the	White	Paper.	All	of	the	key	themes	from	the	HEFCE	draft	paper	were	
included	in	the	White	Paper’	(Taggart	2003	p.94).		
For	Taggart,	this	demonstrates	the	extent	to	which	government	at	that	time	had	faith	in	
HEFCE	to	deliver	its	HE	agenda,	and	suggests	that	government	viewed	HEFCE	more	as	an	
agent	of	government,	rather	than	the	buffer	so	enjoyed	by	UGC:	
‘This	may	indicate	that	the	DfES	has	a	high	measure	of	trust	in	the	ability	of	the	Council	
to	deliver	on	a	demanding	and	complex	agenda	for	higher	education	over	the	rest	of	the	
decade.	It	would	appear	that	the	Government	views	HEFCE	as	a	safe,	trusted	and	
professional	pair	of	hands’	(Taggart	2003	p.95).			
As	such,	this	is	an	important	moment	for	this	research,	since	it	demonstrates	a	tension	
between	HEFCE	as	an	agent	of		a	government,	heavily	involved	in	the	promoting	of	New	
Labour’s	‘third	way’	agenda		(and	thus	very	different	from	the	UGC’s	buffer	role),	and	yet	
equally,	HEFCE’s	purported	influence	over	government’s	thinking	in	HE	policy	development.	
This	moment	is	particularly	significant	for	this	thesis,	since	the	case	studies	have	been	
chosen	from	the	New	Labour	period,	and	in	all	three	cases	there	is	evidence	of	HEFCE	
playing	a	key	role	in	the	initiation	of	the	policy	episodes.					
4.8.4	2007	–	2010	
This	period	in	HEFCE’s	history	saw	a	continuation	of	New	Labour’s	‘third	way’	ideology,	but	
under	the	administration	of	Gordon	Brown	as	Prime	Minister	until	2010,	when	a	general	
election	resulted	in	a	Conservative/Liberal	Democrat	coalition	government.	ASNs	were	
targeted	at	specific	disciplines	and	a	widening	participation	agenda	to	increase	HE	
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participation	to	50%	by	2010.	That	target	was	in	fact	missed	in	2010,	with	only	45.8%	
participation,	although	the	rate	climbed	to	49%	in	2011.		
2007	saw	a	further	shift	in	the	public-private	funding	of	HE,	with	variable	fees	of	£3,070	
introduced,	thus	further	increasing	the	contribution	expected	from	students.	In	the	same	
year,	HEFCE	became	the	principle	regulator	for	110	HE	institutions	under	the	2006	Charities	
Act,	and	hence	a	further	subtle	shift	in	the	remit	of	the	Council.	An	event	which	was	to	have	
a	substantial	impact	on	future	policy	for	HE	was	the	global	financial	crisis	in	2008,	resulting	
in	the	commissioning	of	the	2010	Browne	Review	of	HE	funding:	Independent	Review	of	
Higher	Education	Funding	and	Student	Finance,	which	recommended	proposals	for	greater	
choice	for	students,	the	removal	of	the	cap	on	tuition	fees,	student	finance	plans	and	the	
introduction	of	part-time	fees.	These	notions	had	already	been	at	the	forefront	of	
ministers’	minds	since,	in	2009,	the	Department	for	Business,	Innovation	and	Skills	(BIS)	
announced	the	Higher	Education	Framework,	higher	ambitions:	the	future	of	universities	in	
the	knowledge	economy.	This	document	itself	represented	a	watershed	moment,	
effectively	ending	public	funding	of	universities	in	favour	of	increasing	the	contributions	
from	students	and	employers.	The	emphasis	on	students	as	customers,	competition	
between	institutions	for	funding,	and	business-facing	institutions	are	noteworthy	in	the	
framework.			
This	period	saw	a	reduction	in	funding	to	HEFCE	as	a	result	of	the	comprehensive	spending	
reviews	in	2007	and	2010,	following	significant	cuts	to	public	expenditure	to	reduce	the	
country’s	borrowing	requirements,	leading	to	the	Secretary	of	State	announcing	£180m	of	
efficiency	savings	for	HE	in	2009	and	a	further	£135m	in	2010.	£20m	of	special	funding	was	
made	available	to	deliver	‘efficiency	and	value	for	money	through	shared	services’,	
announced	in	2010	(07/2010).	The	focus	was	on	increasing	access	and	participation	whilst	
increasing	efficiency	and	reducing	costs,	and	government	launched	the	University	
Modernisation	Fund,	with	£270m	for	increasing	access	and	efficiency.		
The	focus	on	efficiency	savings	meant	that	by	the	end	of	the	period,	HEFCE’s	internal	
organisation	had	been	restructured,	with	the	loss	of	the	international	collaboration	team,	
closure	of	subject	centres	in	the	LTSN,	and	replacement	of	HEFCE	regional	teams	with	three	
institutional	teams.		
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4.8.4.1.	Targeted	student	participation	with	less	resource		
ASNs	continued	to	dominate	the	recurrent	funding	methodology,	in	order	to	meet	the	50%	
participation	in	HE	target	by	2010,	and	were	specifically	targeted	at	key	areas	and	
disciplines	such	as	foundation	degrees,	strategically	important	and	vulnerable	subjects,	
STEM,	and	health	(2007/06),	04/2007,	05/2008,	32/2008,	22/2009).	In	2007,	HEFCE	
published	a	strategy	on	employer	engagement	to	support	flexible	learning	in	the	workplace,	
and	allocated	5,000	ASNs	in	2008	on	a	co-funded	basis	with	employer	engagement	
(03/2007),	thus	strengthening	policies	in	relation	to	employer	engagement	and	HE	and	FEC	
collaboration.	As	such,	in	2009,	employer	engagement	and	skills	became	embedded	as	one	
of	HEFCE’s	strategic	aims.	However,	there	was	tension	between	the	need	for	more	ASNs	to	
meet	target	and	a	requirement	to	reduce	costs,	and	so	a	number	of	policy	shifts	were	
introduced	to	reduce	grant.	These	included	the	phasing	out	of	funding	for	Equivalent	Level	
Qualifications	(ELQs)	in	2008	(2008/13),	withdrawal	of	funding	for	old	and	historic	buildings	
and	phasing	out	of	additional	support	for	Foundation	Degrees	in	2010	(2010/08).	To	meet	
unanticipated	student	support	costs,	HEFCE	introduced	clawback	of	funding	in	2009-10	to	
discourage	institutions	from	recruiting	above	2008-09	numbers	(2009/08)	and	also	
introduced	the	setting	of	specific	student	number	controls	for	institutions	in	2010	
(2010/08).	The	University	Modernisation	Fund,	aimed	at	improving	efficiency	and	reducing	
costs,	was	itself	reduced	from	£270m	to	£152m	in	2010	(14/2010)	and	then	abolished	in	
2011	(2011/07).		
Some	investment	to	drive	student	recruitment	in	specific	disciplines	and	for	specific	groups	
of	students	took	place,	although	with	substantially	reduced	resources	than	under	the	Blair	
government.	For	example,	a	focus	on	science	and	engineering	continued	to	dominate,	with	
£75m	over	three	years	from	2007	to	‘support	chemistry,	physics,	chemical	engineering	and	
mineral,	metallurgy	and	materials	engineering’	(13/2007)	and	£25m	recurrent	funding	was	
made	available	for	very	high	cost	laboratory	subjects	in	2009	(2009/08).	The	policy	on	
strategically	important	and	vulnerable	subjects	was	reviewed	in	2010,	and	aligned	to	the	
government’s	New	Industry,	New	Jobs,	Higher	Ambitions	and	Skills	for	Growth	agenda	
(2010/09),	thus	further	aligning	HE	to	government	priorities.	Whilst	there	were	some	time-
bound	special	funding	initiatives	to	support	learning	and	teaching,	such	as	the	£5.7m	pilot	
programme,	established	in	2009	to	develop	a	digital	repository	of	learning	materials,	and	a	
£13.6m	Graduate	Internships	Scheme	to	help	with	employability,	funding	was	relatively	
modest	compared	with	the	previous	period.	
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Widening	participation	remained	a	key	focus	for	HEFCE,	with	institutions	expected	to	focus	
on	disadvantaged	learners	(2007/12),	and	the	funding	methodology	was	amended	in	2009	
to	support	the	additional	costs	of	working	with	schools	in	disadvantaged	areas	(2009/30).	
Disability	also	continued	to	be	a	key	focus,	with	continued	recurrent	and	specialist	funding	
(2009/49).	However,	initiatives	and	funding	incentives	were	fewer	than	under	the	Blair	
administration	and	there	were	no	large	scale	special	funding	initiatives.	Aimhigher	funding	
was	extended	to	2011,	with	a	focus	on	targeting	lower	social	economic	groups,	areas	of	
deprivation	and	care	leavers,	and	a	£21m	Aimhigher	associates	scheme	was	announced	in	
2008.	Policy	on	widening	participation	and	fair	access	was	published	in	2008,	with	a	focus	
on	better	links	with	schools	and	colleges,	and	partnerships	between	HEIs	and	communities	
(2008/10).	Retention	of	students	had	become	a	key	focus	since	the	introduction	of	variable	
fees,	with	£1m	over	three	years	from	2008	introduced	to	disseminate	good	practice	
(08/2008),	increased	funding	for	under-represented	groups	at	risk	of	non-completion	
(2008/12)	and	a	change	in	the	funding	method	in	2009	to	include	funding	for	improving	
retention	(2009/30).		
For	quality	assurance,	a	new	credit	framework	and	guidelines	were	published	by	the	QAA	in	
2008	and	2010,	and	new	arrangements	for	auditing	collaborative	provision,	and	new	policy	
on	quality	assurance	systems	for	institutional	audit,	were	also	published	(2010/17).	The	
shift	of	focus	for	HEFCE	to	ensure	the	public	interest	saw	a	growth	in	HEFCE’s	role	in	
providing	publically	accessible	information,	with	a	new	Unistats	website	introduced	in	2008	
to	provide	course	data	in	order	to	facilitate	students’	choices.	The	NSS	and	Destination	of	
Leavers’	from	Higher	Education	(DLHE)	surveys	were	also	extended	to	include	FECs,	in	line	
with	a	policy	to	encourage	greater	collaboration	across	the	sector.		
Despite	the	continuation	of	significant	spending	cuts,	capital	funding	continued	for	learning	
and	teaching,	with	£1,085m	over	three	years	from	2008	(2008/04).	However,	institutions	
were	asked	to	bring	forward	spending	from	2010	to	address	the	economic	position,	and	
capital	investment	funding	for	FECs	was	put	on	hold	in	2009	(12/2008).	This	was	perhaps	
the	first	of	a	number	of	policy	interventions	that	saw	funding	cuts	aimed	at	FECs.		
4.8.4.2	Research	–	cuts	and	quality	based	on	metrics	
Research	funding	was	also	subject	to	reductions	in	recurrent	funding,	aligned	with	public	
sector	cuts,	with	a	revised	policy	on	the	purpose	and	funding	of	QR	published	in	2008,	and	
the	funding	element	for	the	‘best	5*’	departments	discontinued	in	2009.	The	recurrent	
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grant	methodology	was	further	amended	in	2010,	with	enhanced	funding	for	disciplines	
aligned	to	government	strategic	priorities,	such	as	STEM,	geography	and	psychology.	There	
were	very	few	special	funding	initiatives	during	this	period,	a	notable	exception	being	£6m	
transitional	funding	for	eight	medical	schools	to	build	research	capacity.	In	line	with	
HEFCE’s	increased	role	as	provider	of	publically	available	information	and	protector	of	the	
public	interest,	a	policy	on	open	access	to	research	publications	was	agreed	in	2007.		
The	biggest	change	in	research	policy	came	in	2007,	with	the	announcement	that	a	new	
research	quality	exercise,	the	Research	Excellence	Framework,	would	replace	the	RAE	after	
2008.	The	REF	was	announced	‘as	a	single	unified	framework	for	assessing	and	funding	
research	across	all	disciplines’	using	bibliometric	techniques	and	assessment	of	impact	
(13/2008,	34/2008,	04/2010).	The	REF	saw	the	introduction	of	new	metrics	on	measuring	
research	impact,	which	proved	to	be	problematic,	since	many	critics	argued	that	impact	
was	difficult	to	measure,	and	it	required	researchers	to	have	impact	outside	academia,	
which	undermined	academic	freedom.	Following	consultation	with	the	sector,	David	
Willetts,	then	Universities	and	Science	Minister,	announced	in	2010	that	the	REF	would	be	
delayed	by	a	year,	whilst	further	work	on	the	measurement	of	impact	was	conducted.	Like	
learning	and	teaching	funding,	some	capital	funding	for	research	was	made	available	from	
2008,	with	£1,276m	for	three	years	although,	once	again,	institutions	were	asked	to	bring	
their	spending	forward	to	accommodate	likely	future	reductions	in	funding.			
4.8.4.3	Third	stream	–	conflicting	policies		
Third	stream	activities	continued	to	be	well	funded	from	2006-2010,	with	substantial	HEIF	
funding	of	£396m	from	2008-2011	(2008/02).	However,	HEIF	funding	was	also	incorporated	
into	recurrent	grant	allocations	to	support	all	forms	of	knowledge	exchange	(2008/12):	this	
meant	the	Centres	for	Knowledge	Exchange	were	discontinued	after	a	final	allocation	of	
£8m	in	2008	(2008/02),	and	there	was	a	move	towards	performance	as	the	basis	for	the	
allocation	of	funds.	This	came	to	fruition	in	2011,	when	HEIF	funding	was	calculated	on	
performance	metrics	alone,	rather	than	funding	by	volume.	In	line	with	HEFCE’s	new	
strategy,	Strategic	Development	Fund	funding	was	re-focussed	to	prioritise	employer	
engagement	and,	in	2008,	the	Economic	Challenge	Investment	Fund	was	announced,	
providing	£25m	of	matched	funding	to	support	employer	engagement.		It	is	noteworthy	
that	just	months	later,	HEFCE	announced	that	there	would	be	no	more	funding	for	
employer	engagement	activities	(36/2008),	thus	reflecting	the	disposition	at	the	time	for	
continual	refinements	to	cut	public	expenditure.	In	the	same	year,	and	perhaps	in	conflict	
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with	HEFCE’s	position	to	move	away	from	employer	engagement,	government	announced	
the	New	University	Challenge:	unlocking	Britain’s	talent,	setting	out	‘how	local	higher	
education,	delivered	or	supported	by	universities,	unlocks	the	talents	of	people	and	drives	
economic	regeneration’	(18/2008).	The	document	proposed	that	HEFCE	conduct	a	
consultation	on	a	scheme	for	new	HE	centres	to	stress	the	importance	of	how	local	HE	
institutions	could	work	with	local	business	and	regional	organisations	to	support	
community	access	to	HE.	In	2009,	HEFCE	published	a	policy	and	process	for	developing	new	
HE	centres	(2009/07),	although	these	did	not	fully	come	to	fruition.		
4.8.4.4	A	decline	in	focus	on	leadership		
Unlike	the	previous	period,	where	there	was	a	strong	focus	(and	significant	funding),	for	
governance	and	leadership,	this	period	saw	a	marked	reduction	in	comparison,	as	a	direct	
result	of	required	public	sector	cuts.	In	2007,	HEFCE	provided	direction	to	institutions	
through	the	publication	of	policies	on	race,	disability	and	gender	equality	(2007/01)	and	
notably,	given	the	continued	financial	constraints	on	the	sector,	a	policy	on	severance	for	
senior	staff	in	2009	(06/2009).	The	continuation	of	the	Leadership	Foundation	was	
announced	in	2007,	with	very	modest	funding	of	£4.5m	until	2012,	and	a	further	£10m	for	
the	Leadership,	Management	and	Governance	Fund	07/2009).	However,	this	fund	was	
withdrawn	completely	in	2010	(13/2010),	significantly	reducing	the	focus	on	supporting	
leadership.		
4.8.4.5	The	locus	of	policy-making		
There	are	perhaps	two	significant	events	which	contributed	to	a	change	in	the	relationship	
between	HEFCE,	government	and	institutions	during	this	period.	Firstly,	the	reduction	in	
block	grant	to	60%	by	2010,	and	significant	cuts	in	special	initiative	funding,	meant	that	
HEFCE	began	to	lose	its	strength	as	a	funding	body	and,	indeed,	it	began	to	refocus	its	
purpose	by	acting	as	the	defender	of	the	public	good,	through	an	increased	role	in	
providing	information	to	support	choice.	Secondly,	during	2010	HEFCE	acquired	additional	
powers	as	chief	regulator	for	HE	under	the	2006	Charities	Act	and,	as	such,	HEFCE’s	role	
was	to	ensure	compliance,	by	‘exercising	control	and	management	of	the	administration	of	
the	charity’	(HEFCE	2006).	As	a	consequence,	there	was	a	change	to	the	financial	
memorandum	with	institutions,	where	HEFCE	gained	greater	powers	of	financial	control	
and	governing	bodies	became	directly	accountable	to	HEFCE	in	matters	of	finance.	This	
represents	a	significant	shift	from	the	buffer	relationship	previously	held	by	the	
	112	
intermediary	body,	as	will	be	discussed	in	Section	4.9	(p.120).	For	Shattock,	this	marks	a	
significant	change:	
‘increasingly	universities	had	become	absorbed	into	a	state	accountability	apparatus.	
This	significantly	rebalanced	the	nature	of	state-university	relations’	(Shattock	2012	
p.199).	
This	observation	is	of	particular	significance	to	this	study,	as	this	change	in	HEFCE’s	role	
meant	that	its	responsibility	for	policy	development	and	influence	began	to	diminish	as	it	
lost	its	strength	as	a	funding	body	to	influence	change,	but	it	gained	strength	as	the	body	
ensuring	the	financial	accountability	of	institutions.	As	can	be	discerned	from	many	of	the	
policy	initiatives	described	in	the	previous	sections	on	HEFCE’s	policy	work,	and	particularly	
recognisable	in	the	chosen	case	studies,	much	of	HEFCE’s	work	in	driving	institutional	
behaviour	towards	particular	policy	goals	revolved	around	the	provision	of	special	funding	
initiatives.	As	a	result	of	a	combination	of	very	significant	cuts	to	public	expenditure,	
particularly	for	teaching-related	funding,	and	a	focus	on	performance-related	funding	in	
research	and	third	stream	activities,	HEFCE’s	role	in	policy	development	through	highly	
funded	initiatives	is	less	discernible.	Hence,	there	are	fewer	suitable	candidates	that	meet	
the	criteria	to	be	developed	as	case	studies.					
4.8.5	2011	–	2016	
The	period	2011-2016	was	witness	to	turbulent	times	in	UK	governance,	with	a	coalition	
government	of	Conservative	and	Liberal	Democrats	from	2011	and	a	fully	Conservative	
government	from	2015.	The	leave	vote	in	the	2016	Brexit	referendum	added	further	
turbulence	for	HE,	with	concerns	around	European	staffing,	students	and	research	
collaborations.	The	period	saw	momentous	change	for	HE	in	England,	with	two	White	
Papers:	Students	at	the	Heart	of	the	System	in	2011	and	Success	as	a	Knowledge	Economy:	
teaching	excellence,	social	mobility	and	student	choice	in	2016.	The	2011	White	Paper	
emphasised	the	need	for	greater	competition	through	dynamism,	and	recommended	an	
increase	in	the	variable	fee	up	to	a	maximum	of	£9,000.	The	White	Paper	also	contained	
provision	for	new	types	of	private	sector	providers,	and	a	stronger	emphasis	on	students	as	
customers.	This	prompted	the	increase	in	fees	from	2012	(with	most	institutions	charging	
the	maximum	£9,000	for	the	vast	majority	of	courses),	and	a	shift	of	focus	for	HEFCE:	in	
2012	to	invest	on	behalf	of	students	and,	in	2013,	to	have	greater	regulatory	insight	as	a	
result	of	funding	and	regulatory	reform.	Regulatory	reform	resulted	in	a	new	operating	
framework	from	2013	and	the	introduction	of	the	‘HEFCE	register’	which	listed	all	
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‘appropriately	recognised’	institutions	and	new	providers,	and	held	those	institutions	to	
account	through	compliance.	HEFCE	acknowledged	this	shift	in	focus	in	their	2010-11	
annual	report,	reflecting	the	character	of	the	White	Paper:	
‘future	arrangements	will	require	close	collaboration	on	a	regulatory	framework	which	
will	need	to	be	transparent,	fair	and	proportionate,	and	to	protect	the	interests	of	
students,	the	public	and	taxpayers.	They	will	also	need	to	include	measures	to	further	
student	choice	and	opportunities’	(HEFCE	Annual	Report	2010-11	p.3).		
This	was	accompanied	in	2012	by	a	new	framework	between	BIS	and	HEFCE	and	an	internal	
restructure	of	HEFCE.	In	2016,	HEFCE	no	longer	reported	to	BIS,	but	to	the	Department	for	
Education	(DfE),	the	rationale	being	that	the	Department	could	take	a	holistic	view	of	
lifelong	learning.		A	further	change	in	focus	for	HEFCE	was	its	increased	powers	under	the	
Counter-Terrorism	and	Security	Act	2015,	which	enabled	it	to	monitor	institutions	and	how	
they	prevented	people	from	being	drawn	into	terrorism.		
The	2016	White	Paper	proposed	a	stronger	emphasis	on	regulation	and	the	introduction	of	
the	TEF,	which	awards	teaching	quality	with	a	bronze,	silver	or	gold	rating.	This	proposal	
suggested	the	return	of	the	link	between	funding	and	teaching	quality,	which	had	
consistently	been	resisted	by	HEFCE,	proposing	that	from	2020	teaching	quality	results	
determine	whether	institutions	can	raise	tuition	fees.		Although	TEF	1	took	place	in	2016,	
with	the	subsequent	TEF	2,	and	now	TEF	3	which	focusses	on	discipline	level		(and	is	one	of	
the	key	activities	that	has	been	passed	over	to	the	OfS),	there	has	been	much	criticism,	
both	within	the	sector	and	in	the	media,	over	imperfections	of	the	framework.	In	addition,	
the	2015	Nurse	Review	of	the	research	councils	proposed	the	establishment	of	an	umbrella	
organisation	which	would	fund	research	quality,	thus	removing	the	responsibility	from	
HEFCE.	These	proposals	prompted	the	creation	of	the	Higher	Education	and	Research	Bill	in	
2016,	and	the	ultimate	demise	of	HEFCE,	which	is	considered	in	Section	4.8.6	(p.118).		
Another	key	shift	within	HEFCE	policy	during	this	period	was	a	change	of	emphasis	in	the	
way	that	HEFCE	allocated	funding.	Special	funding	initiatives	had	always	been	a	key	feature	
of	the	HEFCE	landscape	in	driving	institutional	behaviour	towards	particular	policy	goals,	
but	in	2012,	special	initiatives	funding	reduced	from	£208m	to	£125m	and	there	was	a	
move	to	channel	most	funding	through	recurrent	routes	(03/2012).		
There	was	still	a	strong	focus	on	accountability	and	value	for	money,	although	not	as	
strongly	evident	as	it	had	been	in	the	New	Labour	years.	TRAC	continued	to	be	the	tool	by	
which	the	costing	of	activities	was	considered	by	HEFCE,	although	proposed	changes	in	
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2013	to	make	TRAC	data	transparent	to	students	was	met	with	much	criticism	from	the	
sector	(2013/09).	A	focus	on	efficiency	and	shared	services	continued,	with	£250,000	of	
funding	for	‘developing	and	disseminating	good	practice	in	shared	services’	(27/2013).	
There	was	far	less	emphasis	on	policy	in	relation	to	leadership,	management	and	
governance	of	institutions	than	in	previous	years,	as	a	casualty	of	public	sector	funding	cuts	
and	the	need	to	prioritise	other	key	areas.			
4.8.5.1	Learning	and	teaching	–	funding	shifts	and	waves		
The	shift	in	funding	for	learning	and	teaching	away	from	HEFCE	resulted	in	a	plethora	of	
policy	statements,	shifts	in	policy	emphasis	and	new	initiatives	to	focus	effort	on	the	
student	as	customer.	In	2011,	all	elements	of	the	‘teaching	grant,	with	the	exception	of	
widening	participation	and	improving	retention’,	were	subject	to	a	4.28%	cash	reduction	
(2011/07)	and,	in	2014,	there	was	a	£20m	reduction	in	the	recurrent	teaching	grant.	In	
2012,	when	the	new	fee	regime	was	introduced,	students	achieving	AAB	were	no	longer	
included	in	the	Student	Number	Control	(SNC);	in	2013,	more	students	were	taken	out	of	
the	SNC	policy	and,	in	2015,	SNC	was	abolished	altogether.	The	new	fee	regime	was	also	
introduced	for	part-time	as	well	as	full-time	students,	and	consequently	part-time	student	
registrations	dropped	by	40%	which,	despite	some	amendments	to	the	funding	
methodology,	have	to	date	never	fully	recovered.	By	2015,	HEFCE	had	sought	to	simplify	its	
recurrent	funding	methodology	for	teaching,	such	that	the	three	stage	recalculation	
process	was	removed	(30/2013,	29/2014).	The	amount	of	recurrent	grant	continued	to	
decline,	particularly	the	supplement	for	‘old	regime’	students,	which	was	reduced	by	£54m	
in	2016,	although	funding	was	maintained	in	real	terms	for	high	cost	and	STEM	subjects	
(03/2016).	
HEFCE	still	had	some	control	over	the	funding	of	specific	disciplines,	with	financial	
incentives	for	strategically	important	and	vulnerable	subjects	(09/2011),	high	cost	subjects,	
STEM	(for	which	some	new	disciplines	were	now	included	in	classifications,	such	as	sports	
science)	and	a	relaxation	of	the	ELQ	policy	for	some	STEM	subjects	and	students	taking	a	
year	abroad	(14/2013).	In	2011,	despite	HEFCE’s	previous	assertion	that	employer	
engagement	was	no	longer	a	policy	focus,	20,000	ASNs	were	provided	for	co-funded	
employer	engagement	as	part	of	a	workforce	development	programme	(03/2007),	but	by	
2012,	co-funded	places	were	phased	out	and	HEFCE	had	announced	that	workforce	
development	was	no	longer	a	policy	priority.		
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The	vast	majority	of	policy	decisions	in	the	period	were	in	relation	to	the	recurrent	funding	
methodology,	with	little	special	initiative	funding.	However,	what	little	was	available	was	
focussed	on	other	areas	of	the	sector,	such	as	taught	postgraduate	students,	with	£25m	of	
special	initiative	funding	in	2013	to	stimulate	progression	to	taught	postgraduate	(PGT)	
(2013/13)	and	£50m	in	2014	as	matched	funding	towards	the	cost	of	studies	as	part	of	a	
Postgraduate	Support	Scheme	(32/2014).	Following	the	Sainsbury	review	of	technical	skills	
pathways	and	qualifications,	HEFCE	turned	its	attention	to	degree	apprenticeships,	with	
£11m	for	the	Degree	Apprenticeships	Development	Fund	(06/2016).		
In	2011,	as	part	of	HEFCE’s	new	role	in	supporting	students	and	providing	information	on	
choice	and	opportunities,	HEFCE	published	a	policy	on	the	provision	of	information	about	
HE	in	response	to	the	White	Paper,	including	the	establishment	of	Key	Information	Set	(KIS)	
data	to	be	provided	by	institutions	on	all	courses	(2011/18)	and	include	data	from	surveys	
such	as	the	NSS	and	DLHE,	(2011/18).	The	first	KIS	data	was	produced	in	2012	and	
published	on	the	new	UNISTATS	website	(16/2012).	By	2014,	institutions	were	being	asked	
for	more	transparency,	and	asked	to	provide	students	with	information	on	income	and	
expenditure,	as	part	of	the	government’s	Supporting	Public	Accountability	initiative	
(06/2014).	HEFCE	launched	data	maps	of	HE	provision	in	2014,	thus	enhancing	its	role	in	
the	provision	of	publically	available	HE	data.	Provision	of	data	was	extended	to	
postgraduate	provision	in	2015,	with	the	development	of	the	Steps	to	Postgraduate	Study	
decision-making	tool	launched.		
Increasing	participation	continued	to	be	a	priority	for	government,	and	although	
participation	had	increased	to	49%	in	2011,	the	participation	rate	declined	sharply	to	42.1%	
in	2012	with	the	introduction	of	the	higher	fee	cap.	However,	despite	this	drop	in	2012,	
participation	continued	with	an	upwards	trajectory	to	rise	to	49.1%	by	2016	(source:	DfE	
2018).		
Policy	steers	and	recurrent	funding	incentives	were	still	at	the	forefront	of	HEFCE’s	
widening	participation	agenda,	but	these	too	were	subject	to	funding	cuts	during	the	
period.	Indeed,	Aimhigher,	which	had	been	the	flagship	umbrella	organisation	for	widening	
participation	funded	by	two	government	departments	and	HEFCE,	was	closed	in	2011.	
Under	the	coalition	government	in	2011,	a	National	Scholarship	Programme	was	
announced,	which	provided	£300m	of	matching	funding	over	three	years	to	support	
students	whose	household	income	was	less	than	£25,000	(13/2011,	2011/10).	However,	
the	programme	was	short-lived	and,	following	a	re-calculation	of	its	funding	method	to	
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concentrate	funding	in	institutions	with	a	greater	number	of	students	from	low	income	
families	(2013/02),	together	with	a	£50m	reduction	in	funding	in	2014	(32/2013),	the	
programme	was	abolished	in	2015	in	order	to	concentrate	funding	to	support	postgraduate	
students	from	disadvantaged	backgrounds	(24/2013).	A	relatively	modest	£25m	was	
provided	over	two	years	as	special	initiative	funding	in	2014	to	support	a	national	Network	
for	Collaborative	Outreach	Programme	(NCOP)	between	HE	and	FE	(20/2014).	However,	
with	a	now	wholly	Conservative	government,	and	a	push	from	the	then	Prime	Minister,	
David	Cameron,	the	NCOP	became	a	recurrent	funding	stream	with	£90m	over	two	years	in	
order	to	meet	the	PM’s	goals	of	increasing	participation	from	disadvantaged	backgrounds	
by	100%,	and	doubling	the	proportion	of	students	from	ethnic	minority	groups	(27/2016).	
Disabled	students	also	continued	to	be	a	focus	for	HEFCE,	with	funding	doubled	to	£40m,	
albeit	with	revised	weightings	(03/2016).	However,	despite	a	strong	steer	towards	
increasing	participation	from	certain	groups	through	these	funding	initiatives,	by	2016	
formula	funding	for	widening	participation	had	dropped	from	£68m	to	£54m	(03/2016).		
Capital	spending	for	learning	and	teaching	through	the	Capital	Investment	Fund	continued	
to	be	a	priority,	both	for	HEIs	and	for	HEFCE	funded	FECs,	with	increases	year	on	year	from	
2012-14	(05/2012,	2013/08,	03/2014),	and	there	were	moves	to	drive	capital	investment	
towards	particular	priorities,	with	£200m	made	available	in	2014	for	investment	in	STEM	
facilities	(02/2014).	Like	many	of	the	funding	initiatives	being	introduced	post	2011,	this	
required	matched	funding	from	institutions	themselves.	HEFCE	introduced	a	change	of	
emphasis	during	this	period,	with	many	capital	policy	funding	initiatives	being	driven	
towards	the	reduction	of	carbon	emissions,	such	as	the	Revolving	Green	Fund	(16/2011,	
29/2012).	Indeed,	in	2012,	capital	funding	became	‘conditional	upon	carbon	management	
plans	and	improved	environmental	performance’	(16/2011).		
4.8.5.2	Research	–	quality	judged	by	impact	
Although	recurrent	research	funding	was	also	subject	to	cuts	at	the	beginning	of	the	period,	
with	an	overall	reduction	of	1.1%	in	2011	(2011/07),	by	2016	QR	funding	had	increased	by	
£20m	(03/2016).	HEFCE	continued	to	invest	in	research	capability;	from	2012,	£100m	of	
additional	funding	was	made	available	over	three	years	to	support	research	facilities	
(2012/12)	and	there	was	£240m	to	support	postgraduate	research.	The	UK	Research	
Partnership	Investment	Fund	for	capital	funding	was	introduced	in	2013,	with	four	
consecutive	rounds	in	the	four	years	to	2016	of	over	£400m	in	funding	(2012/31,	2013/35,	
2014/17,	2015/33).	However,	there	were	also	changes	to	the	QR	funding	methodology,	
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such	that	two	star	research	outputs	were	no	longer	funded	(03/2012)	and,	in	the	light	of	
the	2014	REF	results,	the	parameters	for	the	funding	method	were	reviewed	(03/2015).	A	
further	shift	of	emphasis	came	in	2014,	when	institutions	were	required	to	comply	with	the	
Concordat	to	Support	Research	Activity,	as	a	condition	of	grant	(153rd	Board	Meeting	
minutes).			
The	key	event	in	HEFCE’s	research	policy	in	the	period	was	the	first	REF	submission	in	2014,	
with	its	increased	focus	on	the	impact	of	research.		In	2016,	the	Stern	Review	reported	on	a	
review	of	the	REF	guidelines,	recommending	that	there	was	an	even	greater	emphasis	in	
future	REFs	on	the	impact	of	research.	However,	there	had	been	criticism	of	this	approach,	
and	a	study	by	the	RAND	Corporation	in	2014	found	that	both	defining	impact	and	
authenticating	the	impact	had	proved	problematic.	Another	key	outcome	from	changes	to	
the	REF	post-2014	was	the	implementation	of	an	open	access	framework	(2013/16,	
2014/07,	32/2016,	2016/35),	such	that	the	findings	of	research	are	publically	available,	thus	
enhancing	its	transparency.			
4.8.5.3	Economy	and	society	
Third	stream	activities	continued	to	be	a	feature	on	the	HEFCE	funding	landscape,	albeit	
much	reduced	in	comparison	with	previous	years.	The	Strategic	Development	Fund	(SDF)	
was	replaced	in	2012	by	Catalyst	Funding,	specifically	targeted	to	promote	activities	such	as	
projects	which	enhanced	the	sector’s	contribution	to	economic	growth,	the	NUS’s	green	
fund	(2012/12)	and	higher	level	technical	education	(2014/21).	The	Catalyst	Fund	became	a	
catch-all	fund	for	supporting	activities	in	other	key	policy	areas,	such	as	the	2016	focus	on	
teaching	innovations	in	addressing	barriers	to	success	and	safeguarding	(20/2016,	
36/2016),	thus	significantly	simplifying	the	funding	of	special	initiatives.		
4.8.5.4	The	locus	of	policy-making		
This	phase	in	HEFCE’s	history	saw	the	locus	of	policy-making	shift	wholly	to	that	of	outside-
in,	as	HEFCE	became	chief	regulator,	and	its	ability	to	influence	policy	through	special	
funding	continued	to	diminish,	both	as	a	consequence	of	continued	cuts	to	public	funding	
and	cuts	to	learning	and	teaching	grant	through	increased	student	fees.	Indeed,	a	good	
many	of	the	special	funding	initiatives,	which	had	previously	given	HEFCE	the	potential	for	
influencing	institutional	behaviour,	became	absorbed	into	recurrent	funding	in	learning	and	
teaching,	research,	and	third	stream	funding.	Hence	shifts	in	policy	direction	tended	to	be	
characterised	by	incremental	shifts	in	the	recurrent	funding	formulas.	The	focus	on	the	
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student	as	consumer	meant	that	HEFCE	found	its	role	more	as	provider	of	information	and	
less	as	influencer	of	policy.	
The	consequences	for	this	study	are	that	in	this	period	of	HEFCE’s	history,	there	are	few	
policy	initiatives	that	adequately	meet	the	criteria	to	be	considered	as	case	studies.	There	
are	few	special	funded	initiatives	resulting	in	adequate	formative	and	summative	
evaluations,	and	little	policy	development	work	which	has	resulted	in	sufficiently	rich	
discussions	and	review	by	other	commentators.					
4.8.6	2017	–	2018	
As	a	consequence	of	the	White	Papers	noted	in	4.8.4	above,	and	the	Nurse	review,	The	
Higher	Education	and	Research	Bill	had	its	first	reading	in	the	House	of	Commons	in	May	
2016	and	received	Royal	Assent	twelve	months	later.	The	Bill	recommended	further	
significant	changes	to	the	funding	and	regulatory	structures	for	HE,	most	notably	the	
demise	of	HEFCE	and	the	introduction	of	a	new	HE	regulator,	the	OfS.	The	Bill	also	saw	the	
merger	of	the	Research	Councils,	and	the	research	funding	functions	of	HEFCE	transferred	
to	a	new	body,	UKRI.	By	April	2018,	formula	funding	for	teaching	and	regulatory	
responsibilities	had	been	transferred	to	the	OfS,	and	formula	funding	for	research	had	
transferred	to	UKRI.	As	such,	the	funding	of	teaching	and	research	had	been	truly	
separated.	
The	OfS	is	essentially	an	amalgamation	of	the	student-facing	functions	of	HEFCE	and	OFFA.	
The	specific	purpose	of	the	OfS	is	to	regulate	the	market	for	HE.	What	little	state	funding	
that	remains	will	come	straight	from	the	DfE:		
‘We	will	establish	a	new	market	regulator,	the	Office	for	Students	(OfS)	that	operates	on	
behalf	of	students	and	tax	payers	to	support	a	competitive	environment	and	promote	
choice,	quality	and	value	for	money.	In	doing	so	we	will	put	students	at	the	heart	of	how	
higher	education	is	regulated.	The	OfS	will	be	explicitly	pro-student	choice,	a	champion	
of	transparency,	and	will	make	sure	that	a	high	quality	higher	education	experience	is	
available	for	students	from	all	backgrounds’	(House	of	Commons	Education	Committee	
report	February	2017).	
Other	HE	agencies	were	also	subject	to	significant	change	within	this	period,	with	the	UUK	
and	GuildHE	Bell	Review	of	the	sector	agencies	recommending	a	merger	of	the	Leadership	
Foundation,	the	HEA	and	the	Equality	Challenge	Unit,	and	this	was	fulfilled	in	2018.	Data	
collection	for	the	sector	was	also	subject	to	change	and	the	Higher	Education	Statistics	
Agency	(HESA)	data	collection	was	rebranded	as	Data	Futures	from	2019-20.	In	a	further	
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move	to	distance	HE	funding	from	the	state,	the	government	also	sold	part	of	the	student	
loan	book	to	the	private	sector	in	2017.	Evans	(2018)	notes	that	the	OfS	had	not	been	set	
up	to	work	co-operatively	with	sector	agencies,	and	indeed	the	review	of	such	agencies	
means	that	
‘the	balancing	influence	of	HEFCE’s	cooperating	bodies	has	been	broken	up	and	
reshaped’	(Evans	WONKHE	2018).			
Much	of	the	policy	work	of	HEFCE	in	its	remaining	months	was	focussed	on	preparing	for	
the	transition	of	its	regulatory	functions	to	the	OfS	and	QR	funding	to	UKRI,	and	hence	
there	were	very	few	new	initiatives,	with	most	work	resulting	in	minor	changes	to	the	
funding	methodologies.	Special	initiative	funding	had	been	almost	completely	withdrawn,	
with	the	exception	of	the	Catalyst	Fund,	which	provided	funds	to	support	focussed	
initiatives,	such	as	tackling	religious-based	hate	crime	(3/2018)	and	supporting	the	mental	
health	of	postgraduate	research	students	(40/2017).	However	there	was	a	continuation	of	
the	Capital	Investment	Framework	with	£324m	to	support	both	teaching	and	research	
(07/2017).	Overall	though,	the	demise	of	HEFCE	and	its	influence	in	policy	was	evident	from	
2017.		
Much	of	the	policy	work	in	2017-18	supported	the	development	of	TEF,	including	changes	
to	the	NSS	data	set	to	include	private	providers	(30/2016).	In	addition,	HEFCE	continued	to	
support	government’s	focus	on	apprenticeships,	with	a	continuation	of	the	Degree	
Apprenticeship	Development	Fund,	although	funding	was	modest	at	only	£5m	for	2017-18	
(06/2016).	Overall,	teaching	recurrent	grant	declined,	by	£40m	in	2017,	although	there	was	
still	a	focus	on	driving	some	areas	of	policy,	such	as	changes	to	formula	funding	to	
accommodate	the	NCOP,	and	a	push	to	support	student	mental	health	(2017/05).		
There	was	some	good	news	for	government	in	2018,	with	the	participation	target	almost	
meeting	50%,	standing	at	49.8%	at	the	end	of	2016-17	(source	DfE	2018),	although	it	has	
been	reported	that	this	is	a	misleading	figure,	since	once	all	modes	of	study	and	gender	are	
taken	into	account,	the	number	of	entrants	is	more	than	4,000	lower	than	in	2011-12	
(Kernohan	and	Coiffait	2018).			
There	was	little	in	the	way	of	new	policy	development	for	research,	other	than	a	
consolidation	of	funding,	with	recurrent	funding	increasing	by	£28m	in	2017,	in	order	to	
switch	the	Global	Challenges	Research	Fund	to	the	recurrent	funding	methodology	
(2017/05,	24/2017).	Special	funding	was	almost	non-existent,	with	the	exception	of	£220m	
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of	research	capability	funding	for	the	UK	Research	Partnership	Investment	Fund	(2017/05).	
The	biggest	policy	influence	from	HEFCE	in	research	was	an	announcement	on	the	
framework	for	REF2012	(33/2017,	REF2017/01).	Recurrent	funding	for	third	stream	
economy	and	society	funding	continued,	although	new	funds	were	relatively	modest,	with	
small	increases	in	HIEF	funding	to	support	government	initiatives	such	as	the	industrial	
strategy	(2017/24).			
As	a	consequence,	there	were	no	policy	initiatives	with	sufficiently	rich	data	to	be	
considered	as	candidates	for	case	studies.			
4.9	From	buffer	to	regulator	(and	a	shift	in	the	locus	of	policy-making)	
For	many	commentators	on	HE,	the	buffer	role	so	enjoyed	by	UGC	had	diminished	with	the	
advent	of	the	Funding	Councils.	Scott	(1995)	described	the	Funding	Councils	as	‘agents	of	
government,	not	buffer	bodies’	(p.27)	and	Shattock	(2012)	agrees,	describing	them	as	
‘essentially	an	instrument	of	government’	(p.100).	He	argues	that	this	agency	relationship	
was	further	strengthened	in	1997	with	the	installation	of	the	New	Labour	government,	
which	saw	the	role	of	HEFCE	as	delivering	policy,	not	creating	it.	For	Shattock,	the	evidence	
for	this	lies	in	examples	where	HEFCE	has	been	over-ruled	by	government,	such	as	the	
occasion	when	a	minister	required	HEFCE	to	reduce	the	number	of	five	star	departments	
identified	in	the	RAE,	since	he	thought	there	were	too	many	(Shattock	2012	p.100).		
However,	despite	the	apparent	loss	of	the	buffer	role,	Shattock	acknowledges	that	HEFCE	
had	a	critical	role	to	play	as	a	‘mediator’.	It	is	noteworthy	that,	in	2003,	Howard	Newby,	
then	Chief	Executive	of	HEFCE,	also	saw	the	role	of	HEFCE	as	a	mediator,	reporting	in	the	
Guardian	newspaper	that	
‘In	carrying	out	our	role	we	act	as	a	mediator	between	Government	and	universities	and	
colleges.	We	robustly	represent	the	needs	of	higher	education	to	Government,	and	
convey	the	views	of	Government	to	higher	education’	(in	Taggart	2003	p.10).		
Conversely,	in	the	same	article	he	describes	how	HEFCE	had	responsibility	for	implementing	
policies	within	the	broad	policy	framework	of	government,	thus	suggesting	that	Scott	and	
Shattock’s	description	of	HEFCE	as	instruments	and	agents	of	government	was	also	
acknowledged	by	HEFCE.	Equally,	Taggart	(2003)	points	to	a	MORI	poll	conducted	in	2002-
03	in	which	90%	of	respondents	from	HEIs	and	FECs	agreed	that	HEFCE	was	an	agent	of	
government	(p.11).		For	Taggart	(2003),	whilst	HEFCE	did	not	have	the	planning	powers	
under	the	terms	of	the	Act	(1992),	it	was	able	to	‘steer’	policy	through	regulatory	powers	
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and	promoting	good	practice.	I	would	agree	with	this	view,	since	there	is	evidence,	as	noted	
by	Taggart	(2003),	that	HEFCE	was	able	to	influence	government,	such	as	with	the	2003	
White	Paper,	and	the	forthcoming	case	studies	demonstrate	that	HEFCE	chief	executives	in	
particular	had	on	occasions	the	opportunity	to	influence	the	instigation	of	particular	policy	
initiatives.				
By	2010,	HEFCE	had	seen	a	further	change	in	focus,	as	student	fees	became	the	dominant	
funding	methodology	for	the	sector,	and	HEFCE’s	role	became	more	regulatory	than	that	of	
a	funding	body;	and	this	is	supported	by	evidence	provided	above,	for	example	the	creation	
of	the	HEFCE	register	in	2013	as	a	result	of	regulatory	reform.	Thus	the	focus	was	on	
regulating	expenditure	and	monitoring	institutions’	financial	health	in	order	to	make	them	
more	accountable	for	spending	fee	income.		Shattock	(2012)	argues	that	this	represented	a	
further	move	away	from	the	buffer	role	for	the	funding	council,	as	HEFCE	was	obliged	to	
refine	itself:	
‘in	2010	HEFCE	abandoned	the	pretence	it	was	a	‘buffer’	and	refined	itself	as	a	‘broker’’	
(Shattock	2012	p.101).		
HEFCE	acknowledged	this	change	in	role	itself	in	its	‘memorandum	of	assurance	and	
accountability	between	HEFCE	and	institutions’	in	July	2017,	in	which	it	described	HEFCE’s	
role	to	‘act	as	a	broker’	(Evans	2018).	However,	with	the	demise	of	HEFCE,	the	role	of	the	
new	intermediary	body,	the	OfS,	shifted	once	again	to	that	of	solely	regulator.			
For	many	commentators	and	observers	of	HE,	the	demise	of	HEFCE	was	inevitable	once	the	
focus	of	funding	shifted	from	the	state	to	the	individual,	and	with	it	came	a	shift	in	the	locus	
of	policy-making.	Whilst	HEFCE	was	able	to	retain	a	key	role	in	using	funding	to	incentivise	
(Selby	2018)	institutions	to	engage	with	certain	policies,	whether	as	a	buffer,	mediator	or	
broker,	it	retained	a	role	influencing	policy	at	both	government	and	institutional	level.	
However,	as	its	funding	power	diminished,	so	did	its	ability	to	influence	policy.		As	Mark	
Leach	observed	in	The	Guardian	in	2015,	HEFCE’s	position	had	been	under	threat	since	
2011:	
‘having	taken	away	most	of	its	carrots	as	the	primary	funder	of	universities,	the	
government	gave	it	no	new	sticks	to	compensate’	(Leach,	2015).		
David	Melville,	former	Chief	Executive	of	the	FEFCE,	writing	in	2018,	takes	this	further,	
arguing	that	the	demise	of	HEFCE	firmly	removed	any	bridge	between	government	and	the	
institutions	and	entirely	shifted	the	locus	of	policy-making	into	the	heart	of	government:	
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‘I	would	argue	that	the	demise	of	HEFCE	is	not	just	another	comma	in	the	last	100-year	
history	of	HE.	Rather	it	is	a	full-stop.	HEFCE	has	been	the	last	bastion	of	a	centuries-old	
compact	between	governments	and	universities	to	provide	the	funding	whilst	leaving	
the	internal	operations	of	the	system	to	the	universities…..	This	parallels	what	has	
happened	in	other	areas	of	the	public	sector	in	terms	of	central	control,	but	universities,	
once	having	the	clout	to	resist	such	moves	have	fragmented	into	competing	mission	
groups	which	make	it	easier	for	central	government	to	impose	its	will.	The	bypassing	of	
HEFCE	on	the	basis	of	ministerial	anecdote	to	invent	dubious	policy	initiatives	has	been	
progressively	more	evident’	(Melville	2018).	
Kernohan,	also	writing	in	2018,	concurs,	arguing	that	HEFCE’s	policy	in	interpreting	and	
managing	policy	was	essential	for	the	sector:	
‘policy	coming	from	ministerial	fiat	was	thoughtfully	translated	into	interventions	that	
made	sense,	and	either	achieved	stated	goals	or	were	at	least	not	actively	harmful.	
Getting	rid	of	this	filter	is	not	good	for	the	sector,	for	either	new	market	entrants	or	
ancient	institutions’	(Kernohan	2018).		
So	the	loss	of	HEFCE	begs	the	question,	where	will	the	locus	of	policy-making	be	in	the	new	
regulatory	world	of	the	OfS?	The	initial	plan	for	OfS	was	that	it	‘would	not	do	policy’	
(Kernohan	2018)	but	would	use	its	regulatory	framework	to	ensure	compliance	and	
monitoring	of	institutions.	Policy	therefore	either	has	to	be	determined	at	institutional	level	
through	market	forces,	which	is	problematic	where	HE	is	not	a	typical	market	good,	and	is	
subject	to	intense	regulation,	or	at	the	level	of	government	department,	and	therefore	the	
responsibility	of	the	minister.	This	would	leave	the	OfS	in	something	of	a	policy	vacuum.	
However,	in	its	short	life,	OfS	has	already	been	asked	to	take	a	position	on	various	issues,	
such	as	vice	chancellors’	remuneration	and	its	role	in	the	industrial	strategy	in	assessing	the	
higher	level	skills	gap	(Kernohan	2018)	and,	as	such,	‘not	doing	policy’	may	not	be	a	
sustainable	position	for	OfS.		
In	articulating	the	role	of	the	intermediary	bodies	and	the	relationship	with	the	locus	of	
policy-making,	it	is	useful	to	summarise	in	Table	8	(p.123)	that	follows.		
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Table	8	–	THE	ROLE	OF	THE	INTERMEDIARY	BODY	AND	THE	CHANGING	LOCUS	OF	POLICY-MAKING		
Period	 Role	of	intermediary	body	 Locus	of	policy-making	
1919-1940s	 Buffer	–	UGC	 Inside-out:	Universities	
1940s	to	
1970s	
Buffer	–	UGC	 Inside-out:	Universities	
1980s	 Buffer/mediator		–	UGC	
	
Move	towards	outside-in:	Universities	but	
greater	state	intervention	
1998-1992	 Mediator	–	UFC	 Move	towards	outside-in:	Universities	but	
greater	state	intervention	
1992-1997	 Agent	–	HEFCE	as	funder	and	regulator	 Outside-in:	Greater	state	intervention	
1997-2008	 Agent/Broker		-	HEFCE	 Outside-in:	Greater	state	intervention	with	
increased	accountability	
2008-2010	 Agent/Broker		-	HEFCE	 Outside-in:	Greater	state	intervention	with	
increased	accountability	
2010-16	 Broker/Regulator	–	HEFCE	(becomes	
chief	regulator)	
Outside-in	
2018	-		 Regulator	–	Office	for	Students	 Outside-in	
	
This	section	is	important	to	the	study	since	it	charts	the	shift	in	focus	for	the	HE	
intermediary	body	from	the	buffer	of	UGC	to	the	regulator	of	the	OfS.	This	chapter	has	
articulated	that	there	is	a	strong	relationship	between	the	role	of	the	intermediary	body	
and	the	locus	of	policy-making,	and	this	will	be	further	explored	through	the	case	studies.	
This	is	particularly	helpful	in	informing	the	discussion	in	Chapter	8	addressing	the	research	
questions	and	articulating	a	position	on	what	an	analysis	of	HEFCE	policy-making	can	reveal	
about	the	locus	of	power	in	policy-making	in	HE,	through	the	evaluation	of	success	and	
failure	in	relation	to	the	case	studies.	
4.10	Conclusion	
This	chapter	has	provided	an	historical	account	of	the	changing	role	of	the	intermediary	
body	in	policy	development,	and	a	summary	of	policy	initiatives	from	HEFCE,	against	the	
backdrop	of	wider	policy	reform	and	other	government	initiatives	and	reviews	during	the	
period,	in	order	to	set	the	scene	for	the	selection	of	the	case	studies.	All	three	of	the	case	
studies	have	been	highlighted	during	this	chapter.	
The	period	2000-2006	saw	a	plethora	of	HEFCE	special	funding	policy	initiatives,	following	a	
significant	increase	in	funding	for	teaching,	research,	capital	investment	and	other	policy	
areas	under	the	New	Labour	government.	A	key	focus	of	this	period	was	New	Labour’s	
‘third	way’	ideology,	which	drove	much	of	the	rhetoric	for	increasing	participation	to	50%	
by	2010,	widening	participation,	and	initiatives	to	engage	HE	with	investing	in	the	
knowledge	economy.	As	part	of	this	ideology	there	was	also	a	focus	on	engaging	FECs	in	HE	
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through	qualification	and	skills	reform	and	a	number	of	initiatives	to	engage	with	the	local	
economy	through	education	and	research.	New	Public	Management	was	also	a	strong	
feature	of	the	period.	All	three	of	the	chosen	case	studies	fit	well	within	the	‘third	way’	and	
they	all	have	some	distinctions	which	are	useful	in	illuminating	different	aspects	of	success	
and	failure	in	relation	to	the	‘process,	programme	and	political	dimensions’	(McConnell	
2010)	of	the	policy,	and	the	locus	of	policy-making	between	HEFCE	and	government.	In	this	
chapter,	I	have	also	observed	that	whilst	this	particular	stage	in	HEFCE’s	history	provided	a	
large	number	of	potential	case	studies,	subsequent	periods	provided	fewer	and	fewer	
helpful	case	study	candidates,	as	HEFCE	had	less	and	less	opportunity	to	influence	policy	
behaviour	through	special	funding	initiatives,	both	as	a	consequence	of	the	changing	nature	
of	its	role	and	significant	public	funding	cuts.		
In	Chapter	3,	I	addressed	the	rationale	of	the	selection	of	the	case	studies	in	terms	of	
methodology,	which	was	determined	by	their	ability	to	‘fit’	well	within	the	McConnell	
framework	for	determining	success	and	failure	and	enabling	evaluation	criteria	for	case	
studies.	To	summarise,	the	selected	studies	needed	to	be	time	bound,	have	clear	objectives	
and	proposed	outcomes,	follow	a	fairly	typical	process	and	implementation	approach,	
whilst	having	some	distinctions,	and	have	sufficient	sources	of	data	to	meet	criteria	for	
replication,	validity	and	evaluation.		Section	3.4	(p.67)	provides	a	fuller	description	for	how	
the	case	studies	meet	these	criteria.		
To	summarise,	the	selected	case	studies	are:	
The	e-University	(2000	–	2004).		
Centres	for	Excellence	in	Learning	&	Teaching	(2005	–	2010).		
Lifelong	Learning	Networks	(2004	–	2011).		
The	next	three	chapters	form	the	thick	descriptions	in	relation	to	each	of	the	case	studies.		
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Chapter	5:	Case	Study	1:	The	e-University	
5.1	Introduction	
The	e-University	is	an	ideal	case	study	since	it	meets	all	the	criteria	set	out	in	Table	6	(p.71)	
in	being	a	time	bound	episode,	having	clearly	identified	proposed	outcomes	and	benefits	to	
the	target	group,	following	a	typical	HEFCE	policy	process	and	having	sufficient	sources	of	
both	primary	and	secondary	texts	to	offer	sufficient	breadth	and	depth	to	develop	a	thick	
description	of	the	policy	episode.	In	considering	each	of	the	chosen	texts,	the	use	of	the	
coding	established	in	Appendix	B	enables	the	thick	description	to	be	interpreted	against	the	
theoretical	framework	in	Chapter	8,	to	give	a	nuanced	approach	in	addressing	the	main	
research	question,	articulating	the	success	or	failure	of	the	e-University	policy	episode.	This	
is	also	used	to	address	the	first	supplementary	research	question	in	establishing	
commonalities	and	differences	between	the	chosen	case	studies.	This	particular	policy	
episode	is	also	of	interest	to	the	thesis	in	that	it	addresses	the	second	supplementary	
research	question,	considering	the	locus	of	power	of	the	policy,	since	there	is	some	debate	
about	whether	the	initiative	was	driven	by	government	or	HEFCE	in	the	first	instance,	and	
the	novel	approach	to	a	public	private	enterprise	raises	some	interesting	questions	about	
the	power	relationships	between	HEFCE	and	the	private	sector	enterprise.		
This	chapter	is	split	into	two	sections:	the	first	provides	an	historical	narrative	of	the	
episode:	how	it	came	to	fruition,	the	national	and	international	contexts,	the	organisations	
and	actors	involved,	the	activities	which	enabled	the	implementation	of	the	policy,	the	
outcomes	and	sequence	of	events.	The	second	section,	drawing	on	the	primary	and	
secondary	texts,	takes	a	thematic	approach	in	articulating	a	critical	analysis	of	particularly	
important	or	interesting	aspects	of	the	policy,	which	will	enable	the	interpretation	of	the	
policy	against	the	theoretical	framework.						
5.1.1	Sources	of	data	
The	initial	sources	of	data	for	this	episode	are	the	landmark	speech	given	by	David	Blunkett	
at	Greenwich	University	prior	to	the	launch	of	the	e-university	initiative	by	HEFCE,	the	initial	
HEFCE	consultation	circular	to	HEIs,	and	the	subsequent	report.	The	initial	Price	
Waterhouse	Cooper	(PwC)	business	model	is	also	a	key	document,	since	this	sets	out	the	
initial	organisational	structure,	target	student	numbers	and	revenue	plan.	The	other	main	
source	of	data	for	this	episode	is	the	findings	and	evidence	of	the	Select	Committee,	as	
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testimony	of	the	views	of	the	principal	actors	in	the	venture.	Unlike	the	other	case	studies,	
this	episode	did	not	have	sufficient	longevity	to	enable	HEFCE	to	commission	formative	and	
summative	evaluations,	but	the	Select	Committee	report	is	comprehensive	in	its	review.	
The	closest	HEFCE	came	to	an	evaluation	was	the	commissioning	of	a	Review	of	the	UKeU	
by	PA	Consulting.	Although	the	review	report	was	made	available	by	HEFCE	in	2005,	it	is	no	
longer	available,	but	Bacsich	(2010)	usefully	summarises	its	findings.		
Considering	the	controversy	surrounding	the	e-University	in	the	HE	world,	there	is	
surprisingly	little	focus	on	it	in	the	academic	literature.	However,	there	are	some	
publications	which	are	widely	cited	as	helpful	commentaries	and	analysis,	and	I	have	used	
them	to	establish	a	critical	account	of	the	episode.	The	main	contributors	are	Garett	(2004)	
who	summarised	the	venture	and	the	reasons	for	the	demise	of	UKeU,	Peters	(2011),	who	
considered	the	partnership	relationships	in	UKeU,	and	Bacsich	(2004,	2005,	2010),	who	has	
authored	a	number	of	articles	on	the	context	of	the	e-University,	accounts	of	the	episode	
and	the	lessons	to	be	learned	from	the	UKeU.	Bacsich	has	had	unprecedented	access	to	
materials	related	to	the	e-University	and	UKeU,	and	he	notes	that	there	are	166	boxes	of	
archive	material	and	nearly	90,000	electronic	files,	but	only	a	small	percentage	of	them	
have	been	made	publicly	available,	mostly	to	a	select	number	of	researchers	such	as	
Bacsich.	Conole	et	al	undertook	an	extensive	piece	of	research	into	the	e-University	
experience	(2006,	2006a,	2006b,	2007),	reviewing	relevant	documentation	and	
interviewing	actors	from	UKeU	and	HEIs	before	reaching	some	conclusions,	particularly	in	
relation	to	the	organisation	of	the	venture,	and	some	of	their	findings	are	also	highlighted	
here.		
There	is	a	considerable	amount	of	literature	citing	the	e-University	as	an	example	in	
relation	to	its	technical	platform	and	the	pedagogical	aspects	of	e-learning	however;	these	
are	not	considered	as	part	of	this	study,	since	they	are	more	technical	considerations,	and	
not	related	to	policy	per	se.			
A	search	for	media	interest	in	the	e-University	revealed	surprisingly	few	mentions	in	the	
THES	and	only	a	small	number	in	the	Guardian	and	Observer	newspapers,	with	the	main	
themes	reported	during	the	episode	being	debates	on	whether	the	initiative	should	be	an	
elite	or	inclusive	venture,	the	lack	of	branding,	potential	private	venture	partners	and	the	
delays	experienced	in	meeting	objectives.	The	eventual	decision	to	close	UKeU,	and	the	
subsequent	Select	Committee	report,	received	the	highest	level	of	reporting	in	2004	and	
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2005.	The	demise	of	UKeU	did	receive	some	international	attention,	being	reported	in	The	
Chronicle	of	Higher	Education	in	Washington	in	May	2004.			
It	is	noteworthy	that,	in	an	article	in	the	Guardian	newspaper	on	21st	March	2004,	John	
Naughton	claims	that	an	article	by	Mark	Townsend	in	the	Observer	newspaper	in	Autumn	
2003	prompted	the	demise	of	UKeU.	He	suggests	that	the	decision	was	not	entirely	that	of	
the	HEFCE	Board,	as	HEFCE	itself	had	reported,	but	driven	by	government	in	seeking	to	
divert	bad	publicity:	
‘In	fact,	my	sources	tell	me	that	the	events	which	culminated	in	HEFCE's	decision	to	
abort	were	triggered	by	a	short	piece	in	this	newspaper	last	autumn	written	by	my	
colleague	Mark	Townsend	in	which	he	reported	the	e-U's	failure	to	recruit	students.	The	
item	was	read	by	Charles	Clarke,	who	arrived	in	his	office	on	Monday	morning	
brandishing	The	Observer	and	demanding	to	know	what	the	hell	was	going	on’	
(Naughton	2004).			
UKeU	is	raised	as	an	example	of	government	failure	in	many	subsequent	House	of	
Commons	enquiries,	and	on	occasion,	along	with	the	Poll	Tax,	as	an	example	of	policy	
failure	in	tit	for	tat	exchanges	between	Conservative	and	Labour	party	representatives.	
Indeed,	David	Cameron	used	it	as	an	example	in	a	vitriolic	speech	in	a	House	of	Commons	
debate	in	November	2006,	when	he	said	“What	happened	to	the	Chancellor’s	e-university,	
which	was	meant	to	link	communities	together?	No	one	uses	it”	(Cameron,	Hansard	
15.11.2006).		
A	full	list	of	primary	and	secondary	texts	used	in	this	section	is	included	in	Appendix	A.	
5.2	An	account	of	the	episode	
The	e-University	was	a	short-lived	policy	episode,	running	from	2001	to	2004,	with	its	
initiation	declared	by	Lord	David	Blunkett	in	his	Greenwich	speech	in	2000.	The	aim	of	the	
e-University	was	to	provide	global	e-learning	programmes,	essentially	owned	by	HEIs	but	
administered	through	an	operating	company,	UKeU	(UK	e-University).	This	was	a	public-
private	venture,	triangulated	between	HEFCE,	HEIs	and	private	companies	and	established	
as	a	response	to	a	perceived	threat	from	the	United	States	to	dominate	the	market	in	
global	HE	e-learning.		HEFCE	withdrew	from	the	venture	in	2004,	closing	down	UKeU,	when	
it	became	clear	that	both	programmes	and	student	numbers	fell	far	short	of	those	
proposed	in	the	original	business	plan.	The	failure	of	UKeU,	and	in	particular	the	waste	of	
substantial	public	funding,	resulted	in	a	House	of	Commons	Education	and	Skills	Committee	
public	inquiry.		
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5.2.1	Origin	
Sir	Brian	Fender,	Chief	Executive	of	HEFCE	from	1995-2001,	took	responsibility	for	the	initial	
idea	for	the	e-University	venture	and,	thus,	it	could	be	argued	that	HEFCE	became	the	
policy	creator.	When	asked	by	the	Select	Committee	review	of	UKeU	if	he	had	been	the	
inspiration	for	the	e-University,	he	responded:	
‘I	think	a	fair	amount	of	responsibility	for	that	falls	on	my	shoulders…	what	we	did	was	
put	in	a	bid	in	the	spending	round,	and	we	said	this	was	important,	we	thought	it	was	an	
initiative…	in	the	end,	the	Department	did	decide	to	put	it	on	the	agenda	and	the	
Secretary	of	State	made	a	statement	saying	that	he	personally	thought	this	was	a	
project	worth	supporting’	(SC	2005	p.	Ev	90).		
Fender	was	influenced	by	a	series	of	meetings	that	he	had	with	public	and	private	
universities	in	the	United	States	at	a	conference	in	Aspen,	Colorado,	at	which	discussions	
centred	on	the	difficulties	that	universities	faced	in	attracting	students,	and	the	role	that	e-
learning	could	play	in	addressing	future	challenges.	He	concluded	that,	in	the	light	of	what	
was	being	achieved	in	the	USA,	raising	the	profile	of	UK	e-learning	was	a	necessity	if	the	UK	
was	not	to	be	left	behind	in	the	global	knowledge	economy.	Fender	discussed	the	idea	with	
HEFCE	colleagues	in	1999,	concluding	that	it	was	important	to	send	out	a	strong	message	to	
the	HE	sector	about	the	value	of	e-learning.	HEFCE	put	forward	a	proposal	for	the	
government	spending	round	and	won	the	support	of	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Education	
and	Employment,	David	Blunkett,	although	there	was	not	a	round	table	discussion	with	
ministers	(as	reported	in	the	Select	Committee	evidence	SC	2005	Q609	p.94).	
On	13th	February	2000,	as	part	of	a	landmark	speech	at	The	University	of	Greenwich,	David	
Blunkett	announced	plans	for	the	e-University,	with	£62	million	of	public	funding	to	set	up	a	
public-private	initiative,	as	an	income	generating	vehicle	to	deliver	HE	programmes	over	
the	internet.	He	said:	
‘I	want	today	to	make	a	significant	statement	about	the	future	direction	of	higher	
education…	Learning	has	become	big	business…	New	Providers	are	already	expanding	
into	the	Learning	environment	to	meet	this	demand,	particularly	in	the	USA…We	must	
have	big	aspirations,	even	if	we	are	a	small	country….The	impact	of	new	technologies	on	
learning	are	well	rehearsed…Nonetheless,	it	is	clear	that	virtual	learning	is	an	industry	
which	is	striving	forward	all	around	us….But	the	challenge	is	also	a	national	one	–	how	
can	we	best,	as	a	country,	respond	to	the	wave	of	change	that	e-learning	is	bringing	to	
higher	education	throughout	the	globe?...That	is	why	I	can	announce	that	HEFCE	will	
bring	forward	proposals	for	a	new	collaborative	venture	between	universities	and	
private	sector	partners,	under	the	working	title	of	the	‘e-Universities’…It	will	be	clearly	
positioned	overseas	as	a	flag-carrier	for	the	best	of	UK	higher	education	in	web	based	
delivery’	(Blunkett,	2000).		
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5.2.2	The	English	context	
The	e-University	was	reflective	of	government	rhetoric	at	the	turn	of	the	century.	New	
Labour’s	‘Third	Way’	placed	HE	as	a	main	driver	for	enhancing	workforce	skills	and	thus	
advancing	the	economy,	as	well	as	increasing	participation	to	50%,	through	higher	
attainment	and	widening	participation.	The	e-University	was	to	be	the	vehicle	to	offer	
programmes	that	reflected	market	demand	for	key	skills	in	the	knowledge	economy,	as	well	
as	meeting	the	needs	of	non-traditional	students	who	did	not	participate	in	HE.	The	e-
University	also	added	a	further	dimension	-	globalisation;	it	was	seen	by	government	as	the	
answer	to	recruiting	students	on	a	global	scale	and,	as	such,	being	a	contributor	to	the	
economy.		
The	1997	election	manifesto	from	New	Labour	prominently	featured	Information	
Technology	and	Communication	(ICT)	as	one	of	the	central	themes,	both	in	addressing	
public	administration	and	in	education.	The	turn	of	the	century	saw	the	rise	of	many	
‘information	age’	policies	in	the	administration	of	public	services	and	local	‘e-government’	
services.	In	addition,	between	1997	and	2007,	more	than	£5	billion	of	funding	was	
channelled	towards	educational	ICT,	in	‘realising	the	potential	of	new	technology’	policies	
(Selwyn	2002).	There	were	a	number	of	ICT	policies	introduced	to	the	schools	sector	at	that	
time,	through	three	phases	of	policymaking:	‘National	Grid	for	Learning’,	‘ICT	in	Schools’	
and	‘Harnessing	Technology’	(Selwyn	2008).	Laurillard	(2008)	describes	New	Labour’s	ICT	
policies	as	‘ambitious’,	but	a	success	in	terms	of	providing	resources	for	schools.	
Policies	around	ICT	in	schools	were	not	just	about	increasing	the	level	of	ICT	provision.	As	
Selwyn	(2002,	2008)	and	Laurillard	(2008)	both	point	out,	these	were	part	of	a	much	wider	
policy	agenda	in	modernising	education,	in	raising	attainment	and	widening	participation.	
This,	in	turn,	was	part	of	the	much	wider	agenda	around	globalisation	and	the	economy:	
‘the	New	Labour	ICT	agenda	was	located	firmly	within	wider	prevailing	concerns	over	
enhancing	competitiveness	in	a	globalised	economy	and	creating	a	lifelong	learning	
system	fit	for	a	successful	knowledge	economy’	(Selwyn	2008	p.708).		
Tony	Blair,	as	Prime	Minister,	resolutely	linked	education	to	the	economy	when	he	said	
‘education	is	the	best	economic	policy	there	is’	(Blair	2004).	However,	Selwyn	(2002,	
2008)argues	that	whilst	the	ICT	resourcing	of	schools	was	seen	as	a	success,	the	success	in	
the	wider	economic	policy	failed	to	materialise.		
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In	addition	to	government’s	focus	on	ICT	and	globalisation,	the	commercial	sector	was	
going	through	a	period	of	rapid	change,	with	the	rise	of	‘dot-com’	companies.	Globalisation	
was	fundamental	to	their	success,	with	rapid	growth	of	businesses	using	the	internet	to	
expand	their	markets	on	a	global	scale.	One	of	the	main	criticisms	of	dot-com	businesses	
(Garrett	2004)	was	that	the	use	of	technology	to	transform	aspects	of	society	was	hugely	
overstated.	Elements	of	this	criticism	are	reflected	in	the	development	of	the	e-University,	
as	will	be	observed	later	in	this	chapter.		
In	March	2000,	the	dot-com	bubble	burst.	Investors	had	put	a	great	deal	of	confidence	into	
technological	developments,	and	both	market	confidence	and	share	values	had	risen	
substantially,	with	many	companies	becoming	over-valued.	This	level	of	confidence	could	
not	be	sustained	and,	after	a	stock	market	collapse	in	early	2000,	a	large	number	of	
companies	suffered	a	dramatic	drop	in	share	price	and	were	consequently	wound	up.	The	
timing	of	the	dot-com	crash	is	noteworthy,	coming	just	one	month	after	the	announcement	
of	the	e-University.		
Globalisation	and	technological	developments	also	began	to	impact	on	HE.	The	1997	
Dearing	report	specifically	recognised	technology	as	being	central	in	advancing	HE	in	the	UK	
and	the	term	virtual	campus	was	becoming	more	prominent.	By	2004,	and	the	demise	of	
the	e-University,	several	universities	had	their	own	substantial	off	campus	on-line	activities,	
such	as	Middlesex,	Liverpool	and	Portsmouth,	as	well	as	many	others	as	part	of	wider	
conglomerates		(Bacsich	2004,	2005,	2010).	However,	the	virtual	campuses	were	more	
frequently	separate	entities,	rather	than	HEIs	expanding	their	provision	from	programmes	
within	the	institutions	(Cinar	2012).		
In	June	1999,	the	Prime	Minister	had	also	announced	a	five	year	plan	to	increase	market	
share	of	overseas	students,	from	17%	to	25%,	with	75,000	extra	by	2005	(reported	in	the	
Guardian	19th	June	1999).	In	this	respect,	the	e-University	could	have	been	an	initiative	
which	helped	to	address	that	aspiration.	
5.2.3	Some	international	perspectives	
As	Bacsich	and	Frank-Bristow	(2004)	note,	there	were,	at	that	time,	a	large	number	of	
countries,	across	all	continents,	engaging	in	some	level	of	e-university	activity.	Universities	
in	the	USA	are	some	of	the	most	notable,	where	they	were	developing	global	enterprises	in	
on-line	learning,	and	by	2000	there	were	a	number	of	highly	organised,	well	branded,	e-
learning	ventures,	such	as	The	University	of	Phoenix’s	on-line	campus,	which	had	109,000	
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students	by	May	2004	(Bacsich	2005).	It	was	against	a	perceived	threat	from	the	USA	in	
dominating	the	on-line	education	global	market	that	the	e-University	was	launched.	As	
Bacsich	notes,		
‘The	UKeU	was	initiated	in	response	to	a	perceived	need	to	be	a	key	player	in	packaging	
UK	HE	internationally’	(Bacsich	2005).	
The	then	Minister	for	Higher	Education,	Kim	Howells,	confirmed	that	this	perception	also	
extended	to	a	fear	of	losing	the	domestic	HE	market	to	the	USA,	summed	up	in	his	evidence	
to	the	Select	Committee	inquiry:			
‘It	was	also	informed	by	a	kind	of	fear	that	the	Americans	were	going	to	capture	
students	and	that	they	were	actually	going	to	capture	students	in	this	country’	(SC	
200SC	20055	p.6).		
Sweden	had	also	embarked	on	a	similar	e-university	project,	investing	SEK470	million	in	the	
Swedish	Net	University	(SNU),	which	is	still	in	existence.	It	acts	as	an	agency,	offering	a	
database	of	publically	funded,	free	courses,	run	by	35	Swedish	universities,	mostly	taught	in	
Swedish.	Christie	and	Jurado	(2007)	undertook	a	comparison	of	UKeU	and	SNU	and	found	a	
number	of	striking	differences.	Sweden	concentrated	on	the	home	market,	and	in	Swedish,	
whereas	UKeU	focussed	on	a	perceived	international	market	for	courses	taught	in	English.	
SNU	was	explicitly	seen	as	a	way	of	increasing	Sweden’s	participation	rate	to	50%,	whereas	
UKeU	was	conceived	as	a	commercial	venture	to	combat	the	perceived	threat	of	
competition	from	the	United	States,	despite	the	conjecture	in	the	business	model	that	the	
venture	should	additionally	address	social	inclusion	(HEFCE	00/44	p.8).	Whilst	UKeU	was	
conceived	as	a	commercial	venture,	SNU	was	entirely	publicly	funded,	free	to	students,	and	
with	universities	being	financially	rewarded	retrospectively	with	grant	for	each	successful	
course	completion.	Therefore,	there	was	incentive	for	Swedish	universities	to	put	courses	
online,	and	although	the	funding	mechanism	changed	in	2004,	they	still	continue	to	include	
their	courses	online	as	a	successful	way	of	increasing	student	numbers.	
5.2.4	Policy	proposal	
The	day	after	the	Blunkett	speech,	Sir	Brian	Fender	(then	HEFCE	Chief	Executive)	wrote	to	
all	English	HEIs	and	HEFCE	funded	FECs,	announcing	the	launch	of	the	e-University	and	
seeking	consultation,	with	responses	required	quickly	by	April	2000.	The	circular	stated	that		
‘The	HEFCE	is	concerned	that	UK	higher	education	(HE)	should	be	able	to	capitalise	on	its	
considerable	expertise	in	new	technologies	and	its	reputation	for	quality	to	secure	a	
significant	share	in	the	markets	accessed	by	these	virtual/corporate	providers’	(HEFCE	
04/00).		
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The	proposed	key	characteristics	of	the	venture	were:	
• ‘A	new	vehicle	for	delivering	higher	education	programmes	through	virtual	distance	
learning;	
• Jointly	owned,	established	and	operated	by	a	consortium	of	higher	education	
institutions,	working	with	private	sector	and	overseas	partners;	
• Focussed	on	meeting	expanding	demand	for	HE	programmes	both	in	the	UK	and	
particularly	overseas;	
• Established	on	a	scale	that	will	enable	it	to	compete	internationally;	
• Established	with	a	central	core	of	founder	members;	
• Identified	as	a	provider	of	the	highest	quality,	both	in	its	programmes	and	in	the	
student	support	structures	that	underpin	them,	maintaining	and	enhancing	the	
international	reputation	of	UK	higher	education’.	(HEFCE	04/00	p.1).	
The	revenue	structure	played	a	major	part	in	the	way	the	e-University	was	conceived.	
Although	it	was	proposed	that	there	would	still	be	an	element	of	grant	from	HEFCE	through	
publically	funded	students,	it	was	envisaged	that	the	e-University	would	be	a	commercial	
venture,	financially	self-sustaining	and	profitable	within	5-6	years.	This	would	be	achieved	
by	charging	variable	fees	to	non-publically	funded	students,	businesses,	overseas	
universities	or	governments.	The	e-University	would	meet	its	operating	costs	through	those	
fees	and	private	investment	from	businesses	providing	expertise	in	supporting	activities	
such	as	the	technological	platform	and	marketing,	and	who	would	ultimately	see	a	share	of	
the	profits.	It	was	a	condition	of	grant	that	UKeU	attracted	private	investment	with	50:50	
public-private	funding.	This	was	the	first	time	that	HEFCE	had	been	involved	in	a	public-
private	venture	on	this	scale.		
5.2.5	Organisations	and	actors	
UKeU,	as	the	operating	company,	was	central	to	the	initiative,	and	the	main	focus	for	both	
the	expected	success	of	the	venture	and	its	subsequent	demise.	Its	two	main	actors	were	
Sir	Anthony	Cleaver	as	Chairman	and	John	Beaumont	as	Chief	Executive.	Both	had	
considerable	experience	in	the	private	sector;	Anthony	Cleaver	had	been	Chair	of	the	UK	
Atomic	Authority	in	the	1990s	and	also	Chairman	of	AEA	Technology	plc,	and	John	
Beaumont	had	had	a	long	career	in	technology-based	industries.	According	to	Barry	
Sheerman	MP,	Chair	to	the	Select	Committee,	Anthony	Cleaver	was	
‘a	formidable	player	in	the	way	that	he	campaigns	to	make	British	business	more	
effective	and	efficient’	(SC	2005	Q139).		
Both	men	had	connections	to	HE,	with	Cleaver	having	chaired	the	Board	of	Governors	of	
Birkbeck	College	and	the	Royal	College	of	Music	in	London,	and	Beaumont	having	been	a	
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professor	at	Stirling	and	Bath	universities	from	1987	to	1992.	It	is	perhaps	pertinent	that	
both	had	been	appointed	for	their	private	and	public	sector	experience,	and	yet	the	public-
private	sector	relationship	for	UKeU	was	the	most	contentious	issue	identified	by	the	Select	
Committee,	as	will	be	considered	below.			
HoldCo	was	the	other	key	organisation	in	the	initiative,	as	the	holding	company	which	
licenced	UKeU	to	operate.	HoldCo	was	the	major	shareholder	of	UKeU,	with	all	but	four	
HEIs	as	members.	The	relationship	between	HoldCo,	UKeU	and	HEFCE	is	significant	to	this	
study,	and	will	be	considered	later	in	the	chapter.			
A	steering	group,	chaired	by	Professor	Ron	Cooke,	Vice	Chancellor	of	the	University	of	York,	
had	also	been	established	to	work	on	behalf	of	HEFC	to	oversee	the	implementation	of	
UKeU	with	institutions.	Other	members	of	the	Steering	Group	were	three	HEFCE	staff,	
including	Sir	Brian	Fender	as	Chief	Executive,	and	seven	senior	leaders	and	managers	from	
HEIs.	There	were	also	representatives	from	the	private	sector,	as	special	advisers:	one	from	
McKinsey	Consultants	and	one	from	British	Aerospace	plc	Virtual	University.		
Other	key	actors,	who	were	ostensibly	not	involved	in	the	establishment	of	the	policy	
episode,	but	came	to	the	fore	as	witnesses	to	the	Select	Committee,	were	Sir	Howard	
Newby,	succeeding	Sir	Brian	Fender	as	Chief	Executive	of	HEFCE	in	2001,	who	had	to	drive	
forward	the	initiative	from	his	predecessor,	David	Young	as	Chairman	of	HEFCE,	and	Dr	Kim	
Howells,	then	Minister	of	State	(Education	and	Skills,	Lifelong	Learning,	Further	and	HE).	
The	Select	Committee	itself	was	chaired	by	Mr	Barry	Sheerman	MP,	with	other	MP	
members	being	Valerie	Davey,	Jeff	Ennis	and	Paul	Holmes.	
5.2.6	Activities	
In	June	2000,	HEFCE	published	the	results	of	the	initial	consultation	with	heads	of	HEFCE-
funded	HEIs,	FECs	and	Irish-funded	HEIs.	74%	of	heads	from	those	institutions	that	
responded	were	in	favour,	although	many	raised	concerns	about	the	high-risk	nature	of	the	
venture.	The	consultation	concluded	that	
‘[stakeholders]	endorsed	the	vision	of	the	e-University	as	a	world-class	provider	of	
virtual	learning	which	should	establish	itself	as	a	brand	associated	with	high	quality	and	
standards’	(HEFCE	00/44a).		
It	is	noteworthy	that	the	original	plan	had	been	for	a	small	number	of	elite	universities	to	
take	part	but,	following	arguments	in	the	Steering	Group,	the	original	business	plan	
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prepared	by	Price	Waterhouse	Coopers	(PwC),	based	on	this	model,	was	rejected	in	favour	
of	a	more	inclusive	approach:	
‘Plans	for	an	elite	core	of	institutions	to	lead	the	project	-	unveiled	as	part	of	education	
secretary	David	Blunkett's	speech	at	the	University	of	Greenwich	in	February	-	have	been	
abandoned’	(THES	06.10.2000).	
HEIs	also	questioned	the	elite	approach,	and	inclusivity	of	the	e-University	was	raised	
during	the	consultation,	with	HEIs	wishing	to	ensure	that	the	whole	sector	was	engaged	
with	the	initiative	and	that	the	venture	was	able	to	accommodate	a	wide	range	of	on-line	
programmes.	However,	whilst	many	institutions	welcomed	the	more	inclusive	approach,	it	
still	remained	a	contested	issue,	with	institutions	such	as	the	London	School	of	Economics	
and	Open	University	expressing	concern	at	having	to	working	with	other	institutions,	which	
they	saw	as	not	sharing	their	quality	brand.		Nevertheless,	the	Steering	Group	was	keen	to	
ensure	the	inclusive	nature	of	the	venture:	
‘the	Steering	Group	has	been	particularly	concerned	to	ensure	that	the	business	model	
maximises	the	opportunities	for	universities	and	colleges	to	contribute	to,	and	benefit	
from,	the	project,	while	also	providing	the	focus,	drive	and	coherence	necessary	to	make	
the	e-University	an	effective	venture’	(HEFCE	EP05/00).	
5.2.6.1	Business	model	and	corporate	structure	
In	October	2000,	taking	heed	of	the	consultation,	HEFCE	published	a	revised	business	
model,	commissioned	from	PwC	(HEFCE	00/44).	The	first	noteworthy	point	is	in	relation	to	
the	aims	and	objectives	set	out	in	the	business	plan,	with	the	primary	aim	to		
‘provide	the	opportunity	for	the	flagship	provision	of	UK	higher	education	excellence	
using	digital	channels,	primarily	abroad	but	also	at	home…	the	result	should	be	an	
expansion	of	the	UK’s	overall	share	of	the	global	overseas	markets	for	higher	education’	
(HEFCE	00/44	p.8).		
The	model	also	notes	a	second	aim	to	
‘support	and	promote	the	expansion	of	lifelong	learning	at	higher	education	levels…	it	
also	offers	a	means	to	help	increase	social	inclusion’		(HEFCE	00/44	p.8).	
Both	of	these	aims	were	concurrent	with	New	Labour’s	‘Third	Way’	ideology.	The	business	
model	proposed	that	the	UKeU,	as	the	operating	company,	acted	as	a	facilitator	and	
technological	platform	for	HEIs	to	make	available	learning	materials	and	programmes.	
UKeU	would	perform	a	number	of	corporate	functions	including	developing	the	brand,	
marketing,	making	resources	available	for	the	development	of	materials,	providing	and	
supporting	the	technological	platform,	overseeing	academic	quality	of	provision,	providing	
	 135	
a	finance	function	to	manage	the	income,	and	administering	students’	registration.	The	
programmes	would	attract	fees	for	the	majority	of	students	and	the	business	model	
proposed	ambitious	targets	which	would	make	UKeU	financially	self-sustaining.	
The	objectives	underpinning	the	aims	in	the	business	model	summed	up	UkeU	as	
• Learner	driven	(demand	led)	
• Responsive	to	change	(to	meet	changes	in	demand)	
• Excellent	fit	for	purpose	
• Excellent	in	use	of	new	technology	to	enable	learning	experience	to	be	delivered	
• Able	to	secure	economies	of	scale	
• Financially	self-sustaining		
It	is	noteworthy	that	in	the	business	model,	the	main	markets	were	considered	to	be	
‘in	careers-associated	areas	as	some	postgraduate	and/or	post-experience	areas,	and	
particularly	various	forms	of	continuing	professional	development,	and	with	a	focus	on	
both	corporate	and	government	consumers.	The	model	notes	the	success	of	corporate	
provision	in	the	US,	short,	executive	courses,	drawn	from	parts	of	an	award	bearing	
course,	are	one	of	the	fastest	growing	and	most	profitable	activities	in	some	US	
universities…	the	e-U	arrangements	must	be	able	to	make	such	provision’	(HEFCE	00/44	
p.15).		
As	such,	the	e-University	was	to	at	least	mirror,	if	not	replicate,	the	models	developed	in	
the	USA.		
The	technological	underpinning	was	one	of	the	main	features	of	the	business	model,	since	
it	was	fundamental	in	supporting	both	the	student-facing	interface	and	the	learning	
materials.	The	business	model	assumed	that	this	was	where	the	e-University	would	develop	
relationships	with	the	private	sector,	where	they	may	‘become	an	important	strategic	
partner’	(HEFCE	00/44	p.28).		
The	corporate	structure,	particularly	the	relationship	between	the	public	and	private	
sector,	was	very	significant	to	the	initiative,	and	became	one	of	the	key	issues	for	the	Select	
Committee	inquiry.		The	business	model	stated	that	
‘it	must	be	attractive	to	the	private	sector	both	as	investors	and	partners.	The	e-U	will	
need	private	sector	investment	and	private	sector	commercial	expertise	to	make	it	work’	
(HEFCE	00/44	p.28).		
The	structure	consisted	firstly	of	the	holding	company	(HoldCo)	which	was	owned	by	the	
HEIs	who	had	signed	up	to	the	e-University.	The	main	purpose	was	to		
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‘ensure	that	the	academic	principles	and	integrity	of	the	e-University	were	
safeguarded,	by	setting	the	terms	on	which	it	would	grant	the	operating	
company	a	licence	to	use	the	e-University	brand’	(HEFCE	00/44).			
An	Academic	Quality	Committee	would	oversee	academic	quality	of	the	programmes	and	
assessments.	The	operating	company	(UKeU)	would	manage	the	day	to	day	operation,	with	
a	small	executive	team	running	the	company.	It	was	also	proposed	in	the	business	model	
that	subsidiary	companies	under	UKeU	would	undertake	more	of	the	risk-taking	and	
investment	with	the	private	sector.	The	PwC	Business	Model	summarises	the	organisational	
structure	as:	
	
Figure	9	–	e-U	CORPORATE	STRUCTURE	(HEFCE	00/44	(p.29))	©HEFCE	
Following	the	publication	of	the	business	model,	activity	began	to	escalate	at	a	pace	and	
HEFCE	published	a	second	consultation	to	the	sector	on	the	model	(HEFCE	00/43).	
Responses	suggested	that	HEIs	were	broadly	happy	with	the	proposals	set	out	in	the	
revised	business	model.	There	were	still	some	concerns,	however;	in	particular,	institutions	
were	concerned	about	intellectual	property	rights	in	relation	to	programmes	of	study,	the	
extent	to	which	the	members	of	the	holding	company	were	liable	financially,	and	whether	
the	e-University	would	be	subject	to	a	quality	review.		
By	the	end	of	2000,	potential	joint	partners	from	the	private	sector	were	invited,	via	
advertisement,	to	join	as	shareholders	in	the	operating	company,	but	were	given	less	than	
one	month	for	expressions	of	interest.	In	January	2001,	HEFCE	began	the	process	of	setting	
up	the	corporate	structure,	and	sought	nominations	for	directors	of	HoldCo	and	UKeU.	
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Nominations	were	also	sought	for	members	of	the	Committee	for	Academic	Quality,	all	
drawn	from	senior	leaders	and	managers	of	HEIs	(HEFCE	02/01).	The	draft	memorandum	
and	articles	of	association	for	HoldCo	were	published	alongside	the	circular,	as	were	the	
roles	and	responsibilities	of	the	Committee	for	Academic	Quality.	
5.2.6.2	HoldCo	
The	Secretary	of	State	for	Education	and	Employment	announced	the	directors	of	HoldCo	in	
March	2001,	consisting	of	Sir	Brian	Fender	(Chief	Executive	of	HEFCE)	as	Chairman,	and	
eleven	leaders	of	HEIs	in	England.	In	April,	all	HEIs	were	invited	to	become	members	of	
HoldCo,	limited	by	guarantee,	with	£1	securing	membership	and	being	the	total	extent	of	
the	liability	(HEFCE	07/01).		All	but	four	HEIs	signed	up	to	HoldCo.		The	intention	was	that	
HoldCo	would	hold	50%	of	the	shares	in	UKeU,	(the	public	sector	share),	with	its	purpose	
being	to	licence	UKeU,	appoint	the	Board	and	hold	it	to	account.	The	establishment	of	
HoldCo	was	to	act	as	a	gateway	between	HEFCE	and	UKeU,	in	order	to	avoid	any	direct	
management	relationship	between	the	two	organisations.	This	was	significant,	since	HEFCE	
could	not	directly	give	public	funding	to	UKeU	as	a	private	company.	However,	HoldCo	was	
granted	authority	by	HEFCE	to	invest	funds	in	UKeU.		
5.2.6.3	UKeU	
In	September	2001,	UKeU	was	launched	and,	two	months	later,	Sir	Anthony	Cleaver	was	
appointed	Chairman.	By	February	2002,	John	Beaumont	had	been	appointed	as	Chief	
Executive.	Just	one	month	after	the	launch,	UKeU	signed	a	Framework	Agreement	with	Sun	
Microsystems,	as	the	first	private	investor,	to	develop	the	on-line	technical	platform.	It	is	
significant	to	the	ultimate	demise	of	UKeU	that,	despite	a	call	for	private	investors,	Sun	
Microsystems	was	the	only	major	private	investor	in	UKeU.	There	was	one	other	smaller	
investor,	‘Fortis	Lease	UK,	who	provided	lease	funding	in	August	2003	to	finance	IT	testing	
equipment’	(noted	in	SC	2005	p.10	footnote	15).	By	April	2002,	UKeU	had	produced	its	first	
business	plan	and	it	was	expected	that	the	organisation	would	launch	its	pilot	programmes	
by	October	2002.	
UKeU	had	around	50	members	of	staff	focussed	on	developing	the	technological	platform,	
quality	assurance	and	marketing	programmes.	The	main	target	audiences	for	UKeU	at	that	
time	were	overseas	students	and	private	sector	companies	wanting	CPD	programmes.	
UKeU	had	a	number	of	business	managers	in	16	countries	who	were	employed	to	help	
market	the	courses	and	provide	support	for	students.			
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5.2.6.4	Programmes	and	students	
The	short	timescale	for	developing	and	launching	new	programmes	meant	that	within	six	
weeks	of	advertising	for	members	of	HoldCo	and	directors	of	UKeU,	HEFCE	had	announced	
that	they	were	launching	the	venture	and	appointed	an	interim	management	team	and	a	
group	of	consultants,	headed	up	by	Professor	Keith	Baker	from	Open	Courseware	Factory	
(OCF).	OCF	began	looking	at	the	distribution	of	e-learning	programmes	and	concluded	that,	
at	that	stage,	there	were	insufficient	on-line	programmes	available	in	the	sector	to	launch	
to	potential	students.	HEFCE	noted	that	
‘a	major	conclusion	from	the	OCF	study	is	that	currently	there	is	not	a	sufficient	volume	
and	range	of	learning	programmes,	fully	developed	to	the	quality	and	standards	we	
envisage	for	the	e-University’	(HEFCE	06/01).	
With	a	proposed	launch	date	for	October	2002,	there	was	now	some	urgency	in	setting	up	
programmes,	as	well	as	marketing	them	and	registering	students.	Consequently,	in	March	
2001,	HEFCE	invited	HEIs	‘to	express	interest	in’	developing	five	pilot	programmes:	
‘Those	invited	to	participate	in	the	pilots	will	need	to	work	closely	with	the	e-University	
operating	company	and	its	partners,	contributing	insights	and	experience	that	will	
ensure	that	the	venture	is	robust	and	effective	for	the	delivery	of	e-learning	programmes	
from	a	broader	range	of	institutions	beyond	the	pilot	phase.	This	role	may	be	most	
suited	to	institutions	that	envisage	global	e-learning	programmes	as	a	significant	part	of	
their	offerings	in	the	future,	and	hence	are	prepared	to	put	in	the	commitment	as	early	
adopters.	There	will	be	subsequent	and	regular	opportunities	for	all	institutions	to	
participate	in	the	e-University's	commissioning	and	delivery	activities’	(HEFCE	06/01).		
With	work	underway	to	develop	programmes,	HEFCE	launched	an	invitation	to	institutions	
in	March	2002	to	bid	for	3000	publicly	funded	additional	student	places	in	the	first	year,	to	
meet	public	services	objectives	through	UKeU		that	would	‘widen	participation	through	
increasing	the	number	of	students	from	disadvantaged	and	under-represented	
backgrounds’	(HEFCE	08/02).	This	is	perhaps	the	only	evidence	that	the	e-University	policy	
was	serious	about	meeting	its	aim	for	social	inclusion,	and	this	is	explored	further	in	Section	
5.3	(p.143).	In	June	2002,	HEFCE	also	invited	interest	in	a	similar	organisation	to	develop	
on-line	teacher	training	programmes	in	China	(HEFCE	14/02),	in	collaboration	with	Chinese	
universities	and	the	Chinese	government,	and	this	organisation	was	incorporated	into	the	
portfolio	of	UKeU.	Although	e-China	cost	£3m	in	UK	public	funds,	its	costs	were	seen	as	
being	equitable	to	its	value	(see	Table	9,	p.141),	and	so	with	the	demise	of	UkEU,	e-China	
was	the	only	element	that	was	retained,	with	project	management	being	transferred	to	the	
University	of	Cambridge.	
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5.2.7	Targets	and	outcomes	
The	original	October	2002	launch	date	was	missed	and	only	three	pilot	programmes	had	
been	launched	by	March	2003,	from	four	institutions:	The	Open	University	and	the	
universities	of	Cambridge,	Sheffield	Hallam	and	York.	These	programmes	resulted	in	just	78	
student	registrations,	thus	missing	an	initial	target	of	340.	The	original	business	plan	targets	
were	ambitious,	with	5,600	forecast	by	2003-04,	110,000	students	by	2007-08	and	growing	
to	250,000	by	2012-13.	
As	a	result	of	the	delay	in	launching	programmes,	and	failure	to	meet	the	initial	student	
number	target,	in	May	2003	HEFCE	announced	that	a	review	of	UKeU	was	to	be	conducted	
by	PA	Consulting.	Alongside	the	review,	UKeU	continued	to	work	with	HEIs	on	new	
programmes	and	to	recruit	new	students	and,	by	October	2003,	one	year	after	the	original	
proposed	launch	date,	17	courses	had	been	launched	with	898	student	registrations.	
However,	by	November	2003,	it	became	clear	that	student	target	numbers	were	not	going	
to	be	met,	and	so	UKeU	revised	its	business	plan,	significantly	reducing	the	student	target	
numbers	to	just	45,000	students	by	2009-10.	In	a	further	attempt	to	address	the	poor	
performance	by	UkeU,	HEFCE	launched	a	new	research	body,	the	E-learning	Research	
Centre,	based	at	Manchester	and	Southampton	universities,	which	was	expected	to	work	
alongside	UKeU	in	realising	the	e-university	ambition.		
However,	the	revision	to	target	student	numbers,	the	lack	of	private	investment	and	no	
likelihood	of	new	private	sector	companies	coming	on	board,	put	considerable	pressure	on	
UKeU	in	its	quest	to	become	financially	self-sustaining.	By	2004,	HoldCo	was	the	major	
shareholder	in	UKeU,	with	the	only	other	shareholders	being	Guillemont	Trust	and	Croft	
Nominees.	These	latter	two	organisations	operated	on	behalf	of	Sun	Microsystems	Ltd	to	
hold	shares	on	its	behalf,	since	the	company	had	chosen	not	to	directly	hold	shares	in	
UKeU.	Consequently,	UKeU	required	more	public	funding	and	the	expected	50:50	public-
private	funding	condition	of	grant	failed	to	be	achieved.	It	is	also	worthy	of	note	that	by	
2004,	a	number	of	universities	had	withdrawn	from	their	partnership	with	UKeU.	
PA	Consulting	completed	its	review	in	January	2004	and	it	was	considered,	along	with	
UKeU’s	revised	business	plan,	by	the	HEFCE	Board	in	February.	The	review	identified	six	
challenges	for	UkeU:	
‘end	to	end	integration	of	the	whole	e-learning	value	train,	the	lack	of	a	documented	
business	strategy,	the	feasibility	of	the	marketing	strategy,	the	financial	and	revenue		
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model,	a	technical	platform	unsuitable	for	the	business	needs	[and,	finally]	the	
investment	challenge	given	the	high	level	of	need	for	capital’	(as	summarised	in	Bacsich	
2010).		
It	was	at	that	Board	meeting	that	the	decision	was	taken	to	withdraw	from	the	initiative	
and	re-structure	UKeU,	such	that	the	commercial	aspects	would	be	closed	down,	leaving	
the	organisation	to	concentrate	on	those	elements	that	supported	the	‘public	good’.	RSM	
Robson	Rhodes	LLP,	a	firm	of	accountants,	was	appointed	to	oversee	the	wind-down	of	the	
company.	In	HEFCE’s	memorandum	to	the	Select	Committee,	they	state	the	reasoning	for	
withdrawing	funding	was	that	
‘The	Board	concluded	that	the	venture	was	in	breach	of	the	condition	of	grant	that	
HEFCE	would	only	fund	against	a	robust	business	proposition.	They	were	also	of	the	view	
that	the	venture	had	breached	the	condition	of	grant	on	achieving	private	matched	
funding’	(memorandum	to	the	Select	Committee	21.06.2004).	
In	his	evidence	to	the	Select	Committee,	Sir	Howard	Newby	explained	that	he	had	advised	
the	HEFCE	Board	that	this	was	the	best	course	of	action,	not	just	because	UKeU	was	in	
breach	of	the	conditions	of	grant,	but	due	to	the	poor	recruitment	and	financial	risks:	
‘in	the	light	of	the…	disappointing	recruitment,	and	in	the	light	of	what	was	going	on	in	
financial	markets,	the	risk….	had	tilted	the	other	way.	This	was	an	unacceptable	risk	for	
us…	our	recommendation	to	the	Board	was	that	the	business	plan	was	not	sufficiently	
robust	on	which	to	base	further	investment.	The	Board	took	the	view	to	restructure	the	
company	in	light	of	that’	(SC	2005	p.10).		
As	a	result,	the	activities	and	services	of	UKeU	were	re-structured	and	some	of	the	
remainder	of	the	funding	(£12m)	was	used	by	HEFCE	to	support	individual	e-learning	
programmes	at	UK	universities,	with	an	emphasis	on	blended	learning	and	on	‘the	public	
good	rather	than	commercial	objectives’	(HEFCE	2009/12).		On	4th	March	2004,	Donald	
MacLeod	reported	in	The	Guardian	that	HEFCE	had	‘pulled	the	plug’	on	UK	e-University	and,	
by	July	2004,	UKeU	had	ceased	trading,	having	spent	£30-£31	million	of	public	funding.	The	
£30-31m	represented	the	difference	between	the	public	expenditure	on	UKeU	and	the	
residual	value	of	its	assets.		
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Table	9	–	EXPENDITURE	AND	RESIDUAL	VALUE	OF	PROJECT	
	 Funding	(£m)	 Value	(£m)	
Public	good	
e-China	
e-learning	research	centre	
Research	studies	and	other	publicly	disseminated	
outputs	to	inform	development	of	eLearning	
Advisers	(legal	and	business)	
	
3	
1	
2	
	
1	
	
3	
1	
2	
	
_	
Commercial	
Technology	platform	development	
Learning	programme	development	
Sales	and	Marketing	(includes	overseas)	
UKeU	operating	costs	
	
14.5	
10.9	
4.2	
12.9	
	
	
1.4	
11	
0.4	
TOTAL	 49.5	 18.8	
Adapted	from	SC	2005	p.22		
The	House	of	Commons	Education	and	Skills	Committee	launched	an	inquiry	into	UKeU	in	
June	2004.	The	results	of	that	inquiry	will	be	explored	in	detail	in	Section	5.3	(p.143),	but	in	
summary,	the	Committee	found	that	UKeU:	
• ‘took	a	supply-led	rather	than	demand	led	approach	
• had	an	inability	to	work	in	effective	partnership	with	the	private	sector	
• failed	to	attract	significant	private	investment	
• failed	to	conduct	sufficient	market	research	
• focussed	too	much	on	providing	an	integrated	e-learning	platform		
• had	systems	and	structures	inappropriate	for	a	venture	that	was	almost	entirely	
publicly	funded’	[taken	from	SC	2005	summary	report	p3-4].	
The	report	of	the	Select	Committee	was	published	in	March	2005	and,	in	a	press	release,	
Chairman,	Barry	Sheerman,	said	that	‘UKeU	was	a	terrible	waste	of	public	money’.		It	is	
noteworthy	that	the	Select	Committee	report	itself	comes	in	for	some	criticism.	Bacsich	
(2010)	observed	that	the	Committee	only	interviewed	a	select	number	of	senior	staff	and	
as	such	the	review	was	flawed.		
By	the	time	the	Select	Committee	had	reported,	HEFCE	had	in	place	a	new	policy	
statement,	‘HEFCE	strategy	for	e-learning’	(HEFCE	2005/12)	which	was	also	published	in	
March	2005.	HEFCE	had	transferred	the	majority	of	the	activities	to	support	e-learning	to	
the	Higher	Education	Academy	(HEA),	and	to	focus	the	strategy	on	‘support	for	the	chosen	
missions	and	partnerships	of	individual	institutions’	(p.3).		
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5.2.8	Timeline	of	events	
Table	10	–	TIMELINE	OF	EVENTS	FOR	THE	E-UNIVERSITY		
1999	 E-University	proposal	included	in	HEFCE	spending	review	bid	by	Sir	Brian	
Fender	
February	2000	 David	Blunkett,	Secretary	of	State	for	Education	and	Employment	
announced	e-University	initiative	in	Greenwich	speech	
HEFCE	seeks	consultation	on	initiative	with	the	sector	
HEFCE	set	up	Steering	Committee	chaired	by	Ron	Cooke	
March	2000	 DOT	COM	crash	
April	2000	 HEIs	report	on	consultation	
May	2000	 Price	Waterhouse	Coopers	(PwC)	develop	business	model		
CHEMS	undertake	initial	market	research	
June	2000	 HEFCE	publishes	results	of	initial	consultation	
October	2000	 PwC	report	on	proposed	business	model	
November	2000	 HEFCE	consults	sector	on	business	model	
HEFCE	advertise	for	joint	venture	partners	from	the	private	sector	
Grant	letter	to	HEFCE	announces	£62m	for	e-University	venture	
December	2000	 Interim	management	team	appointed	with	Nick	Winton	as	interim	CEO	to	
establish	new	company	structure	for	UKeU	
Joint	venture	partners	to	have	made	expressions	of	interest	
January	2001	 Draft	business	plan	for	UKeU	produced	with	PwC		
HEFCE	begins	process	of	setting	up	corporate	structure	and	seeks	
nominations	for	holding	company,	operating	company	and	Academic	
Quality	Committee		
February	2001	
	
HEFCE	announces	conclusions	on	business	model	consultation		
Nominations	for	directors	of	holding	company,	operating	company	and	
Academic	Quality	Committee	to	be	received	
March	2001	 HEFCE	establishes	holding	company	e-learning	Holding	Company	Ltd	to	
oversee	work	of	operating	company	
HEIs	invited	to	express	interest	in	pilot	programmes	
Secretary	of	State	announces	directors	of	holding	company	
April	2001	 HEFCE	invites	HEIs	to	become	members	of	HoldCo	
May	2001	
	
Nominations	for	interest	in	pilot	programmes	to	be	received	by	HEFCE	
Deadline	for	holding	company	membership	forms	
September	2001	 Operating	company	UKeU	established		
October	2001	 Strategic	alliance	with	Sun	Microsystems	Limited	agreed	
Sir	Howard	Newby	replaces	Sir	Brian	Fender	as	CEO	of	HEFCE	
November	2001	 Sir	Anthony	Cleaver	appointed	Chairman	of	UKeU	
February	2002	 John	Beaumont	appointed	Chief	Executive	of	UKeU	and	senior	
management	put	in	place	
March	2002	 Framework	agreement	signed	with	Sun	Microsystems	Ltd	
HEFCE	invites	bids	for	public	sector	student	places	
April	2002	 UKeU	produces	new	business	plan	
October	2002	 UKeU	issues	assurance	on	use	of	technical	platform		
Original	date	for	launch	of	courses	(not	met)	
February/March	
2003	
2	pilot	courses	launched	on	version	0	of	technical	platform	
78	students	registered	(target	was	340	by	this	point)	
May	2003	 HEFCE	informs	UKeU	that	review	will	be	conducted	
July	2003	 Technical	platform	due	to	be	ready	(£10m	spent)	
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October	2003	 Main	launch	with	17	courses	
898	students	registered	
November	2003	 PA	Consulting	Ltd	begin	review	
UKeU	produces	revised	business	plan	with	significantly	reduced	target	
student	numbers	of	1,225	
December	2003	 HEFCE	reviews	draft	PA	Consulting	review	report	and	sends	to	UKeU	and	
HoldCo		
UkeU	joined	by	a	research	body,	the	E-learning	Research	Centre,	based	at	
Manchester	and	Southampton	universities	
January	2004	 PA	Consulting	submits	final	report	to	HEFCE	
HoldCo	responds	to	draft	report	
25	courses	now	on-line	
Original	target	was	5,638	by	this	point		
February	2004	 HEFCE	withdraws	UKeU	funding	and	announces	re-structure	of	UKeU	
Robson	Rhodes	appointed	to	oversee	wind	down	of	UKeU	
UKeU	Board	resign	
HEFCE	decides	to	invest	remaining	initiative	funding	in	development	of	e-
learning	in	HEIs	
April	2004	 HEFCE	moves	public	good	projects,	such	as	e-China,	out	of	UKeU	
June	2004	 Almost	complete	version	of	technical	platform	delivered	
Select	Committee	inquiry	announced	
July	2004	 UKeU	stops	trading	
March	2005	 Select	Committee	publishes	report	
HEFCE	publishes	a	new	statement	of	policy	–	HEFCE	strategy	for	e-leaning	
	
5.3	A	critical	review	of	the	evidence	and	findings	
5.3.1	Process:	Governance	and	organisation:	HEFCE’s	role	
The	organisation	and	governance	of	the	e-University	is	regarded	by	many	contributors	as	a	
central	reason	for	the	failure	of	the	policy	episode,	and	the	organisation	of	HoldCo	and	
UKeU,	and	their	relationship	with	HEFCE,	came	in	for	considerable	criticism.	It	was	
acknowledged	in	the	Select	Committee,	by	both	HEFCE	and	government	that	the	nature	of	
the	governance	structure,	with	public	and	private	elements	in	a	triangulation	between	
HEFCE,	HEIs	and	the	private	sector,	was	something	entirely	new	to	HEFCE,	and	they	lacked	
experience	of	joint	public/private	ventures.	The	Select	Committee	concluded	that	this	was	a	
highly	ambitious	project,	and	that		
‘at	the	heart	of	the	failure	of	UKeU	was	that	systems	and	structures	that	may	have	been	
considered	appropriate	when	set	up	against	the	original	plan	became	inappropriate	for	
a	venture	that	was	almost	entirely	publicly	funded’	(SC	2005	p.12).		
Conole	(2007),	in	a	review	of	lessons	to	be	learned	from	e-learning	organisational	cultures,	
agreed,	arguing	that	‘the	UKeU	was	set	up	with	an	ambitious	set	of	aspirations,	which	with	
hindsight	might	be	considered	somewhat	naïve’.		
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HEFCE’s	remoteness	from	UKeU	via	HoldCo	meant	that	HEFCE	did	not	have	any	direct	
control	over	the	day	to	day	operation,	or	decision-making,	within	UKeU,	despite	the	
organisation	remaining	very	reliant	on	public	funds.	This	was	deliberate,	since	HEFCE	had	to	
maintain	distance	from	UKeU	as	it	could	not	invest	public	funds	in	a	private	company.	
Critically,	this	distance	also	had	to	be	maintained	since	there	was	potential	for	conflict	
between	the	shadow	directorship	and	the	accounting	officer	role	for	the	chief	executive	of	
HEFCE.	This	distance	meant	UKeU	had	considerable	freedom	and	was	easily	able	to	shift	
from	the	PwC	business	model,	without	any	need	for	HEFCE	approval.	This	approach	was	
highly	criticised	by	the	Select	Committee:	
‘The	running	of	the	venture	was	handed	over	to	UKeU	with	limited	restrictions.	The	
management	were	able	to	take	their	own	approach,	and	that,	based	on	limited	
information	and	no	further	market	research,	they	made	strategic	decisions	about	the	
target	markets,	courses,	pricing	strategies,	and	other	major	operating	decisions’	(SC	
2005	para	76	p.23).	
In	the	business	model,	and	as	a	condition	of	grant,	the	ownership	of	UKeU	should	have	
equally	included	public	and	private	investors,	without	reliance	on	public	funding.	The	
tension	between	the	private	and	public	responsibilities	of	HoldCo	and	UKeU	became	
particularly	problematic	once	it	was	clear	that	there	would	not	be	any	matched	private	
investment	and	that	the	whole	venture	would	be	publically	funded.	As	private	investment	
failed	to	materialise,	HoldCo	became	the	dominant	shareholder	in	UKeU,	essentially	
becoming	the	parent	company.	HoldCo	advised	HEFCE	in	autumn	2003	that	the	Board	had	
concerns	that	HoldCo	had	become	the	primary	accountability	agent,	and	it	was	at	that	
point	that	HEFCE	asked	PA	Consulting	Ltd	to	review	UKeU.		
Since	the	Board	of	HoldCo	was	mostly	configured	from	voluntary	and	unpaid	members,	
unable	to	provide	a	full	time	commitment	to	the	key	monitoring	role,	its	influence	over	
UKeU	was	limited,	and	thus	there	was	greater	distance	between	the	funding	and	the	
operation	of	UKeU.	Sir	Brian	Fender,	in	his	role	as	former	Chairman	of	HoldCo,	stated	in	his	
evidence	to	the	Select	Committee	that	although	it	had	always	been	understood	that	HoldCo	
would	be	expected	to	ensure	that	public	funds	were	invested	with	value	for	money	in	mind,	
in	practice	this	role	was	limited	due	to	the	voluntary	nature	of	members	of	the	Board	(SC	
2005	para	85	p.25).	Bascish	(2010)	is	particularly	critical	of	this	voluntary	approach,	arguing	
that	there	was	no	reason	for	members	to	be	unpaid.		
The	Select	Committee	formed	the	view	that	UKeU	was	not	entirely	to	blame	for	that	
situation,	and	despite	Kim	Howell’s	assertion	in	his	statement	to	the	Committee	that	‘I	do	
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not	think	HEFCE	can	be	blamed	for	that	and	I	do	not	think	the	department	can	be	blamed	
for	it’	(SC	2005	para	77	p.24),	HEFCE	was	too	far	removed	from	the	operation	of	UKeU,	gave	
the	company	too	much	of	a	free	rein	and	did	not	require	UkeU	to	provide	a	strategy	or	
business	objectives.	Consequently,	UKeU	were	not	directly	accountable	for	the	spending	of	
HEFCE	funds.	The	Select	Committee	were	particularly	critical	of	UKeU’s	lack	of	
accountability:	
‘a	key	lesson	to	be	learnt	is	that,	in	high	risk	ventures	such	as	UKeU,	a	great	deal	more	
needs	to	be	done	to	support	the	accounting	officer	to	enable	him	to	act	effectively	in	his	
role….	A	group	of	advisors	to	HEFCE…..	could	have	been	put	together	to	keep	UKeU	in	
much	closer	account	in	terms	of	the	decisions	they	made.	This	would	have	enabled	much	
closer	accountability	from	the	start	of	the	project’	(SC	2005	para	98/99	p.28).	
The	Select	Committee	was	clear	in	its	recommendations	that	there	needed	to	be	greater	
accountability	in	the	use	of	public	funds:	
‘an	important	lesson	to	be	learnt	is	that	senior	management	should	have	had	either	very	
clear	accountability	for	the	expenditure	of	public	money,	or	risk	from	market	pressures	
to	succeed	through	private	investment	in	the	project’	(SC	2005	para	82	p.25).	
HEFCE	itself	was	defensive	of	its	lack	of	engagement	with	UKeU,	citing	as	justification	its	
lack	of	experience	with	private	sector	practices	and	a	desire	to	remain	at	a	distance,	so	as	
to	encourage	novel	approaches.	Liz	Beaty,	Director	of	Learning	and	Teaching	at	HEFCE	
summed	this	up	in	a	quote	to	the	THES,	defending	HEFCE’s	‘hands	off’	approach:	
‘We	were	funders,	not	directors.	If	you	tie	everything	down	and	take	no	risks,	it	might	
stop	you	coming	up	with	innovative	things’	(Wainwright	2005).		
A	further	example	which	demonstrated	the	distance	between	HEFCE	and	UKeU,	criticised	
by	the	Select	Committee,	were	the	private	sector-like	bonuses	paid	to	the	company	
directors,	of	which	HEFCE	had	been	apparently	unaware.	One	of	the	key	characteristics	of	
the	business	plan	was	that	the	venture	was	expected	to	operate	in	a	business-like	manner,	
and	indeed	a	condition	of	grant	was	that	UKeU	operated	consistently	‘with	best	practice	in	
the	commercial	sector’	(HEFCE	00/44a).	One	of	the	ways	in	which	this	business-like	
approach	manifested	itself	was	the	rewarding	of	senior	UKeU	staff	with	performance	
related	bonuses.	Sir	Anthony	Cleaver	argued	in	his	evidence	to	the	Select	Committee	that	
this	was	considered	best	practice	in	the	commercial	sector,	where	there	was	considerable	
market	risk:	
‘All	the	bonuses	were	awarded	against	defined	criteria	which	were	set	in	advance	and	
people’s	performance	was	assessed	against	them…	I	have	absolutely	no	qualms	about	
either	the	process	or	the	outcomes	of	the	bonuses’	(SC	2005	p.11).		
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The	Select	Committee	strongly	reproached	the	practice	of	bonuses,	given	the	clear	failure	
of	UKeU	to	meet	its	financial	and	student	targets,	but	more	critically,	it	questioned	the	
extent	to	which	there	was	any	market	risk	in	this	venture,	since	the	company	was	
essentially	being	funded	with	public	money:	
‘We	consider	that	for	either	the	private	sector	or	the	public	sector	the	bonuses	paid	to	
senior	staff	were	wholly	unacceptable	and	morally	indefensible.	The	argument	that	they	
reflect	private	sector	practice	does	not	stand	up	to	scrutiny….We	are	also	unable	to	
accept	the	view	of	the	Chairman	and	Chief	Executive	that	they	were	involved	in	a	risk	
business	which	made	such	bonuses	appropriate.	The	company	was	involved	in	a	new	
and	relatively	untried	sector,	but	it	carried	no	market	risk.	It	was	backed	with	£50	
million	of	public	money;	the	risk	was	to	that	public	investment,	not	to	the	company’	(SC	
2005	para	33/34	p.12).	
The	award	of	bonuses	was	also	picked	up	by	the	press,	with	Naughton,	writing	in	the	
Guardian,	scathing	in	his	criticism:	
‘The	holding	company	duly	set	up	an	'operating'	company,	which	recruited	a	raft	of	
business	types	who	knew	little	or	nothing	about	education.	(The	finance	director	came	
from	Camelot!)	They	did,	however,	know	about	burning	money	and	remunerating	
themselves	nicely.	The	company	accounts	reveal	that	part-time	chairman	Sir	Anthony	
Cleaver,	for	example,	got	£70,000	in	2002-03,	plus	a	£12,236	'performance	bonus'.	Chief	
executive	John	Beaumont	took	home	£180,000	plus	a	bonus	(also	for	'performance')	of	
£44,914’	(Naughton	2004).	
Other	commentators	agreed	that	the	combination	of	poor	governance	and	a	flawed	
business	plan	were	the	essential	ingredients	for	failure.	Peters	uses	UKeU	as	an	example	of	
why	partnerships	go	wrong,	and	argues	that	in	this	case	‘unclear	or	incomplete	
accountability	links…	[where]	the	level	of	delegated	authority	over	resources	and	decision	
making	powers	was	unclear’	(Peters	2011).	Steve	Molyneux,	Director	of	the	Learning	Lab,	
concurs	with	this	view,	and	was	quoted	in	The	Chronicle	of	Higher	Education	as	saying	
‘It	[UKeU]	was	down	to	bad	management,	bad	implementation,	a	flawed	business	plan,	
and	not	listening	to	experts	in	the	field’	(Carnevale	2004).		
5.3.2.	Process:	Private	sector	engagement	
A	major	part	of	the	e-University	concept	was	private	sector	involvement.	HEFCE	considered	
that	developing	such	a	venture	required	external	investment,	partly	because	HEFCE	did	not	
have	the	level	of	funding	to	fully	support	the	development	of	the	platform	and	
infrastructure	required,	but	also	because	it	expected	the	business	model	to	closely	follow	
those	being	successfully	developed	in	the	USA.	Private	sector	involvement	was	clear	from	
the	outset:	
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‘the	operating	company	would	also	involve	joint	venture	partners	from	the	private	
sector	or	non-HE	bodies	‘(HEFCE	00/43).		
In	Sir	Howard	Newby’s	evidence	to	the	Select	Committee,	he	commented	on	the	general	
feeling	towards	the	involvement	of	the	private	sector	in	the	venture:	
‘I	think	there	was	also	recognition	[by	HEFCE	and	the	sector]	that	to	be	a	major	global	
player	in	a	global	market	there	had	to	be	a	substantial	private	sector	involvement,	
because	the	necessary	funding	could	not	come	realistically	from	the	public	sector	alone.	
Government	would	not	wish	to	earmark	sufficient	sums	of	money	to	be	a	heavy	hitter	in	
the	global	market	without	significant	private	sector	involvement	and	certainly	there	
were	no	spare	funds	in	the	Funding	Council’	(SC	2005	Q18	p.8).		
However,	in	the	event,	Sun	Microsystems	Ltd	was	the	only	significant	private	investor	to	
come	on	board,	and	although	it	was	reported	in	the	press	that	Pearson	Education	
(publishers)	and	the	commercial	arm	of	the	BBC	were	expected	to	invest	in	UKeU,	neither	
did.	Following	HEFCE’s	invitation	to	private	investors	to	join	the	venture,	they	were	only	
given	one	month	for	expressions	of	interest,	and	thus	it	could	be	concluded	that	there	was	
simply	insufficient	time	for	investors	to	come	on	board	in	the	initial	stages.	Carnevale,	
however,	writing	in	The	Chronicle	of	Higher	Education,	believes	that	the	reasoning	was	
more	fundamental,	reporting	that		
‘Observers	say	that	companies	did	not	want	any	part	of	the	virtual	university	because	
they	saw	that	the	project	was	flawed	from	the	outset’	(Carnevale	2004).		
This	view	may	have	been	recognised	by	UKeU	itself,	since	when	the	Board	revised	the	
business	plan	in	November	2003,	it	did	not	provide	for	any	‘private	sector	investment	within	
at	least	the	next	six	years’	(as	noted	by	Business	Review	of	the	UKeU	conducted	by	PA	
Consulting	2003).		
HEFCE’s	view	of	why	the	private	sector	did	not	engage	was	not	that	the	project	was	flawed	
(and	indeed	they	continued	to	claim	that	a	number	of	companies	were	interested	in	
joining)	but	that	
‘None	of	the	proposals	seemed	likely	to	be	compatible	with	the	interests	and	concerns	of	
the	HE	sector’	(HEFCE	memorandum	to	the	Select	Committee	21.06.2004).	
Even	the	relationship	between	UKeU	and	Sun	Microsystems	was	not	truly	a	partnership.	
Sun	Microsystems	chose	not	to	hold	any	shares	in	UKeU	or	have	any	representation	on	the	
Board,	and	so	essentially	the	relationship	was	that	of	a	supplier	rather	than	partner,	as	
confirmed	by	Leslie	Stretch,	Vice	President	of	Sun	Microsystems	Ltd,	in	his	evidence	to	the	
Select	Committee:		
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‘It	became	a	supplier/customer	relationship.	At	the	outset	the	intention	was	more	
strategic	but	once	we	got	into	developing	the	system,	the	day-to-day	focus	was	
delivering	that	system’	(SC	2005	Q	531	p.83),		
For	the	Select	Committee,	the	failure	to	secure	partnerships	with	the	private	sector	was	a	
further	major	reason	for	the	failure	of	UKeU:	
‘UKeU’s	attempt	to	form	genuine	partnerships	with	the	private	sector,	though	
unsuccessful,	was	commendable	and	could	have	helped	UKeU	to	stay	competitive	and	
market	orientated.	Instead,	UKeU	became	another	example	of	how	difficult	the	public	
sector	finds	it	to	form	successful	partnerships	with	the	private	sector.	The	failure	to	find	
private	sector	partners	or	investors	should,	however,	have	caused	the	holding	company,	
HEFCE	and	the	DfES	to	have	concerns	sooner	rather	than	later	about	the	validity	of	the	
project’		(SC	2005	para	63	p.19).		
This	perception	was	not	wholly	a	difficulty	with	the	HE	sector,	and	rhetoric	around	public-
private	sector	engagements	was	prevalent	within	government	at	that	time.	Younie	(2006)	
notes	that	this	was	a	policy	problem	more	generally,	and	although	the	DfEE	(as	it	was	in	
1997)	also	had	ambitions	for	joint	public	and	private	collaboration	to	‘bring	together	the	
best	of	private	sector	creativity	and	the	highest	standards	of	public	service’	(DfEE	1997	p3),	
much	of	this	was	not	delivered,	and	was	particularly	noticeable	in	relation	to	delivering	ICT	
in	schools	policies.	As	O’Reilly	(2007)	concludes,	
‘for	an	administration	keen	on	the	involvement	of	the	private	sector	in	the	provision	of	
public	services,	ICT	has	not	seen	the	sustained	involvement	of	private	concerns’	(quoted	
in	Selwyn	2008).	
5.3.3	Process:	Academic	engagement	-	conflicting	cultures	
The	nature	of	partnership	and	conflicting	cultures	in	the	public-private	sectors	also	
contributed	to	the	difficulties	in	forming	a	coherent	approach	that	was	both	business	like	
and	met	the	expectations	of	the	HE	sector.	The	work	of	Conole,	Carusi,	de	Latt	&	Wilcox	
(2006,	2006a,	2006b,	2007)	has	examined	reasons	for	UKeU’s	failure	and	they	concluded	
that	the	organisational	structure,	the	processes	and,	critically,	the	cultural	relationships	
between	the	various	actors	and	organisations	were	significant	in	its	failure	to	achieve	its	
desired	outcomes.		One	of	their	key	findings	was	that	academic	organisations	have	
different	cultural	influences,	practices	and	expectations	to	corporate	ones:	
‘one	of	the	most	important	findings	of	the	research	is	the	mismatch	between	those	with	
more	of	a	business-orientated	vision	for	UKeU	and	those	more	interested	in	the	
academic	aspects	and	the	potential	educational	innovation’	(Conole	et	al	2006	p.136).	
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Their	research	concludes	that	the	organisation	between	the	HEIs	and	the	operating	
company	did	not	seek	to	address	these	cultural	differences,	and	that	there	was	a	belief	that	
business-focussed	approaches	were	more	optimal,	at	the	expense	of	the	academic.	As	a	
result,	the	organisation	and	approach	was	fragmented.	For	them,	the	very	business	model	
developed	by	PwC	was	questionable	in	allowing	for	the	different	cultural	approaches:	
‘The	lack	of	‘joined-up’	or	more	holistic	thinking	may	reflect	the	immaturity	of	the	UKeU	
organisation	at	this	stage;	alternatively,	or	in	addition,	it	may	be	a	feature	of	such	
models	that	they	do	not	capture	the	complexity	and	evolving	nature	of	the	institutional	
and	interpersonal	relationships…	That	there	was	a	rift	between	the	corporate	and	
academic	cultures	in	the	UKeU	has	been	remarked	upon	by	all	interviewees’	(Conole	et	
al	2006	p.143	&	p.147).	
Conole	et	al	(2006,	2006a,	2006b,	2007)	also	note	there	is	often	a	mismatch	between	the	
corporate	sector,	and	its	focus	on	private	goods,	and	the	academic,	with	its	focus	on	public	
goods.	Whilst	this	was	acknowledged	in	PwC’s	business	model,	‘wider	intentions	to	increase	
social	inclusion	and	to	disseminate	good	practice	do	not	sit	comfortably	with	a	focus	on	
profit	maximisation’;	this	mismatch	was	not	explicitly	addressed,	and	as	such	‘there	appear	
to	have	been	no	steps	taken	to	try	to	smooth	the	way	for	cross-sector	and	cross-cultural	
relationships’	(Conole	et	al	2006a	p.8).		
The	findings	of	the	research	by	Conole	(2007)	concluded	that	this	mismatch	was	significant	
in	the	failure	of	the	e-University.	
‘There	was	a	gradual	further	accentuation	of	the	business	or	corporate	nature	of	the	
organisation	at	the	expense	of	its	academic	aspect	and	an	increasing	
corporate/academic	rift.	The	most	significant	point	to	emerge	from	our	analysis	is	the	
importance	of	means	whereby	institutions	could	address	these	differences’	(p.141).		
There	was	equally	a	concern	that	universities	themselves	were	not	wholly	committed	to	the	
project,	particularly	at	senior	levels.	Although	all	but	four	institutions	signed	up	to	the	
project,	in	reality	there	was	little	institutional	commitment	and	the	development	of	
programmes	was,	for	the	most	part,	left	down	to	individuals	with	an	enthusiasm	for	e-
learning.	The	research	by	Conole	et	al	(2006,	2006a,	2006b,	2007)	also	found	evidence	that	
the	internal	workings	and	level	of	commitment	of	individual	HEIs	had	a	significant	impact	
on	how	they	engaged	with	UKeU:	
‘Circumstances	often	included	the	organisation	processes	within	the	HEIs	themselves	
and,	in	particular,	the	way	in	which	the	decision	had	come	about	to	work	with	the	UKeU	
in	the	first	place	and	by	what	internal	structures	the	decision	was	being	enforced’	
(Conole,	2006,	p.144).		
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John	Beaumont	also	questioned	the	commitment	of	universities	to	the	project	in	his	
witness	statement	to	the	Select	Committee:	
‘They	were	asked	to	put	a	pound	in	and	I	think	all	but	four	did,	and	I	am	not	sure	that	
shows	real	commitment	of	an	institution.	What	we	did	find…	was	in	many	institutions	
there	were	a	lot	of	very	enthusiastic	academics,	but	to	get	e-learning	of	quality	and	scale	
you	need	the	whole	institution	to	support	it’	(SC	2005	para	64	p.20).	
By	October	2003,	just	17	courses	had	been	launched,	and	by	2004	a	number	of	HEIs	had	
withdrawn	from	HoldCo,	thus	further	reducing	the	commitment	of	the	organisation	to	hold	
UKeU	to	account	for	its	actions.	The	lack	of	engagement	led	the	Select	Committee	to	
conclude	that	
‘it	appears	to	us	that	the	wave	of	enthusiasm	which	caused	all	but	a	handful	of	higher	
education	institutions	to	sign	up	to	the	UKeU's	project	receded	very	rapidly,	leaving	it	
without	private	sector	investment	or	active	higher	education	sector	engagement’	(SC	
2005	para	65	p.20).	
5.3.4	Process:	A	lack	of	focus	on	the	learner	and	a	supply-driven	approach		
Another	main	finding	of	the	Select	Committee	was	that	UKeU	‘took	a	supply-driven,	rather	
than	demand-led,	approach’	(SC	2005)	to	its	business.		The	main	focus	initially	for	UKeU	was	
to	get	content	onto	the	learning	platform	in	order	to	meet	the	ambitious	October	2002	
launch	date,	and	for	this	they	needed	the	support	of	HEIs	in	providing	programmes.	As	
such,	the	focus	was	on	programmes,	not	on	learners.	This	led	the	Select	Committee	to	
conclude	that	
‘a	supply-driven	approach,	combined	with	the	very	ambitious	nature	of	the	venture	in	an	
emerging	market	that	did	not	sustain	the	high	expectations	of	demand…led	to	the	
failure	of	UKeU	to	meet	its	targets,	aims	and	objectives…	The	problem	for	UKeU	was	a	
combination	of	the	ambitious	nature	of	the	original	idea,	and	an	over-confidence	about	
the	level	of	demand	for	e-learning	which	led	to	an	approach	which	was	insufficiently	
focussed	on	research	and	marketing	and	which	was	not	learner	centered.	To	be	
successful,	the	project’s	main	focus	should	have	been	on	clearly	identifying	its	market	
and	knowing	the	demands	of	its	customers’	(SC	2005	p.13,	para	108	p.30).			
Peters	(2011)	also	cites	the	supply	driven	approach	as	one	of	reasons	for	the	demise	of	
UKeU:	
‘The	lessons	from	this	example	[UKeU]	are	many	but	they	include	the	initiative	being	top	
down	rather	than	arising	either	from	demand	from	international	students	or	a	gap	
perceived	by	universities’	(Peters	2011	p.29).	
In	the	business	model,	following	initial	market	research	by	PwC,	it	had	been	proposed	that	
UKeU	would	concentrate	its	efforts	initially	on	some	low-risk	markets	such	as	UK-based	
postgraduate	and	CPD	programmes,	‘corporate’	universities,	workplace	learning	and	
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selected	overseas	markets.	However,	UKeU	chose	to	go	global	right	from	the	beginning,	
perhaps	because	the	organisation	saw	this	as	a	quick	win	in	generating	substantial	student	
numbers,	and	they	were	heavily	criticised	for	this	approach	by	the	Select	Committee.	UKeU	
had	made	an	assumption	that	the	market	in	the	United	States	mirrored	market	sectors	in	
other	parts	of	the	globe,	and	they	were	influenced	by	government’s	original	assertion	that	
there	was	a	significant	threat	from	the	USA.	In	his	evidence,	Sir	Howard	Newby	concluded	
that	UKeU	had	moved	away	from	the	original	business	plan:	
‘I	think	there	was	shift	of	emphasis,	yes…Once	the	e-University	Opco	[operating	
company]	board	had	been	set	up,	they	certainly	felt	that	there	was	a	major	opportunity	
here,	if	you	like,	for	UK	export	earnings.	A	great	deal	of	emphasis	was	placed	on	
international	recruitment….	Opco	board	took	the	view	that	the	major	growth	market	
was	overseas,	especially	in	Asia’	(SC	2005	Q23	p.9).		
However,	there	was	no	evidence	that	the	global	market	existed.	In	2003,	some	two	years	
after	the	start	of	UKeU,	the	PA	Consulting	Group	review	into	UKeU	concluded	that	‘UKeU	
has	yet	to	demonstrate	that	there	is	a	sustainable	and	accessible	global	market’	(SC	2005	
Q63	p.14).	
There	was	apparent	confusion	around	the	target	market	between	HEFCE	and	UKeU.	Whilst	
UKeU	was	seeking	proposals	from	HEIs	to	meet	demands	in	the	international	market,	Sir	
Howard	Newby	was	writing	to	English	Vice	Chancellors	with	a	different	message	concerning	
the	e-University’s	role	in	supporting	social	inclusion:	
‘This	invitation	[to	bid	for	additional	student	numbers]	is	not	about	commercial	
programmes	but	about	programmes	to	be	offered	as	part	of	the	public	service	of	higher	
education	in	England,	particularly	to	meet	objectives	of	widening	participation’	(THES	
12.04.2002).		
For	some	observers,	a	focus	on	the	pubic	good	was	as	questionable	as	the	international	
market	and,	as	early	as	2001,	commentators	were	questioning	whether	the	development	of	
e-education	was	suitable	as	a	public	service,	given	the	tendency	for	there	to	be	both	an	
absence	of	public	funding	for	e-education	and	increased	financial	burden	on	students,	
which	is	reflected	in	the	business	model	of	UKeU.	As	Rumble	2001	noted:	
‘given	the	unwillingness	or	inability	of	governments	to	meet	the	additional	costs	
involved,	the	tendency	is	either	to	forego	the	expenditure,	or	to	pass	these	costs	on	to	
the	students.	Both	these	strategies	are	evidenced	strongly	in	the	Business	Model	for	the	
[UK]	e-University’	(Rumble	2001	p.226).		
Rumble	(2001)	and	Greener	and	Perriton	(2005)	warned	that	globalisation	of	e-education	
meant	that	attention	would	always	be	focused	on	those	elements	of	the	market	that	could	
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afford	to	pay,	and	thus	ignoring	sectors	unable	to	afford	the	cost,	including	the	local	
market.	This	is	very	much	reflected	in	the	global	approach	taken	by	UKeU	and,	as	such,	it	
failed	to	meet	one	of	the	other	main	objectives:	
‘ensuring	that	the	social	inclusion	agenda	remains	a	priority,	primarily	through	the	
development	of	undergraduate	courses	to	reach	those	in	this	country	who	find	it	difficult	
to	access	the	more	traditional	campus-based	university’	(HEFCE	04/00).		
The	local	and	the	social	good	were	ignored	by	UKeU	but,	in	Rumble’s	view,	this	is	not	
surprising	since	the	original	business	model	failed	to	give	credence	to	this	aspect	of	the	
vision	in	focussing	on	the	financial	sustainability	of	UKeU.	
The	lack	of	a	demand-led	approach	impeded	UKeU	in	meeting	another	of	its	objectives:	to	
be	learner-driven.	UKeU	looked	first	to	what	courses	could	be	supplied	by	HEIs,	rather	than	
focussing	on	the	requirements	of	the	learner.	In	the	original	business	model	(HEFCE	00/43)	
it	was	stipulated	that	the	organisation	must	be	‘learner-centered’.		However,	the	Select	
Committee	found	that	UKeU	had	done	little	to	research	what	learners	wanted	and,	had	
they	done	so,	they	would	have	concluded	that	there	was	greater	demand	for	a	‘blended	
learning’	approach.	This	was	acknowledged	in	the	PwC	business	model,	where	it	suggested	
that	‘we	think	that	this	prospect	of	combining	e-U	with	local	provision	may	offer	a	
particularly	attractive	market	opportunity’	(HEFCE	00/44a	p.13).	Demand	for	a	solely	e-
learning	approach	represented	a	very	small	segment	of	the	market.	Nor	had	UKeU	looked	
at	what	was	being	offered	elsewhere,	which	might	have	better	informed	their	decisions,	
such	as	the	Open	University	or	the	University	of	Phoenix,	both	of	which	offered	blended	
approaches	to	learning.	As	Usoro	and	Abid	(2008)	noted,	
‘In	the	UK,	most	of	the	successful	e-learning	programmes	are	the	blended	rather	than	
the	pure	(no	face-to-face	contact)	approach’	(p.79).	
It	is	noteworthy	that	in	July	2003	HEFCE	consulted	the	sector	on	a	‘strategy	for	promoting	
e-learning’	(HEFCE	2003/35)	and	the	vast	majority	of	responses	supported	a	blended	
approach,	with	e-learning	providing	a	supporting	role.	This	seems	to	be	at	odds	with	the	
consultation	on	the	e-University,	where	74%	of	respondents	supported	the	initiative.	For	
the	Select	Committee,	this	learner	centered	approach	was	entirely	absent	from	UKeU’s	
methodology:		
‘we	have	found	that	UKeU	inherited	a	narrowly	focussed	definition	of	e-learning	and	
chose	to	pursue	that	approach	without	questioning	it	at	any	stage.	It	did	not	focus	on	
research	and	development	concerning	the	definition	of	e-learning,	and	it	did	not	have	a	
‘learner-centred	approach’	(SC	2005	para	43	p.14-15).			
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5.3.5	Programme:	Branding	and	marketing:	a	failure	of	engagement	
UKeU	required	a	strong	brand	in	order	to	market	itself	alongside	its	American	competitors,	
which	was	acknowledged	in	the	PwC	business	model	(HEFCE	00/44a	p.46).	However,	in	the	
event,	very	little	of	the	expenditure	-	just	£4.2	million	-	was	spent	on	branding	and	
marketing.	The	Select	Committee	report	noted	that	a	lack	of	appropriate	branding	and	
marketing	was	another	key	reason	for	UKeU’s	failure.	This	view	was	also	supported	by	The	
Minister	for	Education,	Dr	Howells.	For	Dr	Howells,	UKeU’s	name	itself	represented	a	
significant	barrier	to	the	success	of	the	venture:	
‘I	have	no	doubt	whatsoever	that	if	there	was	a	clearer	brand	–	I	get	tangled	up	just	
trying	to	say	UKeU	anyway.	I	do	not	know	who	dreamt	that	one	up	but	it	was	not	a	
great	title.	It	is	typical	of	the	sort	of	rubbish	that	was	around	at	that	time’	(SC	2005	
p.36).			
Confusion	was	a	characteristic	of	many	of	the	themes	identified	in	relation	to	UKeU,	and	
branding	was	no	exception.	E-learning	ventures	in	the	United	States	tended	to	project	a	
strong	brand,	explicitly	linked	to	an	already	well	established	and	respected	institution,	such	
as	University	of	Phoenix	On-line.	UKeU	did	not	have	a	strong	brand	from	the	outset	since	it	
was	essentially	an	umbrella	for	a	conglomerate	of	institutions.	Neither	did	it	have	an	
established	reputation	for	quality,	unlike	many	of	its	HEI	members.	As	a	result,	potential	
students	could	not	make	an	immediate	link	between	the	strong	brand	of	an	institution	and	
the	on-line	learning,	and	thus	the	brand	was	confused.	As	Garrett	(2004)	noted,	
‘Confusion	existed	between	the	mainstream	UK	education	brand	emphasising	the	three	
elements	of	tradition,	place	and	quality	and	marketing	by	UKeU	that	promised	‘the	best	
of	UK	higher	education	with	online	convenience’	without	being	able	to	utilize	these	
elements…	convenience	is	not	a	strong	part	of	the	image	of	UK	higher	education	abroad’	
(p.4).		
Branding	of	the	e-University	was	picked	up	by	the	media	before	UKeU	had	been	
established.	The	THES	quoted	Neil	Gregory,	head	of	the	research	and	contracts	division	at	
the	London	School	of	Economics,	as	saying,	
‘It	might	be	an	unpalatable	truth	but	the	e-university	will	be	all	about	brand.	Unless	
those	with	international	reputations	are	included,	and	I	am	not	convinced	they	are,	it	
will	have	difficulty	in	getting	off	the	ground	in	any	real	sense’	(THES	16.06.2000).	
It	has	been	observed	in	Section	5.2	(p.127)	that	one	of	the	most	contested	issues	arising	
from	the	initial	consultation	was	the	tension	between	an	organisation	that	included	all	
types	of	HEI	and	the	desire	by	some	elite	institutions	to	protect	their	reputations.	The	THES	
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observed	in	2000	that	the	inclusive	nature	of	the	e-University	would	lead	to	challenges	in	
branding:	
‘Problems	also	remain	with	the	image	of	the	e-university.	If	it	is	to	attract	overseas	
students,	it	must	have	a	strong	brand	image.	But	elite	institutions	are	unlikely	to	lend	
their	names	to	an	inclusive	e-university’	(Goddard	2000).			
Greener	and	Perriton	later	concluded	that	the	lack	of	a	strong	brand	contributed	to	UKeU’s	
collapse	because	there	was	a	reliance	on	the	reputations	of	certain	institutions	to	carry	the	
brand.	
‘UKeU	lacked	a	recognisable	brand	–	so	in	an	internationally	competitive	market	place	
they	relied	upon	the	more	‘marketable’	UK	universities	to	supply	legitimacy	and	a	
recognised	produce	profile’	(2005	p.68).		
The	Select	Committee	also	criticised	UKeU	for	failing	to	‘undertake	any	market	research	or	
put	sufficient	emphasis	on	marketing’	(SC	2005	para	44	p.15),	and	was	critical	of	the	small	
amount	of	marketing	expenditure,	which	only	accounted	for	8.4%	of	the	total	expenditure	
(£4.2m	of	£49.5m).	UKeU	had	been	offered	the	opportunity	to	purchase	a	marketing	
company,	Scottish	Knowledge,	for	£12m,	but	had	rejected	the	offer	as	being	too	expensive.	
In	addition,	there	was	a	lack	of	any	marketing	expertise	at	senior	management	level	(SC	
2005	para	47,	48	p.15-16).	
A	lack	of	systematic	analysis	and	a	reliance	on	anecdotal	evidence	from	individual	contacts	
was	also	considered	by	the	Committee	as	further	evidence	of	failure	in	market	research.	
Many	examples	of	occasions	when	UKeU	senior	management’s	approach	was	to	‘draw	on	
their	contacts’	(SC	2005	para	53	p.17),	mainly	overseas,	were	given	to	the	Committee	(SC	
2005	para	53-55	p.17),	rather	than	conducting	rigorous	and	informed	research.	For	
example,	Sir	Anthony	Cleaver	said	in	his	statement	to	the	Select	Committee,	
‘Fortuitously,	I	was	also	Chairman	of	the	Asia	Pacific	Advisers	for	Trade	Partners	UK	and	
was	able	to	draw	on	their	contacts	in	that	part	of	the	world’	(SC	2005	para	Q161,	ev27).		
UKeU	was	also	criticised	for	failing	to	see	the	potential	for	partnerships,	such	as	with	the	
British	Council	(SC	2005	para	52,48	p.16-17),	which	would	have	helped	UKeU	to	benefit	
from	their	extensive	knowledge	of	overseas	markets.	Overall,	the	Select	Committee	
concluded	that	lack	of	marketing	and	research	contributed	significantly	to	the	failure	of	
UKeU:	
‘Evidence	to	this	inquiry	suggests	that	UKeU’s	understanding	of	their	markets	came	
from	anecdotal	evidence	from	individual	discussions	rather	than	from	systematic	
analysis.	There	was	no	formal	market	research	undertaken	to	assess	either	the	level	of	
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demand	or	the	nature	of	the	demand	and	the	type	of	e-learning	required.	There	was	no	
systematic	evaluation	of	the	markets,	no	thorough	and	robust	market	research,	and	no	
understanding	of	consumer	demand.	This	was	atypical	of	UKeU’s	supply-driven	rather	
than	demand-led	approach’	(SC	2005	para	55	p.17).		
The	press	also	picked	up	on	the	lack	of	market	research,	with	Naughton	being	particularly	
scathing	of	the	lack	of	it:	
‘It	was	pure	dotcommery.	Nobody	had	done	any	market	research.	With	the	exception	of	
the	Open	University,	there	wasn't	an	HE	institution	in	Britain	that	knew	the	first	thing	
about	e-learning.	But	Blunkett	put	aside	£62m	for	his	fantasy	and	set	the	disaster	in	
motion.	First,	there	was	the	obligatory	consultant's	report,	which	spent	55	pages	
avoiding	the	really	central	questions.	Was	there	a	market	for	British	web-based	learning	
materials?	And	could	UK	universities	deliver	anything	that	people	might	actually	buy?’	
(Naughton	2004).	
Conversely,	though,	Bacsich	(2005)	points	out	that	there	is	evidence	of	market	research	
from	UKeU,	with	a	number	of	market	and	competitor	research	studies	carried	out:	
‘[from]	the	market	research	now	published	in	the	e-University	Compendium	and	the	
UKeU	Reports,	it	appears	to	the	author	to	be	the	most	comprehensive	recent	market	
research	on	e-university	e-learning	done	in	recent	years’	(Bacsich	2004	p.5).	
The	problem,	for	Bacsich,	was	not	a	lack	of	market	research,	but	one	of	timing	in	the	long	
delays	between	market	research	in	a	rapidly	changing	world	and	the	use	made	of	it	by	
senior	managers	in	UKeU.	He	also	cites	a	lack	of	knowledge	of	the	market	research,	due	to	
poor	organisation	and	communication	within	the	organisation	itself,	as	a	failure	to	use	the	
available	research	effectively.		
5.3.6	Programme:	The	technical	platform	
The	vast	majority	of	UKeU’s	expenditure	was	on	the	development	of	the	technical	platform	
(£14.5m).	However,	UKeU	was	heavily	criticised	for	putting	far	too	much	emphasis	on	
developing	a	bespoke	on-line	platform	from	which	to	deliver	courses.	Although	the	PwC	
business	model	acknowledged	that	some	bespoke	technological	development	would	be	
required,	and	also	acknowledged	the	advantage	of	having	a	technology	partner	in	the	
business	model,	there	was	an	expectation	that	UKeU	would	look	to	existing	technology	
providers	in	the	first	instance:	
‘The	first	step	in	procuring	such	a	complex	technology	platform	would	be	to	establish	
the	more	detailed	operations	of	the	e-U	to	define	the	functionality	required…	The	second	
step	would	be	to	conduct	a	market	evaluation	of	suitable	technology	providers,	which	
would	include	assessing	possible	commercial	off-the-shelf	products	as	well	as	systems	
integrators	who	could	develop	or	package	a	bespoke	system	–	and	who	may	become	an		
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important	strategic	technology	partner.	It	is	likely	that	the	procurement	strategy	will	
result	in	a	combination	of	bespoke	and	off-the-shelf	solutions’	(HEFCE	00/44a	2000,	
p.28).	
Contrary	to	the	business	model,	UKeU	perceived	that	existing	platforms,	such	as	Blackboard	
and	WebCT,	were	insufficient	to	deliver	the	scale	of	the	activity,	although	they	failed	to	
consult	with	e-learning	experts,	the	Joint	Information	Systems	Committee	(JISC)	or	the	
Learning	and	Teaching	Support	Network	(LTSN).	As	a	result	of	UKeU’s	decision,	Sun	
Microsystems	were	charged	with	developing	a	new	platform.	Significantly,	developing	a	
bespoke	platform	delayed	the	launch	of	courses,	with	the	first	programmes	not	being	
introduced	until	2003.	Garrett	(2004)	argued	that	this	was	a	crucial	mistake	and,	
‘in	retrospect,	the	company	might	have	saved	significant	funds	by	using	an	existing	
platform,	getting	programs	up	and	running	more	quickly,	and	leaving	more	funds	for	
marketing.	This	would	also	have	permitted	the	venture	to	grow	more	slowly’	(p.5).			
Almost	30%	of	UKeU’s	£49.5m	total	expenditure	had	been	spent	on	the	technology	
platform	development	alone,	and	the	Select	Committee	were	highly	critical	of	this	
approach:	
‘UKeU	allowed	the	development	of	the	technology	platform	to	drive	its	strategy	and	the	
development	of	programmes.	It	had	a	skewed	focus	on	the	platform,	based	on	the	
assumption	that	once	this	was	right,	the	original	projections	of	very	high	student	
numbers	would	be	easy	to	realise.	Unfortunately	this	assumption	was	not	based	on	
research	evidence,	but	in	an	over	confident	presumption	about	the	scale	of	the	demand	
for	wholly	internet	based	e-learning’	(SC	2005	para	60	p.18).		
Bascish	observed	that	the	technical	platform	took	up	most	of	the	management	time	and	
proved	to	be	a	most	contentious	issue	between	managers,	the	technical	team	and	
universities.	He	notes	that	the	platform	would	have	caused	far	fewer	management	
difficulties	had	an	existing	commercial	platform	been	brought	in	(Bascish	(2010	p.28).		
Janice	Smith,	in	her	2005	review	of	40	years	of	on-line	learning,	suggests	that	the	
development	of	‘big	systems’	such	as	the	UKeU	technological	platform	is	an	approach	that	
had	been	adopted	by	government	since	the	1997	Dearing	report,	and	their	generic	nature	
typically	leads	to	failure.	She	argues	that	government	needs	to	learn	from	the	failure	of	
UKeU	and	that	technological	innovation	that	match	‘tools	and	resources	closely	to	the	
student	learning	need’	(Smith	2005	p.106)	is	more	appropriate.	The	research	by	Conole	
(2007)	also	concluded	that	e-learning	is	‘complex	and	multi-faceted’	(p.149)	and,	as	such,	a	
narrow	on-line	approach	is	insufficient.	This	lesson	appears	to	have	been	later	understood	
by	HEFCE	in	2005,	in	the	development	of	a	much	broader	and	institutionally	focussed	e-
learning	policy,	funded	from	what	was	left	of	the	e-University	money:	
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‘Our	strategy	[for	e-learning]	should	not	focus	solely	or	even	primarily	on	the	use	of	
technologies	in	distance	learning…	New	technologies	clearly	provide	opportunities	for	
enhancement	and	innovation	in	learning	opportunities	on	the	campus,	or	within	the	
workplace	or	home.	The	definition	of	e-learning	should	be	sufficiently	broad	to	
encompass	the	many	uses	of	ICT	that	individual	universities	and	colleges	decide	to	adopt	
in	their	learning	and	teaching	missions.	Our	strategy	should	promote	and	support	that	
diversity’	(HEFCE	2005/12	2005,	p.5).			
5.3.7	Programme:	A	reliance	on	the	English	language	
Although	the	original	HEFCE	circular	asserted	that	‘English	is	the	preferred	international	
medium	of	instruction	in	HE’	(HEFCE	04/00	Annex	A	point	6),	UKeU	was	criticised	for	not	
taking	into	account	the	PwC	business	model’s	warning	that	‘it	will	be	important	for	the	e-U	
provision	to	be	sensitive	to	local	cultures	and	language’	(HEFCE	00/44a	p.15),	since	UkEU	
proposed	to	provide	all	of	its	programmes	in	English.	As	with	many	aspects	of	UKeU’s	
approach,	the	rationale	for	providing	programmes	only	in	English	was	based	on	hearsay	
rather	than	evidenced	research.	Sir	Anthony	Cleaver	reported	to	the	Select	Committee	that	
his	visits	to	the	Far	East	were	influential	in	determining	the	focus	on	courses	in	English:		
‘Korea	is	probably	the	best	example.	On	my	first	visit	to	Korea	I	met	the	Minister	of	
Education.	He	said	‘well	of	course	we	need	English.	We	as	a	country	are	not	strong	in	
English	and	internationally	that	is	financially	detrimental	to	us’’	(SC	2005	para	54	p.17).			
This	assumption	that	there	was	an	international	market	for	courses	taught	in	English	was	at	
odds	with	evidence	of	success	in	other	countries.	For	example,	the	successful	SNU,	which	
focusses	on	the	home	Swedish	market,	has	courses	entirely	in	Swedish	(Christie	and	Jurado	
(2007).			
5.3.8	Process:	Timescales	
The	account	of	the	episode,	and	the	timeline	above	(Table	10,	p.142),	outline	just	how	
quickly	HEFCE	launched	the	initiative,	with	short	deadlines	for	HEIs	and	private	investors	to	
react	to	consultations	and	invitations	to	engage,	and	HoldCo	and	UKeU	equally	quickly	
established.	The	speed	of	the	initiative	was,	for	many	commentators,	put	down	to	the	need	
to	react	quickly	to	compete	in	the	global	market	and	avoid	being	taken	over	by	the	USA.	
However,	the	necessity	for	such	speed	was	questioned.	Garett	notes	that	
‘there	was	concern	that	if	the	UK	did	not	“do	something”	its	international	student	
market	would	be	overrun	by	aggressive	online	universities	from	the	United	states	and	
elsewhere	was	based	on	fear	rather	than	fact’	(Garett	2004	p.4).	
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Equally,	despite	HEFCE’s	conjecture	that	the	USA	offered	successful	models	of	e-learning	
that	should	be	emulated,	Hedberg	(2006)	observes	that	the	USA	also	experienced	similar	
failures:		
‘The	closure	of	UK	e-Universities	Worldwide	(UKeU)	follows	the	earlier	failure	of	such	
schemes	in	the	USA,	where	the	low	numbers	of	enrolled	students	indicate	that	this	is	not	
always	what	the	majority	of	students	seek	for	their	university	education’	(p.174).		
The	Select	Committee	also	questioned	the	speed	at	which	events	took	place,	and	indeed	Dr	
Kim	Howells	reports	in	his	evidence	that	
‘we	probably	could	have	done	with	more	time	in	terms	of	looking	around	the	world,	
perhaps	not	reacting	as	quickly	as	we	did	to	what	we	perceived	to	be	great	threats	
coming	from	America	of	our	own	students	being	captured	to	do	degrees	by	universities	
like	Phoenix	and	so	on’	(SC	2005	para	106	p.30).	
Equally,	the	speed	with	which	the	initiative	was	shut	down	has	been	criticised.	Bacsich	
(2004)	asserted	that	‘2	years	is	not	long	enough	to	judge	a	dot	com’,	as	did	Michael	Driscoll,	
then	Vice	Chancellor	of	Middlesex	University,	writing	in	the	Guardian	in	2004,	who	said	that	
the	venture	had	not	been	given	long	enough.	The	Select	Committee	also	noted	that	several	
witnesses	had	also	suggested	that	the	final	close	down	of	UKeU	was	too	hurried	and	‘did	
not	allow	enough	time	to	make	the	most	of	existing	assets	and	to	discuss	the	lessons	learnt	
and	ideas	for	the	future’	(SC	2005	para	130	p.35).	Sir	Anthony	Cleaver,	in	response	to	the	
Select	Committee’s	questioning	on	whether	the	venture	was	doomed	to	failure,	said	that	‘I	
do	not	think	it	failed;	it	just	did	not	have	the	time	to	succeed’	(SC	2005	Q323	p.46).	Garrett,	
too,	conjectured	that	the	plug	may	have	been	pulled	too	quickly	and	more	time	might	have	
delivered	a	different	outcome:	
‘Take	short-term	funding	–	and	impatience	for	results	–	out	of	the	equation,	however,	
and	the	venture	would	likely	have	covered	its	costs	in	another	five	years	or	so	and	
become	a	major	online	brand’	(Garrett	2004	p.6).	
Despite	the	closure	of	UKeU,	it	is	noteworthy	that,	as	a	policy,	e-learning	did	not	entirely	
disappear	from	HEFCE’s	agenda,	and	the	organisation	learnt	from	the	mistakes	of	the	e-
university,	revising	its	strategy	to	support	e-learning	in	individual	institutions	(HEFCE	
2005/12),	and	through	the	HEA.	Writing	for	the	Guardian	newspaper	at	the	time,	Stephen	
Hoare	observed:		
‘In	its	dying	days	in	2003,	UkeU	was	joined	by	a	research	body,	the	E-learning	Research	
Centre,	which	is	based	at	both	Manchester	and	Southampton	universities.	It	was	an	
attempt	by	the	Higher	Education	Funding	Council	for	England	(Hefce)	to	rein	in	UkeU's	
ambitions	and	keep	it	in	line	with	market	demand.	The	E-learning	Research	Centre	now	
forms	a	powerful	alliance	with	UkeU's	de	facto	replacement,	the	HE	Academy.	Grainne	
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Conole,	professor	of	educational	innovation	at	Southampton	University	and	co-director	
of	the	centre,	says:	"Rather	than	throw	the	baby	away	with	the	bath	water,	Hefce	has	
taken	up	the	challenge	and	said	'Oh	well,	what	can	we	learn	from	this?'’’(Hoare	2005).	
5.4	Conclusion	
The	e-University	was	perceived	by	many	to	have	been	an	example	of	complete	policy	
failure,	with	UKeU	failing	to	meet	the	student	number	targets	set	out	in	the	business	plan	
and	failing	to	meet	the	conditions	of	grant	in	terms	of	public	and	private	financial	
engagement.	My	evaluation	of	the	episode,	driven	by	the	evidence	and	findings	from	the	
texts,	shows	that	one	of	the	key	reasons	for	the	failure	were	difficulties	of	governance	
between	HEFCE	and	UKeU,	due	to	the	novel	public-private	nexus,	and	the	inability	to	align	
the	differing	organisations,	practices	and	cultures	of	the	commercial	and	academic	sectors.	
In	addition,	UKeU	also	failed	to	understand	its	market,	focussed	on	supply	-	not	learner	-	
demand,	and	invested	too	heavily	in	the	development	of	a	bespoke	technical	platform.		
The	narrative	and	evidence	in	this	chapter	is	used	in	Chapter	8	to	interpret	the	policy	
episode	against	McConnell’s	framework	to	assess	success	or	failure	in	terms	of	the	‘process,	
programme	and	political	dimensions’	(McConnell	2010)	of	the	episode.	The	charting	of	the	
episode	against	the	framework	helps	to	address	the	main	research	question	in	examining	
elements	of	success	and	failure	in	relation	to	the	e-university,	and	to	seek	to	identify	
commonalities	and	differences	between	this	and	the	remaining	two	case	studies.	The	
second	case	study	is	discussed	in	Chapter	6.	
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Chapter	6:	Case	study	2:	Centres	for	Excellence	in	Teaching	
and	Learning	
6.1	Introduction	
The	Centres	for	Excellence	in	Learning	and	Teaching	(CETL)	is	an	ideal	case	study	since	it	
meets	all	the	criteria	set	out	in	Table	6	(p.71)	in	being	a	time	bound	episode,	with	clearly	
identified	proposed	outcomes	and	benefits	to	the	target	group,	following	a	typical	HEFCE	
policy	process	and	there	are	sufficient	sources	of	both	primary	and	secondary	texts	to	offer	
sufficient	breadth	and	depth	to	develop	a	thick	description	of	the	policy	episode.	In	
considering	each	of	the	chosen	texts,	the	use	of	the	coding	established	in	Appendix	B	
enables	the	thick	description	to	be	interpreted	against	the	theoretical	framework	in	
Chapter	8,	to	give	a	nuanced	approach	in	addressing	the	main	research	question,	
articulating	the	success	or	failure	of	the	CETL	policy	episode.	This	is	also	used	to	address	the	
first	supplementary	research	question	in	establishing	commonalities	and	differences	
between	the	chosen	case	studies.		
This	particular	policy	episode	is	of	interest	since	the	initiative	aimed	to	raise	the	quality	of	
learning	and	teaching,	and	enhance	and	celebrate	the	professionalisation	of	teaching	
(HEFCE	2003/36).	The	emphasis	on	learning	and	teaching	had	become	a	priority	for	both	
government	and	HEFCE	as	a	result	of	the	introduction	of	fees	in	the	late	1990s,	with	
students	expecting	greater	value	for	money,	and	consequently	a	number	of	learning	and	
teaching	funded	programmes	were	put	in	place	by	HEFCE	and	other	organisations	such	as	
the	HEA.	Teaching	quality	policies	were	perceived	to	be	less	developed	than	that	of	
research,	which	already	had	in	place	the	established	RAE	for	funding	quality	research,	with	
recurrent	funding	related	to	research	performance.	Initiatives	such	as	the	CETLs	were	
thought	to	be	‘one	way	to	redress	the	balance‘	(Smith	2006	p.50).			
The	CETL	initiative	followed	a	typical	HEFCE	project	funded	approach	in	requiring	
institutions	to	bid	for	capital	and	operating	funding	to	fund	activities	such	as	reward	and	
recognition	for	staff,	facilities	for	students	and	pedagogical	research.	In	total,	£335m	was	
provided	to	support	the	initiative	between	2005	and	2010.	Unlike	research	quality	funding,	
this	initiative	was	envisioned	to	be	time-limited	project	funding	‘over	the	five-year	period	
from	2004-05	to	2008-09’	(HEFCE	2004/05	p.1),	rather	than	recurrent.	Whilst	funding	was	
provided	for	individual	centres,	it	was	anticipated	that	they	would	work	together	with	other	
CETLs	and	sector	agencies	to	disseminate	good	practice	across	the	sector,	thus	creating	a	
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long	term	legacy	beyond	the	funding	period.	One	of	the	key	characteristics	of	the	policy	
approach	was	that	it	was	a	bottom-up,	hands-off	approach	from	HEFCE,	in	which	the	
definition	of	excellence	was	deliberately	loose:	
‘we	hope	that	institutions	will	think	flexibly	and	creatively	about	how	they	define	their	
excellent	practice’	(HEFCE	2003/36	p.2).		
The	chapter	is	split	into	two	sections:	the	first	provides	an	historical	narrative	of	the	
episode,	how	it	came	to	fruition,	the	national	and	international	contexts,	the	organisations	
and	actors	involved,	the	activities	which	enable	the	implementation	of	the	policy,	the	
outcomes	and	sequence	of	events.	The	second	section,	drawing	on	the	primary	and	
secondary	texts,	takes	a	thematic	approach	in	articulating	a	critical	analysis	of	particularly	
important	or	interesting	aspects	of	the	policy,	which	will	enable	its	interpretation	against	
the	theoretical	framework.						
6.1.1	Sources	of	data	
The	main	evidence	and	findings	for	this	case	study	come	from	the	formative	(Saunders	et	al	
2008)	and	summative	(SQW	2011)	evaluations	of	the	CETLs,	which	reported	in	2008	and	
2011	respectively,	and	reported	evidence	of	activity	from	the	CETLs	and	interviews	with	the	
CETLs	and	institutions.	Other	scholarly	works	have	contributed	to	a	commentary	on	the	
CETLs:	Gosling,	Hannan	and	Turner	have,	at	various	stages,	conducted	longitudinal	studies	
into	aspects	such	as	the	bidding	process	through	to	using	CETLs	as	an	example	of	
contestation	in	teaching	and	learning.	Their	work,	and	that	of	Trowler	and	Bamber	(2005),	
Clouder	et	al	(2008)	and	Sabri	(2011),	have	provided	useful	insights	into	CETLs.		
The	idea	of	excellence	in	learning	and	teaching	in	HE	has	been	a	much	debated	and	
contested	issue	for	many	years	and	this	chapter	draws	on	the	work	of	some	of	those	
commentators,	many	of	whom	use	the	CETLs	as	examples,		Barnett	(2000),	Skelton	(2005),	
Allan	(2007)	Little	et	al	(2007),	Nixon	(2007),	Taylor	(2007),	Mieg	(2014),	Lemmens-Krug	
(2015).			
A	review	of	media	sources	reveals	surprisingly	few	mentions	(57),	with	the	THES	being	the	
main	stage	for	commentators’	views.	Many	of	the	early	media	reports	were	from	leaders	of	
individual	CETL	promoting	their	work.	Parliamentary	references	are	few,	with	only	twenty-
seven	during	the	whole	policy	period,	and	most	serving	to	use	CETLs	as	an	example	to	the		
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Innovation,	Universities,	Science	and	Skills	Committee	of	a	policy	successful	in	raising	
student	and	employer	engagement.	A	full	list	of	primary	and	secondary	texts	is	included	in	
Appendix	A.		
6.2	An	account	of	the	episode	
6.2.1	Origin	
The	CETL	initiative	was	initially	envisioned	in	the	2003	White	Paper,	‘The	Future	of	Higher	
Education’	and	its	conception	was	already	well	developed,	with	aspirations	for	the	Centres	
articulated	in	the	paper:	
‘4.28	We	should	also	celebrate	excellent	practice	in	teaching	departments.	The	very	best	
will	be	designated	as	Centres	of	Excellence,	and	given	funding	of	£500,000	a	year	for	five	
years	to	reward	academics	and	to	fund	extra	staff	to	help	promote	and	spread	their	
good	pedagogical	practice.	These	Centres	will	be	identified	through	a	process	of	peer	
review	managed	by	HEFCE	and	drawing	wherever	possible	on	existing	information.	Their	
status	will	help	to	raise	the	profile	of	excellent	teaching,	as	well	as	helping	them	to	
attract	students.	70	Centres	will	be	identified	by	2006	and,	depending	on	successful	
evaluation	of	the	programme,	we	hope	to	expand	it	in	the	future.		
4.29	In	order	to	recognise	the	good	work	of	those	departments	that	come	close	to,	but	
do	not	quite	meet,	the	standard	to	become	a	Centre	of	Excellence,	HEFCE	will	also	offer	
a	‘commended’	status.	This	will	recognise	those	departments’	achievement,	and	make	it	
clear	to	prospective	students	that	they	can	expect	a	particularly	high	standard	of	
teaching	on	their	courses.		
4.30		Centres	of	Excellence	will	be	able	to	bid	for	capital	funding	of	up	to	£2m	each,	for	
improving	their	teaching	infrastructure	and	estates.	Capital	funding	for	teaching	will	
help	to	make	sure	that	the	learning	environment	and	equipment	gives	a	better	
experience	to	students,	keeps	pace	with	the	skill	of	the	lecturers,	and	plays	its	part	in	
raising	the	status	of	learning	at	an	institutional	level.’	(DfES	2003).	
HEFCE	also	drew	attention	to	CETLs	in	its	2003	strategic	plan,	announcing	that	‘we	will	fund	
a	number	of	Centres	of	Excellence	in	teaching,	as	set	out	in	the	higher	education	White	
Paper’	(HEFCE	2003/12	p.18).	As	noted	in	Chapter	4,	there	has	been	some	speculation	as	to	
the	extent	to	which	the	2003	White	Paper	was	the	creation	of	government,	or	was	drawn	
directly	from	the	HEFCE	2003	strategic	plan,	although	the	White	Paper	was	published	first.	
It	is	the	view	of	Taggart	(2003)	that	it	was	the	strategic	plan	that	drove	the	content	of	the	
White	Paper,	and	hence	the	original	articulation	of	the	CETLs	could	have	been	driven	by	
HEFCE.				
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6.2.2	English	context	
Quality	assurance	in	HE	had	been	embedded	within	government	priorities	since	1992,	with	
the	creation	of	the	Funding	Councils	and,	in	1997,	the	QAA.	Since	its	inception,	HEFCE	
engaged	in	the	development	of	funding	initiatives	to	steer	teaching	and	learning,	with	the	
1992	Teaching	and	Learning	Technology	Programme	and,	in	1995,	the	establishment	of	the	
Fund	for	the	Development	of	Teaching	and	Learning,	the	first	to	explicitly	address	
excellence.	The	report	from	the	National	Committee	of	Enquiry	into	HE	in	1997	(NCIHE	
1997)	reasoned	that	the	profile	of	learning	and	teaching	needed	to	be	raised,	particularly	
because	it	was	recognised	that	the	proposed	introduction	of	student	fees	meant	
institutions	would	have	to	demonstrate	value	for	money	and,	consequently,	they	would	
need	to	consider	teaching	and	learning	at	a	more	strategic	level.	The	Dearing	report	
recommended	that	
‘with	immediate	effect,	all	institutions	of	higher	education	give	high	priority	to	
developing	and	implementing	learning	and	teaching	strategies,	which	focus	on	the	
promotion	of	students’	learning’	(NCIHE	1997	p.116).	
The	Dearing	report	recognised	that	learning	to	teach	effectively	went	beyond	the	discipline	
and	wanted	to	professionalise	teaching,	particularly	through	technology,	which	was	
developing	at	a	considerable	rate.	Key	to	the	Dearing	report	was	the	focus	on	three	areas:	
national	policy,	institutional	strategies	and	individuals’	teaching	professionalism.	These	key	
concepts	are	recognisable	in	the	CETL	initiative	as	explored	below.		
In	the	same	year	that	Dearing	was	seeking	to	raise	the	profile	of	learning	and	teaching,	the	
New	Labour	government	was	focussing	schools	policy	on	excellence,	with	the	1997	White	
Paper,	Excellence	in	Schools	(DES	1997).	In	1998,	the	government	announced	the	
establishment	of	‘beacon	schools’,	which	proposed	that	schools	worked	together	in	
partnership	to	disseminate	good	practice	from	schools	considered	to	be	excellent:	‘the	
beacon	schools	initiative	is	designed	to	raise	standards	through	the	dissemination	of	good	
practice’	(DfES	2001).	By	2001,	1000	beacon	schools	had	been	established	(source	BBC	
News	21.06.2001).	It	is	noteworthy	that	this	policy’s	principles	of	sharing	excellent	practice	
in	partnership	across	the	schools	sector	are	reflected	in	the	CETLs	in	the	HE	sector,	and	
indeed	‘beacon’	is	explicit	in	the	original	CETL	objectives	(see	Section	6.2.5,	p.169).	
In	response	to	Dearing,	and	the	introduction	of	student	fees,	demonstrating	a	commitment	
to	learning	and	teaching	quality	became	a	key	focus	for	HEFCE,	as	can	be	observed	from	its	
high	profile	in	successive	strategic	plans	and	annual	reviews.	HEFCE	consulted	the	sector	on	
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a	strategy	for	learning	and	teaching	in	1998	(HEFCE	98/40),	publishing	the	final	version	in	
1999	(HEFCE	99/26).	Reflecting	typical	HEFCE	practice,	the	sector	was	consulted	on	the	
learning	and	teaching	strategy,	with	138	responses	to	the	consultation	(HEFCE	99/26).	
Many	of	the	positive	responses	for	proposals	are	reflected	in	the	subsequent	CETL	
initiative;	for	example,	there	was	considerable	support	for	proposals	which	recognised	and	
rewarded	individual	academics.	Like	Dearing,	respondents	also	recognised	a	key	role	for	
institutions	in	raising	the	quality	of	teaching	and	were	critical	that	HEFCE	had	apparently	
not	given	the	institutional	role	sufficient	priority:	‘the	importance	of	the	institution’s	role	in	
developing	and	supporting	excellence	was	not	appropriately	recognised	in	[HEFCE’s]	
proposals’	(HEFCE	99/26).	Consequently,	HEFCE	proposed	to	strengthen	the	role	that	
institutional	strategies	played	within	learning	and	teaching.	One	of	the	key	messages	to	
emerge	from	the	consultation	was	a	desire	to	ensure	that	institutions	were	able	to	use	
funding	for	improving	excellence,	not	exclusively	rewarding	existing	excellence,	in	contrast	
to	the	funding	methodology	for	research	quality.	HEFCE	acknowledged	
‘the	need	to	prioritise	the	enhancement	and	improvement	of	learning	and	teaching	as	
the	principle	funding	aim	–	rewarding	established	excellence	should	be	secondary	to	
this’	(HEFCE	99/26).		
This	is	a	significant	point	in	relation	to	CETLs.	As	observed	in	the	2003	White	Paper,	CETLs	
were	originally	conceived	as	Centres	of	Excellence,	like	beacon	schools,	but	in	the	event	
they	became	Centres	for	Excellence;	a	subtle	difference	in	wording,	but	significant	in	
shifting	the	rewarding	of	existing	excellence	to	rewarding	the	enhancement	of	excellence.	
The	five	main	themes	to	emerge	from	the	strategy	are	consistent	with	the	key	
characteristics	of	the	CETL	initiative,	which	was	to	follow	almost	half	a	decade	later:	
• ‘Encouragement	and	reward	
• Co-ordination	and	collaboration	
• Dissemination	and	embedding	good	practice	
• Research	and	innovation’	(HEFCE	98/40).	
One	observation	from	the	consultation	was	that	the	sector	recognised	that	there	might	be	
tension	between	funding	the	enhancement	of	learning	and	teaching	and	rewarding	high	
quality	learning	and	teaching,	and	thus	linking	quality	and	funding.	HEFCE	recognised	this	
concern	in	their	response	to	the	consultation:	
‘Although	there	is	wide	support	for	our	learning	and	teaching	strategy,	there	is	a	
perceived	tension	between	encouraging	the	sector	as	a	whole	to	enhance	learning	and	
teaching	-	which	is	widely	supported	-	and	the	selective	approach	of	rewarding	those	
institutions	which	can	demonstrate	high	quality.	While	our	funding	mechanisms	will	
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ensure	a	link	between	high	quality	and	funding,	we	will	place	greater	emphasis	on	the	
development	and	enhancement	of	learning	and	teaching.	Further,	to	increase	the	profile	
and	status	of	learning	and	teaching	across	the	sector	as	a	whole,	we	will	introduce	
approaches	to	funding	which	will	include	all	institutions’	(HEFCE	99/26).		
It	is	notable	that	this	tension	between	funding	enhancement	and	funding	quality	would	
continue	throughout	HEFCE’s	history	and,	in	2016,	government	explicitly	linked	teaching	
quality	measures,	through	the	Teaching	Excellence	Framework	(TEF),	to	increased	funding,	
albeit	through	allowing	increases	in	student	fees:	
‘Under	the	proposals	set	out	in	the	Green	Paper,	in	year	one	of	the	TEF,	providers	who	
have	successfully	completed	a	quality	assessment	review	will	be	awarded	the	first	level	
of	TEF	and	will	be	able	to	raise	their	fees	in	line	with	inflation,	up	to	a	maximum	fee	cap’		
(HoC	2016	p.12).	
In	line	with	the	strategy,	in	1998	HEFCE	developed	the	Teaching	Quality	Enhancement	Fund	
(TQEF)	(HEFC	E	99/48),	which	included	a	number	of	funding	schemes	aimed	at	institutions,	
subject	disciplines	and	individual	academics	and,	in	2000,	the	National	Teaching	Fellowship	
Scheme	(NTFS)	was	launched.	The	NTFS	is	remarkable	in	its	longevity;	it	is	still	in	existence,	
albeit	now	funded	by	the	HEA,	now	part	of	Advance	HE.		
As	a	result,	there	was	increased	engagement	by	the	sector	in	the	late	1990s	in	prioritising	
learning	and	teaching.	In	1995,	David	Gosling	undertook	a	survey	of	educational	
development	units,	dedicated	to	improving	teaching	and	learning	activities	and	
professionalism	across	an	institution,	and	received	23	responses.	When	he	conducted	the	
same	survey	five	years	later	in	2000,	he	received	53	responses.	Gosling	concludes	that	this	
increase	in	activity	partly	reflects	the	extent	to	which	institutions,	and	particularly	the	older	
institutions,	wished	to	be	seen	to	be	taking	teaching	and	learning	development	seriously,	
which	he	puts	down	to	HEFCE’s	focus	on	policy	and	funding,	as	well	as	the	introduction	of	
fees	(Gosling	2001).	Mills	and	Huber	(2005)	also	noted	the	rapid	rise	of	‘educational	
development’	with	government	funded	reforms	and	policies	‘to	promote	the	professional	
status	of	teaching	and	learning’.  
In	2000,	HEFCE	and	other	sector	agencies	set	up	a	number	of	national	organisations	aimed	
at	supporting	the	sector	in	professionalising	learning	and	teaching,	with	The	Institute	for	
Learning	and	Teaching	in	HE,	Learning	and	Teaching	Support	Network	and	Teaching	and	
Learning	Research	Programme	(under	ESRC).	In	2003,	HEFCE,	Universities	UK	and	The	
Standing	Conference	of	Principals	formed	a	national	committee	to	consider	the	
enhancement	of	learning	and	teaching	in	HE,	and	they	recommended	that	one	body	be	
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formed	to	continue	this	work.	By	2004,	the	Higher	Education	Academy	had	been	
established,	as	an	amalgamation	of	The	Institute	for	Learning	and	Teaching	in	HE,	the	
Learning	and	Teaching	Support	Network	and	the	National	Coordination	Team	for	the	
Teaching	Quality	Enhancement	Fund.	Its	mission	was	to		
‘use	our	expertise	and	resources	to	support	individual	staff	,disciplinary	and	
interdisciplinary	teams	and	higher	education	communities	and	institutions	in	general	to	
enhance	the	quality	and	impact	of	learning	and	teaching’	(HEA	2011,	p.6).		
It	is	noteworthy	that	the	new	HEA	was	expected	to	be	a	key	player	in	ensuring	that	best	
practice	of	CETLs,	where	best	practice	in	an	educational	context	is	defined	as	‘existing	
practices	that	already	possess	a	high	level	of	widely-agreed	effectiveness’	(Hargreaves	and	
Fullan	2012),	were	disseminated	throughout	the	sector.	
Despite	the	rising	interest	in	supporting	learning	and	teaching	initiatives,	via	national	
organisations	and	funding	through	the	TQEF,	there	was	recognition	that	teaching	still	had	
low	status	in	comparison	to	research.	The	White	Paper	of	2003	stated	that	‘teaching	has	for	
too	long	been	the	poor	relation	in	higher	education’	(DfES	2003)	and	noted	that	promotion	
for	academic	staff	had	been	largely	based	on	their	research.	Consequently,	the	White	Paper	
proposed	CETLs	as	a	large	scale	funding	initiative	to	redress	this	imbalance.			
For	some	commentators,	the	development	of	the	CETLs	was	also	congruent	with	New	
Labour’s	approach	to	New	Public	Management.		Allan	(2007)	and	Lemmens-Krug	(2015)	
both	argue	that	‘Centres	of	Excellence’	is	a	concept	borrowed	from	the	private	sector	and	
has	strong	links	with	managerialism	and	quality	control	practices:		
‘It	can	be	argued	that	CETLs	inherit	several	features	of	managerialism,	and	therefore	
can	be	best	understood	as	a	managerialist	technology	in	governing	teaching	and	
learning	at	universities’	(Lemmens-Krug	2015	p.13-14).		
One	of	the	key	characteristics	of	managerialism	is	that	quality	assurance	is	used	both	as	a	
mechanism	for	control	and	as	an	agent	of	change	(Lemmens-Krug	2015),	and	these	two	
features	can	be	observed	in	the	CETL	initiative,	as	will	be	considered	below.		
6.2.3	Some	international	perspectives	
There	are	many	examples	of	learning	and	teaching	enhancement	polices	and	funding	
schemes	in	other	countries,	some	of	which	follow	similar	formats	to	those	in	England.	
Scotland	is	the	closest	in	having	a	similar	policy	with	the	National	Quality	Enhancement	
Framework,	introduced	in	2003	as	collaboration	between	The	Quality	Assurance	Agency	
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Scotland,	the	Scottish	Funding	Council	(SFC),	Universities	Scotland	and	the	National	Union	
of	Students	Scotland.	The	themes	of	this	scheme	were	very	similar	to	the	CETLs	in	seeking	
to	be	enhancement-led.	However,	in	contrast	to	the	CETLs,	this	was	not	a	competitive	
funding	scheme,	as	all	universities	were	eligible	to	receive	funding.	
The	Modernisation	Agenda	of	Higher	Education	features	prominently	in	EU	policy	with	the	
goal	of	improving	teaching	and	learning	quality,	and	the	Bologna	agreement	sought	to	
ensure	that	learning	standards	of	HE	qualifications	were	comparable	across	Europe.	In	
Germany,	the	German	Federal	Ministry	of	Education	and	Research	(BMBF)	and	the	federal	
states	run	a	joint	programme,	the	‘Quality	Pact	for	Teaching’,	which	provides	funds	to	
improve	conditions	for	teaching	and	mentoring,	where	186	institutions	receive	funding	
(Lemmens-Krug	2015).	Like	the	CETL	initiative	before	it,	institutions	compete	for	significant	
levels	of	funding,	with	2	billion	euros	to	be	spent	between	2011	and	2020.		
Further	afield,	New	Zealand	has	the	‘Ako	Aotearoa’,	the	Academy	of	Tertiary	Teaching	
Excellence,	established	in	2008,	providing	NZ$2.5m	to	support	projects	at	the	individual	
level,	and	is	also	a	competitive	funding	scheme.	The	Carrick	Institute	in	Australia	was	
established	in	2004,	which	awarded	teaching	and	learning	grants	through	a	fellowship	
scheme,	and	morphed	in	2008	to	become	the	Australian	Learning	and	Teaching	Council	
(ALTC).	This	is	similar	in	ethos	to	the	HEA,	following	the	same	model	in	providing	awards,	
fellowships	and	grant	funding	schemes.	Australia	also	has	substantial	central	government	
funding,	with	the	Learning	and	Teaching	Performance	Fund,	established	in	2009	to	provide	
A$83m	to	21	universities.	Unlike	the	UK,	Australia’s	funding	model	is	much	more	
performance-led	(Brawley	et	al,	2009).	Aligned	to	the	recent	discussions	in	the	UK	on	
teaching	performance	being	linked	to	funding	through	the	TEF	,	Australia	has	also	recently	
seen	a	return	to	discussions	more	generally	around	the	value	of	performance	based	funding	
and	the	value	of	linking	funding	to	quality	criteria	(Hare	2019).	
The	American	HE	system	is	highly	de-centralised,	with	each	state	running	its	own	system,	
with	more	than	50%	of	students	studying	at	community	and	technical	colleges	(Brawley	et	
al,	2009).	As	such,	there	is	a	greater	emphasis	on	scholarship	within	these	institutions,	with	
less	focus	on	research,	meaning	that	teaching	quality	already	has	a	significantly	high	profile.	
There	are	some	national	organisations:	the	Carnegie	Academy	for	the	Scholarship	of	
Teaching	and	Learning	(CASTL),	conducted	by	the	American	Association	of	Higher	
Education,	which	takes	a	leading	role	in	supporting	scholarship,	and	The	Association	for	the	
Study	of	Higher	Education.	However,	the	national	schemes	do	not	provide	substantial	and	
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reliable	sources	of	external	funding:	‘Carnegie	just	lives	grant	to	grant	with	no	guaranteed	
future,	and	thus	are	‘trapped	in	the	margins’	(Brawley	et	al	2009	p.24).	This	is	a	noteworthy	
point	in	relation	to	the	funding	of	learning	and	teaching	enhancement	policies	in	the	UK	at	
the	time	of	the	CETLs,	with	the	vast	majority	receiving	project-based,	rather	than	recurrent,	
funding.			
Brawley	et	al	(2009)	give	a	very	useful	account	of	the	different	systems	in	the	USA,	Australia	
and	the	UK	in	relation	to	teaching	and	learning	enhancement.	They	conclude	that	the	de-
centralised	nature	of	the	USA,	the	sheer	scale	of	the	country,	and	the	fact	that	so	many	
students	are	taught	in	institutions	without	a	research	focus,	has	produced	different	effects	
on	teaching	and	learning	enhancement.	The	scholarship	approach	in	the	USA	is	much	less	
theoretical,	and	more	a	‘social	movement’,	there	is	far	less	emphasis	on	professionalising	
teaching	and	learning	through	pedagogic	research,	and	there	is	much	less	of	a	discipline-
based	approach.	Mills	and	Huber	(2005)	support	the	view	that	the	de-centralised	
organisation	in	the	USA	means	that	enhancement	is	‘less	robust’	than	in	the	UK	and	
Australia,	‘because	the	accreditation,	governance	and	funding	of	US	colleges	and	
universities	are	less	determined	by	central	government	policy	than	their	counterparts	in	the	
UK’	(Mills	&	Huber	2005	p.18).	It	is	of	significance	that	in	relation	to	the	CETLs,	there	was	a	
strong	focus	on	both	disciplines	and	pedagogic	research,	in	contrast	to	the	USA.		
6.2.4	Organisations	and	actors	
Whilst	HEFCE	drove	the	initiative	at	one	level,	it	was	also	keen	to	ensure	that	the	selection	
of	the	CETLs	was	as	a	result	of	peer	review,	rather	than	a	top	down	approach,	very	much	
reflecting	the	philosophy	of	the	whole	initiative.	A	selection	panel	to	review	competitive	
bids	consisted	of	25	members	from	HEFCE	and	HEIs,	chaired	by	Madeleine	Atkins,	then	
Vice-Chancellor	of	Coventry	University.	HEFCE	stated	that	
‘CETLs	will	be	chosen	by	assessment	undertaken	by	peers.	We	received	a	good	response	
to	our	invitation	to	institutions	to	nominate	experienced	senior	staff	to	assist	with	the	
assessment	of	CETL	bids.	An	assessment	panel	comprising	members	of	HEFCE’s	Quality	
Assessment	Learning	and	Teaching	Committee	and	individuals	nominated	by	institutions	
-	chosen	to	represent	a	spread	of	institutional,	subject,	thematic	and	practitioner	
expertise	-	will	advise	the	HEFCE	Board	on	the	selection	of	CETLs’	(HEFCE	2004/05	p.18).	
One	of	the	characteristics	of	the	CETLs	was	the	anticipated	engagement	of	other	agencies,	
and	in	particular	the	HEA	and	its	subject	centres,	for	their	role	in	enabling	the	dissemination	
of	practice	across	the	sector.	For	HEFCE,	this	relationship	was	key,	although	the	
organisations	were	not	represented	on	the	selection	panel.		
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‘Key	to	the	success	of	CETLs	will	be	the	relationship	they	forge	with	the	HE	Academy	and	
its	Subject	Centres.	We	will	make	it	a	condition	of	CETL	funding	that	each	CETL	must	
work	closely	with	the	HE	Academy	and	the	Subject	Centres	to	develop	effective	and	well-
informed	dissemination	strategies	that	build	on	the	practical	experience	of	CETLs	and	
the	sector-wide,	professional	network	experience	of	the	HE	Academy…..	[they]	will	form	
a	powerful	alliance	to	raise	and	sustain	the	profile	of	effective	teaching	and	learning	
throughout	the	sector’	(HEFCE	2004/05	p.5).			
The	other	main	actors	were	those	HEIs	awarded	CETLs,	and	to	some	extent	those	that	were	
not	successful	in	being	awarded	a	CETL.	The	CETLs,	the	senior	management	of	the	HEI,	
professional	service	departments	and	key	individuals	who	led	on	CETL	activities,	and	the	
dynamics	of	the	relationship	between	those	actors,	were	critical	to	the	success	of	the	
CETLs,	as	will	be	explored	in	this	chapter.		
6.2.5	Activities	
In	July	2003,	HEFCE	consulted	institutions	on	the	proposed	CETLs	(HEFCE	2003/36).	As	
noted	in	6.2.2,	the	2003	White	Paper	had	originally	conceived	of	the	programme	as	
‘Centres	of	Excellence	in	Teaching	and	Learning’	but,	following	HEFCE’s	discussions	with	the	
sector,	there	was	a	change	in	approach	to	‘for	excellence’,	with	a	shift	in	focus	from	
rewarding	existing	excellence	to	one	of	incentivising	enhancement,	in	contrast	to	research	
excellence	funding	approaches.	HEFCE	declared	that	
‘The	titling	of	the	centres	as	‘centres	for	Excellence	in	Teaching	and	Learning’	is	intended	
to	capture	the	essence	of	their	role	and	influence	as	forward-looking	and	dynamic	
proponents	on	excellence’	(HEFCE	2004/05	p.4).		
	There	were	5	original	objectives:	
• to	reward	practice	that	demonstrates	excellent	learning	outcomes	for	students;	
• to	identify	beacons	of	good	teaching	practice	and	encourage	development	of	this	
practice	so	that	the	benefits	are	delivered	more	widely;	
• to	enable	institutions	to	develop	approaches	to	teaching	and	learning	that	
encourage	a	deeper	understanding	within	the	sector	of	methods	of	addressing	
student	learning	needs;	
• to	encourage	collaboration	and	sharing	of	good	practice	and	so	enhance	the	
standard	of	teaching	throughout	the	sector;	
• to	contribute	to	the	information	available	to	inform	student	choice	(HEFCE	2004/05	
p.4).		
	
More	than	140	responses	to	the	consultation	were	received	and	75%	broadly	supported	the	
proposals	(HEFCE	2004/05).	It	is	significant	to	note	that	HEFCE	deliberately	did	not	attempt	
to	define	excellence	for	CETLs,	arguing	that	they	did	not	want	to	constrain	institutions,	and	
many	respondents	welcomed	the	flexibility	to	define	excellence	for	themselves:	
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‘We	do	not	attempt	to	define	excellence	in	absolute	or	‘gold	standard’	terms.	This	is	not	
only	difficult	in	itself	but	is	more	likely	to	constrain	than	encourage	institutions	to	select	
excellent	practice	in	a	local	context	that	has	had	a	demonstrably	positive	impact	on	
student	learning.	It	is	more	instructive	to	ask	how	excellence	is	recognised	by	the	sector,	
what	makes	it	distinctive,	where	and	how	it	shows	itself	and	whose	judgements	are	
pertinent	in	relation	to	successful	learning’	(HEFCE	2004/05	p.13).			
Despite	this	loose	approach,	HEFCE	sought	to	establish	some	characteristics	of	excellence	in	
Annex	B	of	the	invitation	to	bid,	mostly	outlining	the	types	of	activities	in	which	excellence	
might	be	recognised	in	qualitative	and	quantitative	terms,	such	as	evidence	of	‘standing	
amongst	peers	and	professional	recognition,	innovative	curriculum	design	and	
development,	understanding	and	addressing	diversity	of	learning	needs,	active	use	of	
student	feedback,	active	dissemination	and	take-up	by	others,	responsive	to	employers’	
needs	and	requirements’,	to	name	just	a	few	(HEFCE	2004/05,	p.28).		
One	area	of	contestation	arose	from	a	widespread	opposition	to	badging	as	‘commended’	
those	bids	that	succeeded	at	the	first	stage	but	failed	at	the	second,	originally	proposed	in	
the	2003	White	Paper,	in	case	observers,	and	future	applicants	to	HE,	saw	this	as	
tantamount	to	a	second	class	rating.	This	proposal	was	abandoned	by	HEFCE	and	there	was	
no	formal	recognition	of	institutional	bids	that	failed	at	the	first	stage.	Some	respondents	
also	feared	that	funding	a	small	number	of	institutions	could	have	unintended	
consequences	for	those	institutions	failing	to	be	awarded	a	CETL,	particularly	in	terms	of	
reputation:	
‘Many	institutions	were	concerned	that	the	creation	of	a	fixed	number	of	CETLs	might	
weaken	rather	than	strengthen	the	promotion	of	excellence	across	the	whole	HE	sector.	
They	felt	that	there	might	be	unintended	consequences	for	those	who	fail	to	secure	a	
CETL.	There	was	widespread	opposition	to	the	proposal	to	badge	bids	successful	at	the	
first	but	not	the	second	stage	as	‘commended	for	excellence’	(HEFCE	2004/05	p.3).	
It	is	striking	that	both	the	formative	and	summative	evaluations	of	the	CETLs	observed	that	
many	HEIs	would	have	preferred	for	funds	to	be	distributed	to	all	HEIs,	rather	than	a	
competitive	process,	although	this	was	not	highlighted	in	the	outcome	of	the	consultation	
process	and	contradicts	the	general	view	of	the	sector	in	1998,	when	institutions	expressed	
a	preference	for	competitive,	rather	than	formula,	funding	in	excellence	strategies.	A	
further	area	of	concern	for	many	respondents	was	the	extent	to	which	the	policy	approach	
would	enable	CETLs	to	embed	their	good	practice	across	the	sector.			
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6.2.5.1	Bids	
In	January	2004,	HEFCE	invited	institutions	to	bid	for	CETL	funds,	with	an	April	deadline	
(HEFCE	2004/05).	HEIs	and	FECs	with	more	than	500	FTE	directly	funded	HE	students	were	
eligible	for	recurrent	and	capital	funding,	which	was	identified	for	five	years	in	the	first	
instance.	There	was	a	restriction	on	the	number	of	bids	per	institution,	dependent	upon	the	
size	of	the	student	population.	Bids	could	be	from	a	single	institution	or	partnerships	
although,	like	excellence,	the	organisational	form	of	partnership	was	not	defined	by	HEFCE.	
It	is	noteworthy	that,	at	that	stage,	there	was	some	suggestion	that	funding	might	continue	
beyond	2010,	but	in	the	event	this	was	not	achieved,	partly	due	to	the	2008	recession	and	
significant	government	cuts	to	HE	funding.		
There	was	a	two	stage	bidding	process,	the	first	requiring	a	rationale	for	the	proposed	CETL	
and	the	case	for	excellence.	Those	successful	at	stage	one	would	go	through	to	stage	two,	
which	would	focus	on	‘the	business	case	for	developing	excellence	and	impact	on	teaching	
and	learning’	(HEFCE	2004/05).	The	invitation	to	bid	defined	the	purpose	as	being	
‘to	reward	excellent	teaching	practice	and	to	invest	in	that	practice	further	in	order	to	
increase	and	deepen	its	impact	across	a	wider	teaching	and	learning	community…..	to	
strengthen	the	strategic	focus	on	teaching	and	learning	by	directing	funds	to	centres	
that	reward	high	teaching	standards,	promote	a	scholarly-based	and	forward-looking	
approach	to	teaching	and	learning,	and	where	significant	investment	will	lead	to	further	
benefits	for	students,	teachers	and	beyond’	(HEFCE	2004/05	p.1/3).		
As	well	as	recognising	institutional	and	sectoral	impact,	funds	for	CETLs	were	expected	to	
reward	excellence	at	the	level	of	the	individual	and	would	
‘recognise,	celebrate	and	promote	excellence	by	rewarding	teachers	who	have	made	a	
demonstrable	impact	on	students	learning	and	who	enthuse,	motivate	and	influence	
others	to	do	the	same.	We	envisage	that	CETLs	will	sustain	and	stimulate	further	
excellent	practice	through	teaching	that	is	informed	by	scholarly	reflection,	developed	
through	innovative	and	adventurous	thinking,	extended	through	tested	knowledge	to	
learning	in	new	contexts,	and	multiplied	by	active	engagement	in	dissemination	of	good	
practice’	(HEFCE	2004/05	p.4).	
In	comparing	the	original	objectives	from	the	consultation	(HEFCE	2003/36)	with	those	in	
the	invitation	to	bid	(HEFCE	2004/05),	it	is	noteworthy	that	there	were	some	subtle	changes	
to	the	rhetoric;	the	encouragement	that	was	implicit	in	the	consultation	was	much	more	
direct	in	the	invitation	to	bid,	with	a	focus	on	action:	leading,	embedding,	supporting,	
influencing	and	demonstrating.	The	language	for	student	engagement	was	much	more	
rigorous	than	just	understanding	student	needs	and	contributing	to	information,	with	more	
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emphasis	on	effectivity	and	maximising	learning	performance.	The	notion	of	CETLs	as	a	
‘beacon’	had	been	dropped	from	the	objectives	by	the	time	of	the	invitation	to	bid.	
Table	11	–	COMPARISON	OF	LANGUAGE	CHANGES	IN	OBJECTIVES	FROM	CONSULATION	TO	
INVITATION	TO	BID		
Consultation	 Invitation	to	bid	for	funds	
To	reward	practice	that	demonstrates	
excellent	learning	outcomes	for	students.	
To	reward	practice	that	demonstrates	excellent	
learning	outcomes	for	students.	
To	identify	beacons	of	good	teaching	
practice	and	encourage	development	of	
this	practice	so	that	the	benefits	are	
delivered	more	widely.	
To	enable	practitioners	to	lead	and	embed	change	
by	implementing	approaches	that	address	the	
diversity	of	learners’	needs,	the	requirements	of	
different	learning	contexts,	the	possibilities	for	
innovation	and	the	expectations	of	employers	and	
others	concerned	with	the	quality	of	student	
learning.	
To	enable	institutions	to	develop	
approaches	to	teaching	and	learning	that	
encourage	a	deeper	understanding	within	
the	sector	of	methods	of	addressing	
student	learning	needs.	
To	enable	institutions	to	support	and	develop	
practice	that	encourages	deeper	understanding	
across	the	sector	of	ways	of	addressing	students’	
learning	effectively.	
	
To	encourage	collaboration	and	sharing	of	
good	practice	and	so	enhance	the	standard	
of	teaching	throughout	the	sector.	
To	recognise	and	give	greater	prominence	to	
clusters	of	excellence	that	are	capable	of	
influencing	practice	and	raising	the	profile	of	
teaching	excellence	within	and	beyond	their	
institutions.	
To	contribute	to	the	information	available	
to	inform	student	choice.	
	
To	demonstrate	collaboration	and	sharing	of	good	
practice	and	so	enhance	the	standard	of	teaching	
and	effective	learning	throughout	the	sector.	
	 To	raise	student	awareness	of	effectiveness	in	
teaching	and	learning	in	order	to	inform	student	
choice	and	maximise	student	performance.		
Key:	yellow	denotes	subtle	changes	in	phrasing,	red	denotes	abandonment	of	concept	
Adapted	from	HEFCE	1994/05	and	HEFCE	2003/36	(Differences	highlighted,	my	emphasis).	
6.2.5.2	Funding	
The	CETL	initiative	was	the	biggest	ever	single	funded	programme	from	HEFCE	to	enhance	
the	status	of	teaching	and	learning,	with	£335m	over	5	years,	equal	to	the	whole	of	all	
other	HEFCE	teaching	enhancement	initiatives	from	1999	to	2009	combined.	£315m	was	
initially	made	available,	including	£140m	for	capital	which	had	to	be	spent	within	the	first	
two	years,	with	an	additional	£20m	made	available	to	CETLs	during	the	course	of	the	
programme.	There	were	three	levels	of	funding,	awarded	depending	upon	the	anticipated	
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reach	of	the	CETL,	notionally	determined	as	£1,000	of	funding	to	a	minimum	ratio	of	one	
student	to	benefit:	
1:	‘£200,000	per	year	for	5	years	and	up	to	£800,000	for	capital	
2:	£350,000	per	year	for	5	years	and	up	to	£1,400,000	for	capital	
3:	£500,000	per	year	for	5	years	and	up	to	£2,000,000	for	capital’	(HEFCE	2004/05)	
Use	of	the	funding	was	not	prescribed,	although	HEFCE	provided	some	examples	for	
guidance,	such	as:	rewarding	excellent	practitioners,	refurbishing	buildings	for	teaching,	
enhancing	IT	and	other	resources,	buying	staff	time,	bought	in	external	expertise	and	
strengthening	the	research	and	administrative	infrastructure.	There	was	an	expectation	
that	strategies	and	practice	would	be	embedded	institutionally	and	continue	beyond	the	
funding	period.	As	such	it	was	expected	that	there	would	be	legacy	from	the	initiative	
(HEFCE	2004/05,	p.10).	
6.2.5.3	Successful	bids			
To	be	granted	funding,	a	proposed	CETL	had	to	have	its	own	identity	within	the	institution,	
provide	evidence	of	existing	excellence	and	demonstrate	an	ability	to	serve	as	a	catalyst	for	
change.	Use	of	new	technology	was	also	one	of	the	favoured	components.	Initially,	the	
2003	White	Paper	proposed	to	focus	specifically	on	subject	disciplines,	but	by	the	invitation	
to	bid,	HEFCE	had	included	‘distinctive	practices’	(Gosling	&	Hannan	2007a),	which	meant	
that	CETLs	with	a	pedagogic	theme	also	stood	a	chance	of	success.	Successful	bids	would	
also	need	to	demonstrate	ways	in	which	they	would	engage	with	sector	organisations	to	
disseminate	best	practice.	
126	institutions	submitted	259	proposals	and	these	were	judged	by	the	independent	panel,	
with	106	(including	24	collaborative	bids)	considered	for	stage	two.	Of	those,	74	CETLs	were	
approved	across	73	HEIs,	including	19	collaborative	centres	and	16	institutions	hosting	
more	than	one	CETL.	59	proposals	did	not	get	CETL	funding	(13	from	pre-92,	18	post-92,	
and	28	small/specialist	institutions)	and	no	further	education	colleges	hosted	a	CETL.	The	
outcomes	were	reported	in	April	2005	(HEFCE	2005/17).	
Some	CETLs	were	stand-alone	units,	whilst	others	were	linked	closely	to	central	
institutional	support	units,	such	as	educational	development	units	or	the	careers	service,		
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and	some	were	based	in	a	single	subject	discipline	departments	or	faculty.	Those	that	were	
based	in	central	services	units	tended	to	have	an	institutional	remit	for	a	particular	area	of	
pedagogy.		
The	successful	bids	were	across	a	range	of	disciplines	and	cross	discipline,	represented	in	19	
subject	categories	and	17	pedagogic	themes.	Although	the	bids	were	judged	on	their	ability	
to	meet	the	funding	criteria	and	objectives,	there	was	also	an	element	of	positive	diversity,	
as	HEFCE	sought	to	avoid	an	imbalance	in	‘geographical	distribution,	subject	coverage,	
thematic	spread	and	pedagogic	focus’	(HEFCE	2004/05	p.18).		The	range	of	disciplines	and	
pedagogic	capacities	covered	by	CETLs	is	represented	below.	
	
	
Figure	10	–	SUBJECT	SPREAD	ACROSS	FUNDED	CETLs	IN	ENGLAND				(Figure	2-1	(SQW	2011	p.9))	
©HEFCE 
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Figure	11	–	PEDAGOGIC	SPREAD	OF	FUNDED	CETLS	IN	ENGLAND (Figure	2-2	(SQW	2011,	p.8))	©HEFCE	
6.2.5.4	Monitoring	and	accountability	
It	has	been	noted	that	HEFCE	did	not	wish	to	constrain	institutions	by	defining	excellence	or	
restricting	activities	in	pursuit	of	excellence	(HEFCE	2004/05).	Equally,	HEFCE	were	unwilling	
to	impose	strict	accountability	demands	on	institutions,	which	is	in	contrast	to	many	other	
HEFCE	policy	initiatives,	where	institutions	were	expected	to	provide	rigorous,	regular	and	
evidence-based	justification	that	funding	was	being	well	spent.	HEFCE	also	did	not	propose	
to	audit	institutions	except	in	exceptional	circumstances.	As	such,	accountability	was	
relaxed:	
‘We	do	not	wish	to	impose	significant	accountability	demands	on	successful	bidders.	We	
do	expect	that	those	granted	funds	periodically	apprise	us	of	progress,	advise	us	if	
significant	problems	arise,	only	use	the	funds	for	the	purposes	intended	and	disseminate	
the	results	of	CETL	activity.	To	this	end,	we	propose	to	request	limited	monitoring	data’	
(HEFCE	2004/05	p.20).		
6.2.5.5	Outcomes	
Since	there	was	little	requirement	for	formal	accountability,	much	of	the	evidence	for	the	
activity	of	CETLs	comes	from	the	formative	and	summative	evaluations	conducted	in	2008	
and	2011.	The	formative	evaluation	was	conducted	half	way	through	the	funding	period	
from	March	2007	to	January	2008	and	was	undertaken	through	interviews	with	senior	
institutional	managers	and	CETL	partners,	with	36	visits	to	CETLs,	a	directors’	survey	and	
	176	
self-evaluations	submitted	by	CETLs	in	July	2007.	It	was	commissioned	by	HEFCE	and	
conducted	by	the	Centre	for	the	Study	of	Education	and	Training	(CSET)	and	the	Institute	of	
Educational	Technology.	The	formative	evaluation	found	that	there	was	an	
‘overall	positive	narrative	for	the	development	of	CETLs	as	‘nodes’	of	teaching	and	
learning-focused	activities…	the	data	points	to	a	range	of	positive	effects	the	existence	
of	the	CETL	programme	had	enabled….these	effects	tend	to	be	circulating	around	the	
direct	beneficiaries	of	CETL	resources	but	there	is	growing	evidence	that	effects	are	
beginning	to	move	out	from	the	enclaves	of	practice	within	CETLs	and,	in	some	cases,	
are	being	used	to	strategic	effect	within	institutions’	(Saunders	et	al	2008	p.4).		
The	report	found	that	the	narrative	from	the	CETLs	themselves	was	very	positive	and	that	
they	had	been	engaged	in	a	range	of	activities	that	benefited	students	and	staff,	as	well	as	
disseminating	good	practice,	with	99%	of	CETLs	claiming	to	have	worked	well	so	far	and	
97%	saying	that	they	were	meeting	their	aims.	89%	said	access	to	additional	resources	
(through	funding)	was	advantageous	in	changing	practice,	with	88%	positively	influencing	
teaching	and	students’	learning.	The	most	common	achievements	were	in	developing	
partnerships	and	networks,	innovative	teaching	practices,	provision	of	new	facilities,	and	
staff	development.	All	CETLs	had	provided	rewards	for	individual	staff,	for	example	through	
teaching	award	and	fellowship	schemes,	small	financial	rewards	and	prizes	and	promotion	
opportunities.		
All	CETLs	agreed	that	a	key	advantage	was	that	funding	had	enabled	them	to	be	innovative,	
creative	and	take	risks.	In	some	cases,	deepening	of	practice	was	evident	across	the	
institution,	but	most	stated	that	these	gains	were	seen	in	modest	terms.	Overall,	the	
interviewees	who	contributed	to	the	evaluation	found	that	‘the	existence	of	a	CETL	in	an	
institution	and	its	associated	injection	of	resources	have	enabled	good	practice	to	develop	
further’	(Saunders	et	al	2008,	p.5).		
However,	despite	an	overall	positive	narrative,	the	formative	evaluation	did	question	the	
extent	to	which	the	programme	overall	would	enable	deepening	effects,	particularly	across	
the	sector:	
‘As	an	embedded	theory	of	change,	the	idea	of	a	CETL	programme	does	have	its	critics…	
The	critique	points	to	the	sub-aim	of	the	programme	to	‘deepen	its	impact	across	a	
wider	teaching	and	learning	community’	[and]	pointed	to	the	difficulties	of	using	the	
CETL	experience	to	deepen	its	effects	within	institutions	and	across	the	sector’	(Saunders	
et	al	2008,	p.5).	
The	summative	evaluation	was	commissioned	in	December	2010,	by	HEFCE	and	the	
Department	for	Education	and	Learning	in	Northern	Ireland,	and	conducted	in	2011by	SQW	
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Consulting	Ltd.	It	was	primarily	based	on	self-evaluations	submitted	by	CETLs	in	May	2010	
with	some	supplementary	research	in	two	e-surveys	of	practitioners	(114	responses),	Pro	
Vice	Chancellors	for	teaching	and	learning	(32	responses)	and	some	consultations	with	
other	stakeholders.	A	summary	of	the	responses	from	the	surveys	and	consultations	is	
collated	from	the	SQW	2001	report	in	provided	in	Appendix	D	and	referenced	throughout	
Section	6.3	(p.179)	below.	
This	report	concluded	that	CETLs	had	been	involved	in	a	variety	of	activities	and	produced	a	
range	of	outputs	such	as	curriculum	content,	diagnostic	toolkits,	support	materials	and	e-
learning	systems.	There	had	been	much	innovation	in	piloting	new	approaches	to	learning	
and	research	projects	and	2,679	spin-out	projects,	secondments,	fellowships	and	awards	
had	been	achieved	through	the	allocation	of	small	research	grants.	There	had	been	3,435	
peer-reviewed	outputs	and	5,594	development	and	dissemination	events	(SQW	2011p.12).	
Many	CETLs	saw	their	main	contribution	as	‘influencing	underlying	attitudes	towards	
teaching	and	learning	and,	in	rather	fewer	cases,	those	of	students	too’	(p.12).			
The	number	of	English	HEIs	claiming	to	have	met	the	targets	and	objectives	set	out	in	their	
business	plans	are	summarised	in	Table	12	below	(p.177),	suggesting	that	the	majority	of	
CETLs	had	achieved	what	they	set	out	to	do.	However,	what	is	striking	about	the	summative	
evaluation	report	is	that,	as	already	highlighted	by	the	formative	evaluation,	whilst	there	
was	considerable	evidence	of	activity	at	individual	and	institutional	level,	the	engagement	
of	sector	agencies	and	dissemination	of	best	practice	across	the	sector,	and	to	those	
institutions	without	a	CETL,	was	less	evident:	
‘Wider	impact	on	the	HE	sector	is	a	challenging	area	to	unpack…	the	extent	to	which	
CETLs	have	directly	contributed	to	sector-wide	changes	in	behaviour	and	culture	is	
impossible	to	quantify’	(SQW	2011,	p.iv).	
This	criticism	will	be	explored	further	in	Section	6.3	(p.179).		
Table	12	–	SUMMARY	OF	TARGETS	AND	OUTCOMES	STATED	AS	A	RESULT	OF	SELF-EVALUATION	
	 2005-06	 2006-07	 2007-08	 2008-09	
Not	achieved	targets	 11	 9	 4	 4	
Achieved	targets	 47	 47	 52	 53	
TOTAL	RESPONSES	 58	 56	 56	 57	
	(SQW	2011	p.11).	
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6.2.6	Timeline		
Table	 13	 below	 summarises	 the	 key	 dates	 of	 the	 CETL	 initiative	 and	 other	 related	 policy	
initiatives.	
Table	13	–	TIMELINE	OF	THE	RELATED	POLICY	ENVIRONMENT	AND	CETL	INITIATIVE	
	 CETLs	 Other	related	policy	initiatives	
1987	 	 Enterprise	in	Higher	Education	programme	
(EHE)	
1989	 	 Computers	in	Teaching	Initiative	(CTI)	
1992	 	 Teaching	and	Learning	Technology	
Programme	(TLTP)	
1995	 	 Fund	for	the	Development	of	Learning	and	
Teaching	[1st	to	explicitly	fund	excellence]	
1997	 	 Quality	Assurance	Agency	created	
1998	 	 HEFCE	consultation	on	Dearing	
recommendations	in	relation	to	learning	and	
teaching	
Teaching	Quality	Enhancement	Funding	
(TQEF)	
1999	 	 HEFCE	L&T	strategy	–	HEFCE	takes	steps	to	
promote	quality	in	L&T	
2000	 	 National	Teaching	Fellowship	Scheme	
Institute	for	Learning	and	Teaching	in	HE	
Learning	and	Teaching	Support	Network	
Teaching	and	Learning	Research	Programme	
(under	ESRC)	
2003	 Consultation	on	CETLs	initiated	and	
concluded	
	
2004	 Invitation	to	bid	for	CETLs	
Submission	of	bids	for	first	stage	
Assessment	of	CETL	bids	
Submission	of	bids	for	second	stage	
Higher	Education	Academy	established	as	an	
amalgamation	of	Institute	for	Learning	and	
Teaching	in	HE,	Learning	and	Teaching	
Support	Network,	TQEF	National	Co-
ordination	Team	
Creation	of	the	International	Society	for	the	
Scholarship	of	Teaching	and	Learning	(iSSoTL)	
2005	 Outcome	of	CETL	bids	announced	
CETL	contracts	signed	
NSS	launched	
2006	 An	additional	£20.86m	of	capital	
funding	was	made	available	to	CETLs	
Research	Informed	Teaching	Fund	launched	
2007	 Each	CETL	submits	self-evaluation	to	
HEFCE	
	
2008	 Formative	evaluation	‘an	overall	
positive	narrative’	
	
2010	 CETLs	funding	stream	wound	up	 TQEF	funding	stream	wound	up	
2011	 Summative	evaluation	notes	some	
good	examples	and	evidence	of	impact	
institutionally	but	a	lack	of	
enhancement	across	the	sector	
Teaching	and	Learning	Research	Programme	
wound	up	
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6.3	A	critical	review	of	the	evidence	and	findings	
6.3.1	Process:	Bottom-up	approach		
The	policy	approach	was	different	to	many	HEFCE	policy	initiatives,	being	bottom-up,	
where	HEFCE	only	loosely	defined	excellence,	there	were	few	constraints	on	spending	and	
activities	and	minimal	monitoring	and	accountability.	HEFCE’s	rationale	was	that	such	an	
approach	would	better	allow	the	sector	the	freedom	to	concentrate	on	embedding	and	
disseminating	excellence.	However,	like	many	other	project	funding	initiatives,	funding	was	
competitive,	and	there	were	mixed	views	from	the	sector	on	whether	a	competitive	
initiative	was	preferable	to	one	which	distributed	funds	to	all	institutions.	Trowler	et	al	
(2013)	suggest	that	the	bottom-up	approach	was	one	of	the	strengths	of	such	HEFCE	policy	
initiatives	in	that	they	let	‘1000	flowers	blossom’	(p.19)	through	allowing	institutional	
autonomy.	However,	this	view	was	not	shared	by	all	in	the	sector,	and	the	formative	
evaluation	observed	some	disquiet	with	this	approach,	with	one	interviewee	commenting	
that	
‘The	price	of	letting	‘a	thousand	flowers	bloom’	is	the	possibility	that	a	lot	of	resource	is	
spent	reinventing	the	wheel		-	if	you	allow	it	to	be	bottom-up	for	too	long	you	waste	a	
lot	of	impact	on	individual	projects		-	there	is	value	to	pulling	people	together	and	
establishing	a	common	framework’	(Saunders	et	al	2008	p.22).	
Whilst	this	bottom-up	approach	resulted	in	a	rich	diversity	of	individual	approaches	and	
examples	of	good	practice	within	CETLs,	for	many,	across	institutions,	one	consequence	
was	that	it	was	difficult	to	identify	how	good	practice	had	been	consistently	disseminated	
and	embedded	throughout	the	sector,	particularly	for	those	institutions	that	had	not	been	
successful	in	their	bid	for	a	CETL.	The	likelihood	of	this	concern	was	raised	by	respondents	
to	the	initial	consultation,	and	whilst	it	was	acknowledged	by	HEFCE	in	the	invitation	to	bid,	
it	did	not	result	in	any	major	changes	to	the	initiative.	These	concerns	were	still	being	
contested	in	both	the	formative	and	summative	evaluations,	and	whilst	it	was	
acknowledged	that	there	was	widespread	good	practice	amongst	institutions,	it	was	
generally	agreed	that	there	was	a	lack	of	sector-wide	impact	and	consequently	a	concern	
that	as	a	policy	approach,	the	initiative	had	failed	to	achieve	one	of	its	main	objectives.	
‘whether	CETLs	are	the	best	policy	instrument	to	stimulate	systemic	change	in	the	
quality	of	learning,	teaching	and	curriculum…	Some	people	felt	that	the	CETL	
programme	represented	weak	policy	making	and	that	the	money	would	have	been	
better	spent	as	part	of	the	block	grant	to	universities’	(Saunders	et	al	2008	p.21/	26).	
‘The	CETLs	were	extraordinarily	and	intentionally	diverse.	While	they	represented	a	
programme	in	the	sense	of	common	overall	aims,	specific	aims	and	detailed	activities	
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varied	widely…..It	is	difficult	to	trace	impact	at	sector	level,	especially	for	those	HEIs	
which	did	not	receive	funding’	(SQW	2011	p.vi).		
Gosling	and	Hannan’s	(2007b)	research	questioned	whether	there	was	a	more	fundamental	
methodological	weakness	beyond	the	CETLs	and,	as	such,	whether	bottom-up	approaches	
for	enriching	and	embedding	learning	and	teaching	excellence	across	the	sector	were	the	
most	appropriate,	since	they	were	somewhat	piecemeal	and	needed	more	coherence	than	
a	range	of	initiatives:	
‘Many	of	those	we	spoke	to	found	it	hard	to	see	how	the	CETL	initiative	was	part	of	an	
overall	strategy	for	enhancing	teaching	and	learning	in	higher	education’	(p.645).			
Gosling	and	Turner	(2015),	writing	after	CETL	funded	ended,	also	observed	that	HEFCE	had	
failed	to	understand	the	complex	nature	of	the	sector	and	that	there	was	a	need	for	a	more	
hands-on	approach	by	the	funding	agency	if	true	sector-wide	change	was	to	be	achieved:	
‘Government-funded	teaching	and	learning	projects	have	emerged	as	a	favoured	tool	of	
policymakers	to	motivate	change	in	teaching	and	learning.	This	strategy	pays	limited	
heed	to	the	complexity	of	higher	education	and	the	contradictions,	tensions	and	
conflicts	that	need	to	be	negotiated	to	change	practice’	(2015	p.1573).			
Trowler	and	Bamber	(2005)	also	questioned	the	policy	approach	and	its	likely	long	term	
legacy,	likening	it	to	a	
‘	“Christmas	Tree”	model	of	policy	development,	plenty	of	pretty	lights	and	shiny	
baubles,	but	they	don’t	last	long,	have	little	relationship	to	each	other	and	don’t	have	
any	lasting	effect	on	normal	everyday	life’	(p.81).		
In	2013,	The	HEA	commissioned	The	Centre	for	Higher	Education	Research	and	Evaluation	
to	review	HEFCE	teaching	and	learning	enhancement	initiatives.	Their	findings	are	
noteworthy	in	relation	to	what	they	categorise	as	‘pilot-based	beacon	project	approaches,	
(such	as	CETLs)’,	which	they	criticise	for	being	too	short	term,	under-evaluated	and	
insufficiently	able	to	instigate	change	through	lack	of	engagement	(Trowler		et	al	2013	
p.12).	
David	Kernohan,	writing	more	recently	as	Associate	Editor	of	WONKHE,	reflected	on	the	
legacy	of	the	initiative	and,	in	particular,	what	tangible	evidence	there	was	for	its	success.		
He	questioned	how	HEFCE	could	determine	which	of	the	proposals	were	‘better	teaching’	
and	whether	it	was	only	the	large	sums	of	money	involved	that	had	attracted	institutions	to	
engage	with	the	initiative:	
‘The	pitch	was	to	grab	the	attention	of	institutional	leaders	where	it	was	most	easily	
attracted:	the	institutional	bank	account.	A	reality-shifting	£315	million	pounds	seemed	
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to	bend	light	around	it,	the	closer	we	looked	the	harder	it	was	to	pick	out	details’	
(Kernohan	2015).	
It	is	the	lack	of	tangible	detail	that	lead	Kernohan	in	the	same	article	to	question	whether	
CETLs	were	a	policy	at	all:	‘a	policy	is	more	than	details	and	the	CETLs	never	truly	become	a	
policy’.	Whilst	the	evidence	from	the	CETLs	clearly	demonstrated	a	good	deal	of	positive	
activity,	there	has	been	a	general	consensus	that	the	approach	was	insufficient	to	enable	a	
consistent	approach	and	embedding	of	activity	at	sector	level.		
6.3.2	Process:	Competitive	bidding	
The	competitive	nature	of	the	initiative	was	an	area	of	contestation,	raised	at	the	
consultation	stage	and,	subsequently,	by	many	commentators.	Concerns	were	not	only	
raised	by	some	institutions,	who	feared	that	there	would	be	negative	reputational	issues	
for	those	HEIs	not	awarded	a	CETL,	but	also	by	other	sector	organisations	and	in	the	press.	
Leon,	reporting	in	THES	in	December	2003,	suggested	that	
‘A	bidding	war	among	universities	seeking	to	host	one	of	more	than	70	Centres	for	
Excellence	in	Teaching	and	Learning	will	begin	in	the	new	year	amid	claims	that	the	
policy	is	dangerously	divisive.	Experts,	agencies	and	unions,	while	welcoming	the	money,	
have	criticised	this	competitive	approach.	They	claim	the	policy	threatens	the	culture	of	
collaboration	and	support	that	has	grown	through	agencies	such	as	the	Learning	and	
Teaching	Support	Network,	the	Institute	for	Learning	and	Teaching	and	the	National	
Teaching	Fellowship	Scheme,	since	the	1997	Dearing	report’	(Leon	2003).		
The	bidding	process,	and	particularly	its	relationship	to	excellence,	was	viewed	with	some	
disquiet.	Gosling	and	Hannan	(2007b)	undertook	a	study	of	the	bidding	process	prior	to	the	
launch	of	the	CETLs,	interviewing	participants	from	25	proposed	CETLs,	12	of	which	failed	to	
receive	funding.		They	found	that	the	process	itself	was	flawed	by	the	lack	of	clarification	
and	uncertainty	over	the	defining	of	excellence.	Although	HEFCE	had	overtly	refrained	from	
defining	excellence,	the	reviewing	panel	made	value	judgements	on	what	they	considered	
to	be	excellent	and	hence	worthy	of	funding.		Their	research	suggests	that	selected	bids	
were	chosen	on	development	plans	that	were	on	themes	preferred	by	HEFCE,	such	as	
technology	and	employability,	rather	than	on	judgements	of	teaching	excellence.	They	
concluded	that	the	
‘bidding	process	discouraged	claims	for	excellence	based	on	a	pervasive	culture	of	
excellence	in	teaching,	which	might	incorporate	a	variety	of	pedagogical	approaches,	
and	favoured	those	taking	a	specific	innovative	approach	that	could	become	a	‘project’	
‘(p.637).			
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Questions	around	the	bidding	process	also	reached	the	House	of	Commons,	with	Chris	
Grayling	MP	asking	one	of	the	very	few	questions	raised	in	the	House,	in	which	he	asked	
the	Secretary	of	State	‘what	estimate	he	has	made	of	the	cost	to	higher	education	
institutions	of	bidding	to	become	a	Centre	of	Excellence	in	Learning	and	Teaching’.	Alan	
Johnson	replied,		
‘Neither	I	nor	the	Higher	Education	Funding	Council	for	England	(HEFCE)	have	made	any	
estimates	of	this	nature	as	the	costs	will	be	variable.	However,	the	bidding	process	for	
Centres	for	Excellence	in	Teaching	and	Learning	has	been	designed	by	HEFCE	to	keep	
additional	costs	to	a	minimum,	while	ensuring	a	rigorous	selection	process’	(Johnson,	
Hansard	05.02.2004).		
The	result	of	a	judgmental	approach	to	selecting	favoured	bids	also	led	to	an	extensive	
range	of	subject	disciplines	and	pedagogic	areas	being	covered	by	CETLs.	Whilst	such	
diversity	was	acclaimed	in	the	summative	evaluation,	this	too	led	to	criticism:	‘CETL	appears	
to	be	more	a	postmodern	celebration	of	difference’	(Skelton	2005	p.68).	Equally,	whilst	
there	was	much	diversity,	Gosling	and	Turner	(2015)	also	observed	that	the	competitive	
nature	of	the	process	‘discouraged	sharing	of	good	practice	outside	the	CETL	itself’,	which	
conflicted	with	HEFCEs	objective	to	disseminate	practice	across	the	sector.	In	a	similar	vein,	
Sabri	(2011)	suggested	that	the	fragmentary	approach	in	selection	of	CETLs	is	reflected	in	
the	way	in	which	the	funding	was	distributed	to	support	such	a	diverse	range	of	activities	at	
institutional,	discipline	and	individual	level.	Since	this	distribution	itself	was	piecemeal	and	
supported	such	a	diversity	of	small	scale	projects,	it	resulted	in	modest	impact	at	
institutional	level	that	could	not	be	replicated	at	sector	level:	
‘The	way	in	which	funds	are	shared	out	–	first	among	institutions,	then	amongst	various	
staff	groups	within	institutions,	and	finally	amongst	individuals	–	results	in	a	panoply	of	
small-scale	projects	with	limited	meaning	beyond	their	local	environment	and	little	
capacity	to	question	the	terms	of	reference	under	which	funds	are	granted.	The	headline	
figures,	in	the	hundreds	of	thousands	or	millions,	belie	the	small-scale	disparate	nature	
of	the	work	that	is	made	possible	under	their	auspices’	(Sabri	2011	p.662).	
The	summative	evaluation	also	came	to	the	conclusion	that	the	competitive	nature	of	the	
bidding	process	and	fragmented	implementation	of	the	funding	had	been	detrimental	to	
the	initiative	in	having	sufficient	influence	at	sectoral	level:			
‘we	would	question	whether	the	competitive	and	selective	bidding	approach	used	in	
England,	and	which	included	a	significant	amount	of	capital	funding,	was	the	most	
effective	way	to	enhance	and	reward	excellence	in	teaching	and	learning	across	the	
sector’	(SQW	2011	p.52).		
Gosling	and	Hannan’s	(2007a)	research	also	concluded	that	the	bid	writing	process	in	HEIs	
was	equally	unsound,	where	bid	writers	tended	to	use	tactical	judgements	and	concentrate	
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on	what	they	thought	the	panel	would	accept	as	evidence	of	excellence,	and	those	that	
‘played	the	game’	were	more	likely	to	be	successful:	
‘The	explanation	for	some	institutions	being	awarded	multiple	CETLs	may	not	be	that	
those	institutions	had	more	excellent	teaching,	but	rather	that	they	had	managed	the	
bid-writing	process	exceptionally	successfully’	(p.157).		
This	correlates	with	the	findings	of	the	formative	evaluation	(Saunders	et	al	2008),	which	
also	suggested	that	it	was	the	expertise	in	bid	writing	that	was	rewarded	rather	than	the	
excellence.			
One	of	the	main	issues	to	arise	in	relation	to	the	competitive	bidding	approach	was	the	
difference	in	that	taken	to	reward	research.	Although	CETLs	were	an	attempt	to	bring	
teaching	excellence	on	a	par	with	research	excellence,	the	two	funding	approaches	were	
contradictory,	with	research	excellence	funding	based	on	retrospective	data	and	metrics	for	
individuals	as	well	as	disciplines,	and	CETL’s	based	on	the	promise	of	excellence.	The	RAE	
approach	rewarded	all	institutions	that	demonstrated	research	excellence	but	the	
competitive	and	selective	nature	of	the	CETLs	meant	that	not	all	excellence	was	rewarded.	
As	Gosling	and	Hannan	(2007a)	point	out,	
‘The	nature	of	the	selection	process	means	that	it	is	not	possible	to	conclude	from	the	
award	of	a	CETL	that	the	individuals	involved,	singly	or	collectively,	are	the	highest	
performing	teachers,	or	that	bidders	are	‘the	most	excellent’	(p.154).		
6.3.3	Process:	Excellence	–	a	contested	issue		
It	has	been	observed	that	HEFCE	chose	not	to	define	excellence.		Whilst	this	was	ostensibly	
in	order	to	allow	CETLs	the	freedom	to	define	their	own	version	of	excellence,	‘excellence’	
itself	is	a	contested	issue	within	HE	more	widely,	and	became	an	issue	for	the	CETLs,	
although	it	is	noteworthy	that	neither	the	formative	nor	summative	evaluations	raised	this	
as	a	matter	of	concern.	Some	scholars	assert	that	the	notion	of	excellence	is	without	
foundation	at	all,	such	as	Barnett	who	argues		that	‘the	idea	of	excellence	has	no	content,	it	
is	neither	true	nor	false,	ignorant	nor	self-conscious…	as	a	carrier	of	a	state	driven	ideology,	
it	should	be	put	aside’	(2000	p.2).	Conversely,	some	scholars	argue	that	the	idea	of	
excellence	can	be	interpreted	as	creating	space	for	innovation	and	creativity,	as	‘important	
sources	of	value	creation’	(Ensign	2002	p.997)	and	‘therefore,	the	political	optimisation	of	
any	framework	of	embedding	excellence	has	dimensions	of	both	randomness	and	creativity’	
(Mieg	(2014	p.78).		
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Others	more	specifically	debate	what	is	meant	by	‘excellence’	in	the	context	of	teaching	
and	learning:		
‘Claims	to	excellence	in	teaching	are	particularly	prone	to	be	contentious,	partly	because	
of	their	close	relationship	with	neo-liberal	ideological	assumptions	about	teaching	
performativity…Judgements	of	excellence	necessarily	involve	contested	values’	(Gosling	
and	Turner	2015	p.1575).		
Nixon	(2007)	also	equates	the	contested	nature	of	excellence	in	education	with	neoliberal	
narratives	on	the	marketisation	of	HE,	suggesting	that	‘excellence’	has	become	synonymous	
with	choice.	For	Nixon,	achieving	excellence	in	this	respect	is	difficult	in	what	has	become	a	
highly	divided,	diverse	system	of	HE.	Nixon	also	describes	excellence	as	‘a	process	of	
growth,	development,	and	flourishing;	it	is	not	just	an	endpoint’	(2007,	p.8).	This	view	is	
particularly	pertinent	to	this	study,	since	much	of	the	evidence	of	the	CETLs’	success	
presented	in	the	evaluations	refer	to	products	(for	example,	the	number	of	teaching	
developments,	rewards	or	publications),	but	the	process	of	excellence	is	less	well	
articulated	and	is	perhaps	one	of	the	reasons	why	evidence	of	deepening	across	the	sector	
has	been	less	well	developed.		
Skelton	(2005)	also	defines	excellence	as	a	process	rather	than	a	product,	articulating	four	
ideal-type	understandings	of	teaching	excellence	in	order	to	‘demonstrate	that	
understandings	of	teaching	excellence	can	differ	fundamentally	in	terms	of	underlying	
assumptions	and	purposes’	(p.25).	He	argues	that	his	third	type,	‘psychologised’,	currently	
dominates	and	influences	policy	making	in	education	and	‘is	to	ensure	that	the	teacher-
student	encounter	is	productive,	leading	to	individual	growth	and	development’	(p.36).	He	
argues	that	the	‘professionalisation’	of	teaching	has	arisen	from	this	understanding.		For	
Skelton,	what	is	meant	by	excellence	in	policy	development	is	often	unclear,	‘as	terms	like	
‘excellent’,	‘good’,	‘outstanding’,	‘competent’	and	‘best’	[practice]	are	often	used	
interchangeably	by	practitioners	and	educational	policy	makers’	(p.19).	These	explanations	
can	be	observed	in	the	contested	nature	of	excellence	in	the	CETLs.		
Little	et	al	(2007)	undertook	a	literature	review	of	excellence	in	teaching	and	learning	for	
the	HEA	and	concluded	that	there	are	different	understandings	of	excellence	in	the	sector,	
especially	at	policy	level,	with	a	focus	on	process	rather	than	content.	They	also	conclude	
that	some	policy	
‘takes	‘excellent	teaching’	to	be	synonymous	with	‘effective’	teaching’,	and	‘in	several	
policy	documents	there	is	an	implicit	acknowledgement	that	excellence	in	student	
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learning	may	not	require	excellent	teaching,	and	that	the	former	can	be	managed’	(p.2-
3).		
They	criticise	policies	for	failing	to	take	account	of	students’	perceptions	of	excellence	and	
it	is	noteworthy	that,	as	Sabri	(2011)	points	out,	‘the	phrase	‘the	student	experience’	is	used	
just	once	in	the	2003	White	Paper’	(p.659).		
Little	et	al	also	contend	that	notions	of	excellence	can	be	discipline	specific:		
‘in	certain	disciplines,	the	usage	of	the	term	‘excellence’	does	vary	in	some	fundamental	
ways,	rather	than	being	used	to	identify	“distinguishing	features	such	that	those	
exhibiting	excellence	stand	out	from	the	rest”,	the	term	is	used	to	imply	a	baseline	
competence’	(2007	p.42).		
With	such	wide	ranging	debate	on	the	meaning	of	excellence	in	learning	and	teaching,	it	is	
inevitable	that	these	issues	would	be	contested	in	relation	to	CETLs.	Gosling	and	Hannan’s	
research	discovered	that	
‘There	was	an	acute	awareness	that	the	concept	of	excellence	was	relative	to	the	beliefs	
and	values	about	pedagogy	of	the	person	making	the	judgement’	(2007b	p.636).		
‘Some	bid	writers	assumed	that	excellence	meant	exceptional,	due	to	the	competitive	
nature	of	the	process,	which	is	backed	up	by	HEFCE’s	feedback	from	stage	one	of	the	
bidding	process	that	commonplace	practice	was	not	rewarded	as	it	did	not	support	the	
claim	for	excellence’	(2007b	p.637).			
They	also	assert	that	‘the	articulation	of	the	CETL’s	claim	to	‘excellence’	[in	the	bid]	was	
framed	within	a	discourse	that	had	little	or	no	credibility	with	colleagues’	(Gosling	&	Turner	
2015	p.1582).		
6.3.4	Process:	Accountability	and	evaluation	
In	common	with	defining	excellence,	the	requirements	for	accountability	were	very	loosely	
defined	by	HEFCE:	‘a	novel	feature	of	the	initiative	was	the	absence	of	strong	accountability	
requirements’	(Gosling	&	Turner	2015	p.1575).	Institutions	had	only	to	report	under	the	
institutional	Annual	Monitoring	Statements	in	relation	to	the	extent	to	which	they	had	met	
their	CETL	targets,	with	a	focus	on	capital	spend.	Although	not	a	formal	HEFCE	requirement,	
self-evaluations	were	produced	by	CETLs	for	the	formative	and	summative	evaluations	and	
although	these	had	to	be	evidence	based,	the	length,	format	and	content	could	be	adapted	
to	suit	each	CETL	and,	as	such,	varied	considerably.	Mark	Fenton-O'Creevy,	Former	Director	
of	the	Practice-based	Professional	Learning	CETL,	quotes	HEFCE	sources	as	saying	‘no	one	at	
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Hefce	will	read	your	self-evaluation	reports’	and	indeed	the	formative	evaluation	noted	that	
HEFCE	failed	to	comment	on	the	interim	reports.	Fenton-O'Creevy	concluded	that	
‘The	evaluation	process	was	poorly	resourced	and	designed,	and	relied	on	reports	
compiled	while	the	Cetls	were	still	active:	hardly	the	best	way	to	assess	lasting	impact’	
(Fenton-O’Creevy	2012).	
This	lack	of	formal	structure	led	to	much	criticism	of	the	self-evaluations.	The	formative	
evaluation	found	that	the	interim	reports	took	an	entirely	positive	stance,	there	was	a	huge	
variety	in	the	quality	of	the	reporting	of	data	and	the	majority	lacked	robust	and	theorised	
evaluation	strategies.	The	authors	noted	that	CETLs	tended	to	focus	on	activity	rather	than	
evidence-led	conclusions:	
‘In	the	majority	of	cases,	the	fact	that	activities	had	occurred	was	the	main	evidence	of	
effect	within	the	report’	(Saunders	et	al	2008p.9).	
‘What	is	important	to	note	is	that	many	of	the	CETL	reports	did	not	refer	to	evidence	
collected	systematically	which	could	act	as	a	resource	for	a	judgement	of	the	
effectiveness	of	an	activity	as	a	change	mechanism	whatever	its	subtlety	or	timeframe’	
(Saunders	et	al	2008	p.115).			
They	concluded	that,	of	the	1181	instances	of	activity,	72%	did	not	provide	evidence	of	the	
impact	of	those	activities	(p.9).	The	summative	evaluation	also	criticised	the	self-
evaluations,	noting	that	using	them	for	the	summative	report	was	‘challenging’	(SQW	2001	
p.2).	They	concluded	that	they	were	useful	in	providing	a	good	deal	of	quantitative	
feedback	on	the	impact	on	individuals	and	institutions	and	some	evidence	of	impact	on	
students,	but	‘it	is	difficult,	however,	to	quantify	these	impacts	in	a	rigorous	way’	(SQW	
2011	p.iii).		
In	2010,	as	CETLs	were	preparing	their	final	self-evaluations,	Virginia	King,	from	the	Centre	
for	the	Study	of	Higher	Education,	published	an	article,	‘Evidencing	impact	of	educational	
developments:	the	‘influence	wheel’	and	its	use	in	a	CETL	context’,	having	concluded	that	
the	interim	self-evaluations	‘revealed	some	excellent	practice	but	no	major	impact’	(King	
2010	p.35).	The	‘influence	wheel’	was	held	up	as	a	tool	which	could	help	CETLs	to	evidence	
impact,	but	there	is	no	evidence	that	such	an	approach	was	systematically	taken	up	by	
institutions	in	their	2010	self-evaluations.	
HEFCE	came	in	for	much	criticism	for	its	hands-off	approach	to	accountability	and	
evaluation,	and	not	just	from	the	resulting	evaluations	but	from	other	agencies,	
commentators	and	the	press.	Turner	(2007)	observed	that	‘CETLs	were	the	apotheosis	of	
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the	strategy	of	steering	at	a	distance’	(p.58).	The	summative	evaluation	criticised	HEFCE	for	
failing	to	put	in	place	any	formal	monitoring	and	evaluation	structure:		
‘An	evaluation	framework	should	have	been	designed	and	developed	with	the	CETLs	
from	the	start	of	the	programme.	CETLs	should	also	have	been	asked	to	provide	more	
detailed	monitoring	feedback	on	the	use	of	the	funds	against	an	agreed	template’	(SQW	
2011	p.vii).		
The	HEA	were	particularly	critical	of	the	policy	approach,	especially	since	it	was	observed	
that	the	lack	of	clarification	made	any	formal	connections	between	CETLs	and	the	HEA	
problematic,	leading	to	less	engagement,	with	former	Chief	Executive	Paul	Ramsden	
arguing	that		
‘Hefce	made	little	attempt	to	coordinate	this	expensive	initiative	or	to	support	and	
instruct	Cetls	and	the	HEA	to	enable	them	to	work	in	harmony.	Instead,	it	pushed	the	
responsibility	for	its	own	unwillingness	to	provide	guidance	over	to	the	Cetls	and	the	
HEA	-	a	classic	case	of	weak	management	that	magnified	the	flaws	in	policy…Hefce	
should	have	found	a	way	to	make	institutions	accountable,	not	just	to	take	the	money	
and	run’	(Ramsden	2012).	
John	Gill,	Editor	of	the	THES,	was	equally	critical	of	the	lack	of	robust	monitoring	and	
evaluation,	and	suggests	that	there	was	a	relationship	between	the	lack	of	monitoring	and	
the	ability	of	the	CETLs	to	successfully	address	excellence	across	the	sector:	‘The	idea	of	
£315	million	being	put	up	with	relatively	little	monitoring	or	oversight	to	raise	the	status	
and	standard	of	teaching	in	higher	education	seems	fanciful’	(Gill,	THES	2012).	
For	Gosling,	HEFCE’s	hands-off	approach	demonstrated	that	the	organisation	was	overly	
reliant	on	HEIs	being	committed	to	the	CETL	initiative	at	a	senior	level	that	wasn’t	
necessarily	demonstrable	at	institutional	level,	and	that	this	reliance	assumed	that	a	high	
level	of	monitoring	was	not	required.			
‘There	was	an	over-confidence	in	rationalist	managerial	approaches	involving	plans,	
targets,	rewards	and	superficial	monitoring’	(Gosling	2013	p.19).	
6.3.5	Programme:	Embeddedness	of	the	CETL	in	the	institution	
CETL	objectives	required	HEIs	to	embed	the	work	of	CETLs	more	widely	within	the	
institution.	The	extent	to	which	this	was	achieved	was	a	concern	of	both	the	formative	and	
summative	evaluations,	as	well	as	other	commentators.	Concerns	raised	in	the	evaluations	
centered	on	the	ability	for	discipline-specific	approaches	to	learning	and	teaching	to	be	
more	generically	embedded,	and	the	extent	to	which	the	position	of	a	CETL	within	an	
institution	gave	it	sufficient	influence	to	embed	more	widely.	The	formative	evaluation	
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concluded	that,	although	the	majority	of	interviewees	said	that	they	saw	the	CETLs	as	
having	a	strategic	purpose	and	a	wider	institutional	role,	only	a	minority	of	CETLs	had	had	
an	effect	on	institutional	policy	and	practice,	and	many	had	little	effect	outside	the	CETL.	
Only	33%	believed	that	the	CETL	was	fully	embedded	in	institutional	learning	and	teaching	
strategies	and	48%	thought	it	was	partly	embedded:	
‘Interviews	with	senior	managers	of	institutions	that	host	CETLs	suggest	a	mixed,	
although	overall	optimistic,	picture	of	CETLs’	propensity	to	‘deepen’	the	effects	of	
excellent	practice.	It	is	justifiable	to	say,	on	the	basis	of	the	evidence	collected	during	
this	evaluation	that	only	a	relatively	small	proportion	of	senior	managers	were	able	to	
point	to	their	CETLs	as	embedded	in	or	providing	leadership	to	the	strategic	direction	of	
the	institution’s	teaching	and	learning	strategy.	Most	commented	on	its	relatively	
‘enclaved’	state	at	present	and	saw	a	need	for	a	more	integrative	approach	going	
forward’	(Saunders	et	al	2008	p.6).	
An	independent	evaluation	of	the	engineering	CETL	at	Loughborough	University	(Tolley	
2008)	reached	the	same	conclusions.		Crawford	and	Dickens	(2008)	considered	the	findings	
of	Tolley’s	evaluation,	concluding	that	‘there	has	been	some	success	in	moving	beyond	
academics	who	are	very	enthusiastic	teachers,	but	there	are	still	only	a	limited	number	with	
a	high	level	engagement’	(p.10).	Tolley’s	evaluation	recommended	that	the	project	‘get	
beyond	the	converted	‘few’	to	the	‘many’	in	order	to	increase	the	pool	of	staff	who	are	
sufficiently	motivated’	(p.5).	
Despite	these	early	concerns,	the	summative	evaluation	observed	that	by	the	time	funding	
was	coming	to	an	end	in	2010,	there	was	more	of	a	deepening	effect,	concluding	that:	
‘Many	of	the	CETLs	contributed	to	increases	in	cross-disciplinary	and	wider	institutional	
working.	In	many	instances	they	fostered	a	sense	of	collegiality	that	spread	beyond	the	
traditional	boundaries	of	academic	disciplines.	Staff	were	able	to	network	and	
collaborate	with	people	outside	their	area	of	expertise,	which	in	many	cases,	would	not	
have	happened	without	the	CETL’	(SQW	2011	p.22).		
However,	they	also	cautioned	that	whilst	there	were	examples	in	which	CETLs	were	able	to	
describe	their	work	as	embedded	and	had	influenced	wider	institutional	strategies,	‘it	is	
difficult	to	assess	the	actual	extent	of	their	influence’	(SQW	2011	p.23).	
For	Gosling	and	Turner	(2015),	the	difficulties	in	embedding	the	work	of	CETLs	across	an	
institution	was	one	of	influence	and	the	need	for	the	support	of	senior	leadership.	They	
observed	that	CETL	directors	often	didn’t	have	the	power,	or	occupy	the	right	space	in	the	
organisation,	to	influence	other	disciplines.	They	concluded	that	without	good	senior	
management	support,	CETL	directors	could	not	influence	change.	They	also	concluded	that	
CETLs	were	more	likely	to	be	able	to	disseminative	their	activities	more	widely,	and	engage	
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more	fully	across	an	institution,	where	the	CETL	was	aligned	to	institutional	goals	and	
where	it	was	not	challenging	to	the	prevailing	culture	of	the	organisation:			
‘CETLs	were	least	likely	to	recount	experiences	of	contestation	where	the	aspirations	for	
the	CETL	exhibited	continuity	with	existing	culture	of	the	institution	or	the	subsection	in	
which	the	CETL	operated’	(Gosling	and	Hannan	2015.	p.1583).	
However,	others	within	CETLs	expressed	an	alternative	view.	Margaret	Price,	then	Director	
of	the	ASKe	CETL	at	Oxford	Brookes	University,	was	quoted	in	the	THES	as	saying,	
‘Because	Cetls	sit	slightly	outside	university	systems,	they	have	freedom	to	explore	new	
directions.	Cetls	are	making	a	tangible	difference	to	students'	learning	experiences	in	
many	ways’	(Attwood	2008).	
However,	she	also	added	that	‘the	proportion	of	centre	directors	who	did	not	feel	supported	
by	senior	managers	was	shockingly	high’.	(Attwood	2008).			
The	formative	evaluation	observed	that	the	relationship	between	the	CETL	and	institutional	
management	was	critical	in	engaging	the	whole	institution	in	the	work	of	the	CETL	and	
effecting	institutional	change.	In	their	survey,	58%	reported	that	the	CETL	was	fully	
supported	by	senior	management,	34%	felt	there	was	some	support	and	8%	thought	there	
was	no	support.	Although	61%	said	of	CETL	directors	that	they	had	worked	with	their	senior	
management	to	disseminate	the	work	of	the	CETL	across	the	institution,	39%	said	that	they	
had	no,	or	only	some,	support	from	senior	managers	(figures	taken	from	Saunders	et	al	
2008). The	summative	report	also	noted	that	a	key	issue	for	institutions	in	their	self-
evaluation	reports	was	‘the	importance	of	securing	senior	management	engagement,	
especially	where	aims	were	institution	wide’	(SQW	2011	p.10).		The	conclusion	of	both	
evaluations	was	that	senior	management	commitment	was	crucial	if	the	work	of	the	CETL	
was	to	be	embedded	across	the	institution.		
A	review	of	the	London	Met	RLO-CETL	Reusable	Learning	Objects	CETL	(Cook	et	al	2007)	
concluded	that	there	was	a	significant	gap	between	top	management’s	commitment	to	the	
CETL	and	the	ability	for	change	at	the	grass	roots	end	of	the	institution.	Equally,	a	report	
into	the	CIPel	and	SCERTrE	CETLs	(Clouder	et	al	2008)	noted	similar	findings,	and	
‘tensions	between	the	managerialist	discourse	promoting	accountability	and	
performativity	evident	in	higher	education	and	the	potential	for	creativity	promoted	by	
strategies	adopted	in	the	context	of	the	two	CETLs’	(p.642).	
The	locus	of	the	CETL	within	an	institution	often	played	a	part	in	how	successful	it	was	in	
meeting	the	objectives	for	disseminating	practice.	HEFCE	did	not	dictate	an	organisational	
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structure	and	encouraged	diversity	of	approaches	and,	as	such,	some	were	based	in	
departments	or	disciplines	and	others	were	more	centrally	located	in	an	institution.	Those	
that	were	discipline	based	had	the	most	difficulty	in	disseminating	their	practice	across	the	
institution,	in	part	because	their	activity	was	often	seen	as	discipline	specific	by	other	parts	
of	the	organisation,	as	opposed	to	CETLs	that	were	based	in	a	central	service	or	had	an	
institution-wide	pedagogic	focus.	As	such,	the	summative	evaluation	concluded	that	whilst	
the	CETLs	were	highly	successful	at	a	local	level,	wider	dissemination	across	the	institution	
was	not	always	as	evident:	
‘Whilst	some	CETL	staff	and	participants	have	benefitted	from	enhanced	recognition	
and	reward,	this	has	not	always	had	a	wider	institutional	impact	in	relation	to	the	
recognition	of	teaching	and	learning	excellence	more	generally’	(SQW	2011	p.iv).			
Those	that	were	stand-alone	units	often	had	more	difficulty	in	engaging	with	central	service	
departments,	and	the	formative	evaluation	observed	how	challenging	it	was	for	many	such	
CETLs	to	deal	with	some	of	the	bureaucratic	processes,	especially	in	HR	and	financial	
reporting,	as	these	did	not	sit	well	with	the	semi-autonomous	nature	of	CETLs.	Many	
considered	that	they	hampered	initial	progress.	This	experience	was	also	reflected	in	the	
summative	evaluation,	where	it	was	concluded	that	
‘some	of	the	newly	established	centres	were	outside	the	pre-existing	academic	structure	
and	some	found	it	a	challenge	initially	to	establish	working	relationships	and	
connections	to	senior	management.	In	a	few	cases,	they	also	underestimated	the	
management	time	which	would	need	to	be	devoted	to	tasks	such	as	finance	and	HR’	
(SQW	2011	p.A-2).	
The	summative	report	observed	that	evidence	for	dissemination	across	the	institutions	was	
sporadic,	and	concluded	that	‘CETL	communications	can	be	complicated	by	the	position	of	
the	centre	within	its	institution’	(SQW	2011	p.23).	Clouder	et	al	(2008)	noted	that	CETLs	
were	often	‘context	bound’	(p.636)	and	Gosling	and	Turner	(2015)	concluded	that	
‘HEFCE’s	assumption	that	CETLs	would	be	spreading	‘good	practice’	took	no	account	of	
intra-departmental	rivalries	and	deeply	felt	differences	of	academic	values	or	of	
principled	indifference	to	the	goals	of	the	initiative’	(p.1582).	
Gosling	(2013)	observed	that	the	issue	of	embeddedness	across	the	institution	was	not	just	
limited	to	CETLs,	but	that	many	of	the	HEFCE	policy	initiatives	aimed	at	enhancement	have	
been	‘based	on	the	theoretically	naïve	assumption	that	teaching	and	learning	practices	
developed	in	the	context	of	one	academic	department	can	be	‘transferred’	to	others’	(p.7).			
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6.3.6	Programme:	Reward	and	recognition	
Providing	incentives	and	rewards	at	individual	level	for	staff	engaged	in	teaching	was	a	
central	part	of	the	CETL	initiative.	HEFCE	suggested	in	its	invitation	to	bid	‘that	CETL	funds	
might	be	used	to	reward	excellent	practitioners	through	financial	or	promotional	schemes	
or	in	other	ways’	(HEFCE	2004/05	p.10),	and	its	first	key	objective	was	‘to	reward	practice	
that	demonstrates	excellent	learning	outcomes	for	students’.	Both	evaluations	reported	
considerable	activity	and	success	in	relation	to	meeting	this	objective,	with	many	examples	
of	fellowships	(the	most	common),	secondments	and	provision	of	resources	for	
conferences	and	other	activities.	52%	of	practitioners	responding	to	the	e-survey	said	that	
they	had	more	time	to	reflect	on	their	teaching	having	been	a	part	of	a	CETL	and	79%	felt	
that	their	overall	learning	and	teaching	practice	had	improved	as	a	result	(SQW	2011	p.19).		
The	self-evaluation	reports	from	May	2010	included	many	examples	where	CETL	and	other	
staff	in	an	institution	had	benefited	from	recognition	and	reward,	but	the	practitioner	
survey	suggested	that	only	46%	of	respondents	agreed	that	their	work	had	been	recognised	
via	promotion	or	other	reward	(SQW	2011	p.25).	Whilst	most	rewards	involved	a	financial	
element,	the	majority	of	recipients	perceived	that	the	recognition	was	much	more	
important	than	financial	gain.	The	summative	evaluation	also	noted	that	it	was	difficult	to	
quantify	the	impact	of	these	rewards	in	a	rigorous	way	as	they	could	be	the	result	of	other	
mechanisms,	and	not	the	direct	influence	of	the	CETL.		
One	of	the	most	common	issues	reported	in	the	self-evaluations	was	the	difficulty	in	
freeing	up	time	for	staff	to	work	with	their	CETL,	as	in	many	cases	they	were	expected	to	
continue	with	their	existing	workload	alongside.		The	summative	evaluation	concluded	that	
one	of	the	main	challenges	had	been	competing	demands	on	time	and	concerns	over	the	
management	of	workload.		
There	were	a	number	of	case	studies	reported	in	relation	to	reward	and	recognition,	more	
than	any	other	area	of	activity.	Turner	et	al	(2008)	undertook	a	small	study	to	examine	the	
impact	of	awards	to	lecturers	received	from	the	HELP	CETL,	which	worked	with	Plymouth	
University	Partner	Colleges	Faculty	to	enhance	the	student	experience	for	those	studying	
within	the	partner	colleges’	network.	The	Award	Holder	Scheme	was	developed	to	reward	
lecturers’	contributions,	ranging	from	£500	to	£10,000	to	support	their	professional	
development.	Their	findings	showed	that	the	recipients	valued	the	rewards	and	the	
opportunities	that	the	funding	provided,	and	raised	levels	of	confidence.	However,	in	
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researching	the	impact	of	the	awards,	the	findings	were	less	positive,	with	recipients	
reporting	that	they	did	not	perceive	that	the	awards	had	recognition	and	value,	particularly	
from	colleagues	and	managers.	Indeed,	the	research	found	that	managers	considered	the	
awards	to	be	detrimental	to	other	operations,	with	the	award	holder	having	to	be	brought	
out	of	teaching	or	being	absent.	Recipients	also	noted	that	buy-out	was	sometimes	not	
forthcoming	and	so	their	CETL	activities	needed	to	be	completed	on	top	of	their	existing	
workload.	The	authors	concluded	that	at	a	local	level	award	and	recognition	had	been	
beneficial,	but	it	had	not	sufficiently	addressed	the	objective	to	raise	the	profile	of	teaching	
in	line	with	research:	
‘our	findings	do	not	question	the	value	of	the	awards	and	the	benefits	to	recipients	but	
pose	a	bigger	question	about	the	ability	of	an	initiative,	like	the	CETL’s,	to	address	the	
wider	issue	of	the	status	of	teaching’	(Turner	et	al		2008	p.447).		
The	Centre	for	Interprofessional	e-Learning	(CIPeL),	a	joint	CETL	between	Coventry	and	
Sheffield	Hallam	universities,	created	‘innovative	e-resources	to	support	interprofessional	
and	interdisciplinary	learning’.	As	with	the	HELP	CETL,	a	survey	of	the	CIPeL	staff	indicated	
that	individuals	were	not	interested	in	financial	returns:	‘There	was	a	general	consensus	
that	recognition	was	in	fact	more	important	than	financial	gain’	(Bluteau	and	Krumins	2008	
p.421).	They,	too,	reported	that	secondees	were	often	not	released	from	their	everyday	
duties	and	so	had	to	undertake	additional	workload.		
One	of	the	main	difficulties	raised	was	in	embedding	reward	and	recognition	beyond	the	
CETL,	aligned	with	institutions’	HR	strategies	and	policies.	Many	CETLs	found	that	they	
needed	to	align	their	work	within	existing	institutional	policies,	if	they	were	to	be	seen	as	
integrated.	Crawford	and	Dickens	(2008)	examined	the	impact	of	the	engineering	CETL	at	
Loughborough	University	and	observed	the	importance	of	integration	with	university	
systems:	
‘This	reward	mechanism	is	run	centrally	by	the	University.	To	ensure	that	we	became	
integrated	into	the	University	reward	system,	the	engCETL	became	involved	in	
discussions	about	the	awards	from	the	outset	in	2005’	(p.4).		
However,	Turner	&	Gosling	(2012)	observed	that	CETLs	had	little	impact	on	reward	systems	
at	an	institutional	level,	which	were	still	grounded	in	research	recognition.	Evidence	from	
their	research	suggests	that	little	progress	was	made	in	terms	of	embedding	reward	and	
recognition	across	those	institutions	where	long	standing	cultures	and	reward	systems	
were	already	firmly	established.	
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‘In	translating	the	reward	agenda,	the	bid	writers	concentrated	upon	what	was	
achievable,	reducing	the	ambition	to	achieve	change	from	the	institutional	to	the	local.	
This	had	consequences	for	the	longer-term	sustainability	of	the	CETL	reward	and	
recognition	strategies,	since	CETLs’	own	local	practices	could	run	counter	to,	or	
alongside,	institutional	reward	systems’	(p.420).			
They	concluded	that	HEFCE’s	failure	to	fully	define	reward	and	recognition	meant	that	the	
perception	that	it	was	a	central	strand	in	enhancing	the	work	of	the	CETL	was	overstated	
(p.427).	Paul	Orsmond,	writing	in	the	THES,	also	observed	the	silo	nature	of	CETLs	in	
relation	to	reward	and	recognition:	
‘They	mostly	provide	opportunities	for	teaching	staff	who	already	have	an	interest	in	
learning	and	teaching	to	shift	into	a	bigger	ghetto	and	talk	to	like-minded	individuals.	
But	they	pass	by	most	of	teaching	staff	because	they	do	not	impinge	on	their	private	
world	and	their	discipline’	(Orsmond	2003).		
6.3.7	Programme:	Engagement	of	students	
Although	four	of	the	six	objectives	of	CETLs	were	explicit	in	their	requirement	for	impact	on	
students,	very	little	space	is	actually	dedicated	to	students	in	the	formative	and	summative	
evaluations.	The	formative	evaluation	interviewed	students	as	part	of	its	case	study	visits	
but	only	dedicated	three	pages	to	students	out	of	a	126	page	report.	The	summative	report	
only	dedicates	a	total	of	three	paragraphs	to	the	impact	on	students.	Indeed,	students	are	
only	referred	to	once	in	the	executive	summary,	and	that	is	in	relation	to	student	fees.				
Despite	the	limited	attention	given	to	students	in	the	evaluations,	the	reports	do	draw	
some	conclusions.	The	formative	evaluation	reported	that	92%	of	stakeholders	concluded	
that	CETLs	had	a	positive	effect	for	students	in	supporting	their	learning.	Although	the	
evaluation	concludes	that	it	was	‘too	early	to	draw	conclusions’	about	the	impact	on	
students,	they	did	note	that,	in	a	number	of	CETLs,	‘there	is	a	greater	emphasis	on	involving	
students	in	planning	and	designing	learning	activities’	(Saunders	et	al	2008	p.51)	and	
students	had	been	involved	in	a	number	of	projects	and	placements.		
The	summative	report	concluded	that	the	vast	majority	of	CETLs	claimed	to	have	student	
engagement	at	the	heart	of	their	work,	and	there	was	substantial	evidence	in	the	self-
evaluation	reports	of	provision	of	resources,	innovation	and	practical	support	for	students.	
However,	the	evaluation	found	little	evidence	of	how	this	had	a	positive	impact	on	the	
experience	of	students.	The	report	notes	that	‘in	some	cases	the	number	of	students	
affected	by	these	changes	is	estimated	in	the	thousands,	although	there	is	seldom	any	
information	to	contextualise	these	numbers’	(SQW	2011	p.11).		Many	of	the	CETLs	proposed	
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to	develop	technology-enhanced	learning	to	support	students;	however,	the	evaluation	
concludes	that	it	was	impossible	to	adequately	assess	the	impact:	
‘It	is	difficult	to	assess	the	specific	impact	that	technology-enhanced	learning	had	had	
on	students.	The	availability	of,	and	access	to,	new	resources,	facilities,	and	teaching	
methods	is	just	one	of	several	factors	that	could	influence	student	motivation	and	
attainment	levels.	Few	CETLs	have	directly	attributed	the	development	of	learners’	skills	
to	the	presence	of	technology-enhanced	learning	although	there	was	a	general	
acknowledgement	in	many	self-evaluation	reports	that	the	two	are	in	some	way	related’	
(SQW	2011	p.39-40).	
6.3.8	Programme:	Impact	across	the	sector	
Three	of	the	CETL	objectives	were	concerned	with	embedding	good	practice	across	the	
sector,	but	this	was	one	of	the	most	contested	themes.	In	the	formative	evaluation,	the	
authors	noted	that	in	the	initial	case	study	interviews,	‘the	aspect	of	impact	within	and	
outside	the	sector	elicited	far	less	information	than	other	issues	we	explored’	(Saunders	et	al	
2008	p.58).	However,	in	later	interviews	they	reported	that	‘many	more	of	the	CETLs	were	
now	turning	their	attention	to	disseminating	their	activities,	and	building	up	links,	more	
widely	and	systematically	across	the	sector’	(p.59).	The	report	observed	that	involvement	of	
CETLs	with	other	HEIs	varied	considerably,	but	concluded	that	the	formative	evaluation	
may	have	been	too	early	to	accurately	assess	the	impact	across	the	sector.					
The	summative	evaluation	is	more	conclusive.	73%	of	pro-vice	chancellors	for	teaching	and	
learning	and	61%	of	CETL	based	staff	suggested	that	‘good	practice	and	innovation	in	
learning	and	teaching	have	been	shared	between	CETLs	and	non-CETL	institutions’,	and	the	
2010	self-evaluations	reported	much	external	activity,	with	over	3,000	publications	and	
more	than	5,500	dissemination	events.	However,	the	authors	do	not	conclude	that	the	
impact	on	the	sector	had	been	evident	and	indeed	suggest	that	only	a	handful	of	the	
reported	publications	and	dissemination	events	indicate	any	impact	externally:	
‘It	is	difficult	to	gauge	the	extent	to	which	this	may	have	led	to	other	institutions	actively	
adopting	the	approaches	and	materials	developed	by	the	CETLs’….	specific	evidence	of	
the	adoption	of	CETL	approaches	in	non-funded	HEIs	is	much	scarcer…	the	extent	to	
which	CETLs	have	directly	contributed	to	sector-wide	changes	in	behaviour	and	culture	is	
impossible	to	quantify’	(SQW	2011	p.iv/	32).		
‘the	legacy	of	the	programme	rests	largely	in	individual	staff	and	in	those	institutions	
which	have	embedded	CETL	developments…	rather	than	in	a	general	enhancement	of	
teaching	and	learning	across	the	sector…	we	do	not	believe	that	the	CETL	programme	
itself	has	led	to	material	changes	in	non-participating	HEIs	and	across	the	sector	as	a	
whole’	(SQW	2011	p.vi).		
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Taylor	(2007)	notes	that	the	notion	of	the	transferability	of	‘excellent	practice’	is	explicit	
within	the	CETLs,	but	queries	whether	it	could	be	transferrable	across	the	sector,	and	
Skelton	(2005)	also	notes	the	difficulties	of	transferring	and	embedding	practice	across	
different	discipline	contexts.	
The	difficulty	of	creating	a	legacy	of	CETL	impact	attracted	media	interest.	Writing	in	the	
THES	in	2007,	HEFCE	Director	Liz	Beaty	was	acclaiming	in	CETLs’	role,	describing	them	as	
‘the	envy	of	the	world'.	She	said,		
‘The	CETLs	are	just	two	years	into	their	five	years	of	funding,	but	hugely	impressive	
outcomes	are	already	visible.	They	all	have	well-equipped	learning	spaces	built	with	
capital	funding	as	part	of	the	CETL	package,	and	growing	communities	of	practice	are	
providing	scholarly	evidence	for	effective	approaches	to	teaching’	(Beaty	2007).	
It	is	noteworthy	that,	just	one	week	earlier,	in	response	to	a	draft	of	the	formative	
evaluation,	journalist	Melanie	Newman,	also	writing	in	the	THES,	reported	that	‘There	is	
little	evidence	that	a	multimillion-pound	scheme	designed	to	"celebrate	and	reward	
excellence	in	teaching"	has	had	much	impact’	(Newman	2007).	Following	the	publication	of	
the	summative	evaluation	report	in	2012,	views	in	the	media	were	mixed.	Craig	Mahoney,	
then	Chief	Executive	of	the	HEA,	but	previously	a	CETL	director,	was	reported	as	saying,	
‘It	was	unfair	to	judge	the	programme	on	its	legacy	as	this	was	not	its	primary	purpose.	
There	is	a	huge	amount	of	evidence	to	suggest	that	this	was	an	effective	use	of	money	-	
there	were	hugely	positive	impacts’	(Gove	2012).	
However,	much	of	the	reporting	at	that	time	was	not	positive.	Jack	Gove,	reporting	in	the	
same	article	under	the	headline	‘Cetls	impact	assessed:	the	sector	hardy	felt	a	thing’	was	of	
the	opinion	that	
‘As	an	example	of	the	failure	of	public	policy	in	higher	education,	the	[CETL]	programme	
would	be	hard	to	beat…	The	report	leaves	no	room	for	doubt	that	the	programme	as	a	
whole	failed	in	its	primary	purpose	of	enhancing	teaching	and	learning	in	higher	
education’	(Gove	2012).	
John	Gill,	also	writing	in	the	same	edition	under	the	headline	‘they	never	came	to	boil’	
argued	that,		
‘The	dearth	of	funds	to	invest	in	teaching	today	makes	the	Cetls'	meagre	legacy	all	the	
more	disappointing.	When	the	funding	came	to	an	end	two	years	ago,	there	was	a	
widespread	feeling	that	the	programme	had	gone	out	with	a	whimper’	(Gill	2012).		
At	the	end	of	CETL	funding	in	2010,	The	HEA	was	commissioned	to	undertake	a	review	of	all	
HEFCE	learning	and	teaching	initiatives,	which	included	a	review	of	CETLs,	and	particularly	
their	impact	on	the	sector.	The	report	concluded	that	
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‘there	is	no	evidence	that	HEFCE’s	enhancement	initiatives	have	led	to	sustained	sector-
wide	cultural	changes	in	teaching	and	learning	in	universities….it	has	been	far	less	
successful	in	promoting	the	strategic	development	of	quality	enhancement	across	the	
sector	as	a	whole’	(Trowler	et	al	2013	p.17).		
One	of	the	main	issues	highlighted	in	the	formative	evaluation	was	the	difficulty	faced	by	
CETLs	in	engaging	with	sector	agencies,	particularly	the	HEA	and	subject	centres.	The	
authors	suggest	this	is	due	in	part	to	agencies	not	being	generously	funded	and	thus	not	
having	the	capacity	for	engagement.	The	formative	report	also	notes	the	absence	of	
collaboration	with	the	HEA:	
‘There	was	some	disappointment	evident	in	many	of	the	self-evaluation	reports	about	
the	role	of	the	HE	Academy,	which	was	initially	viewed	as	having	the	potential	to	enable	
broader	engagement	between	CETLs’	(Saunders	2008	p.32).		
The	formative	evaluation	concluded	that	there	was	unevenness	and	incoherence	of	
engagement	in	different	disciplines	with	HEA	subject	centres,	which	also	impeded	cross-
CETL	connections.	As	such,	dissemination	of	practice	between	HEIs	was	compromised.	The	
summative	evaluation,	however,	found	that	engagement	through	the	Subject	Centres,	was	
fairly	widespread.	Indeed	it	was	noted	that	
‘some	stakeholders	commented	that	some	subject	centres	made	a	significant	
contribution	to	the	impact	of	the	CETL	activity,	by	taking	a	highly	focussed	approach	to	
coordinating	and	streamlining	all	the	experience	in	a	given	field’	(SQW	2011	p.28).		
The	same	cannot	be	said	for	the	CETL	network	itself,	where	there	was	very	little	evidence	of	
CETLs	working	together	outside	discipline	networks.	Although	60%	of	pro-vice	chancellors	
and	56%	of	CETL	staff	reported	effective	working	across	the	CETLs,	the	summative	
evaluation	concluded	that	there	was	no	evidence	to	that	effect.	There	was	
‘No	real	sense	of	a	national	CETL	network	and	many	CETLs	have	not	necessarily	seen	
other	centres	as	important	nodes	in	their	networks’	(SQW	2011	p.iii).		
Overall,	the	summative	evaluation	concluded	that	the	lack	of	coherent	and	systematic	
engagement	within	the	CETL	network	meant	that	the	ability	for	institutions	to	disseminate	
their	work	more	widely	was	compromised,	and	the	programme	would	have	benefitted	from	
some	national	coordination,	noting	that		
‘HEFCE	did	not	take	a	more	strategic	co-ordinating	role’…	and	as	a	result	of	the	light	
touch	approach,	an	opportunity	to	raise	the	status	and	profile	of	teaching	and	learning	
across	the	sector,	and	to	disseminate	results	more	effectively,	had	been	missed’	(SQW	
2011	p.vi).	
	 	
	 197	
6.3.9	Programme:	Funding	and	future	sustainability	
The	provision	of	capital	funding	to	establish	new	teaching	infrastructure	and	acquire	new	
technology	was	considered	one	of	the	successes	of	the	CETL	programme,	as	observed	by	
Turner	and	Gosling	(2012	p.427).	By	the	time	of	the	formative	evaluation,	‘78%	had	
invested	in	equipment	and	facilities’	for	students’	and	‘58%	felt	the	capital	spend	had	been	
essential	to	the	CETL’	(Saunders	et	al	2008).	Crawford	and	Dickens	(2008)	concluded	in	
relation	to	the	Engineering	CETL	that	
‘there	is	no	doubt	that	the	capital	funds,	in	creating	a	high	quality	presence	for	the	CETL,	
have	made	a	significant	contribution	to	raising	the	profile	of	teaching,	thus	achieving	
one	of	the	original	aims	of	the	CETL	programme’	(p.8).		
The	summative	evaluation	concurred,	concluding	that	
‘The	capital	funding	element	of	the	CETL	programme	in	England	has	enabled	
participating	HEIs	to	build	state-of-the-art	learning	spaces	and	to	upgrade	resources	
significantly.	Several	self-evaluation	reports	drew	attention	to	the	impact,	on	staff	and	
students,	of	the	new	build	enabled	by	the	capital	grant’	(SQW	2011	p.24-25).		
However,	timing	of	the	capital	funding	presented	difficulties	for	many	CETLs.	Capital	spend	
needed	to	be	concluded	within	the	first	two	years,	and	the	formative	evaluation	observed	
that,	as	a	result,	there	was	less	long-term	strategic	thinking	for	the	use	of	capital	funds.	The	
summative	report	concurred	that	the	requirement	to	focus	on	capital	spending	in	the	initial	
stages	impacted	on	the	future	development	activities	of	CETLs.	
Although	it	was	not	explicitly	stated	that	CETLs	needed	to	create	a	legacy,	there	was	an	
expectation	that	CETLs	would	continue	beyond	the	funding	period.	Indeed,	it	was	initially	
thought	that	there	would	be	some	continued	funding,	but	this	did	not	come	to	fruition.	
Achieving	such	a	legacy	without	continued	funding	beyond	2010	was	a	concern	for	
institutions,	and	is	highlighted	in	the	evaluations.	As	early	as	2008,	HEIs	were	questioning	
the	approach	to	funding	and	how	sustainability	would	be	possible	beyond	2010	without	
additional	money.	The	formative	evaluation	reported	that	long-term	planning	for	
sustainability	varied	considerably	across	the	CETLs,	with	42%	having	nothing	agreed,	14%	
concluding	that	there	would	be	no	institutional	funding	beyond	2010	(and	therefore	no	
continued	activity),	14%	having	some	funding	agreed	by	their	institutions	and	only	6%	
reporting	that	funding	would	be	guaranteed	by	the	institution.	The	independent	evaluation	
of	the	engineering	CETL	(Tolley	2008,	Crawford	and	Dickens	2008)	noted	as	a	key	
recommendation	that	the	CETL	was	well	embedded	within	its	institution	to	ensure	
sustainability	beyond	the	funding	period.	The	formative	evaluation	summarised	that	there	
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was	very	little	evidence	that	the	sector	saw	the	continuation	of	CETLs	as	an	institutional	
priority.		
By	the	summative	evaluation,	the	continuation	of	CETLs	was	still	not	resolved	for	a	large	
number,	and	the	authors	noted	that	‘our	impression	is	that	none	would	continue	with	the	
same	level	of	resources	and	activities	as	during	the	programme’	(SQW	2011	p.44).	A	
minority	of	CETLs	(17)	reported	that	they	would	continue	beyond	the	funding,	although	
with	reduced	resources,	and	a	number	of	those	reported	that	there	would	be	greater	
emphasis	on	self-funding.	The	evaluation	also	noted	that,	in	some	cases,	the	CETLs	would	
be	incorporated	into	learning	and	teaching	development	units	(p.44)	as	a	mechanism	for	
embedding	the	CETL	more	firmly	within	the	organisational	structure:	
‘The	data	indicate	that	staff	from	a	high	proportion	of	CETLs	will	remain	in	the	host	
institution	and	their	expertise	will	therefore	be	available	for	the	HEI	to	draw	upon	in	the	
future’	(SQW	2011	p.45).		
The	summative	report	also	observed	that	where	CETLs	had	been	able	to	engage	more	
widely	beyond	their	discipline	or	institution,	there	was	more	likelihood	of	a	legacy:	
‘It	is	worth	noting	that	where	strong	external	networks	had	been	established,	often	
involving	practitioners	and	employers	as	well	as	academics,	there	was	a	high	level	of	
confidence	that	these	would	continue	and	be	a	valued	vehicle	for	exchanging	
information	and	good	practice’	(SQW	2011	p45).	
Many	commentators	questioned	HEFCE’s	short	term	funding	approach	as	being	suitable	for	
embedding	CETL	activity	beyond	2010.	Gosling	and	Turner	(2015)	argue	that	there	is	
relative	powerlessness	in	funded	short-term	projects	to	act	as	agents	for	changing	
institutional	culture.	Julie	Hall,	co-Chair	of	the	Staff	and	Educational	Development	
Association,	quoted	in	the	THES,	also	called	into	question	the	short	term	nature	of	the	
funding,	suggesting	that	this	made	the	initiative:	
‘Inherently	flawed.	The	idea	that	...	significant,	time-limited	funding	for	Cetls	would	
impact	more	widely	on	curricula,	university	processes,	student	experience	and	
pedagogic	practice	across	the	sector	was	misguided,	naïve	and	rather	a	waste’	(Gove	
2012).	
Although,	at	£335m,	the	funding	for	the	CETL	programme	was	equal	to	the	whole	of	all	
other	HEFCE	teaching	enhancement	initiatives	from	1999	to	2009	combined,	it	is	perhaps	
surprising	that	there	was	not	greater	interest	from	the	press,	or	in	parliament,	when	the	
legacy	for	the	programme	failed	to	materialise.	The	lack	of	attention	may	reflect	the	fact	
that	views	on	the	success	or	failure	of	the	CETL	programme	were	mixed	across	the	sector	
itself.	Paul	Ramsden,	then	Chief	Executive	of	the	HEA,	stated	that	CETLs	were	‘a	poor	policy	
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poorly	managed	that	leaves	little	to	show	for	£315	million	[sic]’	(Ramsden	2012),	but	others,	
such	as	Mark	Fenton-O'Creevy,	Former	director	of	Practice-based	Professional	Learning	
CETL,	challenged	this	view,	claiming	sour	grapes	on	Ramsden’s	part	for	HEAs	failure	to	
engage	with	CETLs,	and	pointing	to	individual	examples	of	success	in	his	article,	‘Do	the	
maths:	Cetls'	contributions	add	up’	(Fenton-O'Creevy	2012).	
There	was	little	comment	from	government,	despite	the	large	sums	involved.	Indeed,	no	
questions	raised	in	parliament	were	in	relation	to	either	the	high	level	of	funding	or	lack	of	
legacy.	Kernohan,	writing	more	recently	(2015),	questions	why,	with	hindsight,	there	was	
not	a	select	committee	enquiry,	when	there	had	been	an	enquiry	in	to	the	e-University’s	
relatively	modest	£50	million.						
6.3.10	Programme:	Pedagogic	research	
Although	a	requirement	for	pedagogic	research	was	not	explicit	in	the	CETL	objectives,	it	
was	implied	and	was	seen	as	a	mechanism	for	putting	learning	and	teaching	on	a	par	with	
research.	HEFCE	saw	pedagogic	research	as	a	means	to			
‘enable	institutions	to	support	and	develop	practice	that	encourages	deeper	
understanding	across	the	sector	of	ways	of	addressing	students’	learning	effectively…	
[and]	deepen	staff	involvement	in	critical	scholarly	reflection…	by	strengthening	the	
CETLs	research’	(HEFCE	2004/05	p.10).		
The	formative	evaluation	concluded	that	pedagogic	research	had	been	sporadic	in	the	first	
half	of	the	programme	and,	although	83%	engaged	in	the	activity,	there	were	not	many	
examples	of	the	research	feeding	into	teaching	practice.	However,	they	noted,	
‘indications	that	in	a	number	of	CETLs	pedagogic	research	is	helping	to	develop	a	culture	
where	pedagogy	is	being	given	far	more	prominence	than	had	been	the	case	pre-CETL’	
(Saunders	et	al	2008p.74).		
By	the	time	of	the	summative	evaluation,	pedagogic	research	had	become	more	embedded	
and	was	one	of	the	areas	of	the	CETLs	considered	to	be	the	most	effective.	The	vast	
majority	saw	research	as	a	significant	aim,	and	indeed	‘examples	of	CETLs	which	did	not	
undertake	primary	research	were	relatively	rare’	(SQW	2011	p.37).	Most	CETLs	generated	
high	levels	of	research	outputs	such	as	peer-reviewed	journals,	book	chapters	and	case	
studies.	The	development	of	pedagogic	research	networks	were	highlighted	in	the	report,	
and	it	was	noted	that	
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‘Internal	networks	were	sometimes	crucial	in	the	first	few	years	of	the	CETL,	with	larger,	
external	networks	growing	in	prominence	as	centres	became	more	established’	(SQW	
2011	p.37).		
The	evaluation	does	highlight	a	concern	that	CETLs	were	disjointed	from	other	policy	
initiatives	in	this	regard,	with	very	few	examples	of	engagement	with	the	ESRC	and	HEFCE	
Teaching	and	Learning	Research	Programme,	although	it	also	questions	whether	that	was	
simply	because	the	self-evaluation	structure	did	not	give	prominence	to	highlighting	such	
links.				
6.4	Conclusion	
HEFCE	took	a	bottom-up	approach	with	the	CETL	initiative,	giving	institutions	the	freedom	
to	define	excellence	for	themselves,	proposing	their	own	organisational	structures	and	
requiring	little	in	the	way	of	accountability	for	the	funding.	Whilst	some	in	the	sector	
welcomed	such	an	approach,	others	criticised	HEFCE	for	being	too	‘hands-off’	and	for	failing	
to	coordinate	the	programme	to	ensure	that	there	was	a	legacy	of	good	practice	across	the	
sector.	There	is	substantial	evidence	that	a	good	deal	of	CETL	activity	took	place	and	that	
there	were	particular	successes	in	relation	to	capital	spend	for	teaching	resources	and	on	
students,	and	that	the	profile	of	pedagogic	research	had	been	raised	by	the	work	of	the	
CETLs.	At	the	level	of	the	individual	and	within	CETLs,	there	was	also	much	evidence	that	
the	funding	had	led	to	improved	teaching	and	learning	and	professional	development.	
However,	the	evidence	for	impact	at	institutional	level	was	sporadic	and	very	difficult	to	
evidence	at	sector	level.	As	such,	one	of	the	key	conclusions	from	this	analysis	is	that	the	
initiative	did	not	succeed	in	its	primary	objective	to	raise	the	profile	of	teaching	in	line	with	
that	of	research.	
Gosling	concludes	of	the	initiative	as	a	whole	that	
‘If	the	aim	was	to	transform	the	attitude	of	the	sector	towards	teaching,	then	this	
expensive	initiative	must	be	judged	a	failure…it	is	clear	from	the	evaluation	that	co-
ordination	of	the	CETLs	activities	and	their	outputs	has	been	weak’	(Gosling	2013	p.14).	
As	with	the	previous	case	study,	the	work	of	this	chapter	is	used	in	Chapter	8	to	interpret	
the	policy	episode	against	McConnell’s	framework.	Chapter	7	addresses	the	final	case	
study.	
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Chapter	7:	Case	study	3:	Lifelong	Learning	Networks	
7.1	Introduction	
The	Lifelong	Learning	Networks	(LLNs)	is	an	ideal	case	study	since	it	meets	all	the	criteria	
set	out	in	Table	6	(p.71)	in	being	a	time	bound	episode,	with	clearly	identified	proposed	
outcomes	and	benefits	to	the	target	group,	and	there	are	sufficient	sources	of	both	primary	
and	secondary	texts	to	offer	adequate	breadth	and	depth	to	develop	a	thick	description	of	
the	policy	episode.	In	considering	each	of	the	chosen	texts,	the	use	of	the	coding	
established	in	Appendix	B	enables	the	thick	description	to	be	interpreted	against	the	
theoretical	framework	in	Chapter	8,	to	give	a	nuanced	approach	in	addressing	the	main	
research	question,	articulating	the	success	or	failure	of	the	LLN	policy	episode.	This	is	also	
used	to	address	the	first	supplementary	research	question	in	establishing	commonalities	
and	differences	between	the	chosen	case	studies.		
The	LLN	initiative	was	a	policy	to	bring	HEIs	and	FECs	into	local	regional	partnerships	in	
order	to	guarantee	vocational	progression	pathways	to	higher	education	through	
collaboration	between	the	two	sectors.	What	was	distinctive	about	this	policy	episode	was	
that	LLNs	were,	at	least	formally,	a	joint	policy	initiative	with	another	sector	funding	body,	
the	Learning	Skills	Council	(LSC),	and	the	DfES,	as	part	of	a	joint	progression	strategy.	
Another	feature	of	the	initiative	was	an	expectation	that	LLNs	would	collaborate	with	
regional	agencies	such	as	Regional	Development	Agencies	(RDAs)	and	regional	branches	of	
Sector	Skills	Councils	(SSCs),	as	well	as	local	employers.	Like	CETLs,	this	was	a	bottom-up	
policy,	where	HEFCE	sought	to	allow	the	initiative	to	develop	within	the	LLNs,	with	loose	
objectives	and	structures,	rather	than	top-down	and	imposed.	It	is	distinctive	from	the	
other	case	studies	in	that	the	consultation,	a	typical	feature	of	HEFCE	policy	episodes,	was	
conducted	‘on	the	ground’	through	conversations	between	HEFCE	regional	operatives	and	
institutions.	Whilst	funding	was	limited	to	the	life	of	the	policy	(2005	–	2011),	it	was	
expected	that	the	work	of	the	LLNs	would	be	embedded	and	thus	continue	beyond	the	
funding	period.	
7.1.1	Sources	of	data	
The	evidence	for	the	LLNs	is	fertile,	with	both	interim	and	summative	evaluations,	regular	
HEFCE	reports	arising	from	analysis	of	the	LLN’s	own	monitoring	reports,	and	analysis	of	
LLN	learner	attributes,	as	evidence	of	LLN’s	influence	on	learners.	The	LLN	National	Forum	
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was	also	a	good	source	of	reports,	for	example	having	conducted	an	analysis	of	LLN	
research,	as	was	the	Centre	for	Recording	Achievement,	which	conducted	research	on	
behalf	of	HEFCE	into	the	personalised	learning	plans	in	LLNs.	In	the	secondary	literature,	
there	is	some	academic	focus	on	LLNs,	with	the	main	contributors	being:	Betts	and	Burrell	
(2011),	Leahy	(2013),	Little	&	Williams	(2009),	May	et	al	(2012),	Newby	(2005),	Ward	et	al	
(2012),	Watson	(2005),	Wise	and	Shaw	(2011),	and	Woodfield	et	al	(2013).		These	are	
outlined	more	fully	in	Appendix	A.	There	were	surprisingly	few	mentions	in	the	media,	with	
the	majority	of	articles	in	the	THES	being	written	by	the	directors	of	LLNs	showcasing	their	
work,	and	any	criticism	of	the	LLNs	did	not	come	until	later,	when	Ward	(2011)	recognised	
that	the	lack	of	continuation	funding	would	impact	on	LLN’s	survival.	In	the	House	of	
Commons,	although	few	questions	were	raised	in	regards	to	LLNs,	with	only	33	spoken	
references,	the	responses	were	positive.	For	example,	Mark	Williams	(Ceredigion	LD)	paid	
tribute	to	LLNs	on	28th	November	2007,	when	he	said,	
‘I	also	want	to	pay	tribute	to	the	work	in	South	Yorkshire	of	Higher	Futures,	the	lifelong	
learning	network,	which	seeks	to	combat	the	malaise	of	different	learning	providers	and	
bring	them	together	under	one	umbrella	to	provide	fresh	opportunities	for	the	
progression	of	vocational	work-based	learning’	(Hansard	2007).	
A	review	of	the	literature	reveals	a	general	consensus	of	support	for	the	activity	of	the	
LLNs,	both	during	the	life	of	the	initiative	and	since	termination	of	the	funding,	and	
considers	that	they	made	some	impact	on	vocational	entry	into	higher	education.	Most	of	
the	deliberation	concerns	wider	debates	in	terms	of	the	policy	approach,	whether	LLNs	
succeeded	in	raising	vocational	parity	in	line	with	academic	entry	qualifications	and	
whether	they	contributed	to	social	mobility.	LLNs	were	frequently	highlighted	as	evidence	
of	good	practice	on	vocational	skills	in	a	range	of	subsequent	government	reports,	
particularly	in	evidence	to	the	2006-07	Further	Education	and	Training	Bill,	the	2008-09	‘Re-
skilling	for	recovery:	after	Leitch,	implementing	skills	and	training	policies’	for	the	
Innovation,	Universities,	Science	and	Skills	Select	Committee,	and	the	2011	‘Government	
Reform	of	Higher	Education’	for	the	Business,	Innovation	and	Skills	Committee.		
7.2	An	account	of	the	episode	
7.2.1	Origin	
In	2001,	HEFCE	and	the	LSC	proposed	a	new	joint	initiative,	Partnerships	for	Progression	
(PfP),	to	widen	and	increase	participation	in	higher	education,	in	order	to	address	the	
government’s	ambition	of	50%	participation	in	higher	education	by	2010	(HEFCE	01/73).	
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£60m	was	provided	for	three	years,	between	April	2003	and	March	2006,	to	fund	FE	and	HE	
partnerships	with	staff	working	with	schools,	colleges	and	training	providers	on	regionally	
co-ordinated	activities,	such	as	summer	schools.	One	of	the	criticisms	of	this	initiative	was	
that	it	was	driven	at	the	discretion	of	the	HE	sector,	and	the	role	for	FE,	particularly	at	a	
strategic	level	for	delivering	vocational	training,	was	less	coherent	(response	to	the	PfP	
from	the	Learning	and	Skills	Development	Agency	2002).	LLNs,	introduced	towards	the	end	
of	the	PfP	initiative,	were	an	attempt	to	address	some	of	its	shortcomings	in	relation	to	the	
inclusion	of	FE,	and	to	develop	a	nationally	coherent	policy.			
The	HEFCE	Board	had	endorsed	proposals	for	the	development	of	LLNs	in	late	2003,	and	the	
first	public	reference	was	made	by	the	then	Chief	Executive	of	HEFCE,	Sir	Howard	Newby,	in	
the	2004	Colin	Bell	Memorial	Lecture,	‘Doing	Widening	Participation:	Social	inequality	and	
access	to	higher	education’.	Newby	acknowledged	that,	despite	progress	in	widening	
participation	in	the	English	sector,	whilst	90%	of	students	taking	‘A’	levels	progressed	into	
higher	education,	only	40-50%	of	students	undertaking	vocational	qualifications	at	Level	3	
progressed	(Newby	2005a).	Data	showed	that	the	vast	majority	of	students	taking	
vocational	qualifications	were	from	under-represented	and	poorer	backgrounds	(Ward	et	al	
2012)	and	thus,	if	the	sector	was	to	be	successful	in	widening	participation,	there	was	a	
need	to	ensure	greater	opportunity	for	access	to	HE	for	vocational	students.	Newby	argued	
that	this	approach	was	imperative	if	the	government	was	to	meet	the	50%	target.	He	
concluded	that	in	the	English	context,	there	was	confusion	at	the	post	16	level	for	entry	
into	HE	for	those	wanting	to	take	a	more	vocational	route,	and	progression	routes	were	not	
nationally	and	consistently	applied.	In	order	to	combat	this	problem,	he	suggests	that	there	
was	a	
‘need	to	ensure	that	higher	education	accommodates	the	‘vocational’	as	well	as	the	
‘academic’…‘the	academic	and	the	vocational	are	not	a	distinction,	but	a	spectrum’	
(Newby	2005a	p.13).		
Howard	Newby	had	first-hand	experience	of	the	American	system,	as	he	had	been	a	
professor	at	the	University	of	Wisconsin-Madison	in	the	early	1980s.	In	the	Wisconsin	
model,	all	citizens	in	the	state	have	access	to	HE	opportunities	through	the	sharing	of	
pathways	and	resources,	and	there	are	clearer	pathways	for	progression.	In	his	2004	
speech,	he	noted	of	the	USA	that	
‘institutions	with	distinctly	different	missions	have	a	common	interest	in	ensuring	such	
opportunities	are	available,	and	in	putting	arrangements	in	place	to	facilitate	it’	(Newby	
2005a	p.14).	
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As	such,	he	saw	the	potential	for	policy	borrowing	from	the	US.	Newby’s	solution	was	to	
develop	a	network	of	partners,	typically	at	a	regional	level,	headed	by	an	organisation	that	
had	a	distinctiveness	with	which	potential	learners	could	identify	and	would	provide	the	
structure	and	cohesion	required	to	guide	students	through	progression	routes.	He	
proposed	that	these	would	be	called	Lifelong	Learning	Networks	and	
‘LLNs	would	therefore	offer	a	wide-ranging	curriculum,	combining	the	strengths	of	
further	and	higher	education’	…‘At	the	heart	of	every	Network	will	be	arrangements	to	
facilitate	progression’	(Newby	2005a	p.16/17).			
Networks,	for	the	most	part,	would	focus	on	maximising	opportunities	in	the	local	and	
regional	context,	through	links	to	the	Sector	Skills	Councils	and	relevant	employers.	The	link	
to	employers	had	been	less	coherent	in	the	PfP	initiative,	but	formed	a	key	element	for	
LLNs.	In	a	journal	article	a	year	after	the	Colin	Bell	lecture,	Newby	emphasised	the	
importance	of	the	employer	link	to	the	HE	curriculum:	
‘HE	needs	to	engage	more	closely	with	employers,	think	more	systematically	about	
employability	in	a	changing	society	and	economy,	and	be	prepared	to	make	the	
necessary	changes	to	the	existing	curriculum	and	the	ways	in	which	it	is	developed….	
[LLNs	will]	make	the	whole	HE	offer	available	to	learners	over	a	lifetime	of	work	and	
study,	allowing	people	to	build	on	their	earlier	learning	without	being	confined	by	it’	
(Newby	2005a	p179-180).			
At	a	speech	at	the	LLN	National	Forum	in	2009,	Newby	revealed	that	LLNs	had	not	been	the	
first	choice	in	HEFCE’s	vision	for	tackling	vocational	progression.	Preferred	solutions	were	to	
firstly	follow	the	American	Community	College	model	much	more	closely,	with	institutions	
sharing	progression	and	resources	through	the	levels	of	education,	and	the	second	was	a	
proposal	to	merge	FE	and	HE	to	ensure	continuous	progression	(reported	in	Betts	&	Burrell	
2011,	p.2).		However,	HEFCE	had	observed	that	both	approaches	might	be	more	
contentious	(Newby	2005b).		
7.2.2	English	context	
The	post-compulsory	education	policy	context	in	England	since	the	1950s	had	seen	several	
decades	of	government	trying	to	improve	vocational	pathways	to	HE,	but	‘A’	levels	
continued	to	remain	the	dominant	route	for	progression.	The	1980s	and	1990s	saw	the	
development	of	vocational	qualifications	such	as	BTEC	National	Diplomas	and	access	to	HE	
diplomas,	but	there	was	little	which	clarified	their	currency	for,	or	routes	into,	HE,	resulting	
in	what	Little	&	Connor	referred	to	as	the	‘crazy	paving’	of	vocational	progression	(2005).	
Dearing,	in	the	1997	National	Committee	of	Enquiry	into	Higher	Education,	recommended	
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that	HEIs	work	with	FECs	to	develop	curricula	and	access	routes,	in	an	attempt	to	
streamline	progression	through	bridging	courses	and	make	HE	more	accessible	to	
vocational	learners,	but	in	the	event	little	had	changed	by	the	turn	of	the	century.		
In	the	context	of	HE	in	the	early	2000s,	the	dominant	rhetoric	at	that	time	was	New	
Labour’s	commitment	to	increasing	participation	in	higher	education	to	50%	by	2010	(Blair	
2004),	but	in	addition,	New	Labour	focussed	attention	on	proposals	to	widen	participation	
to	under-represented	groups:		
‘The	concept	of	widening	participation	in	higher	education	as	distinct	from	increasing	or	
expanding	participation	is	a	relatively	recent	additional	to	the	policy	discourse’	(CHERI	
2008	p.13).		
In	particular,	there	was	a	focus	on	ensuring	greater	inclusion	from	lower	socio-economic	
backgrounds,	where	the	young	were	more	likely	to	undertake	vocational	qualifications.	The	
attention	on	widening	as	well	as	increasing	participation	was	necessary	if	the	50%	target	
was	to	be	met,	as	Newby	pointed	out	in	his	2004	lecture:	
‘It	is	statistically	highly	unlikely	that	we	could	achieve	a	50	per	cent	participation	rate	in	
higher	education	without	simultaneously	widening	it’	(Newby	2005a	p.4).		
The	focus	on	increasing	and	widening	participation	also	resulted	in	reforms	in	the	14-19	
sector,	with	the	2004	Tomlinson	Review	and	the	development	of	the	14-19	qualifications	
framework,	which	also	sought	to	clarify	and	streamline	educational	progression	for	younger	
learners,	again	in	the	context	of	academic	and	vocational	learning.	Related	to	the	widening	
participation	agenda,	the	government	commissioned	Professor	Stephen	Schwarz	to	
undertake	a	review	of	fair	admissions	to	universities,	resulting	in	the	2004	report,	‘Fair	
Admissions	to	Higher	Education:	Recommendations	for	Good	Practice’,	to	demonstrate	that	
the	admission	of	students	undertaking	non-traditional	entrance	courses	was	as	fair,	
transparent	and	principled	as	that	for	‘A’	level	entrants.	Following	recommendations	in	the	
2004	Higher	Education	Act,	the	Office	for	Fair	Access	(OFFA)	was	established,	with	a	remit	
to	
‘increase	the	proportion	of	learners	from	under-represented	and	disadvantaged	groups	
who	enter,	succeed	in	and	are	well	prepared	to	progress	from	higher	education	to	
employment	or	postgraduate	study’	(OFFA	2015/02).	
Also	as	a	result	of	the	2004	Higher	Education	Act,	the	HE	sector	saw	the	introduction	of	
variable	fees	and	a	shift	in	the	principal	funding	of	higher	education	from	the	state	to	the	
student.	Some	HE	scholars	observed	that	the	introduction	of	higher	fees	might	cause	HE	
institutions	to	re-evaluate	their	priorities	away	from	non-traditional	entry	and	
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qualifications,	thus	putting	greater	pressure	on	maintaining	partnerships	for	progression	to	
HE	(Woodfield	et	al	2013).	Newby	himself	observed	that	there	was	potential	for	greater	
fragmentation	of	FE-HE	collaboration	as	a	result	of	fees,	but	contended	that	LLNs	might	be	
positioned	to	
‘reconnect	a	sector	that	might	otherwise	be	pulled	apart	to	a	greater	degree	by	the	
introduction	of	variable	fees’	(Newby	2005b	p.183).	
Indeed,	some	academic	commentators	on	HE	policy	have	suggested	that	the	development	
of	LLNs	was	an	attempt	to	protect	vocational	opportunities	ahead	of	the	introduction	of	
fees	(Parry	2006).		
One	of	the	other	main	policy	drivers	for	the	New	Labour	government	at	that	time	was	a	
focus	on	the	development	of	skills	to	meet	the	conditions	of	a	more	globalised	and	
knowledge-based	economy,	resulting	in	the	Leitch	Review	of	Skills	in	2004.	The	report,	
published	in	2006,	recommended	a	considerable	degree	of	‘up-skilling’	of	the	workforce,	
with	greater	percentages	of	students	being	expected	to	progress.	In	addition,	the	
establishment	of	the	Regional	Development	Agencies	(RDAs)	in	1998	and	Sector	Skills	
Councils	(SSCs)	in	2002	contributed	significantly	to	the	skills	agenda	and	a	greater	focus	on	
regional	economic	development.	Following	the	Leitch	Review,	which	emphasised	the	
involvement	of	employers	in	skills	education,	the	government	had	begun	to	re-focus	policy	
more	strongly	in	favour	of	employer	engagement,	particularly	at	regional	level.			
These	policies,	and	others	more	specifically	in	higher	education,	such	as	the	development	
of	Foundation	Degrees,	were,	in	principle	at	least,	aimed	at	counteracting	the	‘deficit’	view	
of	under-participation	in	HE,	favoured	by	Dearing	(NCIHE	1997)	which	suggests	that	
participation	can	be	addressed	by	increasing	the	supply	of	HE.	Instead,	these	policies	
favoured	a	more	demand-led	approach,	where	the	needs	of	both	students	and	employers	
were	met,	thus	increasing	participation.	It	is	within	these	policy	contexts	of	progression,	
vocational	skills	development	and	meeting	the	demands	for	local	economies	that	LLNs	were	
expected	to	operate.				
A	key	characteristic	of	LLNs	was	their	engagement	with	a	wealth	of	other	agencies	and	
policy	initiatives	across	many	public	sectors.	There	were	many	other	organisations	and	
initiatives	in	place	at	the	start	of,	and	developed	during,	the	LLN	initiative,	many	of	which	
crossed	policy	boundaries	and	the	focus	of	their	work,	such	as:	
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• Centres	of	Vocational	Excellence	
• New	Technology	Institutes		
• Knowledge	Exchanges	
• Aimhigher		
• Higher	Level	Skills	Pathfinders	
• Train	to	Gain	
• Economic	Challenge	Investment	Fund	
• 14	–	19	Qualifications	Framework		
• Advanced	Apprenticeships	
In	2007,	the	National	Audit	Office	attempted	to	pictorially	sum	up	the	partnership	
relationships	of	organisations	which	helped	to	deliver	the	skills	agenda,	which	included	
FECs,	HEIs	and	LLNs.	This	diagram	is	illustrative	in	contextualising	LLNs	alongside	other	
policy	initiatives	as	well	as	showing	the	complexity	of	the	policy	landscape	at	that	time:	
		
Lifelong	Learning	Networks	 	 	 	 ©	National	Audit	Office	(2007)	
Figure	12	–	ORGANISATIONS	IN	PARTNERSHIPS	INVOLVED	IN	THE	DELIVERY	OF	THE	
GOVERNMENT’S	SKILLS	AGENDA	
7.2.3	Some	international	perspectives	
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and	New	Zealand	have	progression	to	HE	systems	that	are	‘culturally	embedded’	(Watson	
2005	p.193),	such	that	progression	behaviours	are	the	expectation.	Similarly,	since	the	
1990s,	access	to	HE	has	been	a	policy	goal	in	the	European	Union,	and	it	has	been	EU	policy	
since	2002	to	support	Lifelong	Learning	(Nemeth	2010).	However,	much	of	the	focus	has	
been	aspirational	rather	than	effectual,	and	Muller	et	al	(2015)	found	in	a	recent	study	that,	
for	many	countries,	the	transition	between	vocational	and	academic	still	needs	to	be	
simplified.	Muller	et	al	(2015)	suggest	that	the	models	adopted	by	Nordic	countries	
demonstrate	greater	participation	rates,	such	as	in	Finland,	where	lifelong	learning	is	a	key	
principle	of	education	policy,	and	an	act	of	parliament	harmonised	all	entry	level	
qualifications.	Denmark	undertook	a	major	reform	of	its	vocational	and	continuing	training	
system	in	2000,	and	although	secondary	education	is	split	into	the	academic	and	
vocational,	all	students	have	the	opportunity	to	progress	to	HE	through	clear	pathways.	
Hungary	is	perhaps	the	only	other	European	country	to	have	Lifelong	Learning	Networks	as	
a	means	to	enhancing	progression	from	vocational	qualifications	to	HE	(Nemeth	2010).		
7.2.4	Organisations	and	actors	
LLNs	were	unusual	in	engaging	with	such	a	wide	range	of	both	participating	and	influencing	
organisations,	as	Figure	12	(p.207)	demonstrates.	Although	initiated	by	the	HEFCE	Board,	
and	Sir	Howard	Newby	in	particular,	LLNs	were	part	of	the	wider	Joint	Progression	Strategy	
with	the	LSC	and	the	DfES,	and	it	was	envisaged	that	the	LSC	would	be	an	equal	partner	in	
funding	and	driving	the	LLN	policy.	However,	in	the	event,	the	LSC	did	not	contribute	
financially.		
The	regional	dimension	added	a	further	layer	of	complexity	to	the	policy	episode.	
Universities	and	colleges	were	expected	to	play	a	key	role	in	the	LLNs,	but	it	was	intended	
that	HEFCE’s	own	regional	consultants	and	LSC	regional	directors	would	be	the	driving	force	
in	developing	proposals	and	business	plans	for	LLNs,	and	such	proposals	would	be	
influenced	by	the	agendas	of	the	RDAs	and	regional	SSCs.		The	initial	joint	circular	and	
briefing	paper	to	heads	of	HEFCE	funded	institutions,	and	LSC	funded	FECs,	reveals	
expectations	that	LLNs	would	engage	at	regional	level	with	at	least	seven	other	
organisations:	Centres	of	Vocational	Excellence	(CoVEs),	CETLs,	New	Technology	Institutes	
and	Knowledge	Exchanges	(which	were	in	development),	Aimhigher	networks	and	steering	
groups,	local	employers	and	other	regional	agencies	(HEFCE	12/2004	p.6).	
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The	relationship	between	HEIs	and	FECs	in	LLNs	was	critical	to	success	in	developing	a	
progression	strategy	and	vocational	pathways,	but	relationships	were	often	complex.	This	
was	particularly	highlighted	in	relation	to	the	distribution	of	Additional	Student	Numbers	
which,	whilst	a	key	element	of	the	funding,	also	introduced	an	element	of	competition	
between	the	FECs	and	HEIs	(Parry	2006).	It	is	noteworthy	that	in	the	original	briefing	
(HEFCE	12/2004),	it	was	a	condition	of	grant	that	LLNs	had	a	research	intensive	university	as	
part	of	the	network,	although	in	practice	this	did	not	come	to	fruition	for	all	networks.		
The	role	of	learners	in	LLNs	was	complex,	as	students	were	expected	to	engage	with	the	
LLNs	as	entities	in	their	own	right,	as	they	were	intended	to	have	a	sufficiently	strong	brand	
to	be	meaningful	to	learners,	as	well	as	engaging	with	individual	institutions.	However,	this	
relationship	also	proved	difficult,	as	will	be	explored	later	in	this	chapter.		
This	wide	range	of	actors	and	organisations	connected	to	LLNs	afforded	plenty	of	scope	for	
challenging	relationships	and	contested	topics,	which	are	explored	in	7.3	below.	
7.2.5	Activities	
7.2.5.1	A	bottom-up	approach	
Following	Newby’s	speech,	a	proposal	for	LLNs	was	launched	by	HEFCE,	DfES	and	LSC	to	the	
sector	in	June	2004.	As	part	of	the	Joint	Progression	Strategy,	LLNs	were	expected	to	
provide	
‘the	coherence,	clarity	and	certainty	of	progression	opportunities	for	vocational	learners	
into	and	through	higher	education’	(HEFCE	12/2004).		
Unusually	for	a	HEFCE	funding	initiative,	the	proposal	for	LLNs	set	out	in	the	letter	and	
briefing	did	not	constitute	a	consultation,	and	the	sector	was	not	invited	to	comment	
beyond	a	promise	from	HEFCE	to	answer	any	questions.	In	this	policy	episode,	consultation	
took	place	on	the	ground,	through	HEFCE	regional	consultants,	LSC	regional	directors	and	
The	National	Institute	of	Adult	Continuing	Education	(NIACE),	who	would	
‘be	discussing	these	proposals	with	HEIs,	FECs	and	other	interested	parties…	with	a	view	
to	developing	initial	proposals	for	at	least	one	LLN	in	each	region’	(HEFCE	12/2004	p.2).		
Initially,	the	expectation	from	HEFCE	was	that	through	regional	consultations,	
‘demonstrator’	or	pilot	LLNs	would	be	developed,	building	on	existing	progression	
arrangements	and	partnerships	between	institutions,	and	that	different	LLNs	would	take	
different	approaches	to	their	organisational	structures	and	in	supporting	learners.			
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Promoted	in	the	circular	to	institutions	as	a	‘step	change	in	vocational	progression’	(HEFCE	
12/2004	p.1),	LLNs	were	expected	to	offer	a	range	of	curricula	and	pathways	pertinent	to	
their	local	labour	market	needs,	in	order	to:	
• ‘Combine	the	strengths	of	a	number	of	diverse	institutions	
• Provide	support	for	learners	on	vocational	pathways	
• Bring	greater	clarity,	coherence	and	certainty	to	progression	opportunities	
• Develop	the	curriculum	as	appropriate	to	facilitate	progression	
• Value	vocational	learning	outcomes	and	provide	opportunities	for	vocational	
learners	to	build	on	earlier	learning	
• Locate	the	progression	strategy	within	a	commitment	to	lifelong	learning,	ensuring	
that	learners	have	access	to	a	range	of	progression	opportunities	so	that	they	can	
move	between	different	kinds	of	vocational	and	academic	programmes	as	their	
interest,	needs	and	abilities	develop’	(HEFCE	12/2004	p.4).	
It	was	expected	that	each	network	would	have	certain	essential	key	characteristics,	upon	
which	funding	would	be	dependent:	
• ‘LLNs	must	centre	around	Progression	Agreements	(PAs)	
• Will	involve	FECs	and	HEIs	with	at	least	one	research-intensive	institution	in	
partnership	
• Will	have	consulted	with	SSCs	and	other	stakeholders’	(HEFCE	12/2004).	
Each	network	would	facilitate	activities	in	Curriculum	Development,	Information,	Advice	
and	Guidance	(IAG)	to	students	and	development	of	PAs.	Provision	for	students	to	easily	
change	programmes	and	move	to	other	institutions	was	considered	a	key	characteristic	
and,	in	the	initial	proposal,	developing	local	credit	accumulation	transfer	agreements	was	
an	important	component.	
Like	the	CETLs,	this	policy	initiative	followed	a	bottom-up	approach,	and	whilst	LLNs	were	
expected	to	conform	to	the	characteristics	described	above,	the	exact	structure	and	terms	
for	LLNs	were	not	prescribed.	The	rationale	for	developing	such	a	policy	approach	was	that	
initiatives	that	were	sector	driven,	rather	than	prescribed	by	HEFCE,	would	present	less	risk	
in	terms	of	take	up	by	the	sector,	and	continued	sustainability	beyond	the	funding	period,	
with	deepening	effects	across	the	sector,	was	more	likely.	
Unlike	the	CETLs,	there	was	no	firm	deadline	for	proposals,	so	as	not	to	be	‘constrained	by	
artificial	deadlines’	(HEFCE	12/2004	p.2)	and	no	bidding	process	as	such;	the	proposals	and	
business	plans	developed	in	consultation	with	HEFCE	regional	consultants	and	LSC	regional	
directors	were	considered	on	a	case	by	case	basis.	In	September	2004,	HEFCE	approved	the	
first	three	LLNs:	Sussex,	Higher	York	and	Greater	Manchester	Networks	and,	by	2007,	thirty	
networks	had	been	established,	twenty-eight	having	a	regional	focus,	including	120	HEIs	
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and	over	300	FECs,	representing	almost	national	coverage.	In	addition,	two	LLNs,	National	
Arts	Learning	Network	and	VETNET	(to	widen	participation	in	veterinary	education),	had	a	
national	focus	in	two	distinct	disciplines.				
7.2.5.2	Funding	and	accountability	
The	approach	to	funding	is	noteworthy	for	being	a	combination	of	time-limited	strategic	
development	funding	for	the	set-up	of	the	LLN,	and	recurrent	funding	in	the	form	of	ASNs	
awarded	to	each	LLN.	Development	funding	was	flexible,	and	unlike	the	e-University	and	
CETLs,	the	original	proposal	did	not	stipulate	a	figure	for	the	initiative	and	neither	were	
there	set	boundaries	for	funding	bands	based	on	size	or	activity,	as	had	been	the	case	for	
the	CETLs:	‘we	do	not	wish	at	this	stage	to	set	prescribed	limits	to	the	funding	aspirations	of	
prospective	LLNs’	(HEFCE	12/2004	p.3).	Funding	came	from	HEFCE’s	strategic	development	
fund	and	HEFCE	expected	to	award	funds	in	the	first	instance	for	a	minimum	of	three	years,	
which	would	include	start-up	capital	and	running	costs.	However,	in	the	longer	term,	LLNs	
were	expected	to	attract	funds	from	other	external	sources	in	order	to	continue	activities.	
Most	proposals	began	by	seeking	funding	for	a	3-6	month	development	phase	leading	to	
the	production	of	a	full	business	plan,	usually	with	funding	of	£10-30k.	A	HEFCE	advisory	
group	was	established	to	ensure	that	there	were	multiple	readings	of	the	business	plans	by	
staff	across	HEFCE,	who	would	develop	well-documented	feedback	to	proposed	LLNs.	To	
agree	funding,	the	business	plans	were	submitted	to	HEFCE’s	SDF	committee	or,	in	the	case	
of	very	large	proposals,	HEFCE	Board,	for	approval.	Although	HEFCE	initially	planned	that	
LLNs	would	be	a	small	programme	with	demonstrator	models,	over	time	a	large	percentage	
of	the	SDF,	£105m,	was	spent	on	the	LLN	programme.	
The	award	of	ASNs	was	central	to	LLNs,	particularly	as	a	financial	lever	to	encourage	the	
engagement	of	FECs	and	HEIs.	Some	ASNs	were	used	for	new	curriculum	developments,	or	
CPD	where	there	was	demand	from	employers,	and	there	was	a	significant	focus	on	using	
ASNs	for	Foundation	Degrees	(FDs).	Indeed,	FDs	were	a	main	focus	of	much	of	the	LLN	
activity.		
In	the	early	stages,	LLNs	were	able	to	choose	between	two	funding	models.	In	Model	1,	
ASNs	were	allocated	to	institutions	within	LLN	partnerships	as	part	of	mainstream	grant.	In	
Model	2,	ASNs	were	held	outside	mainstream	grant	by	the	LLN’s	lead	institution	for	all	
institutions	within	it.	Initially,	networks	had	expected	to	get	significant	amounts	of	ASNs,	
and	so	put	these	in	their	plans;	and	between	2006	and	2009,	14,700	ASNs	(£60m)	were	
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awarded	to	LLNs.	However,	in	2009,	following	the	wider	economic	difficulties	and	squeeze	
on	public	funding,	HEFCE	significantly	reduced	the	number	of	ASNs	available	which,	in	some	
cases,	impacted	on	LLN’s	ability	to	deliver	their	plans.	By	2009-10,	Model	2	was	being	
phased	out,	with	all	subsequent	ASNs	being	funded	through	the	mainstream	grant,	in	order	
to	embed	the	LLN	activity	before	the	end	of	the	initiative.	
Echoing	the	policy	approach	of	the	CETLs,	HEFCE	did	not	propose	any	formal	accountability	
for	the	networks,	although,	unlike	the	CETLs,	HEFCE	did	propose	to	introduce	some	
quantitative	metrics	for	evaluating	the	success	of	LLNs,	from	data	on	progression	and	
increasing	widening	participation:	
‘The	partners	will	evaluate	the	success	of	networks	in	the	context	of	more	wide-ranging	
research	into	the	patterns	of	progression	to	higher	education	from	vocational	learners’	
(HEFCE	12/2004	p.6).	
The	2005	HEFCE	LLN	progress	report	also	proposed	that,	for	the	purposes	of	establishing	
value	for	money,	the	cost	per	student	would	be	calculated	by	formula,	calculated	using	the	
costs	of	the	LLN	divided	by	the	number	of	students	engaged	with	it	(HEFCE	2005	p.3).	
Targets	(both	in	terms	of	progression	arrangements	and	student	engagements)	were	set	by	
each	LLN	internally,	and	they	were	expected	to	establish	their	own	criteria	for	success.	It	
was	anticipated	that	peer	evaluation	by	the	partners	in	each	LLN	would	be	sufficient	to	
ensure	that	the	key	characteristics	were	being	upheld	and	targets	were	being	met.	Despite	
the	original	expectation	that	LLNs	would	not	be	required	to	formally	account	for	their	
progress,	in	the	event	there	were	regular	progress	reports	on	LLNs	published	by	HEFCE	in	
2005,	2008	and	2009	and,	following	the	recommendation	of	the	interim	evaluation	in	2008,	
a	standardised	reporting	mechanism	was	introduced	for	LLNs	to	submit	an	annual	report.	
These	were	formally	analysed	by	HEFCE	and,	along	with	statistical	reports	on	LLN	learner	
attributes,	used	to	inform	the	HEFCE	progress	reports	up	until	2010.		
7.2.5.3	Organisational	structures	
The	diversity	of	the	approaches	taken	by	LLNs	meant	that	there	were	many	and	varied	
organisational	structures.	HEFCE	supported	proposals	that	established	different	models	of	
engagement,	and	there	was	no	formal	expectation	of	organisational	structure,	other	than	a	
requirement	for	a	management	group	and	strategic	level	group.	Some	LLNs	had	a	large	core	
staff	team	leading	on	projects	funded	in	the	LLNs,	whilst	others	had	a	small	staff	team	and	
funded	activities	led	by	FE	and	HE	partners.	Initially,	HEFCE	proposed	that	LLNs	would	build	
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upon	existing	partnerships	between	FECs	and	HEIs,	developing	these	into	pilot	LLNs	to	test	
different	approaches	to	network	formation,	and	so	it	was	envisaged	that	networks	would	
be	different:	some	might	be	limited	to	some	curriculum	areas,	and	some	might	be	much	
broader.	
All	LLNs	proposed	initially	to	map	existing	provision	in	their	partner	FECs	and	HEIs	in	order	
to	identify	gaps,	and	then	to	develop	curricula,	particularly	bridging	programmes,	to	create	
coherent	progression	routes	from	vocational	programmes	onto	HE	programmes.	
Developing	coherent	PAs,	IAG	and	individual	learning	plans	were	critical	activities	for	LLNs,	
as	outlined	in	the	original	briefing	paper	(HEFCE	12/2004).	Although	all	LLNs	shared	the	
same	long	term	ambitions,	the	nature	of	the	initiative	meant	that	they	could	develop	
individually	in	line	with	their	partners’	curriculum	interests	and	their	unique	regional	
contexts,	thus	allowing	them	to	focus	on	different	and	locally	relevant	employment	sectors.	
As	Williams	notes,		
‘The	iterative	nature	of	the	policy	approach	had	led	to	quite	distinct	differences	between	
LLNs.	Networks	varied	greatly	in	terms	of	their	scope,	focus	and	ambitions’	(Williams	
2008	p.3).	
In	2006,	almost	two	years	after	the	start	of	the	LLNs,	A	National	LLN	Forum	was	established,	
and	hosted	by	Higher	York,	the	first	LLN.	Its	purpose	was	to	share	good	practice	and	
promote	new	ideas	throughout	the	LLN	network,	and	it	was	very	active,	with	evidence	of	
sharing	of	good	practice	and	co-activity,	as	well	as	a	website	and	newsletters,	noted	in	both	
the	interim	and	summative	evaluations.	
7.2.6	Outcomes	
As	a	consequence	of	the	annual	HEFCE	progress	reports,	the	statistical	reporting	of	learner	
attributes	for	2006-07	and	2007-08,	and	the	data	collated	for	the	summative	evaluation,	it	
is	possible	to	build	up	a	clear	picture	of	LLN	activity	and	achievements	throughout	much	of	
the	time	period.		
Analysis	of	the	key	findings	suggests	that	almost	50%	of	funding	was	spent	on	activities	
providing	curriculum	opportunities	such	as	bridging	courses,	PAs	and	IAG.	Towards	the	end	
of	the	funding,	LLNs	were	actively	seeking	funding,	securing	£2,029,380	from	other	sources,	
some	of	which	were	other	HEFCE	initiatives,	to	ensure	their	sustainability	(HEFCE	2009,	
HEFCE	2009/29,	SQW	2010).	Perhaps	surprisingly,	given	the	expectation	that	LLNs	would	
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work	closely	with	regional	employers,	less	than	10%	of	funding	was	spent	on	employer	
engagement.		
The	scale	of	the	activity	was	vast,	and	increased	throughout	the	period	of	the	initiative,	
with	nearly	33,000	staff	involved	nationally	and	more	than	8,500	PAs	in	place	between	
institutions.	The	scale	of	IAG	was	equally	large,	with	200,000	paper	based	resources,	15,000	
learners	receiving	one-to-one	support	and	39,000	group	support,	and	there	were	almost	
one	million	website	hits	(HEFCE	2009,	HEFCE	2009/29,	SQW	2010).	The	need	for	such	large	
scale	IAG	is	unsurprising,	given	that	the	progression	agreements	were	often	complex	
between	courses	and	institutions.	Conversely,	the	scale	of	the	activity	is	not	reflected	in	the	
scale	of	learners	engaging	through	LLNs.	The	numbers	of	LLN	engaged	learners	was	small,	
with	little	over	17,000	nationally	throughout	the	period	and,	in	2008-09,	the	numbers	
represented	only	0.7%	of	the	total	undergraduate	first	year	population,	and	only	a	tenth	
were	in	the	research	intensive	universities.	In	addition,	although	a	large	number	of	learners	
were	engaging	with	the	LLN	at	a	higher	level	than	their	prior	qualifications,	almost	30%	of	
LLN	learners	already	had	an	HE	level	qualification	prior	to	their	engagement,	and	this	level	
was	consistent	throughout	the	period	(HEFCE	2009,	HEFCE2009/29,	SQW	2010).		
These	findings	are	summarised	in	Table	14	below	and	discussed	in	more	detail	in	Section	
7.3	(p.219),	where	they	are	relevant	to	the	themed	discussions.	
Table	14	–	SUMMARY	OF	LLN	ACTIVITY	FROM	HEFCE	MONITORING	AND	STUDENT	ATTRIBUTE	
REPORTS	
Area	 2006-07	key	findings:	 2007-08	key	findings:	 2008-09	key	
findings:	
Expenditure	 	 Curriculum	development	(19%)	
PAs	(16.6%)	
IAG	(14.1%)	
Employer	engagement	(9.1%)	
were	activities	with	the	greatest	expenditure	
Funding	from	
other	sources	
beyond	LLN	
HEFCE	funding	
	 LLNs	received	£1,038,001	
from	other	sources	(some	of	
which	was	HEFCE	other	
initiatives)	
LLNs	received	
£2,029,380	from	other	
sources	(some	of	which	
was	HEFCE	other	
initiatives)	
Curriculum	
development	
	 Key	area	where	LLNs	are	
working	to	clarify	and	create	
progression	routes	is	through	
BTEC	qualifications	and	
through	HE	from	FDs.	
14-19	engagement	
Significant	activity	in	
apprenticeships	
Curriculum	
development	
	 Over	700	new	or	modified	
courses	(3/4	of	which	with	
involvement	of	employers,	
and	some	SSC	involvement)	
1,150	new	or	modified	
curriculum	
developments	with	
another	700	in	progress	
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Area	 2006-07	key	findings:	 2007-08	key	findings:	 2008-09	key	
findings:	
Curriculum		 Creative	arts	and	design	
most	frequently	studied	
subject	area	
Combined	subjects	most	
commonly	returned	as	most	
frequently	studied	area	
Business	and	
administration	studies,	
creative	arts	&	design,	
architecture,	building	&	
planning	most	
frequently	studied	area	
Progression	
agreements	
	 1,697	PAs	in	place	 8,528	PAs	in	place		
Progression	
agreements	
	 Complex	array	of	PAs	(one	LLN	has	52	PAs	with	15,000	
pathways)	
Staff	
development	
and	
partnerships	
	 350	staff	development	
events,	16,000	staff	involved	
(targeting	admissions	staff)	
2,400	staff	
development	events,	
32,900	staff	involved	
IAG	 	 IAG	activity:	
1-1 20,075	
Group	support	36,654	
Website	211,833	
200,000	paper-based	
IAG	resources	
1-1 15,000	
Group	support	53,000	
Website	900,000	
Qualification	
prior	to	LLN	
activity	
28%	already	held	HE	level	
qualifications	on	entry		
23%	had	A	level	or	
equivalent	qualifications	
on	entry	
94%	undertake	a	higher	
level	of	study	in	LLN	than	
previous	level	of	study	
59%	first-time	starters	in	HE	
from	level	3	
28%	already	held	HE	level	
qualifications	on	entry	
31%	had	A	level	or	equivalent	
qualifications	on	entry	
88%	undertake	a	higher	level	
of	study	in	LLN	than	previous	
level	of	study	
46%	first-time	starters	
in	HE	from	level	3	
36%	had	A	level	or	
equivalent	
qualifications	on	entry	
	
Learner	
attributes	
63%	female	
39%	aged	19	or	younger	
83%	white	
12%	from	POLAR	quintile	1	
61%	female	
40%	aged	19	or	younger	
83%	white	
12%	from	POLAR	quintile	1	
	
Learner	
attributes	
3,170	registered	as	LLN	
students	(only	70	
registered	at	a	FEC)	
8,080	registered	as	LLN	
students	(only	440	registered	
at	a	FEC)	
5,880	LLN	flagged	
learners	(0.7%	of	total	
ug	1st	year	population)	
28%	registered	for	first	
degree,	39%	for	FDs	
FEC/HEI		 Almost	two-thirds	of	
students	returned	in	
general	colleges,	specialist	
HEIs	and	FECs	
One	in	5	in	research	
orientated	universities	
Half	of	students	returned	in	
general	colleges,	specialist	
HEIs	and	FECs	
A	tenth	in	research	oriented	
universities	
	
	
	
Note:	student	attributes	assumes	LLN	flagged	learners	(at	all	entry	qualification	levels)	
Since	there	were	regular	monitoring	reports,	and	the	summative	evaluation,	HEFCE	was	
able	to	respond	quickly	to	LLN	issues	as	they	arose.	Whilst	the	general	policy	direction	did	
not	change,	there	were	minor	clarifications	and	modifications	to	enable	the	initiative	to	
meet	its	objectives,	and	thus	the	initiative	was	more	dynamic	than	that	of	the	e-University	
or	the	CETLs.	For	example,	in	the	2005	monitoring	report,	HEFCE	recognised	that	the	issue	
of	PAs	was	causing	some	contestation	amongst	LLN	partners,	and	so	provided	greater	
guidance	on	the	mechanism	for	PAs.	In	addition,	the	relationship	with	Aimhigher	was	
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proving	contentious	and	so	HEFCE	sought	to	clarify	that	LLNs	should	build	on,	not	duplicate,	
the	work	of	Aimhigher	(HEFCE	2005	p.7).	By	the	2008	progress	report,	sustainability	of	the	
LLNs	beyond	the	funding	period	was	becoming	a	concern	for	LLNs,	and	so	HEFCE	sought	to	
clarify	that		
‘it	is	not	possible	to	provide	‘continuation	funding’	for	LLNs.	It	is	inappropriate	in	any	
case;	initiatives	need	to	become	embedded	in	the	core	business	of	institutions	if	they	are	
to	survive	long-term’	(HEFCE	2008	p.3).		
HEFCE	also	used	the	2008	report	to	steer	LLNs	towards	employer	engagement	which,	as	
noted	above,	only	represented	10%	of	LLN	funding	activity,	but	HEFCE	saw	it	as	a	viable	
stream	of	work	to	enable	sustainability	of	the	LLNs.	They	were	clear	that	this	was	‘LLN	
territory’:	
‘If,	moreover,	the	LLN	is	sustained	successfully,	there	should	be	opportunities	to	
contribute	more	fully	in	key	strategic	areas.	Employer	engagement	is	probably	the	most	
important	of	these.	Workplace	learners	are	likely	to	engage	with	learning	in	a	
discontinuous	way	over	a	period	of	time’	(HEFCE	2008	p.3).	
HEFCE	commissioned	the	interim	evaluation	of	LLNs	in	2007,	from	the	Centre	for	Higher	
Education	Research	and	Information	at	the	Open	University	(CHERI).		At	this	point,	LLNs	
were	at	differing	stages	of	development,	with	some	nearing	the	end	of	their	funding	and	a	
small	number	not	yet	in	existence.	The	evaluation,	which	took	the	form	of	desk-based	
research	focussing	on	LLN	monitoring	reports	and	interviews	with	eight	LLNs,	reported	in	
2008.	The	interim	evaluation	found	overall	that	LLNs	were	making	progress	in	meeting	their	
objectives,	but	that	it	was	too	soon	to	ascertain	the	extent	to	which	learners	or	employers	
were	engaging	with	LLN	provision,	or	to	say	whether	the	policy	would	be	a	success	by	the	
end	of	the	funding.	The	report	highlighted	a	number	of	concerns,	some	of	which	HEFCE	
acted	upon	before	the	end	of	the	period,	and	others	which	continued	to	arise	as	themes	for	
concern	in	the	summative	evaluation.	One	of	the	key	issues	addressed	by	HEFCE	at	this	
time	was	the	need	for	greater	monitoring	and	evaluation,	which	was	strengthened	as	a	
result	of	the	interim	report	recommendations,	with	the	introduction	of	a	reporting	
template.		
The	summative	evaluation,	commissioned	by	HEFCE	from	SQW,	included	desk-based	
research,	in	which	information	including	websites	and	LLN	monitoring	reports	(2007-08,	
2008-09)	were	evaluated,	visits	were	made	to	each	LLN,	and	an	e-survey	of	learners	was	
conducted.	The	e-survey	only	attracted	269	responses	and	so	SQW	noted	that	the	
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conclusions	in	relation	to	learners	could	only	be	illustrative.	Overall,	the	summative	
evaluation	found	that	
‘The	LLN	programme	has	achieved	well	against	its	objectives.	The	programme	did	lead	
to	the	development	of	new	curricula,	often	involving	employers.	Information,	advice	and	
guidance	for	learners	on	vocational	programmes	have	improved	and	there	are	several	
thousand	PAs	in	place.	The	programme	has	also	made	an	important	contribution	to	
other	policy	areas	such	as	employer	engagement,	and	the	development	of	new	14-19	
qualifications.	In	addition,	many	consultees	provided	evidence	of	the	ways	in	which	
networks	had	helpfully	formalised	collaborative	working	and	achieved	considerable	
cultural	change	within	institutions’	(SQW	2010	p.xii).		
HEFCE’s	response	to	the	summative	evaluation	also	concluded	that	
‘It	shows	that	the	programme	has	successfully	widened	opportunities	for	progression	to	
higher	education	(HE)	for	learners	on	vocational	programmes’	(HEFCE	2010).		
The	summative	report	reflected	on	the	main	areas	of	activity,	curriculum	development,	IAG	
and	PAs,	and	also	observed	some	key	issues	more	broadly	in	relation	to	LLNs,	some	of	
which	reflect	those	drawn	out	in	the	interim	evaluation.	These	form	the	basis	for	the	key	
themes	which	are	explored	in	7.3	below.		
7.2.7	Timeline	
The	following	Table	15	represents	the	key	moments	in	the	lifetime	of	the	LLN	policy	
initiative,	and	other	pertinent	policy	events.	It	is	noteworthy	that	in	this	policy	episode,	
there	were	a	large	number	of	related	policies	interacting	with	the	LLN	initiative	to	some	
extent.		
Table	15	–	TIMELINE	OF	KEY	LLN	AND	RELATED	POLICY	MOMENTS	
Date	 LLNs	 Other	Policies	
1980s-1990s	 	 Development	of	vocational	
qualifications	such	as	BTEC	National	
Diplomas	and	access	to	HE	diploma	
1997	 	 Dearing	recommends	HEIs	work	with	
FECs	to	develop	curricula	and	access	
routes	in	an	attempt	to	streamline	
progression	through	bridging	courses	
1998	 	 Regional	Development	Agencies	
established	
2000	 	 New	Labour	government	policy	to	
increase	and	widen	participation	in	
HE	to	50%	
2001	 	 Launch	of	Foundation	Degrees	
2002	 	 Sector	Skills	Councils	established	
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Date	 LLNs	 Other	Policies	
December	2003
	 	
HEFCE	Board	endorsed	work	on	LLN	
proposals	as	part	of	the	Joint	Progression	
Strategy	with	LSC	and	DfES	
	
2004	 	 OFFA	established		
Tomlinson	Review	and	the	
development	of	the	14	–	19	
qualifications	framework	
Re-launch	of	apprenticeships	
March	2004	 Howard	Newby	announces	LLNs	as	part	
of	Colin	Bell	Memorial	Lecture	
	
June	2004	 Joint	letter	from	HEFCE	and	the	Learning	
Skills	Council	12/2004	
	
August	2004	 	 Aimhigher	launched	(a	revision	of	
Partnerships	for	Progression)	
September	
2004	
HEFCE	considered	LLN	proposals		from	
partnerships	
Schwartz	report	on	admissions	
	
December	2004
	 	
HEFCE	SDF	agree	proposals	for	Sussex,	
Higher	York	and	Greater	Manchester	
Networks		
	
2005	 5	LLNs	established	(inc.	those	above)	 	
2006	 16	further	LLNs	established	 Leitch	Review	of	Skills	
January	2006	 	 Change	in	government	policy	to	
engage	employers	in	education	
March	2006	 LLN	National	Forum	and	practitioner	
groups	established	
	
September	
2006	
	 First	variable	tuition	fees	
December	2006
	 	
HEFCE	set	out	strategy	for	evaluating	
LLNs		
	
2007	 7	further	LLNs	established	 	
June	2007	 HEFCE	commissioned	interim	evaluation	 	
October	2007	 30	total	LLNs	been	established	 	
April	2008	 Publication	of	interim	evaluation	
National	Forum	seminar	to	reflect	on	
interim	report	
LLN	pairings	expected	to	produce	written	
report	on	peer	evaluation	
	
	
August	2008	 HEFCE	introduced	a	standard	LLN	
monitoring	procedure	
	
October	2008	 First	LLN	reported	against	standard	
monitoring	template	
	
September	
2009	
HEFCE	commissioned	SQW	to	undertake	
summative	evaluation	
	
November	2010	 Summative	evaluation	published	 	
2011	 Funding	for	LLNs	ends	 	
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7.3	A	critical	review	of	the	evidence	and	findings	
A	number	of	themes	can	be	observed	in	the	evidence	and	findings,	which	echo	the	stated	
objectives	for	the	LLNs,	such	that	they	would	facilitate	core	activities	in	curriculum	
development,	IAG	and	development	of	PAs,	as	well	as	a	focus	on	FEC	and	HEI	partnerships	
and	evidence	of	social	mobility.	These	are	explored	below.	
7.3.1	Process:	Approach	
As	described	in	7.2,	HEFCE	took	a	bottom-up	approach	to	the	LLN	initiative,	departing	from	
the	typical	consultation	and	bidding	approach,	and	favouring	consultation	on,	and	
development	of,	proposals	‘on	the	ground’	without	a	formalised	structure.	The	interim	
report	acknowledged	that	HEFCE	had	taken	an	innovative	approach,	but	expressed	concern	
that,	in	the	event,	the	lack	of	structure	meant	that	whilst	there	was	considerable	LLN	
activity,	they	failed	to	make	sufficient	progress	in	some	of	the	more	difficult	areas	of	
activity,	and	concentrated	on	the	‘easy	wins’:	
‘We	acknowledge	that	the	LLN	initiative	has	been	innovative	in	terms	of	policy	
development	in	that	it	was	a	move	away	from	the	normal	‘top-down’	HEFCE	bidding	
process…	However,	we	would	suggest	that	many	of	the	potential	proposals	were	
‘talked-up’	in	terms	of	plans	and	anticipated	achievements	and	outputs.	Moreover,	once	
funded,	activities	may	have	been	biased	towards	‘easy	wins’…Such	ways	of	working	may	
not,	in	fact,	capitalise	on	the	opportunity	provided	by	pump-priming	initiatives	involving	
the	disbursement	of	one-off	funds	to	experiment	and	tackle	the	more	difficult	aspects	of	
the	endeavour	for	fear	of	falling	short	of	targets’	(CHERI	2008	p.8).	
The	summative	report	is	equally	critical	of	the	bottom-up	approach,	suggesting	that	the	
unplanned	and	short-term	nature	of	the	funding	meant	that	the	initiative	could	only	be	
short	lived	and	without	the	potential	for	a	longer	term	legacy:	
‘The	LLN	programme	emerged	as	a	type	of	‘bottom-up’	initiative	and	has	seen	
significant	shifts	in	the	wider	policy	context.	This	approach	was	appropriate	initially,	as	a	
small	number	of	LLNs	were	originally	planned	as	demonstrator	models.	However,	as	the	
programme	expanded,	a	significant	proportion	of	HEFCE’s	Strategic	Development	Fund	
(SDF)	was	spent	supporting	LLNs,	and	it	may	have	been	helpful	at	this	stage	to	adopt	a	
more	focussed	and	planned	approach	to	the	wider	roll-out	of	the	programme’…‘A	five-
year	timescale	with	a	commensurate	reduction	in	annual	funding	may	have	been	more	
appropriate’	(SQW	2010	p.x/xi).	
The	policy	approach	also	came	in	for	some	criticism	from	other	commentators.	For	some,	
the	approach	was	flawed	since	it	did	not	provide	sufficient	structure	or	direction	for	
networks,	which	meant	that	consistent	and	meaningful	evaluation	was	difficult.	Sheila	
Leahy	undertook	a	PhD	study,	‘an	investigation	into	partnership	working	to	widen	
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participation	in	higher	education	in	the	south-west	of	England,	with	particular	reference	to	
Lifelong	Learning	Networks	(LLNs)’,	and	Leahy	is	particularly	critical	of	this	policy	approach,	
acknowledging	the	response	from	one	interviewee	in	the	study,	that		
‘LLNs	were	badly	thought	through,	and	poorly	implemented	and	managed...despite	
[HEFCE]	having	a	genuine	desire	for	change,	it	failed	to	be	sufficiently	directive	to	the	
sector...LLNs	never	had	strategic	direction’	(Leahy	2013	p.123).	
Leahy	concluded	that,		
‘Without	any	rules	imposed	by	the	funder	or	by	policy,	the	LLN	outcomes	were	variable	
and	questionable,	in	some	instances,	in	terms	of	value	for	money’	(Leahy	2013	p.133).	
Conversely,	Little	and	Williams	(2009)	considered	the	bottom-up	policy	approach	to	have	
been	a	success	in	mitigating	against	poor	sector	take	up,	and	point	to	both	the	number	of	
institutions	involved	and	the	high	levels	of	activity	as	evidence	of	LLN’s	success.		
7.3.2	Process:	Monitoring	progress	
One	of	the	biggest	concerns	to	arise	from	the	interim	evaluation	was	that	of	monitoring	
LLN’s	achievements	in	relation	to	their	targets,	and	this	concern	resulted	in	a	
recommendation	that	a	standardised	monitoring	procedure	be	introduced.	The	report	was	
critical	of	HEFCE	for	failing	to	have	a	formal	mechanism	in	place,	and	of	LLNs	for	the	lack	of	
consistency	in	reporting,	with	often	poor	use	of	measurable	baseline	data	and	weak	
financial	reporting.	The	evaluators	noted	that	annual	reports	were	often	descriptive	in	
nature,	rather	than	evaluative,	and	needed	to	take	a	more	critical	approach	(CHERI	2008	
p.17).		Like	Leahy	(2013),	the	report	concluded	that	without	more	structured	monitoring	
and	evaluation,	it	would	be	difficult	to	demonstrate	value	for	money.	HEFCE	took	action	as	
a	result	of	this	recommendation,	and	a	standardised	monitoring	template	was	introduced,	
with	LLNs	being	required	to	report	annually,	covering	a	range	of	topics:	
• Finance	and	expenditure	
• PAs	
• Curriculum	development	and	employer	engagement	
• Staff	development	
• IAG	
• Defining	and	measuring	the	learner	constituency	
• FE	and	HE	progression	links	
• Qualitative	commentary			
(taken	from	HEFCE’s	2008	analysis	of	monitoring	reports,	HEFCE	2008)	
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Despite	the	new	monitoring	process	and	regular	analytical	reports	from	HEFCE	in	2005,	
2008	and	2009,	effective	monitoring	and	demonstration	of	value	for	money	was	still	an	
issue	for	the	summative	evaluation	(SQW	2010),	and	indeed	the	first	recommendation	of	
the	report	suggests	that	
‘HEFCE	should	ensure	that	any	future	programmes	of	this	scale	include	up-front	time	for	
the	design	of	consistent	and	appropriate	monitoring	mechanism	which	will	aid	
subsequent	evaluation’	(SQW	2010	p.59).			
SQW	concluded	that,	by	the	end	of	the	funding,	monitoring	quality	was	still	variable,	with	
LLNs	interpreting	reporting	categories	differently,	and	there	were	frequent	gaps,	especially	
in	relation	to	financial	data.		The	report	concluded	that	HEFCE	should	have	developed	
monitoring	processes	at	the	launch	of	the	initiative,	to	better	ascertain	value	for	money	and	
avoid	duplication	of	activities	between	LLNs.	They	suggested	that	it	would	have	been	
beneficial	if	the	programme,	rather	than	rely	on	peer	observation,	had	engaged	an	
independent	evaluation	team	early	on:	
‘Monitoring	systems	were	not	put	in	place	to	record	spend	on	a	consistent	basis	across	
different	types	of	activity,	and	also	because	of	different	approaches	adopted	by	LLNs	to	
delivering	and	recording	their	activities.	If	clearer	evaluation	and	monitoring	systems	
had	been	established	by	HEFCE	from	the	outset	of	the	programme,	they	would	have	
helped	to	ensure	that	LLNs	were	not	duplicating	activity,	and	would	also	have	been	able	
to	inform	decisions	on	future	levels	of	funding	for	those	LLNs	with	later	start	dates’	
(SQW	2010	p.29-30).		
‘Expenditure	is	not	planned	and	controlled	and	that	activity	and	performance	is	so	
variable	that	it	cannot	be	managed	or	evaluated	within	established	frameworks’	(SQW	
2010	p.3).		
Many	LLNs	themselves	reported	finding	the	monitoring	difficult,	in	part	due	to	a	lack	of	
systematised	methods	for	collecting	data,	particularly	in	relation	to	learners.	Many	said	
they	found	it	difficult	to	monitor	learners,	both	ASNs	and	other	learners,	because	data	
gathering	was	limited	in	institutions	and	through	UCAS,	and	there	was	no	formal	
requirement	for	LLNs	to	identify	non	ASN	learners.	The	differing	nature	of	LLNs,	and	the	
fact	that	institutions	could	belong	to	more	than	one	LLN,	meant	that	is	wasn’t	always	
possible	to	attribute	individual	students	to	an	LLN,	and	so	there	was	a	danger	of	
duplication.	HEFCE	recognised	the	difficulties	in	tracking	students	in	the	2009	monitoring	
report:	
‘Identification	of	LLN	students	is	difficult:	whether	or	not	a	student	is	active	on	a	course	
provided	by	a	LLN	is	not	currently	captured	directly	by	either	HESA	or	ILR	student	
records’	(HEFCE	2009/29	p.6).	
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‘The	distribution	of	student	numbers	by	each	specific	LLN	is	unknown:	although	a	
particular	institution	may	return	a	number	of	LLN	students,	we	are	unable	to	determine	
the	LLN	in	which	those	individual	students	are	operating.	It	therefore	follows	that	
institutions,	and	numbers	of	students,	appear	under	more	than	one	LLN	in	several	
instances’	(HEFCE	2009/29	p.10).	
From	2009-10,	identification	of	LLN	learners	was	built	into	HESA	data	collections.	
The	summative	evaluation	concluded	overall	that	the	lack	of	structured	and	appropriate	
monitoring	mechanisms	hampered	the	ability	to	reach	any	conclusions	in	relation	to	
establishing	value	for	money	for	an	initiative	that	had	absorbed	a	significant	proportion	of	
the	SDF:	
‘It	is	difficult,	therefore,	to	draw	firm	conclusions	about	the	proportion	of	spend	on	
particular	activities	and	overall	value	for	money	of	the	initiative’	(SQW	2010	p.xi).	
7.3.3	Process:	Sustainability	
HEFCE	originally	proposed	that	funding	for	the	LLNs	would	be	for	a	period	of	three	years,	
with	the	provision	of	start-up	funds,	and	some	recurrent	funding	through	ASNs,	but	that	in	
the	longer	term,	sustainability	would	be	achieved	through	funding	from	other	sources.	
There	was	a	clear	expectation	that	the	initial	funding	would	be	sufficient	to	allow	LLNs	to	
develop	and	embed	their	activities,	but	that	partners	would	be	sufficiently	engaged	such	
that	long	term	sustainability	was	desirable	and	achievable:	
‘We	would	envisage	that	the	most	ambitious	LLNs	might	be	supported	by	significant	
resources	to	cover	start-up	costs	and	then	receive	on-going	recurrent	funding,	drawn	
from	a	range	of	sources’	(HEFCE	12/2004	p.3).			
In	the	longer	term,	HEFCE	stated	that	where	networks	were	‘meeting	the	aims	and	
objectives	of	the	Joint	Progression	Strategy’,	there	might	be	further	funding,	but	they	would	
‘expect	HEFCE	funding	to	be	supplemented	by	investment	from	other	partners’	(HEFCE	
12/2004	p.6).	Indeed,	HEFCE	saw	the	partnership	working	with	other	agencies	as	
advantageous	in	identifying	potential	sources	of	funding	beyond	the	development	period:	
‘We	expect	LLNs	to	attract	substantial	funds	from	other	funders.	Networks	will	therefore	
have	to	decide	how	best	to	integrate	funders’	priorities	into	their	management	
arrangements’	(HEFCE	12/2004	p.7).		
From	very	early	on	in	the	initiative,	established	LLNs	were	already	looking	at	long	term	
financial	sustainability,	and	were	engaging	in	activities	seeking	to	find	alternative	sources	of	
funding,	such	as	membership	subscriptions,	pump-priming	from	lead	institutions	and	
further	recurrent	HEFCE	funding	in	the	form	of	additional	ASNs.	The	interim	report	was	
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optimistic	that	many	LLNs	would	survive	beyond	the	HEFCE	funding	period,	although	it	
acknowledged	that	they	may	be	fewer	in	number	and	would	likely	have	lower	levels	of	
funding.	However,	the	report	also	raised	concerns,	shared	by	some	LLNs	and	partner	
institutions,	that	there	was	a	large	number	of	emerging	policies	and	initiatives	concerning	
vocational	learning	and	the	skills	agendas,	with	little	integration	between	them.	As	such,	
many	of	these	initiatives	overlapped	the	work	of	LLNs,	and	were	competing	for	both	finite	
funding	streams	and	the	attention	of	sector	institutions	and	other	stakeholders.	
‘Some	concerns	have	been	expressed	(by	LLN	staff,	partner	institutions	and	other	
stakeholders)	about	emerging	government	policies	and	the	lack	of	integration	between	
initiatives	established	in	response	to	policy	shifts…[and	this]	has	caused	some	tensions	in	
further/higher	education	partnership	working’	(CHERI	2008	p.28).	
The	nature	of	the	funding	also	impacted	on	how	LLNs	approached	their	activities.	The	
interim	report	observed	that	LLN’s	approaches	were	frequently	determined	by	both	the	
need	to	report	to	HEFCE	that	objectives	had	been	achieved	within	three	years,	and	the	
uncertainty	of	future	funding.	It	observed	that	LLNs	were	having	to	focus	on	‘quick	wins’	
and	so,	at	that	stage,	much	of	the	progress	in	activities	had	been	in	favour	of	young	college-
based	learners,	rather	than	work-based	adult	learners,	who	were	more	difficult	to	reach	
and	would	require	greater	investment	of	time	to	achieve	results.	Indeed,	it	was	noted	in	7.2	
that	less	than	10%	of	funding	was	spent	on	employer,	work	based,	engagement.	The	report	
was	critical	of	the	short	term	nature	of	the	funding,	rationalising	that	the	investment	of	
time	to	change	cultures	was	critical	to	embedding	much	of	the	work	of	the	LLNs,	which	was	
not	feasible	in	such	a	short	timescale:	
‘It	is	evident	from	our	interviews	that	attempts	are	being	made	to	embed	LLN	activities	
into	institutional	practices	and	procedures,	but	a	clear	message	is	that	this	takes	time	–	
embeddedness	is	as	much	about	changing	hearts	and	minds	as	it	is	about	practice	and	
procedures’	(CHERI	2008	p.27).		
The	summative	evaluation	was	equally	critical	of	the	short	term	nature	of	the	funding,	
suggesting	that	a	different	approach	might	have	led	to	longer	term	sustainability:	
‘Smaller	sums	of	money	over	a	longer	period	of	time	would	have	enabled	the	
development	of	more	sustainable	activities…	Overall,	funding	was	generous	and	issued	
over	a	short	period.	A	five-year	timescale	with	a	commensurate	reduction	in	annual	
funding	may	have	been	more	appropriate,	as	it	would	have	enabled	a	longer	planning	
period	and	helped	to	set	up	systems	to	ensure	sustainability	of	activity’	(SQW	2010	
p.xiii).	
‘Our	consultations	revealed	a	widespread	disappointment	and	frustration	that	central	
funding	for	LLNs	had	ended	too	soon	in	the	process’	(SQW	2010	p.53).		
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SQW	identified	that	many	LLNs	had	a	strategy	for	continuing	in	some	form	or	other,	often	
with	a	small	team	to	continue	the	work	of	the	LLN	and,	by	the	end	of	the	initiative,	more	
than	£2	million	in	alternative	funding	had	been	secured.		However,	it	concluded	that	it	was	
not	realistic	to	expect	that	all	LLN	work	would	be	fully	embedded,	and	noted	that	without	
continued	financial	support,	there	would	be	an	inevitable	contraction	of	activities.	
Woodfield	et	al	(2013),	in	their	research	into	the	effectiveness	and	sustainability	of	LLN	
progression	agreements,	also	concluded	that	it	would	be	difficult	for	LLNs	to	maintain	the	
level	of	activity	beyond	the	funding	period:	
‘Now	that	the	LLN	funding	stream	is	at	an	end	there	is	a	key	question	about	whether	the	
PA	work	will	be	sustainable	in	the	new	political	and	financial	climate….	It	remains	to	be	
seen	how	these	often	fragile	associations	will	continue	beyond	the	HEFCE	funding	
period’	(Woodfield	et	al	2013,	p.16).		
SQW	noted	the	concerns	of	some	LLNs	that	continuation	of	activities	was	reliant	on	the	
interests	and	support	of	individual	staff,	and	that	the	essential	institutional	commitment	
was	not	always	evident.	However,	many	of	those	interviewed	hoped	that	by	embedding	
courses,	PAs	and	culture	into	institutional	processes,	the	legacy	of	LLN	work	could	continue:	
‘For	many	consultees,	there	was	a	sense	that	the	overall	capacity	of	institutions	(both	
HE	and	FE)	had	been	raised	by	the	LLN	programme	and	it	was	hoped	that	this	would	be	
sustained	whether	particular	networks	continued	to	operate	or	not’	(SQW	2010	p.50).		
Little	and	Williams	(2009),	writing	in	the	year	following	the	publication	of	the	interim	
report,	considered	the	ambiguity	of	the	LLN	policy,	and	the	wider	policy	arena,	as	context	
for	questioning	whether	LLNs	could	meet	the	policy	objectives	in	the	longer	term.	They	
questioned	whether	take	up	in	the	sector	was	sufficiently	strong	to	enable	partnerships	
with	different	values	and	cultures	to	embed	the	work	of	the	LLNs	without	the	infrastructure	
and	funding	to	continue,	and	whether	LLNs	would	be	significantly	valued	for	some	
institutions	with	changing	government	priorities	affecting	institutional	objectives.	They	also	
concluded	that,	given	the	policy	and	funding	approach,	sustainability	could	only	be	
achieved	through	embedding	LLN	activities	and	practices	within	institutional	processes:	
‘the	main	issues	for	the	‘legacy’	of	the	initiative	are	the	extent	to	which	processes	
developed	and	put	in	place	within	LLNs	to	support	the	policy	objective	have	become	
embedded	in	institutional	practices	in	a	sustainable	way…These	are	issues	that	the	
interim	evaluation	was	not	able	to	answer	in	a	sustainable	way’	(Little	and	Williams	
2009,	p.13).				
The	2009	Foundation	Forward	report	into	apprenticeships	and	the	role	of	LLNs	also	
acknowledged	that	collaboration	and	embeddedness	into	institutional	strategies	and	
processes	would	be	key	to	sustainability:	
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‘Collaboration	is	important	and	will	become	increasingly	important	as	LLNs	seek	ways	to	
embed	their	many	successful	strategies	into	institutions	and	processes,	which	unlike	
some	LLNs,	are	likely	to	keep	functioning	over	the	next	few	years’	(fDf	2009	p.37).	
Ward	et	al	(2012)	shared	this	view	and	summed	up	the	difficulties	faced	by	LLNs	in	future	
sustainability:	
‘The	embedding	of	the	work	of	LLNs	within	institutions	and	regions	will	produce	a	
significant	legacy.	However	it	is	a	legacy	which	will	need	nurturing	if	it	is	to	have	long-
term	impact.	There	are	financial	implications,	there	needs	to	be	a	shared	commitment	
from	partner	institutions	towards	this	cultural	and	operational	approach.	There	is	
evidence	of	this,	but	a	reluctance	or	inability	to	fund	the	work	from	existing	budgets.	The	
LLNs	have	stimulated	innovation	and	forged	change,	it	would	be	extremely	
disappointing	if	the	vision	of	Sir	Howard	Newby	were	lost’	(Ward	et	al	2012	p.3).		
7.3.4	Process:	Impact	of	other	policies	
One	of	the	main	issues	of	concern,	highlighted	in	both	the	interim	and	summative	
evaluations,	was	that	of	shifting	government	priorities	and	policies	in	relation	to	the	skills	
agenda,	and	its	impact	on	the	objectives	and	activities	of	LLNs	and	their	partner	
organisations.	During	the	initial	period	of	the	LLNs,	as	they	were	becoming	established,	the	
14-19	qualifications	framework	was	introduced	(2004),	with	qualifications	from	four	
different	routes:	apprenticeships,	general	qualifications	such	as	‘A’	levels,	diplomas,	and	
foundation	degrees.	In	addition,	the	Leitch	Review	of	Skills	was	published	in	2006,	which	
proposed	a	significant	change,	whereby	vocational	training	would	be	demand	led	and,	as	
such,	employers	would	need	to	be	involved	in	the	training	provision,	as	well	as	changes	to	
apprenticeships	and	the	introduction	of	regional	higher	level	skills	pathfinder	pilots	(which	
sat	outside	the	LLNs).	As	such,	these	policy	shifts	impacted	on	the	work	of	the	LLNs	in	
illuminating	and	improving	progression	opportunities	for	vocational	learners.	The	slow	
response	by	government	to	the	Leitch	Review,	and	the	complex	relationships	between	the	
organisations	involved	in	delivering	the	government’s	skills	agenda,	which	included	LLNs,	as	
demonstrated	in	Figure	12	(p.207),	led	Little	and	Williams	(2009)	to	observe	that	
‘A	number	of	LLNs	perceived	a	lack	of	clarity	about	broader	government	policy	and	
strategy	and	the	whole	fit	with	LLN	policy….In	summary	we	can	see	that,	although	there	
may	well	have	been	a	clear	policy	underpinning	the	LLN	initiative,	as	LLNs	were	granted	
funds	and	set	about	putting	their	proposals	into	action,	other	impacting	policies	were	
also	being	developed.	While	it	was	not	the	intention	for	these	other	policies	to	
necessarily	weaken	the	rationale	for	LLNs,	they	were	nevertheless	perceived	as	shifting	
and/or	broadening	(and	in	some	instances	duplicating)	the	work	of	LLNs’	(Little	and	
Williams	2009	p.6/7).	
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This	confusion	and	lack	of	clarity	led	the	interim	evaluation	to	recommend	that	
‘HEFCE	should	continue	to	discuss	with	other	agencies	and	government	departments	the	
desirability	of	creating	conditions	whereby	policies	can	be	developed	in	a	coherent	and	
interlocking	fashion,	against	which	particular	activities	can	be	planned	and	sustained	in	
a		manner	to	meet	the	agreed	goal	‘(CHERI	2008	p.34).		
The	summative	evaluation	also	observed	that	the	skills	agenda	had	been	continually	
shifting	throughout	the	duration	of	the	LLNs,	which	had	then	to	adapt	to	a	changing	
environment.	This	was	particularly	evident	in	relation	to	a	greater	focus	on	employer	
engagement,	with	the	development	of	higher	apprenticeships.	The	summative	evaluation	
credits	the	existence	of	the	National	Forum	as	being	instrumental	in	enabling	LLNs	to	adapt	
quickly	to	the	shifting	policy	environment	and	share	good	practice.	However,	the	report	
also	cautions	that	by	adapting	to	shifts	in	policy,	the	reach	of	LLNs	had	become	so	diverse	
that	the	legacy	of	their	impact	had	become	diluted,	fragmented	and	less	visible.		
‘A	broad	theme	emerging	from	many	of	our	consultations	has	been	the	multi-faceted	
contributions	of	LLNs	both	to	widening	participation	and	a	range	of	other	policy	areas.	
Because	their	reach	is	so	wide,	there	is	a	danger	that	the	true	impact	of	LLN	activities	
may	not	be	fully	apparent	to	some	national	policy	makers	at	present…	whilst	their	
adaptability	to	changing	circumstances	may	be	seen	as	a	key	strength	of	many	
networks,	it	has	also	perhaps	contributed	to	a	sense	of	disconnection	between	their	
actual	achievements	and	the	understanding	of	policymakers’	(SQW	2010	p.48).	
7.3.5	Programme:	Partnerships	and	alliances	
The	LLNs	were	defined	by	their	partnerships,	with	alliances	formed	from	regional	FECs	and	
HEIs	and	engagement	with	regional	employers,	and	regional	and	national	organisations.		As	
such,	their	partnership	arrangements	were	many	and	complex,	as	demonstrated	below	
from	extracts	of	the	text	of	the	initial	circular:	
‘Networks	will	typically	link	FECs	and	HEIs	across	a	city,	area	or	region	that	potential	
learners	identify	with.	These	need	not	conform	to	existing	administrative	boundaries	as	
long	as	they	have	an	‘identity’…The	network	will	establish	close	working	relationships	
with	other	stakeholders	including	Aimhigher	networks…LLNs	will	have	the	involvement	
and	commitment	of	the	Learning	Skills	Council…	with	coordinated	inputs	from	local	
employers,	Sector	Skills	Council,	and	other	regional	agencies’	(HEFCE	12/2004).		
The	interim	report	particularly	highlighted	the	difficulties	raised	by	LLNs	in	seeking	to	
establish	partnerships	between	such	a	diversity	of	organisations	in	the	time	period,	and	the	
likelihood	of	being	able	to	maintain	these	partnerships	once	the	funding	ceased:		
‘Interviews	with	LLNs	have	highlighted	that	the	processes	of	building	up	genuinely	
inclusive	relationships	with	institutions	and	stakeholders	are	complex	and	time	
consuming	–	especially	in	large	partnerships’	(CHERI	2008	p23).	
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One	of	the	most	important	partnership	relationships	in	LLN	activity	was	that	between	the	
FECs	and	HEIs,	and	this	was	recognised	as	a	success,	on	the	whole.	The	LLNs	were	able	to	
bring	together	FECs	and	HEIs	to	develop	shared	understanding	of	courses	and	the	needs	of	
vocational	learners,	and	by	the	time	of	the	summative	evaluation,	more	than	39,000	
institutional	staff	had	engaged	with	LLN	staff	development	activities	across	the	sectors.	
HEFCE’s	2008	analysis	of	the	LLN	monitoring	reports	noted	that	the	main	outputs	from	the	
FE-HE	activity	were	improved	communication	between	the	two	sectors	on	progression,	
credit	and	curriculum	alignment.	The	interim	evaluation	particularly	noted	that	there	was	
evidence	that	much	effort	had	been	put	into	‘building	relationships	and	gaining	trust	and	
buy-in	to	the	LLN	mission’	(CHERI	2008	p.24)	and,	equally,	the	summative	evaluation	
highlights	the	scale	of	collaboration	between	the	two	sectors:	
‘A	consistent	theme	in	our	consultations	has	been	the	positive	impact	of	LLNs	on	the	
scale	and	level	of	collaborative	working	between	HEIs	and	FECs	across	England’	(SQW	
2010	p.45).		
May	et	al	(2012)	and	Woodfield	et	al	(2013),	in	their	work	on	the	value	of	the	progression	
agreements,	noted	that	one	of	the	constructive	outcomes	of	LLNs	was	improved	
partnership	working,	and	that	this	was	most	recognisable	in	the	impact	of	PAs,	and	
improved	shared	understandings	of	curricula	and	vocational	students’	needs.		They	concur	
with	an	extensive	research	report	‘A	Synopsis	of	LLN	Research	2006-2010’	by	Wise	and	
Shaw	(2011),	who	concluded	that	
‘Unanticipated	benefits	included	working	with	and	establishing	good	working	
relationships	with	peers	across	the	curriculum	areas	and	support	staff’	(Wise	and	Shaw	
2011	p.38).		
Leahy	(2013)	also	concluded	that	it	was	the	partnerships	themselves	that	were	key	to	the	
success	of	the	LLNs,	rather	than	their	shared	objectives:	
‘In	general	terms,	the	success	of	the	partnership	appears	to	be	based	on	three	
ingredients:	individuals	who	get	on	with	each	other,	who	have	sufficient	seniority	in	
their	organizations	to	be	influential	in	obtaining	change,	and	the	partnership	offering	
tangible	benefits	to	every	partner.	It	would	seem	that	these	ingredients	are	more	
important	than	the	goal	of	the	partnerships	itself’.	(Leahy	2013	p.126).	
Likewise,	Wise	(2010),	in	a	review	of	LLNs	with	a	focus	on	hospitality,	leisure	and	sports-
related	activities,	argues	that	the	success	of	the	partnerships	had	been	key	to	the	success	of	
LLNs:		
‘Partnership	working	has	been	productive	over	the	lifetime	of	the	LLNs	and	has	been	
instrumental	to	the	success	of	initiatives	to	improve	and	extend	opportunities	available	
to	vocational	learners’	(Wise	2010	p.21).	
	228	
In	their	2008	monitoring	report,	HEFCE	had	acknowledged	Parry’s	(2006)	conclusion	that	
the	introduction	of	variable	fees	might	intensify	an	element	of	competition	between	FECs	
and	HEIs,	that	might	perversely	restrict	the	opportunities	for	vocational	learners	to	
progress	to	higher	education.	However,	the	interim	evaluation	suggested	that	institutional	
commitment	to	a	shared	allegiance	had	been	greatly	enhanced	by	building	relationships	at	
a	strategic	level	in	institutions,	and	by	the	‘hard	cash’	of	ASNs,	such	that	LLNs	were	able	to	
counteract	this	potential	difficulty:	
‘It	is	clear	that	partnerships	have	become	stronger	and	more	mature	because	levels	of	
understanding	have	increased;	hence	trust	has	started	to	replace	(actual	and	perceived)	
competition’	(CHERI	2008	p.25).				
This	view	was	echoed	in	the	summative	evaluation,	which	noted	that:	
‘LLNs	have	provided	a	more	independent	or	impartial	perspective	that	has	been	seen	to	
have	the	interests	of	the	sub-region	(or	discipline)	at	heart.	HE	and	FE	partners	in	a	
number	of	LLNs	pointed	to	how	institutions	that	had	traditionally	been	in	competition	
with	one	another	were	now	collaborating	for	the	first	time’	(SQW	2011	p.45).			
However,	despite	these	positive	assertions,	it	was	observed	that	engagement	by	partners	
varied	considerably	across	LLNs,	and	was	better	where	there	had	been	pre-existing	
relationships	between	institutions.	Buy-in	from	post-92	institutions	was	stronger,	but	some	
partners,	particularly	research-intensive	HEIs,	or	institutions	where	the	LLN	curricula	focus	
did	not	align	with	individual	institutions,	were	not	so	pro-active	in	the	networks.	SQW	
observed	that	
‘partnership	working	was	more	difficult	in	those	LLNs	where	institutions	competed	for	
students,	where	there	was	no	history	of	working	together,	where	institutions	had	joined	
the	LLN	in	order	to	access	project	funding	rather	than	from	an	overarching	commitment	
to	furthering	its	objectives	and	where	ASNs	were	not	available’	(SQW	2010	p	F-1).			
Whilst	the	value	of	partnerships	was	recognised	during	the	development	period,	some	
expressed	doubt	that	they	would	be	strong	enough	to	continue	once	HEFCE	project	funding	
ran	out,	as	Woodfield	et	al	(2013)	observed:	
‘the	end	of	the	HEFCE	funding	streams	supporting	progression,	and	recent	HE	policy	
developments,	places	the	long-term	sustainability	of	inter-institutional	partnerships	and	
networks	at	risk’	(Woodfield	et	al	2013	p.6).		
Much	of	the	debate	around	the	continuation	of	partnerships	beyond	the	end	of	the	funding	
period	focussed	on	the	robustness	of	those	partnerships	to	continue	in	their	existing	form,	
but	also	the	extent	to	which	other	policies,	in	particular	the	complex	skills	agenda	and	
further	increases	in	fees	(Parry	2006),	would	impact	on	shared	views	of	partnership	against	
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increased	competition	between	FECs	and	HEIs	beyond	2010.	Indeed,	this	concern	was	
raised	in	the	2009	report	for	the	Innovation,	Universities,	Science	and	Skills	Select	
Committee,	‘Re-skilling	for	recovery:	after	Leitch,	implementing	skills	and	training	policies’,	
which	stated	that	
‘We	are	also	concerned	by	the	evidence	we	received	about	the	development	of	
competition,	rather	than	collaboration,	which	may	well	stem	from	a	lack	of	clarity	over	
the	roles	of	HE	and	FE	and	their	place	in	the	agenda’.	
May	et	al	(2012)	also	observed	that	whilst	HEIs	were	willing	to	hold	partnership	agreements	
when	ASNs,	and	therefore	hard	cash,	were	on	offer,	the	withdrawal	of	ASNs	could	result	in	
HEIs	being	unwilling	to	sacrifice	their	‘real’	students	for	vocational	learners.	
Engagement	with	employers	was	a	key	objective	of	the	LLNs,	but	the	interim	evaluation	
described	such	engagement	as	‘patchy’	(CHERI	2008	p.5),	and	noted	that	many	LLNs	had	
not,	at	that	stage,	made	employer	engagement	a	priority.	The	most	activity	in	employer	
engagement	was	in	relation	to	curriculum	development,	particularly	in	employment	areas	
such	as	health	care,	where	there	was	a	clear	public	service	demand,	and	in	LLNs	where	an	
employer	champion	had	been	recruited	to	work	with	local	businesses.	The	summative	
evaluation	also	observed	that	employer	engagement	was	better	in	some	LLNs	than	in	
others,	and	engagement	was	often	more	successful	when	alliances	had	been	formed	before	
the	establishment	of	the	LLN,	and	there	had	been	sufficient	time	to	nurture	partnerships.	In	
HEFCE’s	2009	analysis	of	the	LLN	monitoring	reports,	they	too	observed	that	more	
established	relationships	produced	more	collaborative	working.	However,	despite	the	
patchy	nature	of	employer	engagement,	SQW	noted	that	78.6%	of	curriculum	
developments	included	‘some	form	of	employer	engagement	in	the	design	or	delivery’	
(SQW	2010	p.34).	It	concluded	that	
‘LLNs	have	experienced	varying	degrees	of	success	in	engaging	and	involving	employers	
in	their	work.	Several	consultees	from	a	range	of	LLNs	cited	how	they	were	able	to	
engage	training	providers	and	employer	groups	with	relative	ease,	while	other	networks	
had	found	it	more	difficult.	In	some	sectors	where	employers	were	hard	to	engage,	
networks	had	had	considerable	success	in	working	with	SSCs	instead’	(SQW	2010	p.46).		
During	the	time	of	the	LLNs,	employer	engagement	had	become	an	increasingly	important	
strand	of	policy	work	by	government	as	part	of	the	skills	agenda	but,	conversely	the	
economic	downturn	in	2008	had	led	to	employers	being	more	cautious	in	committing	to	
new	ventures,	as	noted	in	HEFCE’s	2009	analysis	of	the	monitoring	reports.			
	230	
It	is	noteworthy	that	with	the	exception	of	SSCs,	little	mention	was	made	in	either	the	
interim	or	the	summative	evaluations	of	engagement	with	other	stakeholders,	such	as	the	
LSC	or	Aimhigher,	other	than	to	note	that	some	LLNs	had	not	made	progress	in	areas	where	
they	felt	that	there	was	the	potential	for	duplicating	other	initiatives	in	other	organisations	
(CHERI	2008	p.23).	Equally,	little	mention	is	made	of	the	National	Forum,	despite	the	
summative	evaluation	observing	that	it	had	been	instrumental	in	assisting	with	high	levels	
of	cross	LLN	working,	and	in	particular	in	encouraging	partnerships	and	commissioning	joint	
research	(p.45).	Indeed,	the	report	goes	so	far	as	to	recommend	to	HEFCE	that	such	a	
forum	could	be	considered	as	best	practice	for	other	policy	initiatives:	
‘HEFCE	should	ensure	that	any	future	programmes	of	this	scale	have	some	funding	for	
sharing	best	practices,	perhaps	through	the	establishment	of	a	forum	on	the	model	for	
the	National	Forum’	(SQW	2010	p.59).		
7.3.6	Programme:	Curriculum	development	
In	the	initial	HEFCE	circular,	the	development	of	curricula	was	expected	to	be	one	of	the	key	
activities	for	the	LLNs:	
‘A	great	deal	will	be	accomplished	within	the	existing	curriculum…	However,	they	may	
also	identify	gaps	in	provision	and	will,	where	appropriate,	develop	new	programmes	to	
facilitate	progression.	These	might	be	‘bridging	courses’	to	enable	learners	to	acquire	
the	skills	to	progress	along	a	chosen	pathway,	or	more	substantial	programmes	that	
constitute	progression	opportunities	in	their	own	right’	(HEFCE	12/2004	p.8).		
The	interim	report	highlighted	that	LLNs	had	made	progress	in	developing	curricula,	
particularly	in	mapping	existing	provision	and	encouraging	institutions	to	put	in	place	new	
and	modified	programmes,	such	as	FDs	and	courses	targeted	at	younger	college	based	
learners.	The	development	of	new	programmes	tended	to	be	those	to	facilitate	
progression,	such	as	bridging	courses,	and	the	most	common	curriculum	areas	identified	
were	in	‘health	and	social	care,	creative	and	cultural	industries,	finance,	business,	enterprise	
and	management,	engineering	and	technology’	(CHERI	2008).	CHERI	concludes	that	this,			
‘in	the	fullness	of	time,	could	make	a	significant	difference	to	the	coherence,	clarity	and	
certainty	of	progression	opportunities	for	vocational	learners’	(CHERI	2008	p.4).	
The	summative	evaluation	found	that	1,200	new	and	modified	courses	had	been	
established	as	a	result	of	LLNs	by	2008-09	and,	by	the	end	of	the	funding,	HEFCE	concluded	
that	there	had	been	around	2,000	curriculum	developments	or	modifications	(HEFCE	
2009/29).	New	programmes	included	HE-level	provision	(of	which	FDs	were	the	most	
common	at	44%),	bridging	courses	and	work-based	learning	opportunities.	Of	the	modified	
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courses,	BTECs	were	the	most	common	(36%).		There	was	considerable	variability	between	
LLNs,	with	some	seeing	new	developments	as	key	to	filling	gaps	in	provision,	whilst	others	
preferred	modification	of	existing	courses	to	enable	progression.	The	high	level	of	FD	
development	by	LLNs	is	significant,	since	the	qualification	was	often	perceived	by	LLNs	
themselves	as	an	agent	of	change	in	facilitating	progression.	In	Leahy’s	research	of	LLNs	in	
the	South	West,	one	interviewee	concluded	that	
‘Foundation	Degrees	have	been	a	greater	spur	for	curriculum	change	than	I	believed	
they	would	be…I	have	seen	change	I	never	thought	I	would	see…	away	from	traditional	
forms	of	teaching	to	embracing	new…ways	of	doing	things	(Respondent	B)’	(Leahy	2013	
p.110).		
77.5%	of	new	courses	and	41%	of	modified	courses	involved	some	employer	engagement,	
and	there	were	many	examples	of	engagement	at	the	design	stage,	but	fewer	in	relation	to	
delivery	or	assessment.	Some	LLNs	had	also	developed	significant	amounts	of	e-learning	at	
the	specific	request	of	employers.	This	is	perhaps	surprising,	given	the	concerns	raised	in	
both	evaluations	that	employer	engagement	was	patchy	across	the	networks.	It	is	
noteworthy	that	the	involvement	of	the	SSCs	was	much	lower,	with	only	36%	of	new	
programmes	having	some	involvement	(SQW	2010	p.20).	
Although	‘16,155	FTE	ASNs	were	provided	to	LLN	member	institutions’	overall	(SQW	2010	
p.13),	in	2009	HEFCE	reduced	the	number	available,	and	consequently	some	anticipated	
new	programmes	were	not	developed	as	planned.	The	Wise	(2010)	review	of	LLN	activity	in	
hospitality	and	leisure-related	subjects	noted	that	some	programmes	set	up	specifically	for	
ASNs	were	not	recruited	to	as	a	result	of	this	change	in	HEFCE	policy.	
7.3.7	Programme:	Progression	agreements	
In	the	original	circular,	there	was	a	strong	emphasis	from	HEFCE	on	the	development	of	PAs	
to	ease	the	transition	from	vocational	qualifications	to	higher	education:	‘at	the	heart	of	
every	network	will	be	arrangements	to	facilitate	progression’	(HEFCE	12/2004	p.5).	As	such,	
the	development	of	PAs	between	institutions	was	a	major	stream	of	work	for	LLNs,	
accounting	for	16.6%	of	expenditure	and	resulting	in	more	than	8,500	agreements.			
By	the	time	of	the	interim	evaluation	there	were	1,697	PAs	in	place,	but	they	had	proved	to	
be	a	most	contentious	area	of	work	for	the	LLNs,	since	there	had	been	initial	confusion	
about	how	they	might	be	defined,	and	LLNs	were	slow	to	develop	agreements	in	favour	of	
less	disputatious	areas	of	work.	The	form	of	agreements	varied,	from	simple	bi-lateral	
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agreements	between	sending	and	receiving	courses,	to	more	complex	‘in	principle’	
agreements	between	institutions,	with	one	LLN	having	52	PAs	with	15,000	different	
pathways.	One	of	the	main	difficulties	with	PAs	was	reviewing	and	establishing	changes	to	
admissions	policies	and	procedures	within	institutions	and,	as	Betts	and	Burrell	(2011)	also	
observed	in	their	research	and	account	of	the	progression	story,	the	bureaucracy	involved	
in	the	development	of	PAs	was	a	challenge	to	LLNs,	partners,	and	particularly	employers:		
‘our	interviews	have	shown	that	the	progression	agreement	aspect	of	LLNs’	core	
business	has	probably	been	the	most	divisive	amongst	partner	institutions	and	is	also	
the	most	diverse	between	LLNs.	Divisiveness	amongst	partners	seems	to	stem	from	fears	
that	initiatives	in	the	area	of	the	progression	agreements	could	undermine	
institutional/departmental	autonomy	in	terms	of	admissions	policies	and	practices’	
(CHERI	2008	p.20-21).	
Although	the	negotiation	of	agreements	was	a	useful	way	to	develop	relationships	with	
institutions,	as	reported	by	both	Betts	and	Burrell	(2011)	and	SQW	in	the	summative	
evaluation	(2010),	in	practice	they	were	difficult	to	implement	between	the	two	sectors,	
with	a	lack	of	common	understanding	or	practice	between	LLNs	and	staff	in	institutions.	
Consequently,	the	interim	evaluation	questioned	
‘how	far	LLNs	are	meeting	the	original	purpose	of	developing	progression	routes	into	as	
well	as	through	higher	education	for	a	range	of	vocational	constituencies’	(CHERI	p.19).	
Despite	the	misgivings	in	the	interim	evaluation,	by	2010	the	summative	report	found	that	
19,500	learners	were	expected	to	benefit	from	PA	routes,	and	it	was	expected	that	a	
further	55,000	would	benefit	over	time.	However,	there	was	still	concern	over	the	quality	
of	some	agreements,	and	that	many	were	bi-lateral	and	therefore	limited	students’	
options,	rather	than	multi-lateral	and	allowing	learners	greater	choice.	SQW	perceived	that,	
for	many	agreements,	the	bureaucracy	was	given	a	higher	priority	than	students’	needs	
and,	in	most	cases,	PAs	were	either	simply	a	guarantee	of	an	interview,	or	an	agreement	on	
the	number	of	places	on	courses.	The	summative	evaluation	also	noted	that	the	extent	to	
which	agreements	had	been	embedded	within	institutions	was	variable:	
‘Although	it	was	generally	agreed	that	PAs	had	opened	up	opportunities	for	learners,	
there	was	considerable	concern	amongst	many	consultees	that	the	quality	and	scope	of	
some	PAs	was	not	as	good	as	it	could	or	should	have	been’	(SQW	2010	p.42).	
For	the	summative	evaluation,	the	lack	of	consistency	in	both	the	development	and	
embedding	of	agreements,	and	variable	quality,	had	led	to	little	progress	in	developing	
network-wide	progression	and	mobility,	which	HEFCE	had	envisaged	as	a	key	objective	for	
the	LLNs.	As	such,	this	also	impacted	on	LLNs’	ability	to	develop	Credit	Accumulation	
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Transfer	Agreements	(CATs),	which	had	equally	been	a	key	objective.	SQW	concluded	that	
‘on	the	whole,	perception	of	PAs	has	been	mixed’	SQW	2010	(p.43).		
One	area	of	contestation	amongst	other	commentators	was	that	of	the	value	of	PAs.	Both	
Watson	(2005)	and	Layer	(2005)	argued	that	agreements	should	have	ensured	parity	of	
progression	with	‘A’	levels,	but	this	was	not	possible	without	national	agreement	on	a	
framework	for	progression.		As	Layer	points	out,	this	was	one	of	the	biggest	challenges	for	
LLNs:	
‘Without	the	progression	framework	being	in	place	they	will	not	succeed	in	being	
regarded	as	having	parity	of	esteem	amongst	learners’	(Layer	2005	p.201).	
Woodfield	et	al	(2013)	reflected	that	the	different	cultures	and	contexts	of	partnerships	
between	institutions	meant	that	agreements	were	inherently	open	to	variability,	both	in	
their	quality	and	implementation.		For	May	et	al	(2012),	most	LLNs’	own	evaluations	did	not	
quantify	the	impact	of	PAs	on	the	number	of	students	who	might	have	benefitted	once	
they	gained	admission	to	HE,	and	hence,	without	evidence,	the	issue	of	parity	would	always	
be	contested:	
‘The	reported	number	of	participants	and	agreements	signed	–	facilitated	by	the	LLNs	–	
clearly	indicates	the	potential	for	increased	progression	to	HE	of	students	studying	for	
vocational	qualifications	and	hence	a	degree	of	social	mobility.	However,	there	is	a	
dearth	of	evidence	of	the	additional	impact	of	PAs	to	progression	patterns	and	the	
performance	of	the	participants	whilst	at	university’	(May	et	al	2012	p.9).	
7.3.8	Programme:	Information,	Advice	and	Guidance	
The	provision	of	IAG	was	not	an	explicit	objective	of	the	LLNs,	although	it	was	implied	
throughout	the	initial	circular,	through	its	expectations	that	LLNs	would	make	progression	
opportunities	clear	to	students.	Most	LLNs	had	evaluated	existing	IAG	provision,	identified	
gaps	and	filled	them	through	a	range	of	mechanisms,	including	marketing	materials	and	
websites,	as	well	as	individual	and	group	IAG	consultations	for	both	potential	learners	and	
staff	in	institutions,	representing	14%	of	LLN	expenditure.	Such	was	the	scale	of	activity	
that,	by	the	summative	evaluation,	more	than	65,000	individuals	had	received	one-to-one	
or	group	support,	200,000	paper	based	resources	had	been	produced	and	there	were	
nearly	1,000,000	website	hits.	There	was	significant	LLN	activity	in	providing	guidance	and	
training	to	staff	in	institutions	regarding	vocational	qualifications	and	engagement,	with	
2,400	development	events	and	engagement	with	external	organisations,	such	as	Aimhigher,	
in	the	development	of	paper	and	web	based	materials	(SQW	2010).		
	234	
The	interim	evaluation	found	that	‘These	developments	are	innovative	and	are	clearly	filling	
a	gap	where	little	or	no	IAG	existed	previously	for	young	people	taking	vocational	level	3	
courses	and	adults	seeking	IAG	about	higher	education	study’	(CHERI	p.20).		However,	there	
was	some	concern	that	LLNs	had	particularly	focussed	on	the	provision	of	IAG	because	it	
could	be	seen	as	a	‘quick	win’.		The	summative	evaluation	echoed	the	CHERI	report	in	
acknowledging	the	value	of	IAG,	noting	the	high	level	of	engagement	between	LLNs	and	
institutions	in	the	provision	of	IAG,	and	concluding	that	this	was	a	very	positive	
development	in	achieving	HEFCE	objectives:	
‘For	some	LLNs,	work	with	FE	tutors	on	IAG	was	quickly	established	as	being	one	of	the	
most	important	activities	for	breaking	down	barriers	to	progression’	(SQW	2010	p.37).	
Wise’s	(2010)	review	of	LLN	activity	in	hospitality,	leisure,	sport	and	related	subjects	also	
concluded	that	the	engagement	of	the	LLNs	in	providing	IAG	to	staff	in	institutions	had	
been	critical	in	building	the	understandings	and	relationships	between	institutions:	‘this	led	
to	on-going	activities	between	FE	and	HE	and	a	greater	understanding	of	each	other’s	
requirements’	(Wise	2010	p.6).		
However,	despite	such	high	levels	of	engagement	with	IAG,	the	interim	evaluation	
expressed	some	concern	that	each	LLN	was	developing	its	own	strand	of	IAG	activity,	and	
therefore	there	was	a	lack	of	national	coherence	in	a	joined	up	service	to	learners.	This	
concern	was	echoed	in	Wise	and	Shaw’s	‘Synopsis	of	LLN	Research	2006-2010’	report	to	the	
National	Forum,	in	which	they	recommended	‘a	single	comprehensive	and	easy	access	
source	of	information’	(Wise	&	Shaw	2011	p.11).		The	interim	evaluation	also	observed	the	
potential	for	duplication	of	effort	with	other	organisations	providing	information	to	
learners,	such	as	Aimhigher,	and	HEFCE’s	own	analysis	of	the	2008	LLN	monitoring	reports	
warns	LLNs	to	ensure	that	they	were	‘careful	not	to	re-invent	structures	that	already	exist’	
(HEFCE	2008	p.10).	There	seems	to	be	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	development	of	the	
National	Forum	aided	a	more	collective	approach	to	IAG,	although	it	was	praised	for	its	
dissemination	of	good	practice	(SQW	2010).		
Concerns	were	also	raised	in	the	interim	evaluation	concerning	the	extent	to	which	IAG	was	
accessed	by	learners	themselves	or	employers,	rather	than	staff	in	institutions	where	there	
was	much	evidence	of	engagement:	
‘There	is	some	evidence	of	staff	in	partner	institutions	and	staff	in	IAG-specific	agencies	
making	good	use	of	the	information	and	resultant	maps	that	have	been	produced,	but	
much	less	about	(potential)	learner	(and	parental)	and	employer	use’	(CHERI	2008	p.20).	
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SQW,	in	the	summative	evaluation,	also	questioned	the	extent	to	which	IAG	provision	had	
been	accessed	by	learners,	with	its	learner	survey	suggesting	that	learners	tended	to	look	
to	FECs	and	HEIs	as	key	sources	of	IAG,	whilst	LLNs	were	key	sources	of	information	for	staff	
in	partner	institutions.	SQW	also	reflected	that	whilst	LLNs	had	provided	IAG	support	to	
both	potential	learners	and	staff	in	institutions,	the	tendency	had	been	to	provide	
information,	rather	than	tailored	guidance.		
The	issue	of	sustainability	in	relation	to	IAG	had	also	been	a	concern,	with	CHERI	(2008)	
noting	from	interviews	that	staff	in	LLNs	and	institutions	were	concerned	that	the	provision	
of	IAG	would	be	difficult	to	sustain	once	the	development	funding	was	concluded,	
especially	given	the	high	cost	of	maintaining	web-based	information.		
7.3.9	Programme:	Learners	and	social	mobility	
The	interim	evaluation	concluded	that	they	were	not,	at	that	stage,	able	to	draw	any	
conclusions	in	relation	to	the	impact	of	the	LLNs	on	learners,	partly	because	of	the	
difficulties	that	had	arisen	in	collecting	and	monitoring	learner	data.	However,	by	the	
summative	evaluation,	there	was	sufficient	data	available	to	draw	some	conclusions,	
although	it	is	noteworthy	that	the	response	rate	to	SQWs’	learner	survey	was	so	small	that	
they	were	unable	to	draw	any	conclusions	on	the	views	of	learners	themselves.		
The	data	available	reveals	that	the	profile	of	LLN	learners	changed	little	between	2006-7	
and	2007-8,	with	63-64%	being	female,	83%	being	white,	39-40%	being	19	or	younger	and	
only	12%	from	POLAR	quintile	1.	This	brings	into	question	the	extent	to	which	LLNs	were	
able	to	influence	widening	participation	as	well	as	increasing	it,	and	this	will	be	discussed	in	
due	course.	The	data	for	how	this	might	have	changed	by	2008-09	is	not	available,	and	it	is	
noteworthy	that	the	summative	evaluation	did	not	address	the	profile	of	learners,	choosing	
instead	to	focus	on	the	type	of	qualifications	on	entry	as	the	key	learner	characteristic	to	
demonstrate	the	value	of	LLNs.	SQW	specifically	requested	this	data	from	HEFCE,	and	it	
reveals	that	there	was	a	significantly	high	proportion	of	LLN	flagged	learners	who	were	
entering	with	‘A’	level	qualifications,	or	already	held	HE	level	qualifications,	and	thus	about	
a	third	of	LLN	students	were	outside	the	target	group:			
‘A	diminishing	but	still	large	proportion	of	the	LLN-flagged	ASNs	entered	HE	with	
academic	qualifications,	representing	48	per	cent	of	flagged	ASNs	in	2006-07	and	36	per	
cent	in	2008-09’	(SQW	2010	p.24).			
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However,	the	data	also	revealed	that	the	number	of	LLN	learners	entering	HE	with	
vocational	qualifications	rose	from	38%	in	2006-07	to	46%	in	2008-08.	The	analysis	led	SQW	
to	conclude	that	
‘the	LLN	programme	made	a	small	but	improving	contribution	to	the	increasing	
numbers	of	learners	on	vocational	programmes	entering	HE	in	the	context	of	a	growing	
student	population’	(SQW	2010	p.25).		
Likewise,	May	et	al	(2012)	observed	that	only	a	few	cohorts	of	vocational	learners	would	
ultimately	have	benefited	from	the	LLNs,	and	they	question	the	extent	to	which	the	focus	
on	‘quick	wins’,	identified	in	the	interim	evaluation,	played	out	by	the	end	of	the	initiative.	
As	such,	it	is	questionable	the	extent	to	which	LLNs	were	able	to	meet	their	overriding	
objective	to	widen	participation	and	increase	social	mobility:	
‘Evidence	from	individual	LLNs	suggests	that	they	embedded	social	mobility	in	their	
overarching	aims	and	that	they	associate	this	with	the	progression	of	vocational	
learners.	However,	when	LLN	objectives	are	considered	over	the	three	core	activities	of	
LLNs,	it	seems	that	the	aspiration	for	social	mobility	becomes	watered	down	in	favour	of	
more	technical	and	realisable	objectives,	resulting	in	limited	opportunities	for	evaluating	
impact	of	progression	agreements	on	social	mobility’	(May	et	al	2012	p.12).		
This	lack	of	evidence	for	widespread	benefit	to	learners	led	to	many	commentators	
questioning	the	extent	to	which	LLNs	had,	in	reality,	contributed	to	social	mobility.	For	
some,	the	continued	‘eliteness’	of	the	research	intensive	institutions,	and	their	limited	
engagement	with	LLNs	(only	10%	of	LLN	learners	were	in	research	intensive	institutions),	
was	a	critical	barrier	to	genuine	social	mobility.	May	el	at	(2012)	and	Woodfield	et	al	(2013)	
questioned	whether	the	lack	of	progression	opportunities	into	professional	subjects	such	as	
law,	sciences	and	medicine	meant	that	the	actual	opportunities	for	vocational	students	to	
access	the	research	intensive	institutions	and	professions	were	limited:	
‘Although	the	LLNs	have	contributed	to	progression	in	vocational	subjects	in	HE,	they	do	
not	appear	to	have	stimulated	learners’	wider	intellectual	horizons.	This	indicates	a	cap	
on	the	LLN’s	social	mobility	aspirations	at	the	outset,	with	an	emphasis	on	social	
reproduction	by	taking	a	conservative	stance	on	the	vocational	learners’	background,	
talents,	study	needs	and	future	careers’	(Woodfield	et	al	2013	p.18).		
The	concentration	of	effort	on	younger,	rather	than	work-based,	learners	was	also	picked	
up	on	in	the	Open	University’s	response	to	the	Select	Committee	on	Education	and	Skills’	
‘Leitch	report	review’	in	April	2008,	which	said,	
‘Although	some	LLNs	are	beginning	to	address	the	needs	of	adult	learners,	the	main	
focus	of	the	initiative	has	been	15-18	year-old	vocational	learners.	There	is	an	urgent	
need	to	connect	government's	skills	agenda	with	its	engagement	with	ageing	workforce	
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as	evidenced	by	the	first	and	second	reports	of	the	Turner	Commission’	(Open	University	
2008).	
Leahy	(2013)	concluded	that	policy	initiatives	like	LLNs	were	simply	not	sufficiently	robust	
to	weaken	the	eliteness	of	the	system:	
‘LLNs	are	an	example	of	a	field	disruption	which	proved	too	weak	to	challenge	the	
prevailing	hierarchy’	(Leahy	2013	p.101).	
For	others,	the	barriers	to	social	mobility	were	both	cultural	and	structural,	with	Watson	
(2005)	arguing	for	a	stronger	approach	in	aligning	tertiary	and	higher	education,	whilst	
acknowledging	that	the	prevailing	hierarchical	and	culturally	competitive	system	of	HE	
snobbery	is	unlikely	to	change.	As	such,	he	questions	the	value	of	LLNs	in	this	regard:		
‘Would	a	more	unified	approach	to	a	tertiary	system	make	a	positive	difference,	and	is	
the	LLN	the	best	approach?’	(Watson	2005	p.192).	
Like	Leahy,	Watson	questioned	whether	LLNs	were	sufficient	to	challenge	the	system,	and	it	
is	noteworthy	that,	as	described	in	7.2,	this	approach	was	rejected	by	HEFCE	as	being	too	
controversial.	Little	and	Williams	(2009)	also	observed	that	the	English	establishment’s	
regard	for	‘status’	challenged	LLNs’	ability	to	successfully	overcome	barriers	to	social	
mobility,	and	questioned	whether	institutions	might	‘revert	to	type’	once	funding	ceased	
(Little	and	Williams	2009,	p.13).	
Conversely,	some	commentators	were	of	the	opinion	that	LLNs	had	enabled	greater	
opportunities	for	vocational	learners:	
‘Their	achievements	were	far-reaching	and	successful	in	changing	the	landscape	and	
opportunities	for	vocational	learners…	The	LLNs	were	pioneers	of	this	work	and	as	such	
it	is	important	that	the	richness	and	diversity	of	their	work	is	not	lost’	(Ward	et	al	2012	
p.1,4).		
‘These	initiatives…have	undoubtedly	reduced	the	barriers	for	vocational	learners	and	
stimulated	progression	into	HE’	(Woodfield	et	al	2013	p.11).	
Although	May	et	al	(2012)	were	sceptical	that	LLNs	had	achieved	their	overall	objective,	
they	acknowledged	that	LLN	focus	on	progression	agreements	were	key	in	promoting	social	
mobility:	
‘One	of	the	strengths	of	progression	agreements	is	their	potential	to	promote	the	
upward	social	mobility	of	students	from	low	income	backgrounds’	(May	et	al	2012	p.4).	
Jill	Ward	(Chair,	Lifelong	Learning	National	Directors'	Forum),	writing	in	the	THES	in	2010,	
equally	argued	that	
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‘The	Lifelong	Learning	Networks	have	managed	to	help	vocational	learners	to	progress	
in	an	environment	of	equity	and	parity	of	esteem.	Indeed,	they	are	heavily	involved	in	a	
number	of	key	national	developments	-	including	frameworks	for	higher-level	
apprenticeships,	ensuring	that	14-	to	19-year-old	diploma	learners	are	fairly	treated,	
and	offering	innovative	guidance	to	those	outside	learning	who	want	to	return’	(Ward	
2010).	
It	was	not	just	those	in	the	sector	that	perceived	that	LLNs	had	added	value	to	widening	
participation	and	social	mobility;	their	apparent	success	was	also	observed	at	government	
level.	In	response	to	a	question	in	the	House	of	Commons	on	28th	October	2008,	from	Mr	
David	Willetts	to	Mr	David	Lammy,	the	then	Secretary	of	State	for	Innovation,	Universities	
and	Skills,	on	plans	for	the	future	of	LLNs,	Lammy	responded	that	
‘The	Government	and	HEFCE	are	in	no	doubt	about	the	value	of	LLNs.	Their	focus	on	
progression	and	widening	opportunity	means	that	they	can	make	an	important	
contribution	to	a	number	of	the	Government’s	strategic	objectives	including	lifelong	
learning,	credit	transfer,	articulation	arrangements	between	higher	education	
programmes	and	the	qualifications	and	credit	framework,	employer	engagement	and	
workplace	learning,	and	progression	from	the	14-19	diplomas’	(Hansard	2008).		
7.4	Conclusion	
The	LLN	initiative	was	introduced	at	a	time	when	the	skills	agenda,	employability	and	
vocational	progression	were	hot	policy	topics	across	a	number	of	public	sectors,	and	the	
policy	environment	was	both	complex	and	subject	to	constant	change.	The	LLNs	were	a	
unique	policy	initiative	for	their	time,	in	their	requirement	to	engage	with	both	FE	and	HE	
sectors,	employers	and	other	external	organisations,	and	be	responsive	to	the	changing	
policy	environment,	which	added	further	dimensions	of	complexity	to	their	work.	The	
approach	taken	by	HEFCE	was	bottom-up,	since	engagement	by	the	sector	was	judged	to	
be	subject	to	less	risk	of	failure,	and	HEFCE	imposed	few	expectations	in	terms	of	
structures,	targets	or	funding	requirements	on	the	networks.	However,	this	loose	approach	
drew	some	criticism,	since	a	lack	of	robust	monitoring	and	reporting	in	the	early	stages	
meant	that	it	was	problematic	to	evidence	value	for	money.	
Evidence	of	LLN	activity	suggested	that	they	were	highly	active	in	curriculum	development,	
PAs	and	IAG,	and	FE-HE	partnerships	were	strengthened	as	a	result	of	the	activities.	Despite	
a	high	level	of	employer	engagement	in	curriculum	development,	inconsistent	engagement	
with	employers	and	other	agencies,	such	as	SSC,	across	the	networks,	was	criticised.	The	
summative	evaluation	concluded	that	there	had	been	an	increase	in	the	number	of	
vocational	learners	progressing	to	HE	during	the	funding	period,	but	only	two-thirds	of	LLN	
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learners	were	in	the	target	group	and	thus,	overall,	only	a	small	number	had	benefited	from	
the	initiative.	Whilst	commentators	in	the	sector	and	government	praised	LLNs	for	the	
extent	of	their	work,	some	questioned	the	extent	to	which	the	initiative	had	made	a	
significant	impact	in	widening	participation	and	contributing	to	social	mobility.	There	was	
also	some	doubt	that,	beyond	the	funding	period,	LLNs	were	sufficiently	robust	to	be	able	
to	ensure	their	sustainability,	or	be	in	a	position	to	instigate	culture	change	in	relation	to	
parity	for	vocational	qualifications,	against	the	prevailing	eliteness	of	the	HE	system.		
The	next	chapter,	Chapter	8,	interprets	all	three	policy	episode	against	McConnell’s	
framework	to	assess	success	or	failure	in	terms	of	the	‘process,	programme	and	political	
dimensions’	(McConnell	2010).	The	chapter	then	seeks	to	bring	together	the	case	studies	to	
identify	commonalities	and	differences	between	them	and	to	identify	opportunities	for	
policy	learning.		
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Chapter	8:	Analysis	and	discussion	of	the	case	studies	against	
the	theoretical	framework	
8.1	Introduction	
This	chapter	draws	on	the	thick	descriptions	of	the	three	policy	episodes	considered	in	
Chapters	5,	6	and	7	to	address	the	main	research	question,	‘How	can	policy	success	and	
failure	be	understood,	from	the	study	of	three	policy	episodes	in	the	context	of	
contemporary	higher	education	in	England,	by	applying	criteria	from	an	existing	framework	
for	success	and	failure?’	For	each	case	study,	in	Sections	8.2	(p.242),	8.3	(p.254)	and	8.4	
(p.268)	of	this	chapter,	the	descriptions	are	used	as	evidence	to	position	the	policy	episode	
on	the	spectrum	of	the	analytical	framework	‘three	dimensions	of	policy	success	and	failure’	
(McConnell	2010).	Each	dimension	-	policy	as	process,	policy	as	programme	and	policy	as	
politics	-	is	considered	in	turn,	using	the	framework	by	McConnell	(2010)	set	out	in	Chapter	
2,	Table	3	(p.47).	In	each	dimension,	the	vertical	axis	of	the	framework	articulates	the	
criteria	that	McConnell	advises	need	to	be	considered:	
‘Evaluators	need	a	typological	framework	to	help	group	different	types	of	outcomes	
with	broadly	shared	characteristics‘	(McConnell	2011	p.71).	
The	horizontal	axis	articulates	the	‘broad	positions	on	a	continuum’	(McConnell	2010	p.60)	
viz:	‘success,	durable	success,	conflicted	success,	precarious	success	and	failure’,	with	
characteristics	in	relation	to	each	criterion	devised	by	McConnell	(2010)	to	aid	the	
researcher	in	making	a	nuanced	judgement	about	the	success	or	failure	of	aspects	of	the	
policy.		
In	order	to	make	my	judgements	systematic,	rigorous	and	grounded	in	McConnell’s	criteria,	
I	have	used	the	10-point	framework	advised	by	McConnell	(Chapter	3,	Table	5,	p.60),	and	
my	own	resultant	coding,	as	a	guide	to	assessing	success	or	failure.	Trustworthiness	in	my	
interpretation	against	the	framework	has	been	achieved	through	the	application	of	Lincoln	
and	Guba’s	(1995)	evaluative	criteria	to	establish	‘trustworthiness’	in	the	study:	‘credibility,	
transferability,	dependability	and	confirmability’	in	the	thematic	evaluation	of	the	primary	
and	secondary	texts,	as	described	in	Chapter	3,	Section	3.6.2	(p.75).	For	each	case	study,	I	
take	each	of	the	three	dimensions	of	policy	process,	programme	and	politics	in	turn,	with	a	
separate	table	for	each.	Then,	I	take	each	of	the	dimension’s	criteria	on	the	vertical	axis	and	
proceed	to	justify	my	positioning	in	relation	to	the	spectrum	of	success	and	failure	on	the	
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horizontal	axis.	This	is	articulated	with	a	short	summary	in	each	criterion	and	a	symbol,	
which	is	differently	coloured	for	each	case	study,	thus:		
e-University		
	
	
CETLs	 LLNs	
Figure	13	–	COLOUR	KEY	TO	CODING	OF	CASE	STUDIES	AGAINST	THE	FRAMEWORK	
The	justification	for	each	criterion	is	more	fully	articulated	under	sub-headings	following	
each	dimension	table.		
Then,	in	Section	8.5	(p.280),	I	address	the	first	supplementary	research	question,	‘Does	the	
evaluation	of	particular	policy	episodes	reveal	any	common	characteristics	and	distinctions	
in	relation	to	policy	that	could	usefully	be	considered	in	relation	to	future	policy	setting	in	
higher	education?’		The	work	of	May	(1992)	on	policy	learning	is	strongly	aligned	to	
McConnell’s	dimensions	of	policy	success,	where	he	considers	the	‘viability	of	policy	
instruments,	implementation	designs	and	political	learning’	(p.332).	He	articulates	
distinctions	in	the	forms	of	learning	and	the	sources	of	evidence	that	might	be	considered	
for	each	approach	in	order	to	conceptualise	and	operationalise	his	approach.	I	consider	that	
May’s	approach	to	examining	policy	learning	is	useful	in	the	context	of	this	study,	since	it	is	
so	closely	aligned	to	the	framework	and	assists	the	researcher	in	identifying	learning	in	the	
instrumental,	societal	and	political	dimensions.	I	will	use	his	distinctions	set	out	in	Chapter	
2,	Table	4	(p.53),	to	inform	this	section	of	work.			
In	Section	8.6	(p.294),	I	use	the	interpretations	from	this	analysis,	and	the	understandings	
of	the	locus	of	HE	policy-making	as	articulated	in	Chapter	4,	Table	8	(p.123),	to	address	the	
second	supplementary	research	question,	‘What	can	an	analysis	of	HEFCE	policy-making	
reveal	about	the	locus	of	power	in	policy-making	in	higher	education?’	
Finally,	in	Section	8.7	(p.297),	I	offer	a	critique	of	the	methodological	framework,	in	order	to	
address	the	final	supplementary	research	question,	‘To	what	extent	is	the	chosen	
methodological	framework	sufficient	or	inadequate	in	analysing	policy	success	and	failure	in	
the	context	of	contemporary	theoretical	approaches	to	policy	analysis?’	with	observations	
on	its	appropriateness	and	limitations	in	the	context	of	higher	education,	and	relating	back	
to	the	discussion	in	Chapter	2	on	contemporary	understandings	of	policy	and	policy	
analysis.		
c	
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8.2	The	e-University	–	mapping	the	policy	episode	to	the	framework		
8.2.1	Policy	process	
Table	16	–	POLICY	AS	PROCESS	(E-UNIVERSITY)	
Policy	as	process:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Process	success	 Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Process	failure	
Preserving	
government	
policy	goals	and	
instruments	
Policy	goals	and	
instruments	
preserved,	despite	
minor	refinements.	
Preferred	goals	and	
instruments	proving	
controversial	and	
difficult	to	preserve.	
Some	revisions	
needed.	
Government’s	goals	
and	preferred	
policy	instruments	
hang	in	the	
balance.	
Termination	of	
Government	
policy	goals	and	
instruments.		
The	policy	goals,	increased	global	market	share	in	e-learning,	social	inclusion	and	a	reduction	on	the	reliance	
on	public	funding	failed	to	be	achieved	by	the	policy	instrument,	the	e-university.	HEFCE	had	to	revise	its	
policy	instrument	for	e-learning	as	a	result	of	the	failure	of	UKeU.		
Conferring	
legitimacy	on	a	
policy.	
Some	challenges	to	
legitimacy,	but	of	
little	or	no	lasting	
effect.		
Difficult	and	
contested	issues	
surrounding	policy	
legitimacy,	with	
some	potential	to	
taint	the	policy	in	
the	long	term.	
Serious	and	
potentially	fatal	
damage	to	policy	
legitimacy.	
Irrecoverable	
damage	to	policy	
legitimacy.	
There	were	minor	challenges	to	policy	legitimacy	initially,	particularly	during	the	consultation	phase,	but	these	
were	dealt	with	through	reassurances	to	the	sector	and	the	development	of	a	business	plan	by	PwC	which	
demonstrated	the	commercial	viability	of	the	initiative.	However,	as	UKeU	failed	to	fulfil	the	terms	of	the	
grant	and	were	almost	solely	reliant	on	public	funds,	HEFCE	itself	questioned	the	legitimacy,	ultimately	closing	
UKeU.			
Building	a	
sustainable	
coalition	
Coalition	intact,	
despite	some	signs	
of	disagreement.	
	
	
	
Coalition	intact,	
although	strong	
signs	of	
disagreement	and	
some	potential	for	
fragmentation.	
Coalition	on	the	
brink	of	falling	
apart.	
Inability	to	
produce	a	sustain-
able	coalition.	
There	was	support	from	within	the	HE	sector	initially,	with	a	steering	group	led	from	within	the	sector	and	all	
but	4	HEIs	signing	up	to	ownership	of	UkeU.	The	involvement	of	PwC	in	the	development	of	the	business	
model	and	their	assertion	that	they	were	‘confident	of	its	success’	shows	confidence	from	the	private	sector;	
however	a	coalition	with	the	private	sector	failed	to	materialise	and	the	differing	cultures	between	the	public	
and	private	sectors	was	never	fully	addressed.	Towards	the	end	of	the	policy	period,	the	coalition	was	not	
sustainable	as	HEIs	withdrew	from	UKeU	and	there	was	little	private	sector	engagement.	
Symbolising	
innovation	and	
influence.	
Not	ground-
breaking	in	
innovation	or	
influence,	but	still	
symbolically	
progressive.	
Neither	innovative	
nor	outmoded,	
leading	(at	times)	to	
criticisms	from	both	
progressives	and	
conservatives.	
Appearance	of	
being	out	of	touch	
with	viable	alter-
native	solutions.	
Symbolising	
outmoded,	insular	
or	bizarre	ideas,	
seemingly	
oblivious	to	how	
other	jurisdictions	
are	dealing	with	
similar	issues.		
The	policy	was	not	innovative	globally,	with	many	other	examples,	some	of	which	showed	signs	of	success	
such	as	SNU	and	Global	University	Alliance.	The	complex	corporate	structure	led	to	UKeU	failing	to	observe	
alternative	solutions.	However,	this	was	an	experimental	public-private	approach	that	was	novel	for	HEFCE.	
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8.2.1.1.	Preserving	government	policy	goals	and	instruments		
The	conception	of	the	e-University	was	in	line	with	New	Labour’s	‘Third	Way’	(Giddens	
1998)	objective	to	enhance	the	UK’s	competitiveness	in	the	global	economy,	widen	
participation	and	social	inclusion,	and	reduce	reliance	on	state	funding	for	higher	education	
(Giddens	1998).	It	also	sat	well	within	other	policy	agendas	with	regards	to	educational	
technology	and	communication	in	schools,	where	there	had	been	some	evidence	of	
success.	Despite	this	policy	goal,	some	commentators,	such	as	Rumble	(2001),	questioned	
whether	e-learning	was	relevant	to	global	educational	needs,	or	succeeds	in	meeting	the	
social	inclusion	agenda,	since	there	was	a	tendency	for	e-learning	approaches	to	be	
commercially	led,		passing	the	cost	on	to	students	who	could	most	afford	to	pay.		
As	a	policy	instrument,	the	e-University,	in	McConnell’s	terms,	failed	to	meet	the	policy	
goal.	Much	of	its	failure	stemmed	from	a	weak	organisational	structure	between	HEFCE,	
HoldCo	and	UKeU,	and	a	lack	of	engagement	with	the	private	sector	which,	despite	some	
proposed	initial	interest,	failed	to	commit	to	the	project.	UKeU	moved	away	from	the	
original	PwC	business	plan	and	did	little	to	increase	the	UK’s	market	share	of	the	global	e-
learning	market,	with	limited	international	engagement,	as	evidenced	by	the	lack	of	
student	registrations.	UKeU	also	failed	to	address	the	social	inclusion	agenda,	by	focussing	
on	students	who	could	afford	to	pay	and	ignoring	the	domestic	market.	The	expectation	
that	the	initiative	would	reduce	reliance	on	state	funding	through	a	public-private	
partnership,	which	would	be	self-financing	in	the	medium	term,	failed	to	come	to	fruition,	
with	HEFCE	still	being	the	main	funder	by	the	end	of	the	initiative.	An	inability	to	resolve	
issues	arising	from	the	different	cultures	of	the	public-private	sectors,	and	particularly	
imposing	commercial	protocols	on	a	public	sector	initiative,	contributed	to	the	failure	to	
meet	the	self-financing	goal.	Following	the	failure	of	UKeU,	HEFCE	sought	to	reframe	its	
policy	instrument	in	respect	of	e-learning,	devising	a	strategy	that	focussed	more	on	
blended	learning	approaches	and	invested	the	remaining	e-University	funding	at	
institutional	level.				
8.2.1.2.	Conferring	legitimacy	on	a	policy	
The	policy	could	initially	be	regarded	as	legitimate,	since	there	was	evidence	from	other	
countries,	such	as	the	USA	and	Sweden,	that	an	e-university	approach	could	be	successful.	
Sir	Brian	Fender,	then	CEO	of	HEFCE,	had	instigated	its	inclusion	in	the	spending	review,	and	
so	it	had	support	of	both	the	sector’s	primary	agency	and	government.	The	e-University	
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was	underwritten	by	a	business	model	developed	by	PwC,	one	of	the	world’s	largest	and	
respected	multinational	professional	services	networks,	who	expressed	‘confidence’	in	its	
success	(HEFCE	00/44a	p.3),	giving	it	evidence-based	commercial	legitimacy	and	little	room	
for	challenge	from	opponents.	At	the	consultation	stage	with	the	sector,	a	Steering	Group	
was	established,	chaired	by	Professor	Ron	Cooke,	then	Vice-Chancellor	of	York	University,	
legitimising	the	project	within	the	HE	sector.		
There	were	some	minor	challenges,	particularly	from	the	HE	sector	at	the	consultation	
stage,	with	regards	to	the	inclusion	of	all	HE	institutions,	and	these	concerns	were	
addressed	by	HEFCE.	However,	this	remained	a	contested	issue,	with	some	institutions,	
such	as	LSE,	questioning	the	effect	on	their	quality	brand	if	the	project	was	inclusive	of	all	
institutions.	HEIs	were	also	concerned	that	the	strong	commercial	aspects	of	the	initiative	
would	entail	a	focus	on	elements	of	the	market	that	could	afford	to	pay,	rather	than	
addressing	a	key	objective	of	social	inclusion,	but	this	concern	was	never	addressed	by	
UKeU.		Once	UKeU	had	revised	the	business	plan,	such	that	student	number	targets	were	
reduced	and	the	public-private	partnership	was	all	but	abandoned,	and	with	UKeU	
remaining	heavily	reliant	on	public	funding,	HEFCE	itself	began	to	question	the	legitimacy	of	
the	initiative,	which	ultimately	led	the	agency	to	take	the	decision	to	close	down	UKeU.			
8.2.1.3	Building	a	sustainable	coalition		
Initially	there	was	evidence	that	the	e-University	could	build	a	sustainable	coalition.	All	but	
four	HEIs	signed	up	to	be	members	of	HoldCo,	although	as	John	Beaumont,	Chief	Executive	
of	UKeU,	pointed	out,	the	£1	fee	did	not	demonstrate	full	commitment	from	institutions.	It	
is	worthy	of	note	that	although	HEIs	appeared	to	give	their	full	support	to	the	initiative	at	
the	consultation	stage,	in	July	2003,	when	HEFCE	consulted	the	sector	on	a	new	e-learning	
strategy	(HEFCE	2003/35),	the	vast	majority	of	responses	supported	an	approach	that	was	
blended,	not	fully	distance	learning,	which	might	suggest	that	there	was	not	in	fact	such	
strong	support	for	the	e-University	approach.		
In	the	event,	institutional	commitment	failed	to	materialise,	with	only	25	courses	being	
provided	on-line	(SC	2005).	A	key	finding	of	the	research	by	Conole	et	al	(2006,	2006a,	
2006b),	and	concurred	with	by	John	Beaumont	of	UKeU,	suggests	that	the	HE	sector	itself	
was	not	fully	engaged	in	a	coalition	at	institutional	level,	with	many	instances	where	the	
work	in	developing	programmes	was	left	to	enthusiastic	individuals,	with	little	engagement	
from	senior	management.	They	concluded	that	the	internal	processes	within	institutions,	
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and	how	decisions	were	made,	were	often	factors	indicating	a	lack	of	engagement	with	
UKeU.	
The	confidence	expressed	by	PwC	in	the	initiative	from	a	commercial	perspective	meant	
that	there	was	initially	some	proposed	interest	from	the	private	sector,	with	both	Pearson	
Education	and	the	BBC	purportedly	being	interested	in	partnership	with	the	e-University.	
However,	the	involvement	of	the	private	sector	failed	to	materialise,	with	only	Sun	
Microsystems	Ltd	partnering	with	UKeU.	The	Select	Committee	(SC	2005)	found	that	Sun	
Microsystems	was	not	in	fact	a	true	partner,	but	had	more	of	a	supplier	relationship	with	
UKeU	in	supporting	the	technical	platform.	One	of	the	key	findings,	both	by	the	Select	
Committee	and	the	research	by	Conole	et	al	(2006,	2006a,	2006b)	was	the	failure	of	the	
initiative	to	successfully	form	a	coalition	between	the	public	and	private	sectors	and	
address	the	cultural	differences	between	them,	resulting	in	contested	issues	such	as	the	
payment	of	bonuses	to	the	company	directors,	which	Sir	Anthony	Cleaver	and	John	
Beaumont	claimed	were	in	line	with	commercial	practices,	but	drew	criticism	from	the	
Select	Committee.		
By	2004,	the	coalition	was	showing	significant	signs	of	disagreement,	with	tension	between	
HEFCE,	HoldCo	and	UKeU,	a	lack	of	engagement	from	the	private	sector	and	some	HEIs	
withdrawing	from	HoldCo.	
8.2.1.4	Symbolising	innovation	and	influence	
The	policy	was	not	innovative	in	global	terms,	with	many	other	examples	of	e-learning	
being	available,	particularly	in	the	USA,	which	had	examples	of	strongly	branded	ventures	
such	as	that	at	Phoenix	University.	It	was	these	e-university	initiatives	in	the	United	States	
that	were	perceived	as	a	major	threat	to	the	UK’s	international	market,	and	as	such	a	
driving	force	behind	the	initiative,	although	as	Hedberg	(2006)	observed,	the	USA	also	
experienced	similar	failures.	The	Swedish	Net	University,	which	is	still	in	existence,	is	a	good	
example	of	success,	but	with	an	entirely	different	approach,	being	wholly	publicly	funded,	
with	recurrent	funding	for	institutions	received	upon	the	successful	completion	of	a	
student’s	studies.	Coursed	offered	by	SNU	are	taught	entirely	in	its	native	Swedish	and	have	
a	strong	focus	on	the	home	market.	Roger	Waterhouse,	then	Vice	Chancellor	of	the	
University	of	Derby,	writing	in	the	THES	in	2000,	observed	that	whilst	the	e-University	was	
just	getting	off	the	ground,	a	Global	University	Alliance	of	‘ten	universities	from	Canada,	the	
United	States,	Australia,	New	Zealand	and	the	UK	had	already	managed	to	set	up	in	Hong	
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Kong	with	more	than	100	courses,	and	students	already	enrolled’	(Waterhouse	2000).	
Significantly,	he	reported	some	characteristics	of	which	HEFCE	and	UKeU	might,	in	
retrospect,	have	taken	heed:	
‘They	share	a	focus	on	higher	vocational	education	and	have	pooled	their	distance-
learning	experience.	They	have	done	their	market	analysis	of	Southeast	Asia	and	
targeted	professionals	in	mid-career.	And,	crucially,	they	have	enlisted	a	commercial	
partner	with	a	proven	delivery	platform’.	(Waterhouse	2000).		
Whilst	the	initiative	was	not	innovative	on	the	global	stage,	in	English	HE	policy	terms	this	
was	a	distinctive	and	experimental	approach	for	HEFCE,	in	forming	a	coalition	of	public	and	
private	stakeholders.		The	crucial	failing	related	to	the	complex	corporate	structure,	which	
meant	that	UKeU	was	able	to	divert	from	the	PwC	business	plan	and	not	pay	heed	to	other	
successful	e-university	ventures.	For	example,	SNU	had	been	successful	in	part	due	to	its	
teaching	in	native	Swedish	and	concentrating	on	the	home	market,	contrary	to	UKeU’s	
perception,	based	solely	on	the	result	of	conversations	in	the	Far	East	that,	globally,	
students	wanted	all	courses	in	English.	Dr	Kim	Howells	(Minister	for	Higher	Education	in	
2005),	in	his	evidence	to	the	Select	Committee,	concedes	that	more	could	have	been	done	
to	observe	what	was	going	on	internationally.			
8.2.2	Policy	programme	
Table	17	–	POLICY	AS	PROGRAMME	(E-UNIVERSITY)	
Policy	as	programme:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Programme	
success	
Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Programme	
failure	
Implementation	
in	line	with	
objectives.	
Implementation	
objectives	broadly	
achieved,	despite	
minor	refinements	
or	deviations.	
Mixed	results,	with	
some	successes,	but	
accompanied	by	
unexpected	and	
controversial	
problems.	
Minor	progress	
towards	
implementation	as	
intended,	but	beset	
by	chronic	failures,	
proving	highly	
controversial	and	
very	difficult	to	
defend.	
Implementation	
fails	to	be	
executed	in	line	
with	objectives.		
UKeU	failed	to	meet	any	of	the	objectives	in	terms	of	being	learner-driven,	responsive	to	change,	developing	
excellence	in	the	technological	platform,	securing	economies	of	scale	or	being	financially	self-sustaining.	The	
pubic-private	organisational	structure	meant	that	UKeU	were	able	to	move	away	from	the	objectives	and	
business	plan	without	accountability	for	use	of	public	funds.	
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Policy	as	programme:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Programme	
success	
Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Programme	
failure	
Achievement	of	
desired	outcomes.	
Outcomes	broadly	
achieved,	despite	
some	shortfalls.	
Some	successes,	but	
the	partial	
achievement	of	
intended	outcomes	
is	counterbalanced	
by	unwanted	
results,	generating	
substantial	
controversy.	
Some	small	
outcomes	achieved	
as	intended,	but	
overwhelmed	by	
controversial	and	
high	profile	
instances	of	failure	
to	produce	results.		
Failure	to	
achieve	
desired	
outcomes.	
	
	
UKeU	failed	to	produce	the	desired	outcomes	in	terms	of	increasing	the	UKs	share	of	the	global	e-learning	
market	or	meeting	domestic	social	inclusion.	In	meeting	the	milestones	set	out	in	the	business	plan,	the	
number	of	programmes	on-line	was	lower	than	expected	and	target	student	numbers	failed	to	be	achieved,	
due	to	a	supply-led	rather	than	demand-led	approach.	A	sustained	public-private	partnership	failed	to	
materialise	through	lack	of	engagement	by	the	commercial	sector.		The	e-China	project	was	a	minor	success	
which	continued	after	the	demise	of	UKeU.		
Meets	policy	
domain	criteria.	
Not	quite	the	
desired	outcome,	
but	sufficiently	
close	to	lay	strong	
claim	to	fulfilling	
the	criteria.	
Partial	achievement	
of	goals,	but	
accompanied	by	
failures	to	achieve,	
with	possibility	of	
high-profile	
examples,	eg.	on-
going	wastage	when	
the	criterion	is	
efficiency.	
A	few	minor	
successes,	but	
plagued	by	
unwanted	media	
attention;	eg.	
examples	of	
wastage	and	
possible	scandal	
when	the	criterion	
is	efficiency.	
Clear	inability	to	
meet	the	criteria.		
	
	
UKeU	failed	to	meet	wider	‘Third	Way’	objectives:	raising	attainment,	social	inclusion	and	widening	
participation,	or	enhancing	the	UK’s	position	within	the	global	economy.	UKeU	failed	in	other	policy	domains:	
public-private	sector	collaboration	as	well	as	value	for	money	in	the	use	of	public	funds.		
Creating	benefit	
for	a	target	group.	
A	few	shortfalls	and	
possibly	some	
anomalous	cases,	
but	intended	target	
group	broadly	
benefits.		
Partial	benefits	
realised,	but	not	as	
widespread	or	deep	
as	intended.	
Small	benefits	are	
accompanied	and	
overshadowed	by	
damage	to	the	very	
group	that	was	
meant	to	benefit.	
Also	likely	to	
generate	high	
profile	stories	of	
unfairness	and	
suffering.		
	
Damaging	a	
particular	target	
group.	
The	failure	to	meet	student	registration	targets	is	sufficient	evidence	that	the	project	failed	to	create	
significant	benefit	for	the	target	groups.	There	were	some	minor	successes	for	individual	students	registered,	
although	these	were	later	transferred	to	the	relevant	institutions.	The	lack	of	focus	on	the	domestic	market	
ignored	social	inclusion	and	potential	students.	There	were	no	high	profile	stories	of	students	being	
disadvantaged.	
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8.2.2.1	Implementation	in	line	with	objectives	
In	the	implementation	of	the	programme,	the	corporate	organisational	structure	was	
central	to	the	failure	of	the	e-University,	as	it	allowed	UKeU	to	divert	from	the	original	
objectives	and	business	plan	without	sufficient	accountability	to	HEFCE	for	the	use	of	public	
funds.	This	was	further	compounded	by	the	distance	put	between	HEFCE	and	UKeU,	with	
HoldCo	acting	as	an	intermediary,	as	HEFCE	could	not,	by	law,	give	public	funds	to	a	private	
company.		
To	re-iterate,	the	objectives	were	that	the	e-University	would	be:	
• Learner	driven	(demand	led)	
• Responsive	to	change	(to	meet	changes	in	demand)	
• Excellent	fit	for	purpose	(in	programmes	being	offered)	
• Excellent	in	use	of	new	technology	to	enable	learning	experience	to	be	delivered	
• Able	to	secure	economies	of	scale	
• Financially	self-sustaining	over	time	
Evidence	points	to	failure	in	the	first	objective	to	be	learner	driven,	since	the	Select	
Committee	criticised	UKeU	for	taking	a	supply	led	approach	in	looking	to	HEIs	to	provide	
programmes,	rather	than	focussing	on	demand	from	students	by	undertaking	sufficient	
market	research.	It	failed	to	shift	the	decision-making	‘towards	the	consumer	and	away	
from	the	provider’	as	required	under	the	business	model	(HEFCE	00/44a	p.9).	In	failing	to	
meet	this	objective,	UKeU	was	unable	to	meet	the	second	objective	to	be	responsive	to	
changes	in	demand,	since	the	venture	was	entirely	supply	driven.	The	business	model	
stated	that	the	interpretation	of	excellence	should	be	‘that	the	e-U	can,	and	should,	be	
relatively	inclusive	for	UK	HEIs	in	terms	of	the	types	and	sources	of	offering	which	it	makes	
available’	(HEFCE	00/44a	p.9).	The	evidence	points	to	failure	in	this	regard,	as	by	2004	only	
25	courses,	from	a	small	number	of	institutions,	were	available	on-line.			
UKeU	was	heavily	criticised	for	the	amount	of	time	and	funding	(£14.5m)	that	had	been	
focussed	on	the	development	of	a	new	technological	platform,	particularly	as	cheaper	off-
the-shelf	technologies	were	available.	However,	given	the	short	amount	of	time	that	the	
UKeU	had	to	run,	it	is	not	possible	to	determine	how	successful	the	platform	might	have	
been	in	the	longer	term.	Indeed,	there	are	mixed	views	on	whether	the	plug	was	pulled	on	
the	initiative	too	early,	with	several	witnesses	to	the	Select	Committee	,	such	as	Dr	Kim	
Howells	and	Sir	Anthony	Cleaver	(Chairman	of	UKeU),	observing	that	this	was	the	case,	
claiming	that	the	initiative	was	not	given	time	to	succeed.	Bacsich	(2004,	2010)	also	
supports	this	view.		
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Economies	of	scale	were	not	achieved	as	the	number	of	students	registered	was	
significantly	below	the	intended	targets,	with	less	than	1,000	registrations	against	an	
original	target	of	5,638	by	2003,	and	a	significant	amount	of	money	had	already	been	spent.	
The	business	model	expected	the	e-University	initiative	to	be	self-sustaining	within	5-6	
years,	requiring	it	to	be	profit	maximising.	
‘Most	aspects	of	the	e-U’s	operations	will	be	profit	maximising;	its	management	style	
should	certainly	be	performance	driven,	and	it	will	need	to	make	surpluses	so	that	it	is	
not	wholly	dependent	upon	external	funding	for	re-investment’	(HEFCE	00/44a	p.10).		
Almost	£50m	of	public	money	was	invested	in	UKeU,	and	by	the	time	it	revised	its	business	
plan	in	2003,	there	would	be	a	further	6	years	before	any	private	sector	investment	was	
planned.	Consequently,	additional	public	funding	would	be	required.	With	so	few	student	
registrations,	and	revisions	to	student	number	targets,	there	was	no	confidence	in	the	self-
sustaining	objective	being	achieved.		
8.2.2.2	Achievement	of	desired	outcomes	
The	original	PwC	business	plan	forecast	110,000	students	within	6	years,	growing	to	
250,000	by	2012-13,	in	order	to	increase	the	UK’s	market	share,	both	in	on-line	learning	
and	in	meeting	the	Prime	Minister’s	target	of	increased	market	share	of	overseas	students	
(from	17%	to	25%)	by	2005.	UKeU	failed	to	achieve	these	targets,	and	indeed	in	2003	
significantly	reduced	the	target	in	its	revised	business	plan	to	just	45,000	students	by	2009-
10.	There	were	some	small	elements	of	success,	such	as	the	e-China	project,	which	was	
retained	after	the	demise	of	UKeU,	but	these	were	limited	and	still	reliant	on	public	
funding.		It	cannot	be	known	whether	UKeU	could	have	ever	reached	these	targets.		
Although	the	Select	Committee	did	not	focus	on	UKeU’s	failure	to	increase	social	inclusion	
in	the	domestic	market	in	its	main	findings,	it	was	nevertheless	one	of	the	key	aims	set	out	
in	the	business	model.	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	business	model	itself	recognised	the	
tension	between	the	development	of	a	profit	maximising	public-private	venture	and	a	
policy	that	promotes	social	inclusion:	‘wider	intentions	to	increase	social	inclusion	and	to	
disseminate	good	practice	do	not	sit	comfortably	with	a	focus	on	profit	maximisation’	
(HEFCE	00/44).	Based	on	the	evidence	that	UKeU	focused	on	the	fee	paying	overseas	
market,	there	is	little	evidence	that	this	wider	aspiration	was	achievable.		
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8.2.2.3	Meeting	policy	domain	criteria	
The	programme	failed	to	meet	the	wider	policy	domain	criteria	in	terms	of	raising	
standards	through	raising	attainment,	social	inclusion	and	widening	participation,	or	
enhancing	the	UK’s	position	within	the	global	economy.	Other	dimensions	of	policy	domain	
that	came	into	play	were	encouraging	public-private	sector	collaboration,	with	an	emphasis	
on	meeting	private	sector	management	and	accounting	standard	benchmarks,	and	
demonstrating	value	for	money	in	the	use	of	public	funds.	In	all	cases,	UKeU	failed	to	meet	
these	policy	domain	criteria,	as	evidenced	by	the	lack	of	student	registrations		(see	page	
160),	failure	to	secure	private	partners,	and	£50m	of	redundant	public	funded	expenditure	
on	UKeU.	
8.2.2.4	Creating	benefit	for	the	target	group	
The	original	proposal	for	the	e-University	had	envisaged	the	target	groups	to	
‘be	in	careers-associated	areas	as	some	postgraduate	and/or	post-experience	areas,	
and	particularly	various	forms	of	continuing	professional	development,	and	with	a	focus	
on	both	corporate	and	government	consumers’	(HEFCE	00/44a	p.15).		
UKeU	failed	to	engage	with	these	target	groups,	particularly	in	the	domestic	market,	
concentrating	their	effort	on	the	overseas	market	as	the	main	source	of	income	from	
students.	However,	the	resulting	lack	of	student	numbers	is	evidence	of	the	lack	of	
engagement	with	even	overseas	students	as	a	target	group.	Indeed,	the	UK’s	market	share	
of	international	students	had	only	risen	by	less	than	2%	since	2000	[10.7%	in	2000,	12.6%	in	
2010]	(source:	Patterns	and	Trends	in	UK	Higher	Education,	Universities	UK,	2014).	A	
number	of	reasons	for	this	were	established	by	the	Select	Committee:	the	confused	
branding	for	students	with	a	lack	of	focus	on	the	quality	of	individual	institutions,	a	lack	of		
market	research	by	UKeU,	and	the	focus	on	provision	in	English.	The	domestic	market,	and	
raising	aspirations	through	social	inclusion,	were	wholly	ignored.	
In	terms	of	the	benefit	to	HEIs,	although	all	but	4	UK	universities	signed	up	to	UKeU,	in	the	
end	only	25	courses	were	put	on-line	by	a	small	number	of	HEIs.	The	original	circular	to	HEIs	
stated	a	number	of	anticipated	benefits	to	HEIs	in	being	involved	with	the	e-University:	
increased	income	from	student	numbers	from	overseas	and	home	CPD	markets,	reduced	
costs	for	development	of	on-line	courses,	scope	to	use	existing	programmes	to	increase	
student	numbers,	involvement	in	the	development	of	technologies,	and	enhancement	of	
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their	reputation	through	involvement	with	a	flagship	project	(HEFCE	00/04).	However,	in	
the	event,	none	of	these	benefits	came	to	pass.	
8.2.3	Policy	politics	
Table	18	–	POLICY	AS	POLITICS	(E-UNIVERSITY)	
Policy	as	politics:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Political	success	 Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Political	failure	
Enhancing	
electoral	
prospects	or	
reputation	of	
governments	and	
leaders.		
Favourable	to	
electoral	prospects	
and	reputation	
enhancement,	with	
only	minor	
setbacks.	
Policy	obtains	strong	
support	and	
opposition,	working	
both	for	and	against	
electoral	prospects	
and	reputation	in	
fairly	equal	
measure.	
Despite	small	signs	
of	benefit,	policy	
proves	an	overall	
electoral	and	
reputational	
liability.		
Damaging	to	the	
electoral	prospects	
or	reputation	of	
governments	and	
leaders,	with	no	
redeeming	political	
benefit.	
No	apparent	effect	on	electoral	prospects.	
Controlling	policy	
agenda	and	
easing	the	
business	of	
governing.	
Despite	some	
difficulties	in	
agenda	
management,	
capacity	to	govern	is	
unperturbed.		
Policy	proving	
controversial	and	
taking	up	more	
political	time	and	
resources	in	its	
defence	than	was	
expected.	
Clear	signs	that	the	
agenda	and	
business	of	
government	is	
struggling	to	
suppress	a	
politically	difficult	
issue.		
Policy	failings	are	so	
high	and	persistent	
on	the	agenda,	that	
it	is	damaging	
government’s	
capacity	to	govern.	
Some	adverse	pubicity	and	some	questions	raised	in	the	House	of	Commons	in	response	to	the	Select	
Committee	report.	However,	HEFCE	managed	to	contain	the	episode	and	divert	remaining	funds	to	a	revised	
strategy	for	e-learning.	
Sustaining	the	
broad	values	and	
direction	of	
government.	
Some	refinements	
needed	but	broad	
trajectory	
unimpeded.		
Direction	of	
government	very	
broadly	in	line	with	
goals,	but	clear	signs	
that	the	policy	has	
prompted	some	
rethinking,	espec-
ially	behind	the	
scenes.		
Entire	trajectory	of	
government	is	
being	
compromised.		
Irrevocably	
damaging	to	the	
broad	values	and	
direction	of	
government.		
HEFCE	reviewed	its	strategy	in	e-learning	and	put	the	remaining	£12m	into	individual	institutions.	A	review	in	
2008	ensured	that	the	policy	agenda	remainded	intact	to	a	large	extent,	although	with	major	modifications	to	
the	original	prorgamme	and	a	withdrawal	from	the	public-private	sector	consortium	model.			
	
8.2.3.1	Enhancing	electoral	prospects	or	reputation	of	governments	and	leaders	
There	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	failure	of	UKeU	had	either	a	damaging	or	an	
enhancing	effect	on	the	electoral	prospects	of	the	then	Labour	government.	Indeed,	since	
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the	initiative	had	its	genesis	within	HEFCE,	it	would	have	been	feasible	for	government	to	
deflect	any	damaging	effects.	However,	the	e-University	was	the	most	politically	‘hot’	of	the	
chosen	case	studies,	and	did	attract	some	adverse	media	attention,	although	surprisingly	
little,	with	a	few	mentions	in	the	THES	and	a	small	number	in	the	Guardian	and	Observer	
newspapers,	mostly	focussing	on	the	level	of	public	funding	that	had	been	put	into	UKeU.	
The	e-University	was	the	only	one	of	the	case	studies	to	result	in	a	Select	Committee	
inquiry,	although	there	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	this	damaged	the	reputation	of	
government	or	its	leaders.		
8.2.3.2	Controlling	policy	agenda	and	easing	the	business	of	governing	
Despite	the	Select	Committee	inquiry	and	some	media	attention,	few	questions	appear	to	
have	been	asked	in	the	House	of	Commons,	with	most	questions	focusing	on	requests	for	
progress	reports	and,	as	such,	the	capacity	to	govern	was	unaffected,	despite	some	
difficulties	with	managing	the	agenda.	HEFCE’s	abrupt	closure	of	UKeU	points	to	a	
concentrated	attempt	at	agenda	management	and	damage	limitation.	There	was,	however,	
a	request	for	a	debate	on	3rd	March	2005,	the	day	that	the	Select	Committee	report	was	
published,	where	Oliver	Heald	MP	asked	
‘When	can	we	debate	today's	damning	Education	and	Skills	Select	Committee	report	on	
the	so-called	UK	e-university?	It	shows	that	only	900	students	have	taken	part	in	this	
£50	million	project—a	whopping	£40,000	per	student.	It	also	finds	that	there	was	
inadequate	research,	a	skewed	focus	and	a	failure	to	work	successfully	with	the	private	
sector.	So	what	did	Ministers	do?	They	paid	bonuses	to	the	senior	executives.	Should	not	
Ministers	have	done	their	homework	before	throwing	vast	sums	of	public	money	at	a	
project	that	nobody	wanted?	Is	that	not	yet	another	piece	of	Government	incompetence	
to	rank	with	the	millennium	dome,	the	Child	Support	Agency	computer	and	the	tax	
credits	administrative	fiasco?	The	two	computer	projects	that	I	have	mentioned	were	
the	work	of	EDS,	to	which	the	Government	have	this	week	given	a	£4	billion	contract	to	
supply	defence	computers.	Can	we	have	a	debate	on	the	rewards	of	failure,	so	that	we	
can	seek	serious	assurances	about	that	massive	contract?’		(Hansard	03.03.2005).		
8.2.3.3	Sustaining	the	broad	values	and	direction	of	government	
Despite	some	limited	adverse	publicity	and	the	Select	Committee	inquiry,	the	government	
was	able	to	contain	UKeU	as	a	short-term	episode	of	failure.	The	remaining	funding	(£12m)	
was	used	by	HEFCE	to	re-focus	its	e-learning	strategy	and	to	support	individual	e-learning	
programmes	in	HEIs,	where	the	emphasis	was	on	a	blended	learning	approach	and	one	that	
focussed	on	the	public	good	rather	than	commercial	objectives.	HEFCE	re-wrote	its	e-
learning	strategy	in	2005	and	Glenaffric	Ltd	undertook	an	independent	review	of	the	
strategy	in	2008.	The	revised	framework	focuses	on	
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‘the	broader	opportunities	offered	through	the	use	of	technology,	rather	than	
concentrating	on	issues	such	as	distance	learning…our	primary	focus	on	the	
enhancement	of	learning	and	teaching	drives	our	approach’	(p.8	HEFCE	March	
2009/12).		
Thus,	HEFCE	was	able	to	control	the	policy	agenda	and	refocus	its	e-learning	policy.	
8.2.4	Summary	
The	policy	process	can	be	judged	to	have	been	a	failure	in	McConnell’s	terms.	Although	the	
initiative	seemed	at	first	to	be	legitimate,	with	a	desire	to	increase	the	UK’s	global	share	of	
e-learning	in	the	face	of	competition	from	the	USA,	and	strong	support	from	the	private	
sector	through	the	confidence	expressed	by	PwC,	the	weakness	of	the	organisational	
structure	all	but	delegitimise	the	project.	Despite	support	from	all	but	four	HEIs	through	
their	initial	commitment	to	HoldCo,	and	initial	expressions	of	interest	from	the	private	
sector,	the	coalition	was	in	fact	weak,	with	little	institutional	commitment	and	a	lack	of	
engagement	by	the	private	sector.	The	aim	for	the	e-University	to	address	social	inclusion	
failed	to	come	to	fruition,	as	UKeU	was	not	targeting	the	home	market,	but	focussing	
instead	on	overseas	markets,	thus	failing	to	meet	New	Labour’s	’Third	Way’	agenda.	UKeU,	
through	internal	shortcomings,	did	not	look	to	other	successful	e-learning	initiatives	
globally	to	legitimise	its	approach.							
The	programme	can	be	viewed	a	failure,	with	a	weak	organisational	structure	which	was	
not	only	experimental	for	HEFCE	in	terms	of	public	and	private	partnership,	but	allowed	
UKeU	to	move	away	from	the	original	objectives.	Failure	in	a	number	of	areas,	as	identified	
by	the	Select	Committee	report,	led	to	the	e-University	failing	to	meet	its	objectives	or	the	
desired	outcomes.	There	were	few	benefits	for	the	target	groups,	with	little	demand-led	
student	engagement,	either	from	an	increase	in	the	UK’s	share	of	the	overseas	market,	or	
in	meeting	the	social	inclusion	agenda.	
In	terms	of	politics,	despite	some	limited	adverse	publicity	and	questions	in	the	House	of	
Commons,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	perceived	waste	of	public	money	that	was	
articulated	in	the	Select	Committee	report	(SC	2005),	government	was	able	to	contain	the	
episode	and	realise	a	durable,	although	conflicted,	success	with	a	change	in	HEFCE	strategy	
and	movement	of	funds	to	support	a	revised	e-learning	policy.		
In	addressing	the	main	research	question,	by	applying	the	McConnell	framework	criteria	to	
the	policy	episode,	the	e-University	can	be	judged	to	be	a	process	and	programme	failure,	
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but	politically,	the	government	was	able	to	contain	the	episode,	with	a	change	in	e-learning	
policy	and	re-direction	of	funding.		
8.3	Centres	for	Excellence	in	Teaching	and	Learning	–	mapping	the	
policy	episode	to	the	framework		
8.3.1	Policy	process	
Table	19	–	POLICY	AS	PROCESS	(CETLs)	
Policy	as	process:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Process	success	 Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Process	failure	
Preserving	
government	
policy	goals	and	
instruments	
Policy	goals	and	
instruments	
preserved,	despite	
minor	refinements.	
Preferred	goals	and	
instruments	proving	
controversial	and	
difficult	to	preserve.	
Some	revisions	
needed.		
Government’s	goals	
and	preferred	
policy	instruments	
hang	in	the	
balance.	
Termination	of	
Government	policy	
goals	and	
instruments.	
The	policy	goals	were	preserved	throughout	the	initiative,	to	raise	the	profile	of	learning	and	teaching	in	line	
with	research.	However,	the	policy	instrument,	a	bottom-up	initiative,	in	which	HEFCE	took	a	hands-off	
approach,	and	the	time	limited	funding,	meant	that	whilst	there	was	considerable	CETL	activity	and	successes	
at	a	local	level,	these	were	difficult	to	sustain	beyond	the	funding	period,	and	the	lack	of	a	nationally	co-
ordinated	approach	meant	that	sectoral	impact	was	difficult	to	achieve.		
Conferring	
legitimacy	on	a	
policy	
Some	challenges	to	
legitimacy,	but	of	
little	or	no	lasting	
effect.		
Difficult	and	
contested	issues	
surrounding	policy	
legitimacy,	with	
some	potential	to	
taint	the	policy	in	
the	long	term.		
Serious	and	
potentially	fatal	
damage	to	policy	
legitimacy.	
Irrecoverable	
damage	to	policy	
legitimacy.	
There	were	a	number	of	contested	issues,	particularly	in	relation	to	defining	excellence,	which	impacted	on	
both	how	bids	were	made	and	how	the	panel	used	their	own	value	judgements	to	select	CETLs.	The	competitive	
nature	of	the	funding	led	to	concerns	about	potential	unintended	consequences	for	HEIs	that	failed	to	secure	a	
CETL.	There	were	questions	concerning	the	reliability	of	the	evaluation	process	which	pointed	to	substantial	
activity	but	little	evidence	of	impact.	
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Policy	as	process:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Process	success	 Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Process	failure	
Building	a	
sustainable	
coalition	
	
	
Coalition	intact,	
despite	some	signs	
of	disagreement.	
	
	
	
Coalition	intact,	
although	strong	
signs	of	
disagreement	and	
some	potential	for	
fragmentation.		
	
Coalition	on	the	
brink	of	falling	
apart.	
Inability	to	produce	
a	sustainable	
coalition.	
The	individual	institutional	prevailing	cultures,	level	of	engagement	by	senior	and	middle	managers,	and	the	
relative	power	of	the	CETL	to	achieve	engagement	and	change	within	their	own	institutions,	impacted	on	the	
likelihood	of	success	at	institutional	level.	The	lack	of	a	nationally	coordinated	programme	meant	that	sectoral	
impact	was	compromised.		
Symbolising	
innovation	and	
influence.	
Not	ground-
breaking	in	
innovation	or	
influence,	but	still	
symbolically	
progressive.	
Neither	innovative	
nor	outmoded,	
leading	(at	times)	to	
criticisms	from	both	
progressives	and	
conservatives.	
Appearance	of	
being	out	of	touch	
with	viable	
alternative	
solutions.		
Symbolising	
outmoded,	insular	
or	bizarre	ideas,	
seemingly	oblivious	
to	how	other	
jurisdictions	are	
dealing	with	similar	
issues.		
Other	jurisdictions	had	similar	schemes,	particularly	in	the	USA,	Australia	and	Europe.	A	combination	of	
approaches	suggests	that	a	nationally	co-ordinated	approach	with	sustainable	funding	for	all	institutions	might	
be	the	most	appropriate	approach.		
	
8.3.1.1.	Preserving	government	policy	goals	and	instruments		
The	policy	goals	were	preserved	during	the	period	of	the	CETL	initiative:	to	raise	the	profile	
of	learning	and	teaching	quality	in	line	with	research	quality,	and	professionalise	teaching	
with	the	introduction	of	fees	and	higher	expectations	from	students.		This	was	achieved	to	
an	extent,	but	the	effects	were	mainly	seen	at	a	local	level;	sectoral	change	proved	more	
difficult	to	achieve	and	the	impact	from	any	engagement	between	the	CETLs,	or	beyond	to	
parts	of	the	sector	without	a	CETL,	proved	difficult	to	assess,	as	was	concluded	by	the	
summative	evaluation	(SQW	2011).	There	were	no	modifications	to	the	policy	goals	in	the	
timeframe	observed.		
The	policy	instrument,	characterised	by	a	bottom-up	approach	in	which	HEFCE	was	
deliberately	loose	in	its	definition	of	excellence,	and	time-limited	project	funding,	was	
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subject	to	some	contestation	and	disquiet	throughout	the	period	of	the	initiative.	One	of	
the	key,	albeit	subtle,	changes	to	the	policy	instrument	was	the	change	in	title	from	Centres	
of	Excellence,	as	articulated	in	the	2003	White	Paper,	to	Centres	for	Excellence,	by	the	time	
the	invitation	to	bid	for	funds	was	announced	in	2004	(HEFCE	2004/5).	This	suggests	a	
change	from	funding	existing	excellence	(like	research	funding)	to	an	initiative	which	
promotes	the	establishment	of	excellence.	Other	areas	of	contestation	were,	firstly,	the	
articulation	of	what	was	meant	by	excellence,	particularly	in	the	selection	process,	where	
value-laden	judgements	were	often	observed	(Gosling	and	Hannan	2007b).	The	notion	of	
excellence	is	already	regarded	as	a	challenging	concept	within	higher	education	(Nixon	
2007),	and	learning	and	teaching	in	particular	(Skelton	2005),	with	some	scholars	arguing	
that	it	is	an	empty	notion	(Barnett	2000)	and	should	be	seen	as	a	process	rather	than	a	
product	(Nixon	2007).	Secondly,	the	original	intention	to	award	institutions	that	failed	to	
succeed	at	stage	one	of	the	bidding	process	with	a	‘commended’	status	was	abandoned	by	
HEFCE,	in	the	light	of	some	disquiet	from	the	sector	that	there	might	be	some	reputation	
damage	for	institutions	that	were	not	awarded	a	CETL.	Finally,	the	sector’s	concern	that	the	
competitive	nature	of	the	funding	was	divisive	persisted	throughout	the	initiative,	
particularly	in	observing	the	lack	of	dissemination	and	deepening	effect	across	the	sector	
(SQW	2011).	Both	the	formative	and	summative	evaluations	of	the	CETLs	commissioned	by	
HEFCE	(Saunders	et	al	2008,	SQW	2011),	observed	that	the	sector	would	have	generally	
preferred	an	approach	that	was	inclusive	of	all	institutions.	The	short	term	nature	of	the	
funding	meant	that	the	policy	goals,	whilst	showing	evidence	of	success	at	a	local	level,	
were	more	difficult	to	sustain	beyond	the	funding	period,	with	the	summative	evaluation	
concluding	that	future	funding	was	not	in	most	cases	an	institutional	priority,	and	that	only	
20%	of	institutions	had	arranged	some	level	of	future	funding	(SQW	2011).		
Accountability	and	monitoring	of	the	CETL	process	was	characterised	by	HEFCE’s	‘hands-off’	
approach	(HEFCE	2003/36).	Whilst	welcomed	by	the	sector,	it	came	in	for	much	criticism,	in	
both	formative	and	summative	evaluations	and	by	other	commentators	(Turner	2007,	
Gosling	2013,	Gosling	and	Turner	2015).	The	formative	and	summative	evaluations	
concluded	that	the	self-evaluations	undertaken	by	CETLs,	although	evidence	based,	took	a	
wholly	positivist	stance,	lacked	robust	and	theorised	evaluation	strategies	and	made	it	
difficult	to	quantify	the	impact	of	CETLs	in	a	rigorous	way.	Thus,	addressing	value	for	
money,	which	itself	is	a	contestable	issue	at	the	level	of	discourse,	was	problematic.			
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Linked	to	the	weak	monitoring	was	the	lack	of	a	co-ordinated	approach	to	the	network	by	
HEFCE,	which	made	the	coherence	of	the	programme	at	a	national	level	problematic.	
Although	by	the	summative	report	there	had	been	a	good	deal	of	external	activity,	with	
over	3,000	publications	and	more	than	5,500	dissemination	events,	measuring	the	impact	
of	that	activity	proved	difficult.	Consequently,	one	of	the	main	recommendations	of	the	
summative	evaluation	was	that	‘any	future	programme	of	this	kind	should	build	in	more	
active	central	management	and	coordination’	(SQW	2011	p.53).		
8.3.1.2.	Conferring	legitimacy	on	the	policy	
As	observed	in	Chapter	6,	there	are	many	examples	of	learning	and	teaching	enhancement	
policies	and	funding	schemes	in	other	countries,	which	followed	a	similar	policy	process	
(Brawley	et	al,	2009,	Lemmens-Krug	2015).	This	gave	the	CETL	initiative,	and	its	approach,	a	
level	of	validity,	as	will	be	discussed	in	8.3.1.4	below.	Although	there	was	sector	
engagement	at	a	national	level,	the	competitive	nature	of	the	funding	meant	that	not	all	
institutions	were	awarded	a	CETL,	which	gave	rise	to	fears	that	there	could	be	unintended	
consequences	for	institutions	without	a	CETL,	particularly	in	terms	of	reputation	for	quality.	
Whilst	these	fears	did	not	seem	to	be	realised,	the	summative	evaluation	observed	that	
there	was	limited	impact	of	CETL	activity	for	institutions	that	were	outside	of	the	CETL	
network	(SQW	2011).		
The	bidding	process	and	contested	nature	of	‘excellence’	also	suggests	some	threat	to	the	
legitimacy	of	the	process,	where	bidders	made	calculated	judgements	on	what	HEFCE	
would	consider	to	be	excellent,	and	CETLs	were	awarded	based	on	the	value	judgements	of	
the	panel.	Research	conducted	by	Gosling	and	Hannan	(2007a,	2007b)	suggested	that	the	
bidding	process	was	flawed	by	the	lack	of	clarification	and	uncertainty	over	the	defining	of	
excellence.				
8.3.1.3.	Building	a	sustainable	coalition	
The	coalition	remained	intact	through	the	period,	but	the	areas	of	contestation	as	
described	above	meant	that	there	were	some	threats	to	its	sustainability.	At	institutional	
level,	there	were	signs	of	disagreement	and	fragmentation,	since	there	was	variation	in	the	
engagement	of	senior	management,	which	Gosling	and	Turner	(2015)	argued	was	crucial	if	
the	work	of	the	CETL	was	to	be	embedded	across	the	institution.	By	the	time	of	the	
summative	evaluation,	deepening	effects	across	institutions	were	being	observed,	but	
there	were	difficulties	in	some	CETLs	being	able	to	gain	sufficient	purchase	to	embed	their	
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work	where	they	conflicted	with	the	prevailing	culture,	or	were	seen	to	be	on	the	
periphery,	of	the	institution.	There	was	also	evidence	to	suggest	conflict	between	staff	in	
the	CETLs	and	their	managers	in	terms	of	time	and	resources	to	deliver	CETL	activities,	as	
was	reported	to	both	the	formative	and	summative	evaluations	(Saunders	et	al	2008,	SQW	
2011).	
The	lack	of	a	nationally	coordinated	programme	and	the	competitive	nature	of	the	funding	
meant	that	a	coordinated	approach	through	a	network	of	CETLs,	and	engagement	with	the	
HEA,	were	sporadic,	although	the	evaluations	observed	that	there	were	often	strong	
connections	with	the	HEA	Subject	Centres	at	discipline	level	(Saunders	2008	p.32).		The	HEA	
and	former	Chief	Executive	Paul	Ramsden	were	particularly	critical	of	the	policy	approach,	
especially	since	it	was	observed	that	the	lack	of	clarification	on	the	policy	made	any	formal	
connections	between	CETLs	and	the	HEA	problematic.		
8.3.1.4.	Symbolising	innovation	and	influence	
The	CETLs	were	not	a	ground	breaking	initiative	internationally.	Scotland	has	a	similar	
enhancement	led	policy	with	the	National	Quality	Enhancement	Framework,	introduced	in	
2003,	but	one	of	the	key	differences	is	that	this	scheme	is	not	competitively	funded,	with	all	
universities	being	eligible	to	receive	funding.	Like	England,	Germany’s	‘Quality	Pact	for	
Teaching’	scheme	and	New	Zealand’s	Academy	of	Tertiary	Teaching	Excellence	have	
competitive	funding	schemes,	as	does	Australia’s	Carrick	Institute.		Australia	also	has	
substantial	central	government	funding,	with	the	Learning	and	Teaching	Performance	Fund,	
a	performance	based	funding	model.		
The	USA,	with	a	much	more	de-centralised	system	of	higher	education,	and	a	larger	number	
of	institutions	focussing	exclusively	on	teaching	rather	than	research,	has	far	less	emphasis	
on	professionalising	teaching	and	learning	through	pedagogic	research,	and	there	is	much	
less	of	a	discipline	based	approach.	There	is	some	national	level	support,	through	the	
Carnegie	Academy	for	the	Scholarship	of	Teaching	and	Learning	(CASTL)	but	its	level	of	
funding	is	small	and	inconsistent.	Mills	and	Huber	(2005)	suggest	that	learning	and	teaching	
enhancement	in	the	USA	is	less	robust	than	in	the	UK	or	Australia	because	it	is	less	
determined	by	central	government	policy.			
The	evidence	from	other	countries	above	and	in	Chapter	6,	Section	6.2.3	(p.166),	suggests	
that	nationally	determined	approaches,	with	sustainability	of	funding	for	all	institutions,	
might	be	the	most	appropriate	approach	for	learning	and	teaching	enhancement.			
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8.3.2	Policy	programme	
Table	20	–	POLICY	AS	PROGRAMME	(CETLs)	
Policy	as	programme:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Programme	
success	
Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Programme	
failure	
Implementation	
in	line	with	
objectives.	
Implementation	
objectives	broadly	
achieved,	despite	
minor	refinements	
or	deviations.		
Mixed	results,	with	
some	successes,	but	
accompanied	by	
unexpected	and	
controversial	
problems.	
Minor	progress	
towards	
implementation	as	
intended,	but	beset	
by	chronic	failures,	
proving	highly	
controversial	and	
very	difficult	to	
defend.	
Implementation	
fails	to	be	executed	
in	line	with	
objectives.		
The	Implementation	was	broadly	in	line	with	the	objectives,	although	there	were	subtle	changes	between	the	
original	articulation	of	the	2003	White	Paper,	the	2004	consultation	and	invitation	to	bid.	Critically,	there	was	a	
focus	on	embedding	excellence	rather	than	celebrating	existing	excellence	and	the	‘commended’	category	of	
CETL	was	abandoned.	Concerns	around	the	competitive	nature	of	the	funding	were	not	addressed.	
Achievement	of	
desired	
outcomes.	
Outcomes	broadly	
achieved,	despite	
some	shortfalls.		
Some	successes,	but	
the	partial	
achievement	of	
intended	outcomes	
is	counterbalanced	
by	unwanted	
results,	generating	
substantial	
controversy.	
Some	small	
outcomes	achieved	
as	intended,	but	
overwhelmed	by	
controversial	and	
high-profile	
instances	of	failure	
to	produce	results.		
Failure	to	achieve	
desired	outcomes.		
	In	the	broadest	terms,	objectives	were	achieved,	with	more	than	90%	of	the	CETLs	reporting	that	they	had	
achieved	what	they	set	out	to	do.	However,	the	summative	evaluation	concluded	that	the	evidence	for	success	
was	limited	to	descriptions	of	actions,	and	failed	to	demonstrate	qualitative	impact,	particularly	at	institutional	
level	and	across	the	sector.	There	was,	however,	no	evidence	of	unwanted	results	leading	to	controversy.			
Meets	policy	
domain	criteria.	
Not	quite	the	
desired	outcome,	
but	sufficiently	
close	to	lay	strong	
claim	to	fulfilling	
the	criteria.	
Partial	achievement	
of	goals,	but	accom-
panied	by	failures	to	
achieve,	with	poss-
ibility	of	high-profile	
examples,	eg.	On-
going	wastage	when	
the	criterion	is	
efficiency.		
A	few	minor	
successes,	but	
plagued	by	
unwanted	media	
attention;	eg.	
examples	of	
wastage	and	
possible	scandal	
when	the	criterion	
is	efficiency.	
Clear	inability	to	
meet	the	criteria.		
The	policy	domain	criteria	were	only	partially	achieved.	In	raising	the	profile	of	learning	and	teaching,	there	is	
evidence	of	success	at	CETL	and	institutional	level,	but	not	throughout	the	sector.	There	is	some	evidence	of	
teaching	and	learning	being	seen	to	be	on	a	par	with	research	in	terms	of	recognition	for	individual	staff	and	
changes	to	institutional	HR	strategies,	but	this	is	very	much	at	an	individual	institutional	level,	rather	than	a	
sectoral	achievement.		
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Policy	as	programme:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Programme	
success	
Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Programme	
failure	
Creating	benefit	
for	a	target	group.	
A	few	shortfalls	and	
possibly	some	
anomalous	cases,	
but	intended	target	
group	broadly	
benefits.		
Partial	benefits	
realised,	but	not	as	
widespread	or	deep	
as	intended.		
Small	benefits	are	
accompanied	and	
overshadowed	by	
damage	to	the	very	
group	that	was	
meant	to	benefit.	
Also	likely	to	
generate	high	
profile	stories	of	
unfairness	and	
suffering.		
Damaging	a	
particular	target	
group.	
The	target	groups	were	individual	staff	and	students.	There	is	evidence	that	individual	staff	did	well	in	terms	of	
professional	development	opportunities,	with	evidence	of	staff	receiving	recognition	for	their	CETL	work,	but	
this	was	an	area	of	contestation	with	staff	feeling	that	their	work	was	frequently	not	recognised	by	managers.	
There	is	also	evidence	in	the	summative	evaluation	that	possibly	thousands	of	students	engaged	with	CETLs	in	
terms	of	provision	of	resources	and	learning	opportunities,	but	it	is	difficult	to	assess	the	impact	of	that	
engagement.	Benefits	are	apparent	but	not	as	widespread	or	deep	as	intended.		
	
8.3.2.1	Implementation	in	line	with	objectives	
The	programme	was	implemented	broadly	in	relation	to	that	intended	in	the	original	2003	
White	Paper,	although	there	was	a	distinct,	but	subtle,	change	in	approach	from	Centres	of	
Excellence	to	Centres	for	Excellence	(see	Section	6.2.5,	p.169).	There	were	some	
modifications	to	the	programme,	particularly	after	the	consultation	stage,	where	the	
category	of	‘commended’	was	abandoned	for	those	bids	that	were	unsuccessful	at	stage	
two.	In	addition,	although	the	programme	had	initially	intended	to	focus	on	disciplines	only,	
in	the	event	a	number	of	pedagogically	focussed	bids	were	successful.	The	number	of	
differently	focussed	CETLs	did	lead	to	some	criticism,	for	example	Skelton	(2005)	observed	
that	‘CETL	appears	to	be	more	a	‘postmodern	celebration	of	difference’	(p.68).		
As	demonstrated	in	Table	11	(p.172),	there	were	subtle	changes	in	the	language	of	the	
objectives	between	the	consultation	and	the	invitation	to	bid,	with	the	former	focussing	on	
encouragement	and	the	latter	being	more	action	focussed.		
8.3.2.2	Achievement	of	desired	outcomes	
CETL	self-evaluations	concluded	that	90%	of	the	objectives	had	been	achieved	and,	indeed,	
at	a	local	level	evidence	from	the	summative	evaluation	(SQW	2011)	suggests	a	good	deal	
of	success,	with	89%	reporting	that	access	to	additional	resources	was	advantageous	in	
changing	practice,	92%	reporting	a	direct	positive	effect	on	teaching	and	students’	learning,	
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2,679	spin-out	projects,	secondments,	fellowships	and	awards	had	been	achieved	and	there	
had	been	3,435	peer-reviewed	outputs	and	5,594	development	and	dissemination	events	
(SQW	2011	p.12).	There	is	evidence	reported	in	the	SQW	summative	evaluation	that	
individual	CETLs	improved	the	opportunities	for	professional	development	and	pedagogical	
research	for	a	large	number	of	individual	staff.	The	evidence	also	points	to	a	wide	diversity	
of	disciplines	and	pedagogic	areas	being	covered	by	the	range	of	CETLs,	and	hence	a	variety	
of	learning	contexts.	There	are	many	examples	of	local	CETL	innovation	(as	reported	in	
Chapter	6),	particularly	in	technological	solutions,	which	were	a	favourite	of	the	selection	
panel.		
One	area	of	uncertainty	related	to	the	outcomes	for	students,	where	it	was	concluded	in	
the	summative	report	that	although	CETLs	had	reported	the	development	of	modules,	
degree	programmes	and	learning	toolkits,	advantaging	thousands	of	students,	there	was	
little	information	provided	with	which	to	back	up	these	claims	(SQW	2011	p.11).				
In	terms	of	the	broader	objectives	at	the	sectoral	level,	which	were	to	‘enable	institutions	to	
support	and	develop	practice	that	encourages	deeper	understanding	across	the	sector	of	
ways	of	addressing	students’	learning	effectively’	and	‘demonstrate	collaboration	and	
sharing	of	good	practice	and	so	enhance	the	standard	of	teaching	and	effective	learning	
throughout	the	sector’	(HEFCE	2004/05),	the	formative	and	summative	evaluations	
questioned	whether	the	desired	outcomes	had	been	achieved,	particularly	in	terms	of	
impact.	The	summative	evaluation	concluded	that	
‘The	legacy	of	the	programme	rests	largely	in	individual	staff,	and	in	those	institutions	
which	have	embedded	CETL	developments	and	continue	to	support	innovation	and	
development	in	teaching	and	learning,	rather	than	a	general	enhancement	of	teaching	
and	learning	across	the	sector…	We	do	not	believe	the	CETL	programme	itself	has	led	to	
material	changes	in	non-participating	HEIs	and	across	the	sector	as	a	whole’	(SQW	2011	
p.53).	
8.3.2.3	Meeting	policy	domain	criteria	
The	wider	policy	domain	criteria	were	only	partially	met.	Raising	the	profile	of	learning	and	
teaching	was	achieved	to	an	extent	at	local	level,	with	a	good	deal	of	CETL	activity	reported	
and	many	individuals	benefiting	from	the	initiative.	However,	even	at	the	local	level,	there	
were	difficulties	reported	in	enabling	the	work	of	a	CETL	to	reach	other	parts	of	its	
institution,	particularly	where	the	CETL	was	discipline	based.	Tolley’s	evaluation	of	the	
engineering	CETL	at	Loughborough	University	(2008)	and	Gosling	and	Turner’s	research	
(2015)	both	concluded	that	embeddedness	across	an	institution	was	patchy,	reliant	on	
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individuals	and	difficult	to	achieve	in	cases	where	the	CETL	did	not	have	the	purchase	to	
influence	senior	management	or	institutional	strategy.	Wider	reach	beyond	institutions	to	
the	sector	and	HEIs	without	a	CETL	proved	even	more	problematic.	Whilst	the	summative	
evaluation	observed	that	73%	of	pro-vice-chancellors	for	teaching	and	learning,	and	61%	of	
CETL	based	staff,	suggested	that	their	work	had	been	disseminated	to	other	CETLs	and	HEIs	
through	thousands	of	events	and	publications,	SQW	also	concluded	that	‘there	is,	however,	
little	evidence	of	collaboration	across	the	range	of	CETLs	as	a	whole’	(SQW	2011	p.13)	and	
consequently	it	was	difficult	to	assess	the	sectoral	impact.	As	such,	the	sporadic	nature	of	
the	impact	can	only	lead	to	the	conclusion	that	raising	the	profile	of	learning	and	teaching	
was	only	partially	achieved	at	sectoral	level.	
Equally,	based	on	the	evidence	of	the	evaluations,	the	wider	policy	goal	to	put	learning	and	
teaching	excellence	on	a	par	with	research	excellence	does	not	appear	to	have	been	
achieved.	The	different	funding	methodologies	between	teaching	and	research	excellence	
suggest	that	the	project-based	approach	of	the	CETLs	had	less	purchase	in	terms	of	
sustainability	than	the	recurrent	nature	of	research	excellence	funding.	Gosling	and	Turner	
(2015)	argue	that	there	is	relative	powerlessness	in	funded	short-term	projects.	Many	
concerns	were	raised	by	HEIs,	evaluators	and	other	commentators	on	the	sustainability	of	
the	CETLs	beyond	the	funding,	and	there	was	evidence	to	suggest	that	it	was	not	an	
institutional	priority	in	the	majority	of	cases,	as	concluded	by	the	summative	evaluation	
(SQW	2011).	Whilst	there	was	some	evidence	of	teaching	and	learning	being	seen	to	be	on	
a	par	with	research	in	terms	of	recognition	for	individual	staff	(SQW	2011	p.25),	with	
changes	to	institutional	HR	strategies,	this	is	very	much	at	an	institutional	level,	rather	than	
a	sectoral	achievement.	
8.3.2.4	Creating	benefit	for	the	target	group	
The	target	groups	were	individual	staff,	through	the	reward	and	recognition	objective,	‘To	
reward	practice	that	demonstrates	excellent	learning	outcomes	for	students’	and	students,	
‘to	raise	student	awareness	of	effectiveness	in	teaching	and	learning	in	order	to	inform	
student	choice	and	maximise	student	performance’.		The	evidence	points	to	a	good	deal	of	
individual	successes	for	staff,	with	79%	concluding	that	their	overall	learning	and	teaching	
practice	had	improved	as	a	result	of	the	CETL	and	professional	development	opportunities	
made	available	through	the	funding	(SQW	2011	p.19).	However,	it	is	noteworthy	that	only	
46%	of	respondents	agreed	that	their	work	had	been	recognised	via	promotion	or	other	
reward	(SQW	2011	p.25).	There	was	some	contestation	in	regards	to	reward,	since	most	
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rewards	had	some	financial	element,	but	the	majority	of	CETL	staff	asserted	that	
recognition	was	much	more	important	than	financial	gain.	However,	recognition	proved	to	
be	difficult	for	many,	where	their	CETL	work	was	not	recognised	in	their	workloads,	and	
many	felt	that	their	managers	did	not	recognise	the	value	of	their	work.	Research	by	Turner	
et	al	(2008)	for	the	HELP	(Higher	Education	Learning	Partnerships)	CETL	concluded	that	
managers	and	colleagues	did	not	recognise	the	value	of	CETL	staff’s	work.				
The	majority	of	the	CETLs	pointed	to	positive	effects	in	providing	resources	for	students	and	
several	noted	the	engagement	of	students,	as	discussed	in	Section	8.3.2.2	(p.260)	above,	
which	were	estimated	to	number	in	the	thousands.	However,	there	is	little	substantial	
evidence	of	demonstrable	impact	in	learning	maximising	performance	for	students.	There	is	
no	evidence	from	the	evaluations,	and	indeed	there	is	little	mention,	that	CETLs	helped	to	
inform	student	choice.	Hence	as	a	benefit	to	students	as	a	target	group,	the	evidence	of	
success	is	limited.		
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8.3.3	Policy	as	politics	
Table	21	–	POLICY	AS	POLITICS	(CETLs)	
Policy	as	politics:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Political	success	 Durable	success	 Conflicted	
success	
Precarious	
success	
Political	failure	
Enhancing	
electoral	
prospects	or	
reputation	of	
governments	and	
leaders.		
Favourable	to	
electoral	prospects	
and	reputation	
enhancement,	with	
only	minor	setbacks.	
Policy	obtains	
strong	support	and	
opposition,	
working	both	for	
and	against	
electoral	prospects	
and	reputation	in	
fairly	equal	
measure.	
Despite	small	signs	
of	benefit,	policy	
proves	an	overall	
electoral	and	
reputational	
liability.		
Damaging	to	the	
electoral	prospects	
or	reputation	of	
governments	and	
leaders,	with	no	
redeeming	political	
benefit.	
No	apparent	effect	on	electoral	prospects.	
Controlling	policy	
agenda	and	
easing	the	
business	of	
governing.	
	
	
	
	
	
Despite	some	
difficulties	in	
agenda	
management,	
capacity	to	govern	is	
unperturbed.		
Policy	proving	
controversial	and	
taking	up	more	
political	time	and	
resources	in	its	
defence	than	was	
expected.	
Clear	signs	that	the	
agenda	and	
business	of	
government	is	
struggling	to	
suppress	a	
politically	difficult	
issue.		
Policy	failings	are	so	
high	and	persistent	
on	the	agenda,	that	
it	is	damaging	
government’s	
capacity	to	govern.	
Difficulties	in	agenda	management	were	limited	to	the	sector	and	managed	by	HEFCE,	rather	than	
government.	Therefore,	there	was	no	effect	on	capacity	to	govern.			
Sustaining	the	
broad	values	and	
direction	of	
government.		
Some	refinements	
needed	but	broad	
trajectory	
unimpeded.		
Direction	of	
government	very	
broadly	in	line	with	
goals,	but	clear	
signs	that	the	
policy	has	
prompted	some	
rethinking,	
especially	behind	
the	scenes.		
Entire	trajectory	of	
government	is	being	
compromised.		
Irrevocably	
damaging	to	the	
broad	values	and	
direction	of	
government.		
The	broad	direction	and	values	of	government	were	not	affected	by	the	CETL	initiative,	but	wider	political	and	
economic	issues	did	lead	to	some	considerable	refinement	of	policy	direction,	through	less	reliance	on	state	
funding	and	a	change	of	role	for	HEFCE	from	funder	to	regulator.	It	was	not	the	CETL	initiative	itself	that	led	to	
a	re-think	of	policy	goals,	but	a	change	in	government	and	a	global	economic	crisis.		
	
8.3.3.1.	Effect	on	government’s	capacity	to	govern		
Given	the	project-based	approach	and	time-limited	nature	of	the	CETL	programme,	the	
initiative	did	not	have	sufficient	longevity,	or	a	sufficiently	high	profile	beyond	the	sector,	to	
have	any	effect	on	government’s	capacity	to	govern.	There	was	very	little	media	attention	
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given	to	CETLs,	and	although	there	was	disquiet	in	relation	to	their	success,	particularly	
after	the	publication	of	the	summative	report,	this	was	limited	to	the	specialist	HE	press.	
CETLs	were	not	a	high	profile	concern	for	Parliament,	with	very	few	questions	being	raised	
in	the	House,	and	these	were	not	in	relation	to	the	success	or	failure	of	the	initiative.			
8.3.3.2	Controlling	policy	agenda	
The	policy	agenda	was	controlled	by	HEFCE,	and	there	were	some	difficulties	in	agenda	
management,	mainly	in	relation	to	the	contested	issues:	what	was	meant	by	excellence,	the	
award	of	‘commended’	status	and	the	competitive	nature	of	the	funding.	The	legacy	of	the	
CETLs,	or	lack	of	it,	could	have	proved	controversial,	given	the	large	funding	envelope	of	
£335m	and	lack	of	evidence	that	there	had	been	impact	across	the	sector,	but	these	
attracted	little	attention	beyond	the	specialist	press.	As	the	CETL	funding	came	to	an	end	in	
2010,	the	recession	bit	and	a	new	coalition	government	came	into	power.	As	such,	there	
was	a	shift	in	thinking	around	higher	education	funding,	with	the	main	focus	now	on	
passing	the	cost	of	HE	to	students	and	reduced	state	funding.	Consequently,	there	was	also	
a	shift	of	focus	for	HEFCE,	from	funder	to	regulator.	A	focus	on	the	CETL	initiative	and	any	
possible	continued	funding	was	lost	amongst	these	step	changes	in	HE	funding.			
8.3.3.3	Sustaining	the	broad	values	and	direction	of	government	
The	broad	values	and	direction	of	the	New	Labour	government	were	not	harmed	by	the	
CETL	initiative,	but	wider	political	and	economic	issues	had	an	influencing	effect	on	HEFCE’s	
approach	to	funding	learning	and	teaching	initiatives,	as	did	the	change	of	government	in	
2010.	With	a	greater	focus	on	fees	and	less	state	funding,	and	a	major	global	recession,	
there	was	significantly	less	money	available	for	such	initiatives,	and	indeed	HEFCE	did	not	
launch	any	learning	and	teaching	initiatives	on	this	scale	of	funding	throughout	the	
remainder	of	its	history.	In	2013,	The	HEA	commissioned	The	Centre	for	Higher	Education	
Research	and	Evaluation	to	review	HEFCE	teaching	and	learning	enhancement	initiatives,	
and	it	found	considerable	weaknesses	in	‘pilot-based	beacon	project	approaches,	such	as	
CETLs’	(Trowler	et	al	2013).		
8.3.4	Summary	
The	policy	process	can	be	interpreted	as	one	of	conflicted	success.	The	bottom-up	policy	
approach	led	to	some	contested	issues:	defining	excellence,	competitive	funding	and	a	lack	
of	co-ordinated	monitoring	meant	that	impact,	particularly	across	the	sector,	was	difficult	
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to	assess.	These	characteristics	were	critiqued	in	both	the	formative	and	summative	
evaluations	(Saunders	et	al	2008,	SQW	2011)	and	in	much	of	the	CETL	research	by	Gosling,	
Hannan	and	Turner.	The	project-based	approach	meant	that	sustainability	of	the	policy	was	
challenging,	and	was	again	one	of	the	main	criticisms	of	the	approach	in	the	evaluations.	
The	coalition	broadly	remained	intact	through	the	initiative,	although	there	was	evidence	of	
conflict	at	institutional	level,	particularly	where	CETLs	came	into	conflict	with	prevailing	
cultures	and	managers	not	recognising	the	work	of	CETL	staff	(Gosling	and	Hannan	2007a).	
Beyond	individual	institutions,	there	was	little	evidence	of	cross	CETL	working	and	few	
examples	of	working	with	the	HEA	to	embed	good	practice	across	the	sector.	There	was	
evidence,	however,	of	collaboration	between	CETLS	and	HEA	Subject	Centres	for	those	
CETLS	with	a	discipline	focus,	and	more	than	56%	of	practitioners	and	pro-vice-chancellors	
perceived	that	the	work	of	the	CETLs	was	being	disseminated	widely	(see	Appendix	D).	
There	was	no	evidence	that	the	policy	initiative	had	learnt	from	other	jurisdictions,	where	
commentators	observed	that	project	based	funding	was	problematic	in	learning	and	
teaching	enhancement	initiatives,	and	that	a	lack	of	national	co-ordination,	such	as	that	in	
the	USA,	made	deepening	effects	difficult	to	achieve	(Brawley	et	al	2009,	Lemmens-Krug	
2015).		
The	programme	can	be	interpreted	as	a	durable	but	conflicted	success.	The	
implementation	was	broadly	in	line	with	objectives,	although	there	was	a	subtle	change	
from	the	vision	of	the	2003	White	Paper	for	CETLs	to	reward	existing	excellence,	which	was	
then	out	of	step	with	research	quality	funding,	a	divide	which	the	initiative	was	intended	to	
address	(HEFCE	2003/36).	The	project	based	approach	and	competitive	nature	of	the	
funding	meant	that	whilst	there	was	much	evidence	of	CETLs	meeting	their	objectives	at	a	
local	level,	institutional	impact	was	more	sporadic	and	very	difficult	to	evidence	at	sector	
level,	partly	due	to	the	absence	of	national	coordination.	As	such,	the	effects	were	not	as	
widespread,	or	as	deep,	as	intended	and	the	broader	sectoral	objectives	were	not	
satisfactorily	met.	There	is	evidence	that	individual	staff	benefited	from	the	initiative,	but	
less	evidence	that	the	impact	for	students	went	beyond	the	provision	of	additional	
resources.	These	were	also	the	main	findings	of	the	summative	evaluation	(SQW	2011).		
The	CETL	initiative	could	be	interpreted	as	a	durable	political	success.	There	were	no	
apparent	effects	on	electoral	prospects,	but	there	were	wider	economic	and	political	
events	and	agendas	which	impacted	significantly	on	the	work	of	HEFCE,	which	went	beyond	
the	scope	of	the	CETL	initiative.	These	were	an	economic	recession,	which	led	to	a	tight	
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squeeze	on	public	funding,	and	a	shift	in	the	HE	policy	agenda	towards	higher	fees.	As	such,	
the	role	of	HEFCE	as	a	funder	was	reduced.	These	events	led	to	a	rethink	of	public	spending	
on	learning	and	teaching	enhancement,	which	Gosling	sums	up	best:	
‘By	2010…the	Government’s	confidence	that	public	funding	could	deliver	improvements	
to	teaching	had	completely	disappeared…students	are	no	more	satisfied	with	higher	
education	than	ten	years	ago’	(Gosling	2013	p.1).		
In	returning	to	the	main	research	question,	the	application	of	the	McConnell	framework	the	
the	CETL	policy	episode	suggests	that	the	initiative	was	a	conflicted	process	success,	with	
some	contestation.	The	programme	was	also	a	conflicted	success,	but	durable,	with	many	
local	successes,	although	less	evidence	of	a	sectoral	success.	The	political	success	of	the	
episode	was	durable,	but	overtaken	by	other	events,	such	as	a	global	recession,	which	led	
to	shift	in	the	political	HE	agenda	away	from	funding	learning	and	teaching	enhancement.	
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8.4	Lifelong	Learning	Networks	–	mapping	the	policy	episode	to	the	
framework		
8.4.1	Policy	as	process	
Table	22	–	POLICY	AS	PROCESS	(LLNs)	
Policy	as	process:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Process	success	 Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Process	failure	
Preserving	
government	
policy	goals	and	
instruments.	
Policy	goals	and	
instruments	
preserved,	despite	
minor	refinements.		
Preferred	goals	and	
instruments	proving	
controversial	and	
difficult	to	preserve.	
Some	revisions	
needed.	
Government’s	goals	
and	preferred	
policy	instruments	
hang	in	the	balance.	
Termination	of	
Government	policy	
goals	and	
instruments.	
The	policy	goals	were	retained	throughout	the	period	with	no	change	to	the	goal	of	widening	participation	to	
HE	through	vocational	progression.	The	policy	instrument	was	subject	to	few	refinements,	other	than	a	
widening	of	the	programme	beyond	pilot	LLNs	and	HEFCE	overlooking	the	original	funding	requirement	for	all	
LNNs	to	engage	with	research	intensive	HEIs.	However,	the	LLN	initiative	was	operating	in	an	overcrowded	and	
constantly	changing	policy	domain.		
Conferring	
legitimacy	on	a	
policy.		
Some	challenges	to	
legitimacy,	but	of	
little	or	no	lasting	
effect.	
Difficult	and	
contested	issues	
surrounding	policy	
legitimacy,	with	
some	potential	to	
taint	the	policy	in	
the	long	term.	
Serious	and	
potentially	fatal	
damage	to	policy	
legitimacy.	
Irrecoverable	
damage	to	policy	
legitimacy.	
There	were	no	challenges	to	the	legitimacy	of	the	policy,	as	it	sat	well	within	government’s	goal	to	increase	HE	
participation	to	HE,	following	the	principles	of	the	Wisconsin	model.			
Building	a	
sustainable	
coalition.		
Coalition	intact,	
despite	some	signs	
of	disagreement.		
Coalition	intact,	
although	strong	
signs	of	
disagreement	and	
some	potential	for	
fragmentation.	
Coalition	on	the	
brink	of	falling	
apart.	
Inability	to	produce	
a	sustainable	
coalition.	
The	clear	support	from	government	and	HEFCE	and	the	involvement	of	almost	fully	national,	sector	wide	
coverage	and	the	engagement	of	nearly	33,000	staff	in	LLN	activities	show	evidence	of	a	sustainable	coalition.	
However,	there	is	some	evidence	of	lack	of	full	engagement	on	behalf	of	some	elements	of	the	sector,	
particularly	research	intensive	institutions.	The	impact	of	higher	fees	policy	led	to	some	elements	of	
competition	between	FEC	and	HEI	partners.	
Symbolising	
innovation	and	
influence.	
Not	ground-
breaking	in	innov-
ation	or	influence,	
but	still	symbolically	
progressive.		
Neither	innovative	
nor	outmoded,	
leading	(at	times)	to	
criticisms	from	both	
progressives	and	
conservatives.	
Appearance	of	
being	out	of	touch	
with	viable	
alternative	
solutions.	
Symbolising	
outmoded,	insular	
or	bizarre	ideas,	
seemingly	oblivious	
to	how	other	
jurisdictions	are	
dealing	with	similar	
issues.		
The	policy	was	not	ground	breaking	in	its	innovation,	since	it	was	born	out	of	a	regard	for	the	USA	system	in	
public	universities	and	there	are	examples	of	successful	progression	arrangements	in	several	European	and	
non-European	countries.	However,	for	the	English	system,	it	was	progressive	in	being	a	novel	attempt	to	
instigate	a	sector	wide	policy	to	put	vocational	progression	on	a	par	with	academic	progression.				
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8.4.1.1	Preserving	government	policy	goals	and	instruments		
The	policy	goal,	widening	participation	to	higher	education	through	the	aligning	of	
vocational	and	academic	qualifications,	and	creation	of	accessible	pathways	for	vocational	
learners,	was	preserved	throughout	the	period	and	there	were	no	significant	amendments	
to	the	policy	goals.	
The	LLN	initiative,	as	the	policy	instrument,	was	not	subject	to	any	significant	changes	
throughout	the	period,	other	than	a	widening	of	the	programme,	such	that	instead	of	‘pilot’	
LLNs,	there	were	30	networks	established,	and	a	significant	proportion	of	the	SDF	(Strategic	
Development	Fund),	£105m,	was	used	to	fund	the	networks.		What	was	noteworthy	about	
the	LLN	initiative	was	that,	although	it	was	subject	to	little	change,	there	was	considerable	
impact	from	other	policy	goals	introduced	and	modified	over	the	course	of	the	programme.	
The	publication	of	the	2004	Tomlinson	Review	and	the	development	of	the	14	–	19	
qualifications	framework,	the	development	of	higher	apprenticeships	and	the	2004	
Schwartz	Review	of	Admissions,	all	had	some	impact	on	the	policy	goal	of	enabling	
progression	to	higher	education	from	vocational	education.	In	2007,	following	the	Leitch	
Review	of	Skills,	government	refocussed	its	attention	on	employer	engagement,	such	that	
this	became	a	key	strand	of	activity	for	many	LLNs	that	were	not	in	their	original	
propositions.	The	introduction	of	variable	fees	as	a	result	of	the	2004	Higher	Education	Act	
created	different	and	increasing	competitions	between	FECs	and	HEIs,	thus	putting	
pressure	on	the	sustainability	of	LLN	partnerships,	particularly	with	the	research	intensive	
institutions.	Indeed,	it	had	originally	been	a	condition	of	grant	that	all	LLNs	engaged	with	at	
least	one	research	intensive	HEI,	although	this	did	not	come	to	fruition	in	some	cases.	As	
Watson	(2005)	observed,	LLNs	had	to	operate	in	an	already	crowded	field	(p.187)	in	
vocational	progression	and	widening	participation,	as	is	evidenced	by	the	somewhat	
complex	diagram	of	organisational	relationships	in	Figure	12	(Chapter	7,	p.207).	The	
capacity	for	the	LLN	initiative	to	survive	throughout	its	funding	period	in	the	face	of	these	
other	competing	and	influencing	policy	agendas	and	initiatives	demonstrates	its	agility.			
8.4.1.2	Conferring	legitimacy	on	the	policy	
The	policy,	although	originated	by	Sir	Howard	Newby	within	HEFCE,	sat	well	within	
government	goals	to	increase	participation	in	higher	education	to	50%	by	2010,	and	was	
endorsed	by	the	HEFCE	Board.	Newby	had	already	had	first-hand	experience	of	the	
Wisconsin	model	in	the	USA	(Newby	2005b),	which	had	proved	successful	in	enabling	
academic	and	vocational	learners’	access	to	shared	resources	and	pathways	to	higher	
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education.	Newby	argued	that	an	approach	which	brought	further	and	higher	educational	
institutions	together	in	partnership	was	necessary	if	the	50%	target	was	to	be	achieved,	
through	both	increasing	and	widening	participation.	It	is	noteworthy	that,	unlike	the	other	
two	case	studies,	there	was	no	formal	consultation	with	the	sector	on	the	LLN	initiative,	
and	so	the	sector	had	little	opportunity	to	formally	challenge	the	programme,	other	than	
though	discussions	with	the	HEFCE	regional	consultants,	who	were	charged	with	developing	
the	LLNs	in	partnership	with	institutions.	This	combination	of	factors	meant	that	there	were	
no	public	challenges	to	the	legitimacy	of	the	episode.						
8.4.1.3	Building	a	sustainable	coalition	
The	LLN	initiative	had	the	full	support	of	government	and	HEFCE,	since	it	met	the	conditions	
for	increasing	participation	to	HE	as	outlined	in	Section	8.4.1.2	(p.269)	above.	Although	the	
policy	episode	was	badged	by	HEFCE	as	being	a	bottom-up	approach	to	ensure	the	
engagement	of	the	sector,	this	episode	was	unusual	in	being	driven,	not	by	institutions	
themselves,	but	by	HEFCE	regional	consultants	working	with	FECs	and	HEIs	to	develop	the	
business	plan	and	targets	for	the	LLNs.	As	such,	they	were	in	a	position	to	both	influence	
the	institutions’	commitment	to	the	initiative	and	provide	a	critical	link	between	HEFCE	and	
institutions	that	was	lacking	to	a	large	extent	in	the	other	case	studies.	As	such,	and	since	
there	was	near	national	LLN	coverage	with	the	involvement	of	120	HEIs	and	300	FECs,	and	
almost	33,000	staff	engaged	across	the	sector	with	LLNs,	it	could	be	argued	that	the	sector	
fully	endorsed	the	policy.		
The	formation	of	the	National	Forum,	as	an	entity	which	helped	to	sustain	the	coalition	and	
share	good	practice,	was	also	recognised	as	a	worthwhile	addition	to	the	initiative,	and	was	
credited	with	enabling	LLNs	to	cope	with	the	shifting	vocational	and	skills	policy	
environments.	The	National	Forum	was	commended	by	SQW	(2010)	in	the	summative	
evaluation	as	good	practice	for	all	such	policy	initiatives.	A	Foundation	Forward	research	
report	into	the	importance	of	LLNs	for	apprenticeships	also	recognised	the	National	Forum	
for	encouraging	LLNs	to	work	together	(FdF	2009	p.21).	Although	there	was	much	praise	for	
the	National	Forum,	there	was	criticism,	in	both	the	formative	and	summative	evaluations	
and	Wise	&	Shaw	(2011)	that	the	provision	of	IAG	and	PAs	were	patchy	across	the	
networks,	and	would	have	benefited	from	national	co-ordination.	Equally,	a	perceived	lack	
of	national	co-ordination	by	HEFCE	was	a	key	criticism	of	the	summative	evaluation	(SQW	
2010).		
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Despite	the	appearance	of	a	strong	coalition,	the	extent	to	which	some	parts	of	the	sector	
were	fully	engaged	could	be	challenged.	For	example,	the	summative	evaluation	found	that	
buy-in	from	post-92	institutions	was	stronger,	and	some	partners,	particularly	research-
intensive	HEIs,	were	not	so	pro-active	in	the	networks.	This	is	evidenced	by	only	10%	of	the	
LLN-engaged	learners	being	registered	at	research	intensive	institutions.	The	introduction	
of	higher	fees,	as	a	result	of	the	2004	White	Paper,	may	also	have	had	an	effect	on	the	
coalition,	particularly	from	the	research	intensive	institutions,	with	many	commentators	
expressing	concern	that	higher	fees	might	increase	the	competition	between	FECs	and	HEIs	
(Woodfield	et	al	2013,	Newby	2005,	Parry	2006).		
It	was	also	intended	that	LLNs	should	engage	with	other	sector	agencies,	such	as	Centres	of	
Vocational	Excellence,	New	Technology	Institutes,	Aimhigher	and	The	HEA,	as	well	as	
regional	and	national	organisations	such	as	the	SSCs.	However,	in	the	event,	there	appears	
to	have	been	little	engagement,	and	this	strand	of	activity	is	not	one	that	receives	much	
attention	in	either	the	formative	or	summative	evaluations.	Engagement	with	employers	
was	also	a	key	objective,	but	both	the	interim	and	summative	evaluations	described	such	
engagement	as	‘patchy’	(CHERI	2008	p.5),	although	SQW	did	observe	that	‘78.6%	of	
curriculum	developments	included	some	form	of	employer	engagement	in	the	design	or	
delivery’	(SQW	2011	p.34).		
8.4.1.4	Symbolising	innovation	and	influence	
Vocational	transition	to	HE	has	been	a	consistent	policy	theme	for	many	countries	and,	
along	with	the	USA,	many	non-European	countries	have	progression	to	HE	systems	that	are	
‘culturally	embedded’,	such	as	Singapore,	Australia	and	New	Zealand	(Watson	2005	p.193).	
In	Europe,	it	has	been	EU	policy	since	2002	to	support	lifelong	learning	(Nemeth	2010),	
although	Muller	et	al	(2015)	suggest	that,	for	many	countries,	‘the	transition	between	
vocational	and	academic	still	needs	to	be	simplified’	(p.530).	The	models	adopted	by	Nordic	
countries,	such	as	Finland	and	Denmark,	demonstrate	the	greater	participation	rates,	
although	Hungary	is	perhaps	the	only	other	European	country	to	have	lifelong	learning	
networks	(Nemeth	2010).		
Although	the	LLNs	could	not	be	said	to	be	innovative	within	an	international	context,	they	
could	be	described	as	influential	in	an	English	context,	and	certainly	symbolically	
progressive,	since	this	was	an	attempt	at	a	new	sector-wide	partnership	initiative	between	
FECs	and	HEIs	to	put	vocational	progression	on	a	par	with	academic	progression.	However,	
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commentators	have	questioned	the	extent	to	which	LLNs	were	sufficient	to	be	able	to	
challenge	the	existing	hierarchy	and	perception	of	vocational	qualifications	in	comparison	
to	academic	qualifications	(Leahy	2013,	Watson	2005,	Little	and	Williams	2009).	
8.4.2	Policy	programme	
Table	23	–	POLICY	AS	PROGRAMME	(LLNs)	
Policy	as	programme:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Programme	
success	
Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Programme	
failure	
Implementation	in	
line	with	
objectives.	
Implementation	
objectives	broadly	
achieved,	despite	
minor	refine-
ments	or	devia-
tions.		
Mixed	results,	with	
some	successes,	but	
accompanied	by	
unexpected	and	
controversial	
problems.	
Minor	progress	
towards	
implementation	as	
intended,	but	beset	
by	chronic	failures,	
proving	highly	
controversial	and	
very	difficult	to	
defend.	
Implementation	
fails	to	be	executed	
in	line	with	
objectives.	
Implementation	was	in	line	with	objectives,	and	although	there	were	some	minor	modifications,	HEFCE	was	
able	to	steer	and	control	these	through	the	regional	consultants	and	regular	progress	reports.		
Achievement	of	
desired	outcomes.	
Outcomes	broadly	
achieved,	despite	
some	shortfalls.	
	
Some	successes,	but	
the	partial	
achievement	of	
intended	outcomes	
is	counterbalanced	
by	unwanted	
results,	generating	
substantial	
controversy.	
Some	small	
outcomes	achieved	
as	intended,	but	
overwhelmed	by	
controversial	and	
high-profile	
instances	of	failure	
to	produce	results.		
Failure	to	achieve	
desired	outcomes.		
Outcomes	were	broadly	achieved,	with	much	evidence	of	activity,	particularly	in	curriculum	developments,	PAs	
and	IAGs.	However,	the	success	of	partnerships	was	variable	and	the	timescale	for	funding	did	not	allow	those	
with	weak	partnerships	to	fully	embed	the	work	within	institutional	strategies.	The	sustainability	of	the	LLNs	
beyond	the	funding	period	was	a	significant	concern.	However,	the	successes	were	not	counterbalanced	by	
substantial	controversy.		
Meets	policy	
domain	criteria.	
Not	quite	the	
desired	outcome,	
but	sufficiently	
close	to	lay	strong	
claim	to	fulfilling	
the	criteria.	
	
Partial	achievement	
of	goals,	but	
accompanied	by	
failures	to	achieve,	
with	possibility	of	
high-profile	
examples,	eg.	on-
going	wastage	when	
the	criterion	is	
efficiency.	
A	few	minor	
successes,	but	
plagued	by	
unwanted	media	
attention;	eg.	
examples	of	
wastage	and	
possible	scandal	
when	the	criterion	
is	efficiency.	
Clear	inability	to	
meet	the	criteria.	
In	meeting	the	policy	domain	criteria,	the	LLNs	were	in	a	position	to	fulfil	the	requirement	for	a	‘step	change	in	
vocational	progression’	(HEFCE	12/2004	p.1)	and	aid	both	vocational	progression	and	widening	participation	
and,	despite	a	constantly	changing	policy	environment,	many	were	able	to	adapt.	However,	the	timescale	was	
not	sufficient	to	show	sufficient	progress	in	being	an	agent	for	change	in	social	mobility,	which	might	have	
been	achieved	with	a	longer	funding	period.	
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Policy	as	programme:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Programme	
success	
Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Programme	
failure	
Creating	benefit	for	
a	target	group.	
A	few	shortfalls	
and	possibly	some	
anomalous	cases,	
but	intended	
target	group	
broadly	benefits.		
Partial	benefits	
realised,	but	not	as	
widespread	or	deep	
as	intended.		
Small	benefits	are	
accompanied	and	
overshadowed	by	
damage	to	the	very	
group	that	was	
meant	to	benefit.	
Also	likely	to	
generate	high	
profile	stories	of	
unfairness	and	
suffering.	
Damaging	a	
particular	target	
group.	
There	were	some	benefits	for	the	target	group,	with	vocational	progression	enabled	for	some	learners.	
However,	the	learner	constituency	characteristics	point	to	a	failure	to	achieve	widening	participation	to	a	great	
extent.	This	might	have	been	mitigated	by	a	longer,	or	more	sustainable,	funding	period.		
	
8.4.2.1	Implementation	in	line	with	objectives	
The	implementation	of	the	LLNs	initiative	was	in	line	with	that	originally	intended.	HEFCE	
undertook	a	bottom-up	approach,	with	loose	objectives	and	no	prescribed	organisational	
structure	and,	initially	at	least,	few	monitoring	and	accountability	requirements.	Although	
implementation	was	in	line	with	the	objectives,	this	bottom-up	approach	was	an	area	of	
contestation	for	the	initiative,	since	both	the	interim	and	summative	evaluations,	and	
others	such	as	Leahy	(2013),	questioned	whether	the	approach	provided	sufficient	direction	
on	the	policy	instrument.	
Whether	this	approach	was	truly	bottom-up	is	open	to	debate,	given	the	close	involvement	
of	the	HEFCE	regional	consultants	in	the	business	plans	of	LLNs,	and	HEFCE’s	own	
assessment	of	sector	impact	(HEFCE	2007),	where	they	conclude	that	the	initiative	was	not	
genuinely	bottom-up	as	there	was	an	on-going	process	of	negotiation	between	policy	
makers	and	providers.	As	such,	HEFCE	was	better	able	to	control	implementation	in	line	
with	the	objectives,	and	indeed	did	make	some	minor	modifications,	such	as	the	
implementation	of	stronger	monitoring	requirements	as	a	result	of	the	recommendations	
of	the	interim	evaluation,	and	improved	identification	and	tracking	of	LLN	learners	from	
2009-10	built	into	HESA	data	collections.	The	regular	progress	reports	from	HEFCE	also	
allowed	them	to	provide	a	greater	steer	to	the	LLNs,	such	as	the	2008	report	to	guide	LLNs	
towards	greater	employer	engagement	as	a	result	of	a	change	of	focus	in	other	policy	
domains.				
	 	
	274	
8.4.2.2	Achievement	of	desired	outcomes	
The	desired	outcomes,	which	were	deliberately	loose,	are	set	out	in	Section	7.2.5.1	(p.209).	
In	achieving	the	objectives,	it	is	clear	that	LLNs	were	engaged	in	a	very	substantial	amount	
of	activity,	in	terms	of	the	number	of	curriculum	developments,	PAs	and	IAG	engagements	
across	a	large	number	of	institutions,	as	set	out	in	Table	14,	Chapter	7	(p.214).	As	such,	on	
the	basis	of	the	range	and	scale	of	activities,	it	could	be	argued	that	LLNs	were	successful	in	
providing	‘support	for	learners	on	vocational	pathways	and	‘developing	the	curriculum	to	
facilitate	progression’	(objectives	2	and	4).	
However,	much	of	the	criticism	in	the	evaluations,	and	from	other	commentators,	centred	
around	the	extent	to	which	LLNs	focussed	on	‘quick	wins’	in	order	to	show	progress	within	
the	funding	period,	and	the	extent	to	which	their	own	monitoring	reports	focussed	on	the	
descriptive,	rather	than	a	thorough	evaluation	of	the	impact	and	deepening	effects	of	their	
work.	In	addition,	there	was	some	disquiet,	from	LLNs,	institutions	and	through	the	
evaluations,	that	the	short-term	project	nature	of	the	funding	meant	that	the	LLNs	were	
not	sufficiently	able	to	embed	their	activities	so	that	they	were	sustainable	beyond	the	
funding.		
Whilst	there	was	a	considerable	amount	of	IAG	(Information	and	Guidance)	activity,	with	
200,000	paper-based	IAG	resources,	15,000	1:1s,	530,000	group	support	activities,	900,000	
website	hits	and	8,528	PAs	(Progression	Agreement)	in	place,	the	extent	to	which	LLNs	
were	able	to	‘bring	greater	clarity,	coherence	and	certainty	to	progression	opportunities’	
(objective	3)	was	questionable.	The	summative	evaluation	and	other	commentators	
observed	the	variable	quality	of	some	of	the	progression	agreements,	and	that	the	most	
common	bi-lateral	agreements	actually	restricted	the	range	of	progression	opportunities,	
and	many	of	the	professional	subjects,	such	as	Law,	were	not	available	to	vocational	
learners	(May	el	at	2012,	Woodfield	et	al	2013).	Thus,	LLNs’	ability	to	meet	objective	6,	
‘locate	the	progression	strategy	within	a	commitment	to	lifelong	learning,	ensuring	that	
learners	have	access	to	a	range	of	progression	opportunities	so	that	they	can	move	between	
different	kinds	of	vocational	and	academic	programmes	as	their	interest,	needs	and	abilities	
develop’	is	called	into	question.	
One	of	the	main	difficulties	with	PAs	was	reviewing	and	establishing	changes	to	admissions	
policies	and	procedures	within	institutions,	and	as	Betts	and	Burrell	(2011)	observed,	the	
bureaucracy	involved	in	the	development	of	PAs	was	a	challenge	to	LLNs,	partners,	and	
particularly	employers,	and	thus	was	not	clearly	articulated	for	learners.	A	further	concern,	
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raised	in	both	evaluations,	was	the	extent	to	which	institutions	were	sufficiently	engaged	at	
a	senior	level	to	embed	the	activities	into	their	strategies	beyond	the	funding	period,	
particularly	given	the	time	and	money	required	to	support	IAG.	
Partnerships	were	praised	for	‘combining	the	strengths	of	a	number	of	diverse	institutions’	
(objective	1)	and	there	was	support	for	the	extent	to	which	staff	in	institutions	had	sought	
to	understand	their	partners	and	their	courses.	However,	the	evidence	suggested	that	this	
was	variable	across	the	networks,	particularly	in	regard	to	the	engagement	of	some	of	the	
research	intensive	institutions,	as	noted	above.	Woodfield	et	al	(2013)	also	observed	that	
the	end	of	the	funding	period	would	result	in	the	breakup	of	many	of	the	networks,	as	
activities	were	not	fully	embedded.		
It	is	questionable	whether	the	sector	was	fully	engaged,	despite	the	national	coverage	of	
institutions,	and	all	but	a	few	being	involved	in	at	least	one	network.		Evidence	suggests	
that	partnerships	were	often	successful	as	a	result	of	individuals	rather	than	institutions	
and	that,	in	some	cases,	HEI	involvement	was	based	on	the	financial	incentive	of	ASNs	
rather	than	a	genuine	desire	to	put	vocational	progression	on	a	par	with	academic	
progression.	In	addition,	policy	changes	in	relation	to	the	skills	agenda	resulted	in	LLNs	
developing	a	wider	range	of	work,	often	far	beyond	their	original	business	plans,	which	led	
to	some	disconnect	between	LLNs,	their	partners	and	other	stakeholders,	such	as	
employers.	
8.4.2.3	Meeting	policy	domain	criteria	
HEFCE	had	advocated	LLNs	as	being	a	catalyst	for	fulfilling	a	‘step	change	in	vocational	
progression’	(HEFCE	12/2004	p.1)	and	helping	government	to	achieve	its	aim	of	a	50%	
participation	rate	in	higher	education.	The	policy	initiative	was	able	to	meet	the	policy	
domain	criteria	in	this	regard,	to	some	extent	through	considerable	activity	in	the	
development	of	curriculum,	PAs	and	IAG.	However,	the	short-term	funding	approach,	
which	came	in	for	much	criticism,	meant	that	LLNs	were	not	able	to	show	sufficient	
progress	towards	meeting	the	longer	term	aim	of	increasing	social	mobility	or	embedding	
culture	change	and,	as	May	et	al	(2012)	observed,	the	LLNs	helped	to	enable	progression	
for	only	a	small	number	of	students.		
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8.4.2.4	Creating	benefit	to	the	target	group	
The	data	available	reveals	that	in	2007-08,	the	profile	of	LLN	learners	was	64%	female,	83%	
white,	40%	19	or	younger	and	12%	from	POLAR	quintile	1.	What	is	striking	about	this	profile	
is	that	there	was	less	than	1%	change	between	this	and	the	previous	year.		This	profile	also	
did	not	differ	hugely	from	the	profile	of	other	undergraduate	students,	bringing	into	
question	the	extent	to	which	LLNs	were	able	to	widen	participation	as	well	as	increase	it.		
The	data	does	also	reveal	that	the	number	of	LLN	learners	entering	HE	with	vocational	
qualifications	rose,	from	38%	in	2006-07	to	46%	by	2008-09	but,	of	the	5,880	LLN	flagged	
learners,	28%	were	registered	for	first	degrees	and	39%	for	FDs.	It	is	not	possible	to	
ascertain	whether	the	39%	of	FD	students	would	have	registered	without	the	aid	of	the	LLN	
or	whether	the	Foundation	Degree	policy	itself	influenced	them.	The	data	also	reveals	that	
there	was	a	significantly	high	proportion	of	LLN	flagged	learners	who	were	entering	with	‘A’	
level	qualifications,	or	already	held	HE	level	qualifications,	and	thus	about	a	third	of	LLN	
students	were	outside	the	target	group.		This	brings	into	question	the	extent	to	which	LLNs	
had	achieved	objective	5,	value	vocational	learning	outcomes	and	provide	opportunities	for	
vocational	learners	to	build	on	earlier	learning’.		Perhaps	a	more	striking	figure	is	that	the	
5,880	LLN	flagged	learners	represented	just	0.7%	of	the	total	undergraduate	population	for	
that	year.			
The	analysis	of	this	data	led	SQW	to	conclude	that	the	LLNs	were	making	a	small,	although	
still	significant,	contribution	to	vocational	learning.	As	such,	LLNs	did	create	benefits	for	
some	of	the	target	group,	but	these	were	only	partial,	and	not	as	deep	or	widespread	as	
intended.	
Further,	a	number	of	observers	question	the	extent	to	which	LLNs	were	in	a	position	to	
change	the	prevailing	hierarchy	of	vocational	and	academic	qualifications	and	thus	enhance	
social	mobility	in	such	a	short	timescale	(Watson	2005,	Leahy	2013).	It	has	been	observed,	
and	highlighted	by	the	summative	evaluation,	that	a	longer	timescale,	or	different	funding	
regime,	might	have	been	beneficial	in	enabling	LLNs	to	meet	their	social	mobility	objectives	
more	fully.	
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8.4.3	Policy	as	politics	
Table	24	–	POLICY	AS	POLITICS	(LLNs)	
Policy	as	politics:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Political	success	 Durable	success	 Conflicted	
success	
Precarious	
success	
Political	failure	
Enhancing	
electoral	
prospects	or	
reputation	of	
governments	and	
leaders.		
Favourable	to	
electoral	prospects	
and	reputation	
enhancement,	with	
only	minor	setbacks.	
Policy	obtains	
strong	support	and	
opposition,	
working	both	for	
and	against	
electoral	prospects	
and	reputation	in	
fairly	equal	
measure.	
Despite	small	signs	
of	benefit,	policy	
proves	an	overall	
electoral	and	
reputational	
liability.	
Damaging	to	the	
electoral	prospects	
or	reputation	of	
governments	and	
leaders,	with	no	
redeeming	political	
benefit.	
No	apparent	effect	on	electoral	prospects.		
Controlling	policy	
agenda	and	
easing	the	
business	of	
governing.	
Despite	some	
difficulties	in	agenda	
management,	
capacity	to	govern	is	
unperturbed.		
Policy	proving	
controversial	and	
taking	up	more	
political	time	and	
resources	in	its	
defence	than	was	
expected.	
Clear	signs	that	the	
agenda	and	
business	of	
government	is	
struggling	to	
suppress	a	
politically	difficult	
issue.		
Policy	failings	are	so	
high	and	persistent	
on	the	agenda,	that	
it	is	damaging	
government’s	
capacity	to	govern.	
The	changing	policy	environment	throughout	the	timescale	of	the	LLN	initiative	demonstrates	some	difficulty	in	
managing	the	agenda,	but	LLNs	demonstrated	remarkable	resilience	in	adapting	to	changing	agendas,	perhaps	
as	a	result	of	HEFCE’s	agenda	management	through	regular	reports	and	the	engagement	of	regional	
consultants	with	the	sector.	
Sustaining	the	
broad	values	and	
direction	of	
government.		
Some	refinements	
needed	but	broad	
trajectory	
unimpeded.		
Direction	of	
government	very	
broadly	in	line	with	
goals,	but	clear	
signs	that	the	
policy	has	
prompted	some	
rethinking,	
especially	behind	
the	scenes.		
Entire	trajectory	of	
government	is	being	
compromised.		
Irrevocably	
damaging	to	the	
broad	values	and	
direction	of	
government.		
The	broad	direction	of	government	in	terms	of	meeting	the	50%	participation	in	HE	target	and	widening	
participation	agenda	was	sustained	throughout	the	period.		
	
8.4.3.1	Effect	on	government’s	capacity	to	govern	
There	is	no	evidence	to	suggest	that	the	LLN	initiative	damaged	the	electoral	prospects	of	
government,	perhaps	because	government	and	HEFCE	were	able	to	demonstrate	that	the	
initiative	represented	a	logical	and	legitimate	justification	for	raising	the	status	of	
vocational	qualifications	and	widening	participation	in	HE,	since	this	was	not	dissimilar	to	
models	that	had	been	adopted	in	many	progressive	countries.	Equally,	there	appeared	to	
be	a	sustainable	coalition	that	represented	almost	the	entire	sector.		
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8.4.3.2	Controlling	policy	agenda	
The	policy	environment	was	somewhat	volatile	throughout	the	LLN	initiative,	with	a	new	
14-19	qualifications	framework	and	a	re-focus	on	employer	engagement	and	advanced	
apprenticeships	following	the	Leitch	Review	of	Skills	(2006).	The	LLN	initiative	was	for	the	
most	part	robust	and	adaptable	to	the	fluctuations	in	other	policy	realms,	perhaps	because	
HEFCE	was	quite	adept	at	managing	the	policy	agenda	through	minor	modifications	and	
regular	communications	with	the	LLNs	through	progress	reports,	regional	consultant	
engagement	and	the	work	of	the	National	Forum.			
8.4.3.3	Sustaining	the	broad	values	and	direction	of	government	
The	broad	values	and	direction	of	government	were	not	harmed	by	the	LLN	initiative.	
Indeed,	despite	considerable	fluctuation	in	the	policy	agendas	for	vocational	education	and	
skills,	the	government	remained	broadly	on	an	upwards	trajectory	to	meet	the	50%	
participation	in	HE	by	2010,	rising	from	42%	in	2006-07	to	46%	in	2010-11	and	49%	in	2011-
12	(although	to	date	50%	has	not	quite	been	achieved)	(source	DfE	SFR4/2017).	Although	
the	LLNs	cannot	claim	to	have	been	entirely	responsible	for	this	rise,	they	did	make	a	
contribution	to	a	small	number	of	learners.		
8.4.4	Summary	
The	LLN	policy	process	can	be	described	as	a	durable	success,	despite	operating	in	a	
complex	and	crowded	vocational	and	skills	policy	environment	during	its	lifetime,	as	
demonstrated	in	Figure	12	(Chapter	7,	p.207).	Unusually,	there	was	no	formal	consultation	
with	the	sector	on	the	initiative,	with	consultation	taking	place	‘on	the	ground’	between	
HEFCE	consultants	and	LLN	partner	organisations.	Thus,	contested	issues	could	be	resolved	
at	a	local	level.	HEFCE	was	deliberate	in	designing	a	bottom-up	initiative	with	loose	
objectives,	with	little	requirement	initially	for	monitoring	and	accountability,	as	stated	in	
the	original	circular	to	institutions	(HEFCE	12/2004).	However,	despite	the	bottom-up	
approach,	there	was	a	strong	connection	between	policy	makers	and	implementations,	as	
HEFCE	regional	consultants	were	critically	engaged	with	partner	institutions	in	designing	
the	business	plans	for	LLNs.	The	initiative,	whilst	not	wholly	innovative,	was	legitimised	by	
echoing	to	an	extent	the	progression	approach	taken	in	the	USA	in	the	Wisconsin	model	of	
access	to	HE,	as	articulated	by	Newby	(2005a)	in	his	Colin	Bell	Memorial	Lecture,	and	many	
other	countries	that	sought	to	align	vocational	and	academic	qualifications	(Muller	et	al	
2015,	Watson	2005).	The	policy	had	broad	support	and,	at	face	value,	significant	support	
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from	across	the	sector,	with	almost	national	coverage.	A	significant	number	of	staff	were	
shown	to	have	engaged	with	the	LLNs,	and	many	HEIs	and	FECs	had	some	level	of	
engagement,	as	concluded	in	the	summative	evaluation	(2005).	However,	there	is	evidence	
that	some	elements	of	the	sector	were	not	fully	engaged,	such	as	some	of	the	research	
intensive	institutions,	as	noted	in	HEFCE’s	own	summary	reports	and	the	summative	
evaluation	(HEFCE	2009,	HEFCE2009/29,	SQW	2010).		
The	LLN	programme	was	broadly	a	durable	success,	since	its	implementation	remained	in	
line	with	objectives,	through	HEFCE’s	engagement	and	communication	with	LLNs	through	
regular	progress	reports,	which	allowed	it	to	control	the	policy	agenda	to	an	extent.	The	
objectives	were	broadly	achieved,	particularly	in	terms	of	the	large	number	of	activities	and	
staff	involved,	with	the	summative	evaluation	finding	that	39,000	institutional	staff	had	
engaged	with	LLN	activities.	However,	the	short-term	nature	of	the	funding	meant	that	
these	were	not	as	deep	or	as	widespread	as	they	might	have	been	had	a	different	funding	
approach	been	maintained,	and	this	was	one	of	the	main	criticisms	of	the	summative	
evaluation	(SQW	2010).	There	was	some	benefit	to	the	target	group,	although	the	number	
of	learners	gaining	from	the	initiative	was	small,	with	5,880	LLN	flagged	learners	
representing	just	0.7%	of	total	undergraduate	1st	year	population.	The	impact	on	social	
mobility	was	less	obvious,	as	observed	by	Little	and	Williams	(2009),	but	might	have	
improved	with	more	time.		
The	LLN	initiative	could	be	interpreted	as	a	durable	political	success.	The	policy	had	no	
effect	on	electoral	prospects	and	HEFCE’s	close	engagement	allowed	it	to	manage	any	
difficulties	in	agenda	management,	despite	the	complex	and	changing	policy	environment.	
The	LLN	made	a	contribution,	albeit	small,	to	the	broad	values	and	direction	of	government	
in	its	aim	to	raise	the	participation	rate	to	50%.		
Returning	to	the	main	research	question,	the	application	of	the	McConnell	framework	to	
the	LLN	initiative	suggests	that	the	LLNs	were	a	durable	success,	in	part	due	to	a	strong	
coalition	and	relationship	between	policy-makers	and	policy-implementers.	The	
programme	too	was	a	durable	success,	with	a	large	number	of	participants	and	some	
success	for	students.	This	might	have	been	more	widespread	that	there	been	longer	term	
funding.	The	politics	was	equally	a	durable	success,	with	government	being	able	to	control	
the	agenda	management,	despite	a	turbulent	policy	arena.		
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8.5	Discussion:	Characteristics,	similarities,	differences	and	policy	
learning	
In	this	section,	I	seek	to	address	the	first	supplementary	research	question,	‘Does	the	
evaluation	of	particular	policy	episodes	reveal	any	common	characteristics	and	distinctions	
in	relation	to	policy	that	could	usefully	be	considered	in	relation	to	future	policy	setting	in	
higher	education?’		
Policy	learning	in	this	context	is	understood	to	be	the	way	in	which	government	uses	
knowledge	of	policy	processes,	programmes	and	outcomes	to	view	problems	and	solutions	
to	inform	future	policy	decisions	(IPP	2018),	and	policy	learning	completes	the	policy	cycle,	
since	it	uses	evaluation	of	previous	policy	episodes	to	inform	future	policy	work.	The	work	
of	May	(1992)	is	particularly	pertinent	to	this	study,	where	he	considers	that	instrumental,	
societal	and	political	aspects	of	a	policy	can	be	operationalised,	such	that	it	is	possible	to	
learn	lessons	about	the	validity	of	the	policy.	There	are	some	key	aspects	of	his	criteria	on	
policy	learning	that	are	useful	to	this	study,	since	they	strongly	reflect	the	process,	
programme	and	political	dimension	of	the	McConnell	(2010)	framework	for	articulating	
policy	success	and	failure.	Indeed,	May	argues	that	examining	policy	successes	and	failures	
is	useful	for	formulating	potential	conditions	for	future	success:		
‘policy	failures	are	useful	to	consider	since	failure	serves	as	a	trigger	for	considering	
policy	redesign	and	as	a	potential	occasion	for	policy	learning…	policy	success	might	be	
said	to	provide	a	stronger	basis	for	learning	by	making	it	possible	to	trace	conditions	for	
success’	(May	1992	p.341).		
In	articulating	a	position	of	success	and	failure	in	relation	to	each	of	the	case	studies	above,	
I	have	examined	each	criterion	on	the	policy	process,	programme	and	politics	framework	
and	sought	to	identify	characteristics	that	were	common	between	the	case	studies,	or	
distinctly	different.	I	conclude	that	there	are	five	broad	themes	that	arise	from	my	
interpretations,	in	relation	to	policy	process	and	programme,	which	benefit	further	
consideration.	As	well	as	articulating	these	broad	themes,	I	have	also	considered	where	on	
the	spectrum	of	success	to	failure	I	consider	each	of	these	to	lie	in	relation	to	each	case	
study,	to	ascertain	whether	there	are	lessons	to	be	learned	for	either	those	elements	that	
were	a	success,	or	a	failure,	in	relation	to	policy	learning.	Then,	using	May’s	(1992)	criteria	
for	policy	learning	as	a	guide,	I	consider	how	lessons	learned	might	be	useful	for	future	
policy-making.	May	concludes	that	by	focussing	on	particular	aspects	of	policy	instruments,	
or	implementation	design,	it	is	possible	to	articulate	an	understanding	of	the	source	of	
policy	failure,	and	how	the	policy	instrument	and	design	could	be	improved	for	
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instrumental	learning,	which	he	describes	as	entailing	‘new	understandings	about	the	
viability	of	policy	interventions	or	implementation	design’	(May	1992	p.335).	Equally,	
focussing	on	the	scope	of	the	policy	and	its	goals	can	help	to	change	expectations	or	re-
define	goals,	leading	to	social	policy	learning,	which	he	describes	as	entailing	‘a	new	or	
reaffirmation	social	construction	of	a	policy	by	policy	elites	of	a	given	policy	domain’	(May	
1992	p.337).	An	examination	of	the	political	feasibility	and	policy	processes	can	lead	to	
political	learning,	which	May	describes	as	different	to	instrumental	or	social	policy	learning,	
since	it	
‘is	concerned	with	lessons	about	manoeuvring	within	and	manipulation	of	policy	
processes	in	order	to	advance	an	idea	or	problem….	Political	learning	takes	place	within	
advocacy	coalitions,	leading	to	more	sophisticated	advocacy	of	particular	proposals	or	
problems’	(May	1992	p.340).		
These	aspects	are	fully	demonstrated	in	Chapter	2,	Table	4	(p.53).	In	this	section,	I	will	
consider	each	of	the	five	themes	in	turn,	focussing	firstly	on	the	similarities	and	differences	
between	each	case	study	in	relation	to	the	theme	and	then,	in	examining	aspects	of	
instrumental,	social	or	political	learning,	articulate	possible	future	policy	learning	in	relation	
to	each	theme.			
It	is	important	to	note	that	each	theme	is	not	discrete,	and	there	are	strong	connections	
between	them,	so	some	cross-referencing	between	the	sections	is	necessary.	
8.5.1	Theme	1:	Enabling	strong	and	sustainable	coalitions	(process)	
In	all	three	case	studies,	the	establishment	of	a	sustainable	coalition	was	vital	to	the	success	
of	the	initiative.	This	relates	not	just	to	‘who	was	on	board’	but	also	a	consideration	of	the	
relationship	between	the	stakeholders	within	the	policy	context,	and	in	accommodating	
each	other’s	prevailing	cultures.	
The	e-University	was	a	failure	in	terms	of	not	establishing	a	coalition	to	enable	the	success	
of	the	initiative.	It	was	the	first	time	that	HEFCE	had	engaged	in	a	public-private	enterprise	
on	such	a	scale,	and	the	expectation	that	it	was	possible	to	impose	commercial	protocols	
and	culture	on	a	publicly	funded	venture	was	perhaps	naïve,	as	was	evidenced	by	the	
controversy	of	the	bonuses	paid	to	UKeU’s	directors.	Although	HEFCE	believed	that	it	had	
the	support	of	the	HE	sector,	with	all	but	four	HEIs	signing	up	to	HoldCo,	in	fact	there	was	
little	commitment	required	from	institutions,	since	there	was	no	upfront	requirement	for	
engagement	other	than	a	£1	fee.	Indeed,	the	HEI	element	of	the	coalition	failed,	in	part	due	
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to	the	reliance	on	individuals	within	institutions	to	carry	the	initiative	forward,	rather	than	
having	the	strategic	support	of	senior	management	and,	in	the	end,	due	to	the	withdrawal	
of	many	institutions	from	HoldCo	towards	the	end	of	the	initiative.	The	private	sector	
partnerships	failed	to	come	to	fruition,	perhaps	because	timescales	for	expressions	of	
interest	were	so	short,	but	also	there	was	a	lack	of	confidence	in	the	venture	itself,	despite	
the	PwC	business	model	and	its	level	of	confidence	in	the	initiative.	The	biggest	failing	in	
establishing	a	workable	coalition	related	to	the	structure	between	the	public-private	
organisations,	HEFCE,	HoldCo	and	UKeU.	The	complex	organisational	requirement	to	
separate	HEFCE	from	UKeU	meant	that	HEFCE	was	one	step	removed	from	the	agenda	
management,	and	thus	it	was	unable	to	control	the	objectives	and	desired	outcomes,	as	
evidenced	by	UKeU’s	divergence	from	the	business	plan.	The	target	group	(both	domestic	
students	and	international	students)	was,	in	my	view,	an	important	part	of	the	coalition	
and,	in	the	case	of	the	e-University,	UKeU	failed	to	understand	its	target	groups,	notably	
ignoring	a	large	part	of	the	policy	goal	for	enabling	social	inclusion.	This	led	to	a	failure	to	
benefit	the	target	groups.	
The	CETLs	had	a	conflicted	success	in	establishing	a	coalition.	Unlike	the	e-University	and	
LLNs,	the	initiative	did	not	require	a	formal	level	of	engagement	with	either	the	private	or	
FE	sectors,	and	so	it	did	not	require	an	understanding	of	diverse	cultural	contexts.	This	
should	have	made	the	process	of	establishing	a	coalition	easier,	and	indeed	the	coalition	
within	each	CETL	was	evidently	strong,	but	there	were	a	number	of	process	issues	which	
resulted	in	the	CETLs	garnering	conflicted	success.	HEFCE	chose	to	adopt	a	competitive	
approach	to	the	policy	process,	which	resulted	in	some	contested	issues,	particularly	in	
relation	to	concerns	that	those	institutions	without	a	CETL	would	be	disadvantaged.	The	
competitive	nature	of	the	funding	also	meant	that	CETLs	remained	relatively	insular	to	their	
institution	and,	although	there	were	many	instances	of	external	engagement,	the	notion	of	
a	‘CETL	network’	did	not	come	to	fruition.	Unlike	the	LLNs,	which	were	praised	for	having	a	
National	Forum	to	share	good	practice	across	the	sector,	there	was	no	national	co-
ordination	of	the	CETLs,	for	which	HEFCE	was	criticised,	and	the	resultant	impact	across	the	
sector	was	sporadic.	Indeed,	the	summative	evaluation	(SQW	2011)	concluded	that	it	was	
difficult	to	assess	CETLs’	impact	on	genuine	sectoral	change	in	raising	the	profile	of	learning	
and	teaching	in	line	with	research,	which	had	been	a	key	objective.	One	of	the	other	issues	
to	arise	from	the	CETLs	was	related	to	engagement	by	senior	management	in	institutions,	
which	was	a	common	theme	throughout	all	three	case	studies.	It	was	observed	in	each	case	
that	where	elements	of	success	could	be	demonstrated,	be	it	the	development	of		
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e-learning	programmes,	devising	learning	toolkits	with	CETL	funding	or	engaging	with	FEC	
partners	in	understanding	vocational	admissions	in	the	LLNs,	this	was	often	through	the	
commitment	of	individuals	or	groups	of	individuals,	rather	than	as	a	strategic	commitment	
to	the	initiative	at	institutional	level.	This	was	particularly	noticeable	in	some	CETLs,	where	
the	units	were	often	marginalised	within	disciplines,	did	not	fit	within	the	prevailing	culture	
of	the	institution,	or	were	not	valued	by	members	of	staffs’	line	managers.	Their	limited	
power	to	instigate	change	within	the	institution	impacted	on	their	ability	to	influence	
culture,	for	example	in	changing	HR	strategies	such	that	learning	and	teaching	was	as	
equally	valued	as	research	in	progression	strategies,	and	success	in	this	area	was	sporadic.	
Indeed,	the	success	of	the	CETLs	was	mostly	observed	at	the	level	of	individual	staff.	
The	formation	of	a	coalition	for	the	LLNs	was	a	durable	success	and,	perhaps,	the	most	
successful	of	the	three	episodes,	despite	the	complexities	of	partnership	arrangements	
between	different	sectors	with	different	cultures:	HEIs,	FECs,	employers	and	other	agencies	
such	as	the	HEA	and	SSCs.		The	LLNs	also	had	to	work	within	a	crowded	and	complex	policy	
environment,	which	involved	policy	realms	outside	of	HE,	which	was	not	so	evident	for	the	
other	policy	episodes.	Although	not	all	of	these	partnership	relationships	were	completely	
successful	(for	example,	the	engagement	with	the	HEA	was	limited	and	the	engagement	of	
the	research	intensive	universities	was	variable),	there	was,	however,	almost	national	
coverage	of	FEC/HEIs	and	engagement	of	33,000	individual	staff.	Despite	the	policy	process	
being	labelled	by	HEFCE	as	bottom-up,	the	drive	came	not	from	institutions,	but	from	
HEFCE	regional	consultants,	who	worked	with	partners	in	the	coalition	to	enable	and	
develop	the	LLNs.	Perhaps	their	engagement	with	the	sectors	and	their	strong	links	with,	
and	knowledge	of,	the	policy	initiator,	HEFCE	(not	observed	so	strongly	in	the	e-University	
or	CETLs),	meant	that	it	was	easier	to	maintain	the	coalition	and	manage	the	policy	agenda,	
which	was	particularly	important	in	the	changing	policy	environment.	The	summative	
evaluation	also	praised	the	work	of	the	LLN	National	Forum,	which	it	saw	as	instrumental	in	
assisting	with	high	levels	of	cross	LLN	working,	and	so	was	also	able	to	maintain	the	
coalition.	Although	the	LLNs	were	not	required	to	hold	formal	partnership	arrangements	
with	the	private	sector,	unlike	the	e-University,	they	were	required	to	engage	in	significant	
collaboration	with	employers.	It	was	observed	that	this	was	inconsistent	across	the	
networks,	but	nevertheless	77.5%	of	new	courses	established	by	LLNs	had	some	level	of	
employer	engagement,	and	thus	engagement	with	the	private	sector	that	had	proved	so	
difficult	to	achieve	in	the	e-University	initiative.	
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8.5.1.1	Policy	learning	
The	above	analysis	leads	me	to	the	conclusion	that	LLNs,	which	had	complex	coalition	
relationships	across	sectors	with	diverse	cultures	and	an	evolving	policy	environment,	were	
more	successful	in	building	a	coalition	than	the	e-University,	or	more	particularly	the	CETLs,	
where	maintaining	the	coalition	should	have	been	relatively	straightforward.	In	considering	
what	instrumental		policy	learning	(as	described	in	the	introduction	to	Section	8.5,	p.280)	
there	may	be,	it	is	important	to	focus	on	the	design	of	the	policy	instrument	in	each	case,	
and	in	particular	on	the	organisational	structures.		
The	organisational	structure	for	the	e-University	was	the	point	of	failure,	because	HEFCE,	as	
the	policy	initiator,	was	too	far	removed	from	the	implementation	(by	UKeU)	to	control	the	
agenda	management	and	thus	maintain	a	strong	coalition.	In	the	CETLs,	the	coalition	was	
more	fragmented,	influenced	by	the	competitive	nature	of	the	funding,	and	thus	not	every	
institution	had	a	CETL	connection;	some	CETLs	sat	uneasily	within	their	institutional	
structures	and	thus	successes	tended	to	be	at	the	level	of	the	individual,	and	the	lack	of	
supportive	national	coordination	meant	that	it	was	much	more	difficult	to	enable	a	sectoral	
coalition	and	thus	enable	change.		In	the	case	of	the	LLNs,	the	organisational	structure	
entailed	a	stronger	connection	between	the	coalition	and	HEFCE	through	the	HEFCE	
regional	consultants,	who	had	more	ownership	of	the	LLN	business	plans.	The	LLNs	also	
benefited	from	the	National	Forum,	which	was	well	placed	to	maintain	a	strong	coalition,	
since	it	was	able	to	engage	with	all	the	LLNs	and	share	good	practice	between	them	
through	publications	and	networking	events.		
The	engagement	of	the	institution	at	a	senior	level	is	also	a	potential	point	of	instrumental	
failure.	In	all	three	episodes,	the	engagement	of	senior	management	at	a	strategic	level	
appeared	to	be	weak,	and	there	was	a	strong	reliance	on	individuals.	However,	senior	
management	should	be	an	integral	part	of	the	coalition,	particularly	to	ensure	that	
individuals	not	only	have	sufficient	purchase	to	change	the	hearts	and	minds	of	other	
individuals	within	the	institution,	but	also	the	tools	to	initiate	a	step	change	within	
institutional	cultures	and	structures.	The	LLNs	may	have	been	more	successful	in	this	regard	
than	the	CETLs,	because	the	HEFCE	regional	consultants	would	most	likely	have	been	in	
communication	with	those	at	a	senior	level.		
The	policy	design	in	terms	of	the	competitive	approach	to	policy	episodes	was	also	a	
potential	point	of	failure	in	sustaining	a	strong	coalition.	This	is	evident	in	the	e-University,	
where	institutions	had	to	bid	for	funds	and	ASNs,	and	some	institutions	were	concerned	
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that	the	e-University	brand	might	be	detrimental	to	their	own	quality	brand.	It	is	also	
evident	in	the	CETLs	where	there	was	much	concern	that	there	might	be	reputational	
damage	for	institutions	that	were	not	awarded	a	CETL.	Indeed,	in	both	cases	it	was	the	view	
of	the	sector	at	the	consultation	stage	that	the	initiatives	should	benefit	all	institutions.	The	
e-University	did	not	have	sufficient	longevity	to	determine	any	causal	effects,	but	the	
competitive	element	to	the	CETL	initiative	resulted	in	less	robust	impact	across	the	sector,	
as	it	was	difficult	to	ascertain	the	impact	on	institutions	that	did	not	have	a	CETL.	The	LLNs,	
on	the	other	hand,	were	not	competitive	and	a	good	many	HEIs	and	FECs	were	part	of	at	
least	one	LLN	and,	as	such,	maintaining	a	coalition	across	the	whole	sector	was	easier	to	
achieve.		
For	future	policy	making,	to	establish	and	maintain	a	strong	coalition,	instrumental	learning	
from	this	research	project	suggests	that	the	policy	design	needs	to	be	non-competitive,	
such	that	all	institutions	can	benefit	from	the	outset,	which	may	lead	to	greater	deepening	
effects	across	the	sector.	The	organisational	structure	needs	to	be	clear,	such	that	the	
policy	initiator	maintains	a	strong	link	to	the	coalition	and	therefore	ownership	of	the	
agenda.	This	may	be	through	the	establishment	of	a	national	co-ordinating	organisation,	on	
which	the	policy	initiator	has	sufficient	representation	to	control	the	agenda	management.	
The	engagement	of	senior	management	of	institutions	is	also	a	critical	part	of	the	coalition,	
such	that	the	policy	is	a	part	of	the	strategic	thinking	of	the	institution,	not	the	
responsibility	of	individuals,	in	order	to	provide	sufficient	purchase	to	embed	change.	To	
maintain	engagement	at	a	strategic	level,	policy-makers	could	introduce	inducements	or	
penalties	for	engagement	or	non-engagement	with	the	policy	as	a	condition	of	funding.	This	
might	avoid	accusations	of	‘take	the	money	and	run’,	such	as	that	levelled	at	institutions	
with	a	CETL	(Ramsden	2012).	There	is	an	element	of	social	policy	learning	(described	in	
Section	8.5,	p.280)	in	this	regard,	where	institutions	need	to	have	an	improved	
understanding	of	the	causal	relationships	between	the	policy	and	their	actions,	such	that	
the	deepening	effects	of	a	policy	can	be	observed	at	institutional	and	sectoral	level.		
8.5.2	Theme	2:	The	trajectory	of	policy-making	between	policy-makers	and	
implementers	(process)	
A	top-down	or	bottom-up	approach,	whereby	policy-makers	might	either	impose	the	policy	
instrument	(top-down),	or	loosely	define	it	such	that	the	policy	evolves	with	
implementation	(bottom-up)	could	be	described	as	the	trajectory	of	policy-making.	This	
trajectory	is	a	key	consideration	in	the	policy	process	and,	for	each	of	these	case	studies,	
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the	approach	taken	was	influential	in	its	success	or	failure.	The	e-University	was	the	most	
‘top-down’	of	the	initiatives,	in	which	there	was	a	clear	business	plan,	and	targets,	set	by	
HEFCE,	for	programmes	to	be	developed,	along	with	the	e-China	initiative.	Institutions	were	
able	to	bid	for	pre-determined	development	funds	and	for	ASNs.	Like	the	majority	of	HEFCE	
initiatives,	there	was	a	consultation	process	with	HEIs,	resulting	in	some	changes	to	the	
initiative.	The	most	notable	change	was	the	move	from	an	exclusive	‘elite’	approach	in	
which	only	a	select	number	of	institutions	were	involved,	to	a	much	more	inclusive	project	
for	all	institutions.	Despite	the	top-down	approach,	the	organisational	structure	with	
HoldCo	and	UKeU	resulted	in	HEFCE	having	very	hands-off	engagement	with	the	initiative,	
as	they	were	removed	from	the	implementation	of	the	programme.	Thus,	UKeU	was	able	to	
divert	from	the	planned	targets	and	objectives,	resulting	in	a	failure	of	the	policy	process,	
and	hence	the	programme,	in	meeting	its	objectives	or	delivering	to	the	target	group.	
The	CETL	initiative	was	a	‘bottom-up’	approach,	where	HEFCE	was	deliberately	hands-off,	
with	very	loose	definitions	for	what	was	meant	by	excellence	and,	whilst	there	was	some	
guidance	on	the	‘characteristics’	of	a	CETL,	proposed	organisational	structures	were	not	
defined.	There	was	some	guidance	on	size	and	shape	of	the	CETL	in	terms	of	funding	
against	the	size	of	the	student	population,	but	little	guidance	on	how	the	funding	should	be	
spent,	other	than	a	condition	of	grant	to	spend	the	capital	funding	within	the	first	two	
years.	There	was	consultation	with	the	sector,	which	led	to	some	contested	issues	being	
resolved,	such	as	the	abandonment	of	the	‘commended’	status.	However,	the	loose	
definition	of	excellence	meant	that	both	bidders	and	the	judging	panel	were	able	to	impose	
their	own	value	judgments	of	excellence	on	the	award	of	CETLs,	which	was	one	of	the	most	
contested	issues	of	the	episode.	Whilst	the	hands-off	approach	did	allow	the	CETLs	
freedom	to	set	up	their	own	structures	and	control	their	internal	and	external	activities,	the	
lack	of	any	nationally	co-ordinated	network	meant	that	work	beyond	the	CETLs	was	difficult	
to	assess,	particularly	in	non-CETL	institutions,	and	thus	sectoral	change	was	less	
demonstrable.	Whilst	there	was	much	evidence	of	success	for	individual	staff	as	a	target	
group,	the	evidence	for	students	is	less	evidenced	beyond	the	provision	of	additional	
resources.	As	such,	the	bottom-up	approach	led	to	a	conflicted	success	for	the	policy	
process.		
The	LLN	initiative	was	equally	a	bottom-up	approach.	There	were	no	formal	organisational	
structures	proposed	and	the	objectives	for	LLNs	were	kept	fairly	loose,	although	it	could	be	
argued	that	they	were	more	defined	than	the	CETLs,	with	some	clear	expectations	set	out	
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in	the	objectives.	Unlike	the	other	two	episodes,	the	funding	envelope	was	not	defined,	
which	meant	the	LLNs	could	be	any	size	and	shape,	and	there	was	no	formal	consultation	
process.	However,	despite	formally	being	a	bottom-up	approach,	HEFCE	actually	had	
greater	control	of	the	LLN	initiative	than	the	other	two	case	studies.	The	formation	of	the	
LLNs	was	driven	by	the	HEFCE	regional	consultants	in	consultation	with	the	sector,	so	
contested	issues	could	be	dealt	with	in	a	more	informal	manner	at	a	local	level.	Despite	an	
initial	lack	of	close	monitoring,	LLNs	were	in	the	end	required	to	complete	annual	
monitoring	templates,	and	HEFCE	produced	regular	progress	reports,	which	gave	it	the	
opportunity	to	provide	greater	guidance	to	the	LNNs	and	the	sector,	particularly	as	other	
impacting	policy	realms	evolved.	The	creation	of	the	National	Forum	also	meant	that	there	
was	greater	opportunity	to	control	dissemination	across	the	sector.	As	such,	the	LLN	
programme	was	better	able	to	deliver	on	its	objectives	and	benefit	the	target	group	(the	
limitations	of	which	are	discussed	in	8.5.5	below)	at	both	the	level	of	the	LLN	and	the	
sector,	and	thus	was	a	durable	success.								
8.5.2.1	Policy	learning	
The	discussion	on	the	policy	approach	suggests	that	there	is	instrumental	policy	learning	in	
considering	the	type	of	policy	design.	A	top-down	policy	approach	does	not	necessarily	
guarantee	that	policy-makers	have	sufficient	control	of	the	policy	and	other	factors,	
particularly	where	it	is	structurally	removed	from	the	implementation,	as	this	can	have	an	
effect	on	how	the	programme	is	delivered,	as	was	the	case	with	the	e-University.		Equally,	a	
true	bottom-up	approach,	where	objectives	are	loosely	defined,	can	leave	the	policy	open	
to	areas	of	contestation	and	institutions	looking	inwards	to	resolve	contested	areas,	rather	
than	a	greater	sectoral	approach.	This	leads	to	objectives	being	met	at	a	local	level,	but	
deepening	effects	across	the	sector	not	being	achieved,	resulting	in	conflicted	success.	
Perhaps	the	most	successful	approach	is	one	in	which	organisational	structures	and	
objectives	remain	relatively	loose,	and	activity	can	be	determined	by	the	institutions	
themselves,	but	there	is	strong	involvement	from	policy-makers	in	monitoring	progress	and	
controlling	the	policy	agenda,	by	providing	guidance	to	institutions	on	steering	progress	
towards	the	desired	outcomes,	resulting	in	policy-makers	having	greater	control	over	the	
sectoral	impact	of	the	policy.	This	might	still	lead	to	a	durable,	rather	than	an	outright	
success,	but	policy-makers	will	have	had	greater	influence	over	engaging	institutions	
towards	that	success.		
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8.5.3	Theme	3:	Approaches	to	ensure	sustainability	(programme)	
The	long-term	sustainability	of	a	policy	initiative	is	a	key	part	of	the	programme	design,	if	it	
is	to	be	a	worthy	use	of	public	funds,	and	able	to	endure	a	deepening	effect	across	the	
sector.	The	e-University	was	the	only	one	of	the	policy	episodes	in	which	the	long	term	
sustainability	of	the	initiative	was	fully	articulated	by	HEFCE,	through	the	business	model,	
which	expected	the	initiative	to	be	self-sustaining	within	5-6	years,	funded	through	student	
fees	and	with	a	small	element	of	public	funding	through	ASNs.	What	little	public	funding	
there	was	came	in	the	form	of	development	funding	for	programmes,	and	ASNs	to	support	
the	social	mobility	aims	of	the	initiative.	In	the	event,	the	self-sustaining	goals	of	the	
business	model	were	not	sustainable,	but	the	failures	were	due	not	to	the	financial	model	
itself,	but	to	significant	failings	in	the	policy	process	and	delivery	of	the	programme.		It	is	
noteworthy	that	several	witnesses	to	the	Select	Committee	suggested	that	the	final	
closedown	of	UKeU	was	too	hurried,	and	that	it	might	have	been	financially	sustainable	
given	more	time.	
Both	the	CETL	and	LLN	initiatives	were	financed	by	time	limited,	project	funding,	although	
the	significant	difference	was	that	CETL’s	funding	envelope	was	set	at	£335m	over	5	years,	
but	the	LLNs	had	no	defined	limit,	as	HEFCE	did	not	want	to	limit	LLN’s	plans;	in	the	end,	
£105m	of	the	SDF	was	spent	over	6	years	on	LLNs.	One	difference	between	the	two	case	
studies	was	that	LLNs	had	a	small	element	of	recurrent	funding,	through	the	allocation	of	
ASNs	to	either	the	LLN	itself	or	its	partner	institutions,	although	these	were	cut	when	public	
spending	cuts	were	introduced	during	the	2008	recession.	The	CETL	funding	had	few	
restrictions	on	how	the	money	could	be	spent,	although,	crucially,	capital	spending	had	to	
be	complete	within	the	first	two	years.	Some	CETLs	observed	in	their	evaluations	that	the	
focus	on	spending	within	the	first	2	years	impacted	on	how	they	managed	the	CETL	and	its	
subsequent	spending	in	the	remainder	of	the	period.	Thus	it	could	be	concluded	that	the	
way	in	which	funding	is	allocated	and	restricted	can	have	a	fundamental	effect	on	the	way	
in	which	the	policy	episode	plays	out	in	institutions.		
The	time-limited	nature	of	the	funding	for	both	the	CETLs	and	LLNs	was	one	of	the	most	
contested	issues	in	the	evaluations	of	the	episodes.	The	summative	evaluation	of	the	CETLs	
found	that	few	institutions	had	a	long	term	commitment	to	continuing	CETLs,	with	only	
20%	committing	funds	to	secure	their	existence	beyond	the	funding	period	(SQW	2011).	For	
SQW,	this	was	a	significant	failing	of	institutions	and	HEFCE,	whom,	they	argued,	had	let	the	
legacy	of	the	initiative	lie	with	individuals	committed	to	keeping	the	work	going	beyond	
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funding.	As	a	result,	although	there	was	significant	CETL	activity,	the	lack	of	embedding	the	
activity	in	institutions	and	the	sector	meant	that	the	longer	term	legacy	was	not	
sustainable.	This	resulted	in	the	programme	being	a	durable	but	conflicted	success.	Gosling	
and	Turner	(2015)	suggest	that	this	is	a	typical	weakness	of	short-term	funding	projects,	
that	they	are	relatively	powerless,	with	little	purchase	to	instigate	real	change	in	the	sector.	
Trowler	et	al	(2013)	in	an	HEA	commissioned	review	of	all	HEFCE	learning	and	teaching	
initiatives,	concluded	that	there	was	no	evidence	that	project	funded	initiatives	such	as	
CETLs	had	resulted	in	culture	change	across	the	sector.		
Like	CETLs,	time	limited	funding	for	LLNs	came	in	for	much	criticism	in	the	evaluations,	as	
few	institutions	had	committed	to	funding	beyond	the	initial	funding	period.	The	limited	
timeframe	meant	that	LLNs	tended	to	work	towards	‘quick	wins’	rather	than	focussing	on	
the	longer	term	need	to	embed	vocational	progression	in	the	work	of	institutions.	Like	
CETLs,	the	summative	evaluation	concluded	that	there	had	been	insufficient	focus	on	the	
long	term	sustainability	of	the	LLNs,	and	although	many	LLNs	had	a	strategy	for	continuing	
in	some	form	or	other,	it	was	unrealistic	to	expect	that	all	LLN	activity	would	be	embedded	
in	institutions,	and,	without	continued	financial	support,	there	would	be	an	inevitable	
contraction	of	activities	(SQW	2010).	This	was	particularly	problematic	for	achieving	the	aim	
of	increasing	social	mobility,	since	whilst	there	had	been	some	success	for	a	small	number	
of	students,	the	effects	were	not	widespread	and	needed	more	time	to	embed	across	the	
sector.	
An	observation	that	was	common	across	all	three	episodes	was	that	there	was	no	upfront	
commitment	required	by	institutions	for	the	funding,	or	any	requirement	to	commit	to	the	
continuation	of	the	initiative	at	the	end	of	the	funding	period.	John	Beaumont	(Chief	
Executive	of	UKeU)	had	complained	during	the	Select	Committee	enquiry	into	the	e-
University	that	institutions	had	little	commitment	to	HoldCo,	with	only	a	£1	upfront	
payment.	Trowler	and	Bamber	(2005)	considered	that	beacon	projects	like	CETLs	were	
‘Christmas	Tree’	models	of	policy	making,	all	shiny	lights	but	with	no	lasting	effect,	because	
institutions	were	attracted	by	the	large	sums	of	funding	involved,	but	not	committed	to	the	
initiative	in	the	longer	term	without	funding.	Equally,	David	Kernohan,	Associate	Editor	for	
WONKHE,	speculated	that	institutions	had	been	attracted	to	the	large	sums	of	money	
involved,	rather	than	an	actual	commitment	to	improving	teaching	(Kernohan	2015).	
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8.5.3.1.	Policy	learning	
The	discussion	on	sustainability	of	the	episodes	highlights	opportunities	for	both	
instrumental	and	social	policy	learning.	An	understanding	of	the	consequences	of	short	
term	funding	policy	design	illustrates	that	the	end	of	the	funding	period	is	a	point	of	
weakness	in	project-based	initiatives,	which	gives	them	insufficient	purchase	to	ensure	a	
deepening	effect	across	the	sector,	resulting	in,	at	best,	durable	success.	This	effect	is	
magnified	when	there	is	a	lack	of	commitment	within	institutions	at	a	strategic	level	to	
continue	funding,	and	it	is	left	to	individuals,	as	observed	with	the	CETLs.	Social	learning	can	
be	achieved	through	changed	expectations	of	both	the	policy-makers	and	senior	
management	in	institutions,	in	ensuring	that	there	is	a	commitment	to	continue	beyond	the	
funding	period	at	a	strategic	level.	This	might	be	achieved	through	time	limited	project	
funding,	to	enable	an	initiative	to	get	off	the	ground,	and	a	longer	term	commitment	from	
policy-makers,	with	smaller	recurrent	funding	which	rewards	institutions	who	continue	to	
progress	deepening	effects	of	the	initiative	across	the	sector.	Institutions	might	also	be	
required,	as	a	condition	of	funding,	to	submit	a	plan	at	the	bidding	stage	for	how	
continuation	of	the	project	is	enabled	within	their	longer	terms	strategies,	to	ensure	senior	
management	commitment.	
8.5.4	Theme	4:	The	role	of	monitoring	and	evaluation	to	ensure	value	for	money	
(programme)	
Monitoring	and	evaluation	are	an	important	part	of	the	policy	programme:	to	complete	the	
policy	cycle;	to	demonstrate	value	for	money;	and	for	policy	learning.	Evaluation	was	not	an	
explicit	dimension	on	the	McConnell	framework,	but	it	is	a	key	implicit	part	of	it.		
The	e-University	initiative	did	not	require	formal	monitoring,	partly	because	the	business	
plan	produced	by	PwC	meant	that	there	should	not	have	been	sufficient	reliance	on	public	
funds	in	the	medium	term	to	require	extensive	monitoring,	and	ASNs	allocated	to	
institutions	would	be	monitored	through	the	usual	institutional	annual	monitoring	
mechanisms.	However,	UKeU	was	expected	to	report	to	the	HEFCE	Board,	and	it	was	its	
revision	to	the	business	model	reported	to	the	HEFCE	Board	that	triggered	its	closure.	
At	the	outset,	both	the	CETL	and	LLN	initiatives	had	very	few	monitoring	and	accountability	
requirements,	as	part	of	their	bottom-up	design	approach.	Gosling	and	Turner	(2015)	
observed	that	when	the	CETLs	were	first	established,	the	lack	of	strong	accountability	was	a	
novel	feature	of	the	initiative.	Due	to	the	bottom-up	approach	adopted	by	HEFCE,	both	
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CETLs	and	LLNs	were	expected	to	be	self-monitoring	and,	in	both	cases,	this	approach	was	
met	with	much	criticism.	Gosling	(2016)	noted	of	the	CETLs	that	HEFCE	had	an	over-reliance	
on	institutions’	managerial	commitment	to	oversee	the	monitoring	themselves,	but	as	
already	observed	elsewhere	in	this	chapter,	much	of	the	implementation	of	these	initiatives	
was	left	to	individual	staff,	and	there	tended	to	be	a	lack	of	institutional	level	management.	
It	was	noted	in	Chapter	6	that	Ramsden,	then	of	the	HEA,	said	of	the	CETLs,	‘a	classic	case	
of	weak	management	that	magnified	the	flaws	in	policy…HEFCE	should	have	found	a	way	to	
make	institutions	accountable,	not	just	to	take	the	money	and	run’	(Ramsden	2012).	
However,	despite	the	initial	similarities,	LLNs	did	become	subject	to	closer	monitoring,	after	
much	criticism	of	the	approach	by	the	interim	evaluation.	HEFCE	set	up	a	monitoring	
template	and	this	was	used	to	produce	regular	progress	reports.	This	regular	monitoring	
and	reporting	enabled	HEFCE	to	steer	LLNs	in	particular	directions,	which	was	necessary	in	
such	a	challenging	and	changing	policy	environment,	as	noted	in	8.4.2.1	above.		
Like	many	HEFCE	initiatives,	both	CETLs	and	LLNs	were	subject	to	a	mid-term	formative	and	
an	end-of-term	summative	evaluation,	conducted	by	independent	evaluators.	In	both	
cases,	the	evaluations	were	mostly	desk-based	activities,	with	self-evaluations	from	the	
centres	and	networks,	and	e-questionnaires.	Some	interviews	were	conducted,	however,	
usually	with	centres’	directors	and	senior	institutional	staff.		Some	individual	CETLs	and	
LLNs	were	independently	evaluated,	but	this	was	not	widespread.	It	is	noteworthy	that	
evaluating	benefit	to	the	target	groups	was	often	difficult,	particularly	in	assessing	the	
benefit	to	students	and,	in	the	case	of	the	LLNs,	the	e-survey	to	learners	resulted	in	only	
269	responses,	making	it	difficult	to	gauge	the	impact	on	learners	with	any	authority.		
One	other	area	of	commonality	is	that	the	self-evaluations	from	centres	and	networks	for	
both	initiatives	came	in	for	a	good	deal	of	criticism.	They	tended	to	vary	in	quality	and	be	
highly	descriptive	and	one	of	the	keys	criticisms	of	the	summative	evaluations	was	that	they	
were	not	evidence	led.	In	both	cases,	the	summative	evaluations	concluded	that	they	were	
challenging	to	use	and	it	was	difficult	to	both	assess	value	for	money	and	evidence	the	
deepening	effects	across	the	sector.	In	the	case	of	the	LLNs,	the	centres	themselves	
observed	that	that	it	was	often	difficult	to	evidence	LLN	learners	because	the	monitoring	
mechanisms	outside	of	the	LLN,	in	institutions	and	through	UCAS,	made	it	difficult	to	
identify	LLN	specific	learners.				
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8.5.4.1	Policy	learning	
A	review	of	the	monitoring	and	evaluation	mechanism	in	each	case	gives	rise	to	
instrumental	policy	learning	with	regards	to	the	implementation	design.	The	above	analysis	
has	demonstrated	that	weak	monitoring	and	evaluation	design	leads	to	poorly	evaluated,	
insular,	self-evaluations	and	an	inability	to	evaluate	both	value	for	money	and	cultural	
change	across	the	sector.	It	has	also	been	observed	that	a	poor	response	to	the	formal	
evaluations	by	target	groups	makes	it	challenging	to	evaluate	impact	with	authority.	SQW,	
following	the	summative	evaluation	of	the	LLNs,	recommended	to	HEFCE	that	the	design	of	
any	such	policy	initiatives	should	have	time	for	a	full	programme	of	evaluation	built	in	(SQW	
2010	p.59).	I	would	suggest	that	time	and	funding	for	a	fully	articulated	and	designed	
evaluation	is	always	built	into	future	initiatives,	such	that	there	is	an	evaluative	template	
which	requires	regular	evidence	of	meeting	targets	and	objectives,	demonstrable	benefit	to	
the	target	group	and	the	impact	on	the	institution.	It	might	be	the	case	that	some	funding	is	
held	back	until	the	full	monitoring	and	evaluation	requirements	have	been	met.	
Full	consideration	of	the	evaluation	requirements	in	advance	should	also	include	any	
system	design	revisions,	to	mitigate	such	instances	as	observed	with	the	LLN	initiative,	
where	existing	systems,	through	UCAS	and	institutions	for	monitoring	student	numbers,	
made	monitoring	of	LLN	learners	problematic.	In	addition,	this	should	be	centrally	co-
ordinated	such	that	the	impact	of	the	initiative	across	the	sector	as	a	whole	can	be	
evaluated.	Regular	monitoring	would	allow	refinements	to	the	evaluation	to	be	made	
during	the	lifetime	of	the	initiative,	which	worked	well	for	the	LLNs.	This	will	become	
particularly	important	in	the	future,	as	one	of	the	duties	for	the	OfS	under	the	Higher	
Education	and	Research	Act	(2017)	is	to	monitor	and	promote	value	for	money	as	one	of	
the	priorities	of	the	regulatory	framework.			
8.5.5	Theme	5:	The	role	of	policy-makers	in	preserving	the	policy	goals	and	agenda	
management	(process	and	politics)	
A	key	part	of	the	McConnell	framework	is	the	success	or	failure	of	a	policy	to	retain	the	
broad	values	of	government,	and	for	it	to	successfully	manage	the	policy	agenda.	
Consideration	of	how	this	was	achieved	in	relation	to	these	policy	episodes	is	particularly	
relevant	to	this	study,	since	HEFCE	held	a	unique	position	between	the	sector	and	
government,	and	played	a	pivotal	role	in	all	of	the	case	studies.	It	is	noteworthy	that	in	all	
three	cases,	despite	the	large	sums	of	money	involved,	none	received	particularly	adverse	
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publicity,	beyond	the	specialist	press.	Although	the	e-University	was	probably	the	most	
politically	‘hot’	episode,	in	that	its	failure	was	the	most	publicly	aired	in	the	form	of	a	Select	
Committee	inquiry	and	there	was	much	disquiet	in	relation	to	the	waste	of	public	funds,	it	
actually	represented	the	smallest	in	value,	at	almost	half	the	expenditure	of	the	LLNs	and	
only	a	fifth	of	the	CETLs.		
Despite	the	absolute	failure	of	the	e-University	policy	instrument	to	deliver	the	
government’s	broader	goals,	these	were	not	adversely	affected	by	the	policy	failure.	It	
could	be	argued	that,	although	HEFCE	was	criticised	by	some	for	closing	down	UKeU	too	
quickly	and	not	giving	it	a	chance,	HEFCE’s	quick	reaction	saved	further	pubic	funding	from	
being	consumed.	In	addition,	the	quick	turnaround	in	reviewing	its	strategy	for	e-learning,	
enabling	it	to	appease	institutions	by	putting	the	remaining	£12m	into	institutionally	based	
e-learning	programmes	with	mixed	modes	of	delivery,	may	have	also	contributed	to	
retaining	the	broader	policy	goals.	In	this	case,	HEFCE	was	able	to	control	the	agenda	
management,	such	that	it	did	not	damage	either	the	government	or	its	policy	goals.	
The	CETLs	are	noteworthy	for	their	potential	to	have	become	politically	hot,	since	they	only	
partially	met	the	policy	goals	and	domain	criteria,	and	as	a	result	were	a	conflicted	success.	
Yet,	the	conflicted	success	was	at	a	cost	equal	to	the	total	cost	of	all	other	learning	and	
teaching	enhancement	initiatives	at	that	time.	The	evidence	for	these	shortcomings	at	such	
a	cost	could	have	resulted	in	greater	scrutiny,	either	from	government	or	the	media,	and	
indeed	Kernohan	(2015)	questioned	why,	with	hindsight,	there	was	not	a	select	committee	
inquiry.	Part	of	the	reason	for	CETLs	being	a	conflicted	success	was	HEFCE’s	policy	
approach,	which	left	some	parts	of	the	process	open	to	contestation,	and	absence	of	
national	co-ordination	meant	that	the	effects	were	modest	and	mostly	local,	and	there	was	
little	evidence	of	sectoral	change.	In	this	case,	the	bottom-up	approach	meant	that	HEFCE	
was	less	able	to	control	the	agenda	management.		
The	LLN	initiative	was	the	episode	in	which	control	over	the	policy	goals	and	agenda	
management	had	the	potential	to	be	the	most	problematic,	given	the	volatile	and	complex	
policy	environment	at	that	time.	However,	the	initiative	was	able	to	deliver	a	durable	
success,	which	I	would	contend	was	due,	in	part,	to	HEFCE’s	ability	to	manage	the	agenda	
with	the	LLNs	through	the	regional	consultants,	regular	monitoring	and	progress	reports,	in	
which	they	were	able	to	steer	LLNs	through	some	challenging	policy	domains	impacting	on	
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their	work.	For	example,	HEFCE	was	able	to	steer	LLNs	towards	greater	engagement	with	
employers,	as	a	result	of	the	change	in	government	focus	following	the	Leitch	Review	of	
Skills.				
8.5.5.1	Policy	learning	
An	analysis	of	how	the	policy	agenda	was	managed	in	each	case	offers	both	instrumental	
policy	learning	and	political	learning	(as	articulated	in	Section	8.5,	p.280)	opportunities.	In	
instrumental	terms,	the	agenda	management	is	a	critical	part	of	the	policy	process,	
particularly	when	the	policy	environment	is	complex	and	volatile,	and	requires	policy-
makers	to	retain	some	agility	over	the	policy,	and	steer	changes	and	re-direct	quickly	to	
ensure	at	least	a	durable	success.	In	process	terms,	it	is	helpful	to	have	policy-makers	to	
have	advocates	‘on	the	ground’	to	help	manage	the	policy	agenda	with	the	coalition.	In	the	
case	of	the	LLNs,	the	close	involvement	of	HEFCE	regional	consultants	and	the	National	
Forum	were	instrumental	in	this	role.	As	such,	it	would	be	helpful	for	future	higher	
education	policy-makers	to	establish	networks	of	advocates	at	the	policy	design	stage.		
In	terms	of	political	learning,	the	focus	rests	with	May’s	(1992)	political	flexibility,	in	that	
policy	processes	and	programmes	are	sufficiently	robust	to	accommodate	changes	in	
government	and	other	policy	initiatives	which	might	impact	on	the	likely	success	of	the	
programme,	as	was	the	case	with	the	LLNs.	In	the	case	of	the	e-University,	the	policy	
process	and	the	programme	were	insufficiently	successful	to	accommodate	flexibility,	
primarily	due	to	the	weaknesses	of	the	organisational	structure	and	coalition.	However,	
HEFCE	was	sufficiently	aware	of	the	difficulties	in	the	agenda	management	at	the	point	that	
UKeU	offered	a	revised	business	plan	(which	relied	almost	entirely	on	public	funds)	to	close	
down	the	initiative	and	re-direct	remaining	funds	to	a	revised	e-learning	policy.	As	such,	
this	suggests	that	future	policy-makers	need	to	have	both	a	strong	relationship	with	the	
coalition	to	enable	policy	agility	and	also	a	close	relationship	with	government,	such	that	
they	have	sufficient	purchase	to	take	control	of	the	agenda	management	when	required,	to	
avoid	a	political	disaster.		
8.6	Discussion:	understanding	the	locus	of	policy	making	
In	this	section	I	consider	understandings	of	the	locus	of	HE	policy-making	as	articulated	in	
Chapter	4,	Table	9	(p.141),	and	the	lessons	learned	from	the	above	analysis,	to	address	the	
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second	supplementary	research	question,	‘What	can	an	analysis	of	HEFCE	policy-making	
reveal	about	the	locus	of	power	in	policy-making	in	higher	education?’	
In	Chapter	4,	I	observed	that	higher	education	was	perhaps	unique	in	having	an	
intermediary	body	between	government	and	the	sector,	and	in	Table	9	(p.141)	I	articulated	
how	the	position	of	that	intermediary	body	has	changed	since	the	inception	of	UGC	in	
1919,	where	higher	education	policy	was	‘inside	out’	(Shattock	2012),	with	universities	
determining	their	own	policies	and	UGC	operating	as	a	‘buffer’	to	mitigate	between	the	
potential	policy	conflicts	of	universities	and	government.	There	was	little	change	in	this	
situation	until	the	1980s,	when	there	was	greater	state	intervention	and	UGC’s	role	began	
to	morph	into	a	mediator,	as	policy-making	became	more	‘outside	in’	(Shattock	2012),	as	
state	funding	of	the	sector	continued	to	increase.	With	the	advent	of	HEFCE	in	1992,	the	
role	changed	once	more	to	that	of	‘agent’	acting	on	behalf	of	government	as	the	funder,	
where	universities	had	to	become	more	accountable	for	state	funding.	Over	the	next	25	
years,	HEFCE’s	position	continued	to	change,	from	agent	and	funder	to	‘broker’	between	
the	opposing	sides	of	government	and	the	sector,	as	successive	governments	increased	
accountability,	whilst	reducing	funding,	and	shifting	policy	goals	towards	the	marketisation	
of	higher	education.	In	2010,	HEFCE	formally	became	the	regulator	of	higher	education,	
with	a	much	reduced	funding	role	and,	upon	its	demise	in	2018,	the	OfS	has	become	the	
principle	regulator	for	HE,	with	a	regulatory	framework	agreed	under	the	Higher	Education	
and	Research	Act	(2017).		
Central	to	this	study	is	the	consideration	of	the	locus	of	policy-making	during	the	HEFCE	
period,	and	what	this	might	mean	for	future	higher	education	policy-making.	Successive	
governments	have	held	neoliberal	policy	ideals	for	higher	education	over	the	last	25	years,	
where	neoliberalism	is	understood	to	refer	to	a	preference	for	market-orientated	policies,	
driven	by	strong	state	orientation	towards	the	market	(Mirowski	2014).	Such	an	approach	
can	be	observed	in	HE,	with	increased	marketisation	of	the	sector,	moving	funding	from	the	
state	to	the	consumer,	but	with	notably	increased	requirements	for	accountability.		
From	an	analysis	of	the	three	case	studies,	it	has	been	demonstrated	that	HEFCE	played	a	
pivotal	role	in	managing	the	agenda	of	policy-making.	In	all	three	cases,	the	impetus	seems	
to	have	come	from	HEFCE,	and	the	knowledge	and	expertise	of	its	chief	executives,	all	of	
whom	had	experience	of	the	HE	sector.	Sir	Brian	Fender,	Chief	Executive	of	HEFCE	in	2001,	
took	responsibility	for	the	idea	of	the	e-University,	claiming	that	HEFCE	had	put	forward	the	
idea	prior	to	the	spending	round,	and	that	it	had	been	subsequently	taken	up	by	ministers.	
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The	CETL	initiative	was	initially	envisioned	in	the	2003	White	Paper	‘The	Future	of	Higher	
Education’,	but,	according	to	Taggart	(2003),	HEFCE	had	already	included	the	idea	for	CETLs	
in	their	2003	strategic	plan,	and	in	fact	the	White	Paper	was	essentially	a	copy	of	HEFCE’s	
plan.	In	2003,	the	Chief	Executive	of	HEFCE,	Sir	Howard	Newby,	laid	claim	to	the	LLN	
initiative,	announcing	it	in	the	2004	Colin	Bell	Memorial	Lecture.		
From	the	analysis	of	the	case	studies	against	the	McConnell	framework,	it	is	my	view	that	
there	is	a	direct	relationship	between	the	involvement	of	HEFCE	in	the	process,	
implementation	and	agenda	management,	and	the	success	of	the	policy	initiative.	For	the	
e-University,	the	organisational	structure	removed	HEFCE	from	the	process	and	the	
programme,	resulting	in	organisational	weaknesses	in	the	coalition	and	the	failure	of	the	
initiative.	It	was	possibly	HEFCE’s	agenda	management	in	closing	down	UKeU	and	diverting	
the	remaining	funding	to	a	revised	e-learning	policy	that	averted	a	political	failure.	The	
CETLs	were	a	conflicted	success,	and	many	of	the	issues	that	made	it	so	related	to	HEFCE’s	
bottom-up	approach.		This	approach	meant	that	its	deliberately	vague	definitions	of	
excellence,	together	with	weak	monitoring	and	accountability	processes,	left	the	initiative	
open	to	contestation.	The	competitive	nature	of	the	funding	and	lack	of	central	co-
ordination	for	the	initiative	meant	that	its	successes	were	localised	and	effects	were	not	as	
deep	as	intended	across	the	sector.	The	LLN	initiative,	although	ostensibly	bottom-up,	
actually	had	the	most	HEFCE	involvement	of	all	three	episodes,	being	driven	by	HEFCE	
regional	consultants	in	dialogue	with	the	sector.		Despite	a	complex	and	changing	policy	
environment,	HEFCE’s	monitoring	and	regular	progress	reports	meant	that	it	was	better	
able	to	control	the	agenda	management.	Although	the	LNNs	were	a	durable,	rather	than	an	
outright,	success,	this	was	due	to	the	inability	of	the	programme	to	sufficiently	embed	
cultural	change	within	the	timescale,	and	so	was	only	able	to	reach	a	small	number	of	
learners.	In	my	view,	this	last	point	represents	a	generic	weakness	in	the	English	political	
system,	whereby	policy	appears	to	often	only	be	thought	of	in	the	medium	term,	driven	by	
the	election	of	governments	and	corresponding	changes	in	political	parties’	agenda	
manifestos	every	four	to	five	years,	resulting	in	the	funding	of	such	initiatives	not	being	
considered	over	the	longer	term.				
I	would	argue	that	HEFCE	was	not	just	hugely	influential	as	a	policy-maker,	but	also	had	at	
its	disposal	the	power	to	shape,	influence	and	steer	policies	in	action,	and	has	thus	been	a	
key	part	of	Ball’s	(2006)	‘policy	context	of	practice’	(see	Chapter	2).	This	brings	the	thesis	
back	to	Ball’s	point	that	policy	is	not	just	a	legislative	moment,	and	that	it	is	the	agency	of	
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policy	that	is	important.	HEFCE	positioned	itself	such	that	it	was	very	influential	in	
managing	that	agency	in	higher	education.	In	terms	of	the	locus	of	power	for	future	higher	
education	policy-making,	this	discussion	brings	the	thesis	back	to	the	questions	raised	in	
Chapter	4,	and	the	role	of	the	OfS,	where	the	initial	plan	for	OfS	was	that	it	‘would	not	do	
policy’	(Kernohan	2018),	and	has	not	been	set	up,	as	Evans	(2018)	notes,	to	actively	engage	
with	other	sector	agencies.	As	such,	the	locus	of	power	for	policy-making	would	lie	with	
ministers,	who,	in	my	view,	do	not	have	the	time,	expertise	or	purchase	to	engage	with	the	
agency	of	policy	in	the	context	of	practice.	As	such,	it	will	be	more	difficult	for	them	to	
actively	engage	in	securing	a	strong	coalition	and	preserve	the	policy	goals	through	
effective	agenda	management,	which	are	critical	for	ensuring	policy	success,	as	articulated	
above.	
8.7	Discussion:	critique	of	the	framework	
In	this	section,	I	offer	a	critique	of	the	theoretical	framework,	in	order	to	address	the	final	
research	question,	‘to	what	extent	is	the	chosen	theoretical	framework	sufficient	or	
inadequate	in	analysing	policy	success	and	failure	in	the	context	of	contemporary	
theoretical	approaches	to	policy	analysis?’,	with	observations	on	its	appropriateness	and	
limitations	in	the	context	of	higher	education,	and	relating	back	to	the	discussion	in	Chapter	
2	on	contemporary	understandings	of	policy	and	policy	analysis.		
It	is	my	view	that	the	McConnell	framework	(2010)	has	served	to	provide	both	a	sound	
methodological	approach	and	a	useful	operational	tool	for	a	systematic	examination	of	the	
process,	programme	and	politics	dimensions	of	the	chosen	case	studies.	The	10-point	
framework	that	McConnell	suggests	to	guide	researchers	in	examining	particular	aspects	of	
policies,	as	described	in	Table	5	(p.60),	proved	useful	in	devising	the	codes	for	seeking	out	
particular	aspects	of	the	case	studies	from	the	chosen	texts.	The	framework	has	enabled	
me	to	articulate	an	interpretative	position	of	success	and	failure	along	the	spectrum	of	the	
framework	and	helped	identify	that,	in	all	three	case	studies,	aspects	of	the	policy	process,	
programme	and	politics	were	more	successful	than	others.	This,	in	turn,	has	enabled	me	to	
identify	some	distinctions	and	commonalities	from	the	case	studies	and,	in	recognising	
what	aspects	were	more	successful	than	others,	informed	a	discussion	on	future	policy	
learning,	aided	by	the	work	of	May	(1992)	in	policy	learning.			
However,	use	of	the	framework	has	also	highlighted	some	limitations,	particularly	in	
relation	to	contemporary	understandings	of	policy	analysis	and	higher	education	policy-
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making	in	England.	I	have	identified	three	main	limitations	and	will	offer	some	possible	
solutions	to	address	each	of	these	shortcomings.		
8.7.1	Dynamism	over	time	
McConnell	suggests	that	the	researcher	should	identify	the	time	period	which	they	wish	to	
address	in	relation	to	the	policy.	The	framework	lends	itself	well	to	addressing	a	particular	
timeframe,	particularly	given	the	static	nature	of	the	matrix,	and	I	sought	to	address	this	by	
identifying	case	studies	which	concluded	within	an	articulated	timeframe.	However,	this	
does	not	acknowledge,	even	within	the	chosen	timeframe,	that	a	policy	may,	for	example,	
succeed	initially,	but	fail	later	on,	and	the	framework	not	does	have	sufficient	fluidity	to	
articulate	this	position.	This	would	be	particularly	beneficial	in	analysing	how	well	the	policy	
met	its	objectives	or	benefitted	the	target	group	on	the	programme	dimension,	which	may	
well	change	over	time.	The	CETLs	are	a	good	example	of	this,	where,	at	the	point	of	the	
interim	evaluation,	there	was	much	evidence	of	success,	and	the	interim	evaluation	
concluded	that	there	was	
‘an	overall	positive	narrative	for	the	development	of	CETLs	as	‘nodes’	of	teaching	and	
learning-focused	activities…	the	data	points	to	a	range	of	positive	effects	the	existence	
of	the	CETL	programme	had	enabled…these	effects	tend	to	be	circulating	around	the	
direct	beneficiaries	of	CETL	resources	but	there	is	growing	evidence	that	effects	are	
beginning	to	move	out	from	the	enclaves	of	practice	within	CETLs	and,	in	some	cases,	
are	being	used	to	strategic	effect	within	institutions’	(Saunders	et	al	2008	p.4).		
However,	by	the	summative	evaluation,	it	was	clear	that	the	deepening	effects	across	the	
sector	had	failed	to	come	to	fruition,	and	so	what	appeared	to	be	a	durable	success	became	
a	conflicted	success	by	the	end	of	the	time	period	under	investigation.	As	a	result,	the	CETLs	
failed	in	the	overarching	aim	to	bring	teaching	and	learning	excellence	on	a	par	with	
research	excellence.		Equally,	the	LLNs	could	be	an	example	of	a	policy	that	both	succeeded	
and	failed	over	the	time	period.	To	enable	the	framework,	the	analysis	for	LLNs	stops	at	the	
end	of	the	funding	period,	and	it	was	observed	that	whilst	there	had	been	success,	this	had	
only	been	evident	for	some	learners,	and	so	the	effects	were	not	as	deep	or	as	widespread	
as	intended.	Had	the	analysis	been	extended	beyond	the	funding	period,	it	might	have	been	
the	case	that	many	more	learners	had	benefitted	and	so	the	deepening	and	widening	
effects	may	have	been	more	apparent.	In	both	cases,	it	might	have	been	possible	to	
represent	this	shift	in	a	more	dynamic	way	on	the	framework,	and	to	articulate	possible	
reasons	for	the	shift,	which	might	have	been,	for	example,	further	revisions	to	the	policy	
realm,	a	further	injection	of	funding	or	a	change	of	government.	Two	examples	are	given	in	
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Tables	25	(p.299)	and	26	(p.300),	the	first	articulating	a	change	between	the	two	
evaluations	of	the	CETLs,	and	the	second	a	fictitious	example	of	what	could	have	been	
articulated	had	the	timeframe	of	the	LLNs	been	extended.	In	each	case,	the	notion	that	the	
granularity	of	success	has	changed	over	time	is	represented	by	the	arrow	demonstrating	a	
shift	from	one	characteristic	of	success	to	another,	with	the	dates	indicating	the	period	of	
time.	For	the	CETLs,	this	visualisation	demonstrates	that	the	achievement	of	the	desired	
outcomes	declined	over	time,	and	for	the	LLNs,	the	benefits	for	the	target	group	(could	
have)	improved	over	time.	Such	a	representation	would	demonstrate	the	dynamism	of	
policies	to	change	over	time.		
Table	25	–	POLICY	AS	PROGRAMME	(CETLS)	–	ADDING	DYNAMISM	TO	THE	FRAMEWORK	
Policy	as	programme:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Programme	
success	
Durable	
success	
Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Programme	
failure	
Achievement	of	
desired	outcomes.	
Outcomes	
broadly	achieved,	
despite	some	
shortfalls.	
	
	
	
	
	
2008	
Some	successes,	but	
the	partial	
achievement	of	
intended	outcomes	
is	counterbalanced	
by	unwanted	results,	
generating	
substantial	
controversy.	
	
	
	
2011	
Some	small	
outcomes	achieved	
as	intended,	but	
overwhelmed	by	
controversial	and	
high-profile	
instances	of	failure	
to	produce	results.		
Failure	to	achieve	
desired	outcomes.		
At	the	interim	evaluation	stage,	the	programme	was	a	durable	success,	such	that	outcomes	for	individuals	
were	being	achieved	and	there	was	some	evidence	of	working	towards	all	outcomes	being	achieved.	By	the	
summative	evaluation,	in	the	broadest	terms,	objectives	were	achieved,	with	more	than	90%	of	the	CETLs	
reporting	that	they	had	achieved	what	they	set	out	to	do.	However,	the	summative	evaluation	concluded	that	
the	evidence	for	success	was	limited	to	descriptions	of	actions,	and	failed	to	demonstrate	qualitative	impact,	
particularly	at	institutional	level	and	across	the	sector.	There	was,	however,	no	evidence	of	unwanted	results	
leading	to	controversy.			
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Table	26	–	POLICY	AS	PROGRAMME	(LLNs)	–	ADDING	DYNAMISM	TO	THE	FRAMEWORK	
Policy	as	programme:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Programme	
success	
Durable	success	 Conflicted	
success	
Precarious	success	 Programme	
failure	
Creating	benefit	for	
a	target	group.	
A	few	shortfalls	and	
possibly	some	
anomalous	cases,	
but	intended	target	
group	broadly	
benefits.		
	
	
	
	
date	
Partial	benefits	
realised,	but	no	as	
widespread	or	
deep	as	intended.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
2010	
Small	benefits	are	
accompanied	and	
overshadowed	by	
damage	to	the	very	
group	that	was	
meant	to	benefit.	
Also	likely	to	
generate	high	profile	
stories	of	unfairness	
and	suffering.	
Damaging	a	
particular	target	
group.	
There	were	some	benefits	for	the	target	group	by	the	end	of	the	funding	period,	with	vocational	progression	
enabled	for	some	learners.	However,	the	learner	constituency	characteristics	point	to	a	failure	to	achieve	
widening	participation	to	a	great	extent.	By	(fictitious	date)	there	had	been	greater	engagement	of	the	
research	intensive	universities	and	more	learners	had	benefited	in	line	with	the	intended	targets.			
	
8.7.2	Lack	of	investigation	of	the	agency	of	policy	
It	is	my	view	that	the	framework	does	not	allow	for	sufficient	agency	for	the	policy	under	
investigation,	and	therefore	does	not	take	sufficient	account	of	how	the	policy	might	have	
been	interpreted	or	implemented	differently	by	policy	receivers.		Contemporary	views	of	
policy	analysis	consider	that	policy	formation	and	implementation	is	not	a	linear	construct	
of	the	process,	programme	and	politics,	and	analysis	needs	to	take	account	of	the	dynamic,	
cyclical	and	chaotic	nature	of	policy,	considering	notions	of	power	and	discourse	and	how	
these	are	received.	Drawing	on	Foucault’s	theories	of	knowledge	and	power	and	how	the	
relationship	between	them	is	used	by	government	or	other	institutions	to	control	policy	
implementation,	and	the	related	work	of	Ball	(1993)	and	Fairclough	(2014)	on	discourse,	
such	that	language	and	power	are	intrinsically	connected	is,	in	my	view,	missing	from	the	
McConnell	(2010)	framework,	and	it	is	insufficient	in	encouraging	the	researcher	to	
examine	the	language	of	policy	texts,	how	these	are	received	and	interpreted	and	the	
power	relationships	between	policy-makers	and	implementers.	As	observed	in	Chapter	2,	
Ball	(2006)	emphasises	the	importance	of	the	‘policy	receivers’	and	the	‘policy	texts’	in	
making	sense	of	policy:	‘implementation	may	be	driven	by	different	interpretations	of	
change’	(Ball	2006	p.9),	and	such	notions	are	not	considered	by	the	rather	linear	and	static	
nature	of	the	framework.	Newman	(2014)	also	suggests	that	the	framework	is	lacking	in	not	
taking	account	of	the	different	interpretations	of	policy	receivers	and	he	suggests	re-
framing	the	dimensions	into	four	categories:	‘process,	goal	attainment,	distributional	
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outcomes	and	political	consequences’	(see	Figure	7,	p.50),	in	order	to	better	account	for	the	
agency	of	the	policy.		
‘By	evaluating	these	aspects	of	a	policy	separately,	it	is	possible	to	provide	an	
assessment	of	policy	success	that	can	account	for	different	aspects	of	success	and	
differing	interpretations’	(Newman	2014	p.203).		
I	support	his	view	that	these	categorisations	might	allow	the	researcher	to	better	articulate	
how	the	policy	was	received	and	interpreted	within	the	‘distributional	outcomes’	
dimension,	and	an	analysis	of	the	discourse	of	policy	texts,	and	the	power	relationships	of	
the	policy	implementers	and	receivers,	might	be	better	articulated	within	this	dimension.		
8.7.3	The	invisibility	of	sub-units	
For	me,	one	of	the	key	criticisms	of	the	McConnell	framework	is	the	one-dimensional	view	
it	has	of	government,	and	its	failure	to	take	account	of	‘sub-units’,	such	as	HEFCE,	or	other	
sub-units	in	education	such	as	the	Skills	Funding	Agency	or	Young	people’s	Learning	Agency	
or,	more	generally,	local	education	authorities.		As	I	have	already	articulated,	HEFCE,	as	a	
sub-unit,	was	critical	in	both	the	formation	and	agency	of	higher	education	policies,	and	so	
this	omission	is	critical	to	this	study.	This	omission	is	also	linked	to	the	weakness	of	the	
framework	in	failing	to	sufficiently	recognise	the	power	relationships	and	agency	of	policy.	
Gore	(2011)	is	equally	critical	of	this	omission	and	sums	this	up	well	in	his	criticism	of	the	
framework.	He	says	it		
‘ignores	the	key	role	of	sub-national	units	and	inclusive	partnerships	in	influencing	and	
implementing	policy…..little	attention	is	paid	to	how	policy	filters	between	different	tiers	
in	a	national	(or	even	supranational)	policy’	(Gore	2001	p.48).	
More	recent	conceptualisations	of	policy	analysis	have	focussed	on	what	Lipsky	(1980)	
termed	the	street	level	‘policy	making	community’.	Ayres	and	Marsh	(2013),	Newman	
(2013),	Lowndes	and	McCaughie	(2013)	and	Van	der	Steen	et	al	(2013)	have	all	considered	
that	the	local	is	an	important	notion	within	the	context	of	practice.	The	emphasis	by	
McConnell	on	‘government’	misses	an	important	point	in	the	power	and	influence	of	sub-
agencies,	such	as	HEFCE,	in	being	able	to	affect	higher	education	policy	and	its	success	or	
failure.		
It	is	my	view	that	the	politics	dimension	on	McConnell’s	framework	is	particularly	difficult	
to	apply	in	terms	of	higher	education	policy,	when	the	sub-unit,	HEFCE,	was	such	a	key	
influencer.	The	framework	assumes	a	position	where	the	policy	is	of	such	critical	
importance	that	its	success	or	failure	will	determine	the	future	prospects	of	government.	
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However,	the	majority	of	higher	education	policies,	with	the	exception	of	the	current	high	
profile	debates	on	fees	and	vice	chancellors’	pay,	rarely	reach	the	attention	of	the	general	
public,	as	was	the	case	with	all	three	of	the	case	studies,	and	so	had	little,	if	any,	effect	on	
government’s	electoral	prospects.	However,	in	all	three	cases,	HEFCE	held	a	critical	position	
in	controlling	the	agenda	management	on	behalf	of	government	and	thus	influenced	the	
direction	of	the	policy	such	that	any	failures	in	process,	programme	or	politics	had	little	
effect	on	the	overall	ability	to	govern.	In	order	to	make	this	particular	dimension	more	
meaningful,	it	might	be	a	useful	addition	to	consider	who	or	what	sub-unit	is	controlling	the	
policy	agenda,	its	power	and	discourse	relationship	with	government,	and	its	position	in	
influencing	the	broad	values	and	directions	of	government.		
Chapter	9	brings	this	thesis	to	a	conclusion	in	addressing	the	main	research	question,	by	
firstly	summarising	the	key	findings	for	each	case	study	against	the	McConnell	framework	
and	summarising	the	five	keys	areas	where	there	were	particular	characteristics,	
commonalities	and	differences	between	them,	as	identified	in	Section	8.5	(p.280).	This	
analysis	is	then	used	to	consider	some	implications	and	recommendations	arising	from	the	
policy	learning.				
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Chapter	9:	Conclusions	
9.1	Introduction	
This	chapter	concludes	the	thesis,	firstly	by	summarising	the	key	findings	of	the	case	
studies,	and	articulating	them	together	against	the	McConnell	(2010)	framework.	Section	
9.2	(p.303)	then	goes	on	to	draw	the	analysis	of	each	case	study	to	a	conclusion,	
articulating	success	or	failure	in	each	case	and	summaries	the	five	key	areas	where	there	
were	particular	characteristics,	commonalities	and	differences	between	them.	Section	9.3	
(p.308)	considers	the	implications	and	recommendations	for	future	policy	design	arising	
from	the	analysis	of	the	case	studies,	using	the	construct	for	‘policy	learning’	devised	by	
May	(1992).	These	findings	are	then	related	back	to	contemporary	understandings	of	policy	
and	policy	analysis.	Section	9.4	(p.312)	then	re-addresses	the	main	and	supplementary	
research	questions,	summarising	the	conclusions	reached	in	Chapter	8.	Section	9.5	(p.315)	
considers	the	original	contribution	that	the	thesis	makes	to	understandings	of	policy	in	the	
field	of	higher	education	studies.	Section	9.6	(p.316)	considers	the	limitations	constraining	
the	research	and	finally,	Section	9.7	(p.318)	articulates	some	possible	future	directions,	
which	would	further	enhance	the	research	work.		
9.2	Summary	of	key	findings	
The	thesis	considered	three	case	studies	of	HE	policy	initiatives	from	the	learning	and	
teaching	strand	of	HEFCE	policies	during	the	New	Labour	period	of	governance.	Using	the	
theorised	framework	from	McConnell	(2010),	I	undertook	an	analysis	of	each	to	enable	an	
interpretative	position	in	regards	to	the	nuances	of	success	and	failure	in	terms	of	the	
‘policy	process,	programme	and	politics	dimensions’	(McConnell	2010).	All	three	cases	
revealed	elements	of	success	and	failure	in	each	dimension,	and	none	was	a	complete	
success	or	an	outright	failure,	although	the	e-University	came	closest	to	being	a	failure	in	all	
dimensions.	The	analysis	in	these	cases	concurs	with	McConnell’s	assertion	that	‘success	is	
not	an	‘all	or	nothing’	phenomenon’	(McConnell	2010	p.55).	My	conclusions	in	relation	to	
each	case	and	each	dimension	are	summarised	in	tables	27-29	below.	
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Table	27	–	POLICY	AS	PROCESS	(SUMMARY	OF	CASE	STUDIES)	
Policy	as	process:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Process	
success	
Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Process	failure	
Preserving	
government	
policy	goals	
and	
instruments.	
Policy	goals	and	
instruments	
preserved,	despite	
minor	refinements.	
Preferred	goals	and	
instruments	proving	
controversial	and	
difficult	to	preserve.	
Some	revisions	needed.		
Government’s	
goals	and	
preferred	policy	
instruments	hang	
in	the	balance.	
Termination	of	
Government	policy	
goals	and	
instruments.		
Conferring	
legitimacy	on	a	
policy.		
Some	challenges	to	
legitimacy,	but	of	
little	or	no	lasting	
effect.		
Difficult	and	contested	
issues	surrounding	
policy	legitimacy,	with	
some	potential	to	taint	
the	policy	in	the	long	
term.		
Serious	and	
potentially	fatal	
damage	to	policy	
legitimacy.	
Irrecoverable	
damage	to	policy	
legitimacy.		
Building	a	
sustainable	
coalition.	
Coalition	intact,	
despite	some	signs	
of	disagreement.	
	
	
	
Coalition	intact,	
although	strong	signs	of	
disagreement	and	some	
potential	for	
fragmentation.		
Coalition	on	the	
brink	of	falling	
apart.	
Inability	to	produce	
a	sustainable	
coalition.		
Symbolising	
innovation	and	
influence.	
Not	ground-breaking	
in	innovation	or	
influence,	but	still	
symbolically	
progressive.		
Neither	innovative	nor	
outmoded,	leading	(at	
times)	to	criticisms	from	
both	progressives	and	
conservatives.	
Appearance	of	
being	out	of	
touch	with	viable	
alternative	
solutions.		
Symbolising	
outmoded,	insular	
or	bizarre	ideas,	
seemingly	oblivious	
to	how	other	
jurisdictions	are	
dealing	with	similar	
issues.		
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Table	28	–	POLICY	AS	PROGRAMME	(SUMMARY	OF	CASE	STUDIES)	
Policy	as	programme:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Programme	
success	
Durable	success	 Conflicted	success	 Precarious	
success	
Programme	
failure	
Implementation	
in	line	with	
objectives.	
Implementation	
objectives	broadly	
achieved,	despite	
minor	refinements	or	
deviations.		
Mixed	results,	with	
some	successes,	but	
accompanied	by	
unexpected	and	
controversial	
problems.	
Minor	progress	
towards	
implementation	as	
intended,	but	beset	
by	chronic	failures,	
proving	highly	
controversial	and	
very	difficult	to	
defend.	
Implementation	
fails	to	be	
executed	in	line	
with	objectives.			
Achievement	of	
desired	
outcomes.	
Outcomes	broadly	
achieved,	despite	
some	shortfalls.		
Some	successes,	but	
the	partial	
achievement	of	
intended	outcomes	is	
counterbalanced	by	
unwanted	results,	
generating	
substantial	
controversy.	
Some	small	
outcomes	achieved	
as	intended,	but	
overwhelmed	by	
controversial	and	
high	profile	
instances	of	failure	
to	produce	results.		
Failure	to	
achieve	
desired	
outcomes.	
	
	
Meets	policy	
domain	criteria.	
Not	quite	the	desired	
outcome,	but	
sufficiently	close	to	
lay	strong	claim	to	
fulfilling	the	criteria.		
Partial	achievement	
of	goals,	but	
accompanied	by	
failures	to	achieve,	
with	possibility	of	
high-profile	
examples,	eg.	on-
going	wastage	when	
the	criterion	is	
efficiency.		
A	few	minor	
successes,	but	
plagued	by	
unwanted	media	
attention;	eg.	
examples	of	
wastage	and	
possible	scandal	
when	the	criterion	
is	efficiency.	
Clear	inability	to	
meet	the	criteria.		
Creating	benefit	
for	a	target	
group.	
A	few	shortfalls	and	
possibly	some	
anomalous	cases,	but	
intended	target	group	
broadly	benefits.		
Partial	benefits	
realised,	but	not	as	
widespread	or	deep	
as	intended.		
Small	benefits	are	
accompanied	and	
overshadowed	by	
damage	to	the	very	
group	that	was	
meant	to	benefit.	
Also	likely	to	
generate	high	
profile	stories	of	
unfairness	and	
suffering.		
Damaging	a	
particular	target	
group.	
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Table	29	–	POLICY	AS	POLITICS	(SUMMARY	OF	CASE	STUDIES)	
Policy	as	politics:	the	spectrum	from	success	to	failure	
Political	success	 Durable	success	 Conflicted	
success	
Precarious	
success	
Political	failure	
Enhancing	
electoral	
prospects	or	
reputation	of	
governments	and	
leaders.		
Favourable	to	
electoral	prospects	
and	reputation	
enhancement,	with	
only	minor	
setbacks.	
Policy	obtains	
strong	support	and	
opposition,	
working	both	for	
and	against	
electoral	prospects	
and	reputation	in	
fairly	equal	
measure.	
Despite	small	signs	
of	benefit,	policy	
proves	an	overall	
electoral	and	
reputational	
liability.		
Damaging	to	the	
electoral	prospects	
or	reputation	of	
governments	and	
leaders,	with	no	
redeeming	political	
benefit.	
Controlling	policy	
agenda	and	
easing	the	
business	of	
governing.		
Despite	some	
difficulties	in	
agenda	
management,	
capacity	to	govern	is	
unperturbed.		
Policy	proving	
controversial	and	
taking	up	more	
political	time	and	
resources	in	its	
defence	than	was	
expected.	
Clear	signs	that	the	
agenda	and	
business	of	
government	is	
struggling	to	
suppress	a	
politically	difficult	
issue.		
Policy	failings	are	so	
high	and	persistent	
on	the	agenda,	that	
it	is	damaging	
government’s	
capacity	to	govern.	
Sustaining	the	
broad	values	and	
direction	of	
government.	
	
Some	refinements	
needed	but	broad	
trajectory	
unimpeded.		
Direction	of	
government	very	
broadly	in	line	with	
goals,	but	clear	
signs	that	the	
policy	has	
prompted	some	
rethinking,	
especially	behind	
the	scenes.			
Entire	trajectory	of	
government	is	being	
compromised.		
Irrevocably	
damaging	to	the	
broad	values	and	
direction	of	
government.		
	
The	e-University	was,	overall,	a	process	and	programme	failure.	The	weakness	of	the	
organisational	structure,	whereby	HEFCE	was	far	removed	from	the	operational	aspects	of	
the	public-private	venture,	was	a	significant	reason	for	that	failure,	which	resulted	in	
destabilising	the	legitimacy	of	the	policy,	such	that	UKeU	could	deviate	so	substantially	
from	the	original	business	plan.	As	a	result,	the	programme	failed	to	meet	the	policy	
objectives	or	deliver	results	for	the	target	groups,	particularly	in	meeting	government’s	
	 307	
social	inclusion	agenda.	The	coalition	deteriorated	as	UkeU	failed	to	satisfactorily	engage	
the	sector	or	private	investors.	Overall,	the	policy	instrument	failed,	which	resulted	in	a	
failure	to	preserve	government	policy	goals.	Government	was	able	to	contain	the	episode,	
through	the	actions	of	HEFCE,	and	close	down	UKeU,	thus	realising	a	durable,	although	
conflicted,	political	success,	with	a	change	in	HEFCE	strategy	and	movement	of	funds	to	
support	a	revised	e-learning	policy.		
The	CETL	policy	process	can	be	interpreted	as	a	conflicted	process	success;	the	bottom-up	
policy	approach	led	to	some	contested	issues,	with	some	of	the	coalition	interpreting	
excellence	in	different	ways,	and	the	competitive	funding	approach	resulted	in	less	
deepening	across	the	sector	than	anticipated.	One	of	the	weaknesses	of	the	approach	was	
having	a	strong	coalition	at	the	level	of	the	CETL	itself,	but	a	weaker	coalition	at	
institutional	level,	and	an	even	weaker	one	at	sector	level,	due	to	a	lack	of	national	
coordination.	The	programme	can	be	interpreted	as	a	durable	but	conflicted	programme	
success,	with	much	evidence	of	success	at	a	local	level,	but	institutional	impact	was	more	
sporadic	and	very	difficult	to	evidence	at	sector	level.	The	CETL	initiative	could	be	
interpreted	as	a	durable	political	success,	with	no	apparent	effect	on	the	ability	to	govern,	
but	some	difficulties	in	agenda	management	at	sectoral	level.	However,	the	impact	of	wider	
economic	and	political	events	(a	change	of	government,	the	advent	of	higher	fees	and	a	
global	recession),	led	to	a	rethink	on	public	spending	for	teaching	and	learning	initiatives,	
and	the	CETL	initiative	was	not	continued	in	any	form.		
The	LLN	policy	process	and	programme	can	be	described	as	durable	successes.	Despite	the	
bottom-up	approach,	there	was	a	strong	connection	between	policy-makers	and	receivers	
through	HEFCE	regional	consultants,	and	strong	coalition	across	the	sector,	with	almost	
national	coverage,	and	a	national	co-ordinating	body,	the	National	Forum.	The	objectives	
were	broadly	achieved,	particularly	in	terms	of	the	large	number	of	activities	and	staff	
involved,	although	the	short-term	nature	of	the	funding	meant	that	these	were	not	as	deep	
or	as	widespread	as	they	might	have	been.	There	was	some	benefit	to	the	target	group,	
although	the	number	of	learners	gaining	from	the	initiative	was	small,	but	might	have	
improved	with	longer	term	funding.	The	initiative	could	be	interpreted	as	a	durable	political	
success.	The	policy	had	little	effect	on	electoral	prospects,	and	HEFCE	was	able	to	manage	
any	difficulties	in	agenda	management,	despite	the	complex	and	changing	policy	
environment,	through	a	high	level	of	engagement	with	the	LLNs,	with	regular	monitoring	
and	evaluation,	and	progress	reports,	which	enabled	HEFCE	to	influence	the	direction	of	the	
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policy.	The	LLN	made	a	contribution,	albeit	small,	to	the	broad	values	and	direction	of	
government	in	its	aim	of	raising	the	participation	rate	to	50%.		
The	analysis	of	the	case	studies	identified	five	key	areas	where	there	were	particular	
characteristics,	commonalities	and	differences,	and	an	articulation	of	success	or	failure	in	
each	case	enabled	some	aspects	of	policy	learning,	as	identified	in	Section	8.5	(p.280):	
a) Enabling	strong	and	sustainable	coalitions	(process)	
b) The	trajectory	of	policy-making	between	policy-maker	and	implementers	(process)	
c) Approaches	to	ensure	sustainability	(programme)	
d) The	role	of	monitoring	and	evaluation	to	ensure	value	for	money	(programme)	
e) The	role	of	policy-makers	in	preserving	the	policy	goals	and	agenda	management	
(process	and	politics).	
9.3	Implications	and	recommendations	arising	from	policy	learning	-	
related	to	contemporary	understandings	of	policy		
As	noted	above,	five	themes	arose	from	the	analysis	of	the	characteristics,	commonalities	
and	differences	between	the	case	studies.	Using	the	construct	devised	by	May	(1992),	I	
concluded	that	there	were	possibilities	for	policy	learning	that	might	be	applied	to	future	
policy	design.	These	are	articulated	in	Chapter	8,	but	are	summarised	here	and	related	back	
to	contemporary	understandings	of	policy	as	considered	in	Chapter	2.	
9.3.1	Enabling	a	strong	and	sustainable	coalition	(process)	
I	concluded	that	the	design	of	the	policy	instrument	was	key	in	enabling	a	strong	and	
sustainable	coalition,	and	concur	with	Ball’s	(2006)	view	of	the	importance	of	‘policy	
receivers’	as	part	of	the	coalition,	and	Lipsky’s	(1980)	street	level	‘policy-making	
community’.	The	policy	design	should	ensure	that	there	are	strong	associations	between	
policy-makers	and	receivers	at	all	levels	of	the	coalition,	in	Ball’s	(2006)	terms,	the	context	
of	practice.	In	HE	in	particular,	the	relationship	between	policy-makers	(HEFCE),	senior	
management	of	institutions,	and	staff	with	a	vested	interest	in	implementation	of	the	
initiative,	are	part	of	the	context	of	practice.	Without	a	strong	association	between	all	
elements	of	the	coalition,	there	is	greater	chance	of	unintended	policy	effects,	as	observed	
by	Margetts,	6	and	Hood	(2010)	(Chapter	2,	Section	2.3.3,	p.20),	and	Dery’s	‘policy	by	the	
way’	(1999	p.165-6);	for	example,	the	weakness	of	the	coalition	of	the	e-University,	where	
HEFCE	was	far	removed	from	the	policy	programme,	led	to	UKeU	being	able	to	deviate	so	
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far	from	the	programme	that	the	objectives	and	benefits	to	the	target	groups	were	not	
met.		
A	strong	coalition	is	more	likely	to	result	in	more	durable	policy	success	across	the	sector,	
and	not	just	small	pockets	identifiable	in	individual	institutions.	A	strong	coalition	between	
policy-maker	and	institutions,	either	through	regional	consultants	with	close	institutional	
relationships,	or	national	forums,	is	crucial	in	enabling	the	steer	of	policy,	particularly	when	
it	might	be	open	to	elements	of	contestation,	or	a	greater	steer	due	to	the	impact	of	other	
policy	realms.	The	LLN	coalition	was	stronger	in	this	regard	than	the	CETLs,	and	was	a	more	
durable	sector-wide	success.	
The	importance	of	the	local	(Lipsky	1980,	Ayres	and	Marsh	2013,	Newman	2013,	Lowndes	
and	McCaughie	2013,	Van	der	Steen	et	al	2013),	and	the	agency	which	individuals	and	local	
leadership	have	for	influencing	and	changing	policy	in	practice,	is	equally	an	important	
element	in	the	policy	design.	A	strong	association	among	HE	senior	management	of	
institutions	within	the	coalition	is	necessary	to	engage	policies	at	an	institutionally	strategic	
level,	and	to	embed	policy	work	beyond	the	funding	period.	This	ensures	that	policy	
successes	are	embedded	and	institutionalised,	rather	than	being	reliant	on	enthusiastic	
individuals,	which	was	a	criticism	of	both	the	e-University	and	CETLs.		
There	is	also	greater	opportunity	for	sector-wide	success	of	policy	initiatives	where	the	
policy	design	is	inclusive	of	the	coalition,	such	that	the	policy	design	does	not	introduce	an	
element	of	competition	between	institutions.	Competition	leads	institutions	to	be	more	
reticent	to	share	their	successes	beyond	their	institution,	which	leads	to	fewer	
opportunities	for	deepening	effects	across	the	sector,	as	observed	with	the	CETLs.	More	
inclusive	policy	initiatives,	such	as	the	LLNs,	demonstrate	more	durability	in	sector-wide	
benefits.		
9.3.2	The	trajectory	of	policy-making	between	policy-maker	and	implementers	
(process)	
The	trajectory	of	policy-making,	either	as	a	top-down	or	a	bottom-up	approach	in	the	policy	
instrument	design,	also	plays	a	key	part	in	determining	how	Ball’s	(2006)	context	of	practice	
plays	out	in	policy	implementation.	A	top-down	approach,	whilst	appearing	to	give	policy-
makers	greater	control	over	the	agenda	management	(useful	in	policy	contexts	where	there	
is	a	crowded	and	rapidly	changing	policy	landscape),	needs	to	be	designed	such	that	the	
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organisational	structure	is	sufficiently	robust,	and	does	not	remove	policy-makers	so	far	
from	implementation	that	the	policy	objectives	can	be	re-focussed	by	receivers.	This	was	
particularly	observed	in	the	e-University	which,	whilst	top-down,	had	a	weak	organisational	
structure,	leaving	HEFCE	too	far	removed	from	the	agenda	management.	Conversely,	a	
bottom-up	approach	gives	more	freedom	for	the	local,	as	identified	in	9.3.1,	to	interpret	
and	influence	policy	implementation.	Whilst	such	an	approach	was	highlighted	by	HEFCE	to	
be	beneficial,	because	it	allowed	the	policy	to	be	sector	driven,	in	fact	such	an	approach	can	
leave	the	policy	open	to	greater	contestation.	This	is	particularly	true	where	the	policy	texts	
provide	sufficiently	loose	discourse	for	policy	to	be	re-interpreted,	misinterpreted	and	
transformed	in	policy	spaces	by	receivers	to	suit	their	own	agendas	and	meaning,	as	was	
the	case	with	the	CETLs.	In	such	cases,	policy	‘is	both	contested	and	changing’	(Ball	1993	
p.11).	The	case	of	the	CETLs	also	highlights	a	phenomenon	observed	by	Taylor	(2004),	
where	the	language	of	the	policy	texts,	particularly	in	relation	to	defining	the	meaning	of	
‘excellence’	for	the	CETLs,	highlighted	competing	discourses	between	HEFCE,	the	panel	
reviewing	business	cases,	and	the	bidders	themselves	in	defining	excellence.	In	a	bottom-up	
policy	design,	weakly	constructed	policy	texts	and	poorly	defined	objectives	can	result	in	
Ball’s	(2006)	context	of	practice	being	more	open	to	areas	of	contestation,	and	thus	
objectives	being	met	locally,	but	less	widespread	success	across	the	sector.	I	concluded	that	
the	most	successful	approach	is	one	in	which	the	policy	design	leaves	the	objectives	
relatively	loose,	such	that	interpretations	can	be	best	suited	to	individual	institutions,	and	
therefore	have	more	currency	at	institutional	level,	but	with	strong	involvement	from	
policy-makers	in	monitoring	progress	and	controlling	the	agenda,	steering	progress	towards	
the	desired	outcomes.	This	results	in	policy-makers	having	greater	control	over	the	sectoral	
impact	of	the	policy.	Such	an	approach	worked	well	with	the	LLNs,	where	there	were	
regular	progress	reports,	which	helped	steer	certain	aspects	of	the	policy	implementation	
in	the	light	of	other,	competing,	policy	domains	impacting	on	the	LLNs,	in	what	Hill	(2009)	
refers	to	as	a	‘crowded	policy	space’	(p.16).	In	this	respect,	such	an	approach	sits	well	with	
Ball’s	(1993)	assertion	that	policy	is	not	just	a	legislative	moment,	but	a	dialogue	and	a	
continual	process,	‘in	which	the	loci	of	power	are	constantly	shifting	as	various	resources	
implicit	and	explicit	in	texts	are	re-contextualised	and	employed	in	the	struggle	to	maintain	
or	change	views’	(Ball	2006	p.13).	This	also	sits	well	with	the	work	of	Fairclough	(2014),	who	
argues	that	language	and	power	are	intrinsically	connected,	and	thus	the	discourse	of	the	
regular	monitoring	of	LLNs,	and	provision	of	progress	reports,	gave	HEFCE	the	power	to	
maintain	the	policy	agenda.		
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9.3.3	Approaches	to	ensure	sustainability	(programme)	
I	argued	in	Chapter	8	that	the	end	of	the	funding	period	is	a	point	of	weakness	in	project-
based	policy	initiatives,	since	there	is	insufficient	purchase	to	ensure	a	deepening	effect	
across	the	sector	in	the	timescale,	resulting	in,	at	best,	durable	success.		This	observation	
concurs	with	the	work	of	Trowler	et	al	(2013),	who	undertook	‘a	review	of	the	role	of	HEFCE	
in	teaching	and	learning	enhancement’,	and	concluded	that		
‘a	project-based	approach	is	probably	not	the	most	effective	for	multiple	reasons	
(including	the	difficulty	in	‘scaling	up’	from	the	project	base,	which	is	often	left	
unaddressed	and	the	issue	of	effective	planning	for	the	post-funding	continuation)’	
(p.12).	
In	this	respect,	the	end	of	the	funding	period	represents	a	breaking	point	in	the	policy	cycle,	
such	that	there	is	no	further	impetus	for	policy	implementation	to	continue,	and	the	power	
relationship	within	the	context	of	practice	(Ball	2006)	is	concentrated	with	the	policy	
receivers.	As	such,	there	is	greater	opportunity	for	unintended	consequences	(Margetts,	6	
and	Hood,	2010),	and	the	policy	initiative	may	fail.	To	maintain	a	balance	of	power	in	the	
context	of	practice,	I	argued	that	this	might	be	achieved	through	changing	expectations	of	
both	the	funder	and	senior	management	in	institutions,	in	ensuring	that	there	is	a	
commitment	to	continue	beyond	the	funding	at	a	strategic	level.	This	might	be	achieved	
through	time-limited	project	funding,	to	enable	an	initiative	to	get	off	the	ground,	and	a	
longer	term	commitment	from	policy-makers	with	smaller	recurrent	funding,	which	
rewards	institutions	who	continue	to	progress	deepening	effects	of	the	initiative	across	the	
sector.		
9.3.4	The	role	of	monitoring	and	evaluation	to	ensure	value	for	money	(programme)	
Nachmias	(1983),	and	Howlett	and	Ramesh	(1995),	considered	that	evaluation	was	a	critical	
element	of	the	policy	cycle.	I	would	concur	with	this	view,	and	argued	in	Chapter	8	that	any	
policy	design	should	include	the	provision	for	monitoring	and	evaluation,	since	this	could	
lead	to	policy-learning	(May	1992).	This	view	also	concurs	with	the	recommendation	of	
SQW,	following	the	evaluation	of	the	LLNs,	suggesting	that	all	such	policy	initiatives	should	
have	a	full	programme	of	evaluation	built	in	(SQW	2010	p.59).This	is	particularly	important	
for	higher	education	in	the	current	climate,	where	demonstrating	value	for	money	is	a	key	
principle	of	the	regulatory	framework	for	the	OfS.		
The	analysis	of	the	case	studies	demonstrated	that	weak	monitoring	and	evaluation	design	
leads	to	poorly	evaluated,	insular,	self-evaluations	and	an	inability	to	evaluate	both	value	
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for	money	and	cultural	change	across	the	sector.	I	suggested,	therefore,	that	time	and	
funding	for	a	fully	articulated	design	evaluation	is	always	built	into	future	initiatives,	which	
requires	regular	evidence	of	meeting	targets	and	objectives,	demonstrable	benefit	to	the	
target	group,	and	the	impact	on	the	institution.	In	addition,	this	should	be	centrally	co-
ordinated,	such	that	the	impact	of	the	initiative	across	the	sector	as	a	whole	can	be	
evaluated.	Regular	monitoring	would	allow	for	refinements	to	the	policy	to	be	made	during	
the	lifetime	of	the	initiative,	which	worked	well	for	the	LLNs.		
9.3.5	The	role	of	policy-makers	in	preserving	the	policy	goals	and	agenda	
management	(process	and	politics)	
Concurring	with	Ball’s	(1993)	view	that	policy	is	not	just	a	legislative	moment,	I	have	argued	
that	for	a	policy	to	be	successful,	policy-makers	play	a	key	role	in	ensuring	the	success	of	
the	policy,	as	the	agenda	management	is	a	critical	part	of	the	policy	process.	This	enables	
policy-makers	to	maintain	a	successful	power	relationship,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	
communication	of	the	policy.	This	is	particularly	true	when	the	policy	environment	is	
complex	and	volatile,	and	requires	policy-makers	to	be	able	to	steer	policy	changes	and	re-
direct	quickly	to	ensure	at	least	a	durable	success.	In	practical	terms,	I	argued	that	it	is	
helpful	for	policy-makers	to	have	advocates	‘on	the	ground’,	to	help	manage	the	policy	
agenda	with	the	coalition.	In	the	case	of	the	LLNs,	the	close	involvement	of	HEFCE	regional	
consultants	and	the	National	Forum	was	instrumental	in	this	role.				
I	have	argued	for	an	element	of	political	flexibility,	as	observed	by	May	(1992),	such	that	
policy	processes	and	programmes	are	sufficiently	robust	to	accommodate	changes	in	
government	and	other	policy	realms	which	might	impact	of	the	likely	success	of	the	
initiative,	as	was	the	case	with	the	LLNs,	where	the	evolving	skills	agenda	after	the	Leitch	
Review	of	Skills,	and	the	introduction	of	variable	fees,	impacted	greatly	on	the	work	of	the	
LLNs.	As	such,	this	suggests	that	future	policy-makers	need	to	have	both	a	strong	
relationship	with	the	coalition	to	steer	policy,	and	also	a	close	relationship	with	
government,	such	that	they	have	sufficient	purchase	to	take	control	of	the	agenda	
management	when	required	to	avoid	a	political	disaster.	
9.4	Addressing	the	research	questions	
The	thesis	uses	the	McConnell	(2010)	theoretical	framework	to	address	the	main	research	
question:	‘How	can	policy	success	and	failure	be	understood,	from	the	study	of	three	policy	
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episodes	in	the	context	of	contemporary	higher	education	in	England,	by	applying	criteria	
from	an	existing	framework	for	success	and	failure?’	
The	thesis	has	taken	a	post-positivist	design	approach	to	three	HEFCE	policy	episodes,	
chosen	from	field	of	learning	and	teaching,	with	research	methods	appropriate	for	case	
study	research,	and	used	documentary	sources	to	produce	thick	descriptions	of	those	
episodes.	Using	the	theoretical	framework	developed	by	McConnell	(2010),	I	have	taken	an	
interpretative	approach,	to	produce	a	nuanced	interpretation	of	success	and	failure	in	each	
episode	in	relation	to	the	policy	process,	programme	and	politics.	This	research	concluded	
that	none	of	the	episodes	could	be	categorised	as	an	outright	success	nor,	equally,	an	
outright	failure,	but	that	elements	of	the	process,	programme	and	politics	in	relation	to	
each	episode	demonstrated	some	degree	of	success	or	failure	in	accordance	with	the	
framework,	as	summarised	in	Section	9.1	(p.303)	above.		
This	analysis	led	me	to	be	able	to	address	the	first	supplementary	research	question,	‘does	
the	evaluation	of	particular	policy	episodes	reveal	any	common	characteristics	and	
distinctions	in	relation	to	policy	that	could	usefully	be	considered	in	relation	to	future	policy	
setting	in	higher	education?’	The	analysis	of	the	case	studies	suggested	a	number	of	
characteristics,	distinctions	and	commonalities	in	relation	to	each	episode,	which	further	
raised	a	range	of	issues	and	questions	in	relation	to	the	policy	design,	implementation,	
evaluation,	and	the	role	of	policy-makers.	I	concluded	that	there	were	five	main	issues	to	
be	addressed	and,	using	the	construct	devised	by	May	(1992),	I	articulated	how	there	might	
be	some	elements	of	future	policy	learning	in	relation	to	each	of	these,	as	described	in	9.2	
above.		
In	Chapter	4,	I	provided	an	historical	account	of	how	the	higher	education	intermediary	
bodies	have	changed	from	that	of	‘buffer’,	in	the	early	part	of	the	nineteenth	century,	to	
that	of	‘regulator’	in	the	present	day.	I	also	used	an	account	of	policy-making	during	the	
HEFCE	years	to	articulate	how	HEFCE	itself	changed	from	that	of	‘agent’	in	its	early	years,	to	
regulator,	as	neoliberal	preferences	for	market-orientated	policies	(Mirowski	2014)	came	
into	effect,	with	increased	requirements	for	institutional	accountability	whilst	moving	
funding	from	the	state	to	the	consumer.		
Using	this	historical	account,	and	the	analysis	of	the	case	studies	against	the	McConnell	
framework,	I	have	been	able	to	address	the	second	supplementary	research	question,	
‘what	can	an	analysis	of	HEFCE	policy-making	reveal	about	the	locus	of	power	in	policy-
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making	in	higher	education?’	It	is	my	view	that	it	is	no	coincidence	that,	in	all	three	of	the	
chosen	case	studies,	HEFCE	had	a	strong	influence	in	both	the	articulation	of	each	episode,	
and	in	its	implementation,	and	there	is	a	direct	relationship	between	the	involvement	of	
HEFCE	in	the	process,	implementation	and	agenda	management	and	the	success	of	the	
policy	initiative.	I	argued	that	HEFCE	was	not	just	hugely	influential	as	a	policy-maker,	but	it	
has	also	had	at	its	disposal	the	power	to	shape,	influence	and	steer	policies	in	action,	and	
has	thus	been	a	key	part	of	Ball’s	(2006)	‘policy	context	of	practice’,	bringing	the	thesis	back	
to	Ball’s	point	that	policy	is	not	just	a	legislative	moment,	and	that	it	is	the	agency	of	policy	
that	is	important.		
The	five	key	policy-learning	themes	that	I	identified	as	a	result	of	the	case	studies’	analysis	
all	indicate	that	policy-makers	play	a	critical	role	in	the	agency	of	policy,	if	policies	are	to	be	
at	least	a	durable	success.	These	are	in		
• designing	and	maintaining	a	strong	coalition,	
• designing	a	policy	approach	which	ensures	the	currency	of	the	policy	at	a	local	
level,		
• enabling	policy-makers	to	steer	the	policy	through	complex	policy	agendas,	thus	
preserving	the	policy	goals	and	agenda	management,	
• enabling	the	sustainability	of	the	policy	goals	and	outcomes	to	ensure	sector-wide	
deepening	and	longevity	of	the	policy,	
• ensuring	value	for	money	through	effective	evaluation	and	policy-learning.		
This	discussion	brings	the	thesis	back	to	the	role	of	the	OfS,	which	asserted	that	it	‘would	
not	do	policy’	(Kernohan	2018),	and	hence	raises	questions	about	whether	the	locus	of	
power	for	HE	policy	remains	at	government	level	or	within	OfS,	and	what	that	might	mean	
for	government’s	ability	to	successfully	guide	policy	within	the	HE	‘context	of	practice’	(Ball	
2006).	
Finally,	I	concurred	with	the	work	of	other	scholars	in	addressing	the	final	supplementary	
research	question	through	the	lens	of	higher	education	studies:	‘to	what	extent	is	the	
chosen	methodological	framework	sufficient	or	inadequate	in	analysing	policy	success	and	
failure	in	the	context	of	contemporary	theoretical	approaches	to	policy	analysis?’	It	is	my	
view	that	the	McConnell	framework	(2010)	has	served	to	provide	both	a	sound	theoretical	
approach,	which,	as	noted	previously,	Tight	(2012,	2018)	argues	has	been	less	obvious	in	
higher	education	research	(see	9.4	below),	and	a	useful	operational	tool	for	a	systematic	
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examination	of	the	process,	programme	and	political	dimensions	of	the	chosen	case	
studies.	Although	the	framework	allows	for	an	interpretative	approach,	it	gives	the	
researcher	a	structure	in	which	to	frame	their	assertions,	more	so	than	the	framework	
approach	taken	by	Newman	(2014),	which	adopts	a	similar	success/failure	framework,	but	
is	less	descriptive	in	defining	the	nuances	of	success	and	failure.	However,	I	concurred	with	
Gore	(2011)	that	the	matrix	approach	does	give	the	framework	a	rigidity	which	makes	some	
elements	of	policy	analysis	more	difficult.	I	suggested	that	the	framework	is	insufficient	in	
three	areas.		
Firstly,	the	framework	does	not	allow	the	researcher	to	show	how	a	policy	might	succeed	or	
fail	over	time,	and	I	would	suggest	that	it	should	be	possible	to	build	more	dynamism	into	
the	framework,	to	better	articulate	how	time	might	be	a	factor	for	success	and	failure	
(Chapter	8,	Section	8.7.1,	p.298).	I	also	argued	that	the	framework	is	insufficient	in	
addressing	the	agency	of	policy,	and	in	particular	does	not	sufficiently	acknowledge	
competing	discourses	(Taylor	2004),	and	the	discourse	of	policy	texts	(Ball	2006,	Fairclough	
2014),	and	their	role	in	the	context	of	practice.	I	am	in	agreement	with	Newman	(2014)	that	
re-framing	the	dimensions	into	four	categories	–	‘process,	goal	attainment,	distributional	
outcomes	and	political	consequences’	(see	Figure	7,	p.50)	-	might	allow	the	researcher	to	
better	articulate	how	the	policy	was	received	and	interpreted	within	the	‘distributional	
outcomes’	dimension,	and	an	analysis	of	the	discourse	of	policy	texts	might	be	more	
feasible	under	this	dimension.	Finally,	I	concurred	with	Gore	(2011)	that	the	framework	
does	not	account	for	the	role	of	sub-units	of	government,	such	as	HEFCE,	which,	as	I	have	
argued	in	this	thesis,	held	a	key	position	in	determining	the	success	or	failure	of	elements	of	
the	process,	programme	and	political	dimensions.			
9.5	Original	contribution	to	knowledge	
The	thesis	sits	within	the	‘system	policy’	strand	of	HE	research,	as	defined	by	Tight	(2012	
p.7,	2018	p.95),	and	in	particular	in	Tight’s	sub-categories	of	‘policy	context,	national	
policies	[and]	historical	policy	studies’	(Tight	2012).		Tight	argues	that	historical	case	studies	
are	a	useful	way	to	examine	policies,	but	that	they	offer	little	in	the	way	of	policy	learning	
(Tight	2012	p.120).	This	study	has	sought	to	address	that	criticism	by	using	the	case	studies	
to	illuminate	particular	characteristics,	similarities	and	differences	in	relation	to	particular	
policy	episodes	and,	further,	to	provide	some	insight	into	policy	learning	from	those	
particular	characteristics,	using	May’s	(1992)	construct	for	policy	learning.	Thus,	this	thesis	
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has	contributed	to	the	field	of	‘system	policy’	research	(Tight	2012,	2018)	by	using	case	
studies	and	a	theoretical	model	to	offer	some	insight	into	policy	learning.			
Tight	(2012)	contends	that	many	higher	education	researchers	do	not	engage	explicitly	with	
theory,	although	it	is	increasing	(Tight	2018)	and	the	inter-disciplinary	nature	of	higher	
education	studies	lends	itself	well	to	importing	theories	from	other	academic	disciplines.	
Likewise,	although	Busemeyer	and	Trampusch	(2011)	contend	that	there	is	a	growing	
interest	in	the	use	of	political	science	in	the	study	of	education,	they	argue	that	it,	too,	is	
under-theorised.	This	thesis	has	sought	to	address	these	deficits	by	using	a	theoretical	
framework,	imported	from	the	study	of	political	sciences	and	applied	to	the	field	of	higher	
education	studies.		Thus,	this	thesis	has	made	a	theoretical	contribution	to	the	study	of	
educational	research.			
Section	2.2	(p.13)	observed	that	there	are	increasing	examples	of	theoretical	frameworks	
devised	and	adopted	in	higher	education	studies,	such	as	Kogan	and	Hanney	(2000),	Bacchi	
(2009),	Taylor	(2004),	Hyatt	(2013)	and	Jungblut	(2015).	However,	none	of	these	theoretical	
frameworks	have	been	specifically	applied	to	the	study	of	a	nuanced	examination	of	policy	
success	and	failure	in	English	higher	education,	and	so	I	would	attest	that	my	use	of	
McConnell’s	(2010)	framework	approach	is	a	novel	application	in	English	higher	education	
studies.	Equally,	although	there	are	critiques	of	McConnell’s	framework,	I	have	not	been	
able	to	identify	any	that	critique	it	through	the	lens	of	higher	education,	and	so	I	would	
argue	that	my	critique	is	novel	in	this	respect.			
Thus,	this	thesis	makes	three	contributions	to	knowledge:	
1) The	application	of	a	chosen	theoretical	framework	to	the	field	of	higher	
education	policy	studies,	which	has	hitherto	been	under	theorised;	
2) A	systematic	assessment	of	the	success	and	failure	of	three	policy	episodes,	as	
informed	by	the	framework,	which	have	not	previously	been	examined	in	terms	
of	their	success	and	failure	using	the	McConnell	(2010)	framework	and	thus	
contributing	to	understandings	of	those	policy	episodes;	
3) A	critique	highlighting	the	merits	and	demerits	of	the	framework,	through	its	
application	to	English	higher	education.		
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9.6	Limitations	constraining	the	research	
The	research	was	principally	constrained	by	three	main	factors.	The	first	was	my	position	in	
full-time	employment,	without	the	funds	or	capacity	to	undertake	a	scheme	of	work	that	
was	beyond	desk-based	research.	Whilst	I	have	acknowledged	in	Chapter	3	that	
interviewing	key	actors	in	each	policy	episode	would	bring	its	own	difficulties,	such	as	the	
practicalities	of	undertaking	interviews,	and	the	length	of	time	in	which	their	memories	
would	have	been	clouded	and	swayed	by	other	actors	and	other	policy	events,	interviews	
would	nevertheless	have	offered	an	interesting	perspective	and	degree	of	triangulation	
with	other	research	methods.	Interviewing	actors	in	the	policy	process	may	well	also	have	
helped	to	identify	‘non-actions’,	Heclo’s		(1972)	‘non	policy’	(p.85),	or	consequential	events	
which	went	beyond	the	scope	of	the	policy	episode	itself,	which	are	not	articulated	in	the	
policy	texts	available,	such	as	the	formative	and	summative	evaluations.				
Secondly,	the	desk-based	nature	of	the	research	meant	that	it	was	only	possible	to	analyse	
episodes	for	which	there	was	extensive	text-based	evaluation	with	which	to	support	my	
interpretations.	This	meant	that	the	choice	of	case	studies	was	constrained	to	those	where	
there	had	been	either	substantial	formative	and	summative	evaluations	or,	in	the	case	of	
the	e-University,	an	in-depth	Select	Committee	review	and	report.	There	were	a	number	of	
policy	episodes	which	I	consider	would	have	offered	equally	fascinating	insights,	but	for	
which	there	was	limited	data	available.	For	example,	in	2008,	HEFCE	began	phasing	out	the	
ELQ	funding,	but	relaxed	this	for	some	STEM	subjects	in	2014.	The	process	and	
consequences	for	implementing	this	policy,	and	the	subsequent	change	of	heart,	would,	in	
my	view,	been	an	illuminating	case	study,	but	might	have	required	more	time-consuming	
and	costly	research	methods.	Equally,	a	study	of	the	National	Scholarship	Programme	
would	have	been	of	significance	in	articulating	an	understanding	of	its	benefit	to	the	target	
group	and	widening	participation.		
Finally,	the	McConnell	(2010)	framework,	and	the	need	to	constrain	the	limitations	of	the	
data	for	the	research,	meant	that	project-based	policy	episodes,	with	clearly	defined	end	
points,	were	apposite	for	this	research.	This	meant	that	policy	learning	has	been	
constrained	to	these	particular	types	of	policy	initiatives.	Longer	term	policy	initiatives,	such	
as	those	with	recurrent	funding	over	a	long	period	of	time,	would	equally	have	offered	
fascinating	insights	into	the	higher	education	policy	world,	and	would	likely	have	offered	
very	different	opportunities	for	policy	learning.	An	analysis	of	one	such	episode,	Foundation	
Degrees,	would	have	also	strongly	highlighted	a	particular	weakness	in	the	McConnell	
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framework,	in	that	it	does	not	lend	itself	well	to	demonstrating	the	dynamism	in	a	policy	
over	time,	such	that	it	can	succeed	in	one	timeframe	and	fail	in	another.	My	original	
research	proposal	did	include	Foundation	Degrees	as	a	fourth	case	study,	but	it	became	
evident	that	the	sheer	volume	of	material	available	for	the	case	study	meant	that	it	was	not	
possible	to	do	justice	to	it	in	the	limiting	constraints	of	a	PhD	thesis,	along	with	the	other	
three	episodes.	One	of	the	key	observations	of	this	case	study	was	that,	by	2010,	FDs	had	
overshot	their	initial	2010	student	number	target	and	therefore	been	a	programme	success	
but,	just	three	years	later,	by	2013,	entrants	to	FDs	had	fallen	by	46%,	and	thus	success	
could	be	durable	at	best	in	a	longer	timescale.		
9.7	Directions	for	future	research	
This	research	was	narrowly	defined	in	examining	three	distinct	policy	episodes	in	the	
learning	and	teaching	strand	of	HEFCE’s	policy	work.	I	believe	that	I	have	demonstrated	that	
the	theoretical	framework	approach	adopted	for	this	study	is	useful	in	articulating	a	
nuanced	position	of	success	and	failure	in	policy	episodes,	and	so	there	would	be	scope	for	
using	this	approach	to	examine	other	aspects	of	HEFCE’s	policy	work,	as	an	approach	to	
policy	learning.	Widening	participation,	for	example,	although	not	initially	a	key	strand	of	
HEFCE’s	work	in	1992,	as	observed	in	Chapter	4,	became	an	increasingly	important	focus	for	
HEFCE,	particularly	as	the	funding	environment	changed,	and	its	role	as	principal	funder	
was	reduced.	As	such,	it	would	be	interesting	to	conduct	an	analysis	of	widening	
participation	policy	episodes	from	early	on	in	HEFCE’s	history,	and	to	compare	its	approach	
in	later	policy	episodes,	when	its	role	in	funding	was	much	reduced.			
Furthermore,	it	would	be	interesting	to	examine	HEFCE’s	policy	approaches	to	research,	
which	had	a	very	different	funding	environment,	with	dual	funding	from	HEFCE	for	research	
quality,	and	from	the	research	councils	for	funding	future	research	in	line	with	government	
research	priorities.		It	would	be	particularly	informative	to	examine	how	HEFCE’s	policy	
approaches	differed	from	those	of	the	research	councils,	and	how	the	framework	might	
identify	successful	and	less	successful	process	approaches	and	programme	designs,	as	well	
as	the	role	of	the	research	councils	in	preserving	the	policy	goals	and	agenda	management.		
With	the	demise	of	HEFCE	and	the	advent	of	the	OfS,	which	has	stated	that	it	will	‘not	do	
policy’	(Kernohan	2018),	it	would	be	interesting	to	use	the	framework	to	examine	future	
episodes	of	higher	education	policy	in	relation	to	learning	and	teaching.	I	would	be	curious	
to	examine	whether	any	of	the	policy	learning	identified	in	the	HEA-commissioned	
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evaluation	to	review	HEFCE	teaching	and	learning	enhancement	initiatives	(Trowler	et	al	
2014	p.12),	had	been	observed	in	the	articulation	of	future	policy	episodes.	It	would	also	be	
particularly	illuminating	to	examine	the	locus	of	policy	making	under	the	new	regime,	and	
whether	the	OfS	is	true	to	its	word	and	does	not	do	policy,	suggesting	therefore	that	policy	
will	come	directly	from	government.	This	would	be	of	particular	interest	to	me,	given	the	
findings	identified	here,	in	that	the	position	of	the	policy	initiator	is	key	if	the	policy	agenda	
is	it	to	be	successfully	managed	and	steered	in	complex	policy	environments.		
Finally,	although	the	McConnell	(2010)	framework	has	proved	to	be	valuable	in	articulating	
a	nuanced	position	of	success	and	failure	in	relation	to	policy	process,	programme	and	
politics,	it	does	have	its	limitations,	as	discussed	in	Section	8.7	(p.297).	It	would	be	a	
worthwhile	test	of	the	framework’s	usefulness	to	adopt	other	contemporary	policy	analysis	
frameworks,	such	as	Newman’s	(2014)	re-framing	of	the	dimensions	into	four	categories,	to	
determine	whether	an	interpretation	of	success	and	failure	using	this	framework	would	
determine	similar	interpretative	outcomes.	It	could	also	be	beneficial	to	adopt	other	
frameworks	to	examine	other	aspects	of	the	chosen	case	studies,	such	as	Hyatt’s	(2013)	
‘framework	for	critical	analysis	of	higher	education	policy	texts’,	and	Bacchi’s	(2009)	
discourse	analysis	approach	to	examine	‘What’s	the	Problem	Represented	(WPR)’,	and	to	
compare	the	policy	learning	from	these	analyses	to	those	in	this	study.	Such	an	approach	
would	concur	with	Bobrow	&	Dryzek’s	(1987)	view,	in	which	they	advocate	a	post-positivist	
multi-disciplinary	frames	approach,	using	more	than	one	framework	in	order	to	ensure	that	
there	is	a	range	of	insights.		
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Appendix	B:	CODING	ESTABLISHED	FROM	THE	THEORETICAL	
FRAMEWORK	
(adapted	from	McConnell	2010	p.96-101)	
	 Question	 Code	
1	 Do	you	want	to	assess	process,	
programme	and/or	politics?	
Identification	of	element	in	relation	to:	
Process	[met	objectives/failed/adapted?]	
Programme	[met	objectives/failed/adapted?]	
Politics	[met	objectives/failed/adapted?]	
2	 What	time	period	do	you	want	to	assess?	 Policy	episode	first	declaration	
End	date	of	policy	(usually	end	of	funding)	
Note	extensions	to	policy	episode	
Note	curtailing	of	policy	episode	
3	 What	benchmark	will	you	use	to	ascertain	
success?	Government	objectives,	Benefit	
to	target	group,	Before-and-after,	Policy	
domain	criteria,	Who	supports	the	policy,	
Another	jurisdiction,	Balance	sheet,	
Newness	and	innovation,	Ethics,	Morality	
and	the	law	
Ideological	position	in	line	with	government	preserved/failed/adapted?]	
Stated	policy	objectives	
Targeted	benefit	groups	
Changes	to	policy	objectives	as	a	result	of	consultation	
Data	in	evaluations	to	support	meeting	target	
Data	in	evaluations	to	support	failing	to	meet	target	
Where/by	whom	policy	was	initially	supported	(government/HEFCE)?	
Where/by	whom	there	was	support	for	policy	
Where/by	whom	policy	was	contested	
Policies	in	other	countries	being	replicated	
Cost	against	targets	
Claims	of	innovation/replication	
4	 Are	you	confident	that	sufficient	and	
credible	information	is	available	in	order	
to	reach	a	conclusion?	
Existence	of	formative	and	summative	evaluation	reports	
Independent	evaluation	reports	
Evidence	of	consultation	with	institutions	
Data	in	meeting	or	failing	target	
Data	satisfying	target	group	
Media	reports	[positive/negative]	
Academic	commentaries	
5	 Are	you	confident	that	you	can	isolate	
the	policy	outcomes	from	all	other	
influences	on	these	outcomes?	
Identification	of	policy	outcomes	in	line	with	intended	outcomes	
Identification	of	other	outcomes	
Support	for	continuation	of	policy	identifiable	at	the	end	of	the	episode	
Media	reports	[positive/negative]	
Existence	of	other	competing/complementing	policies	
6	 To	the	best	of	your	knowledge	and/or	
instincts,	do	you	consider	a	hidden	
agenda	to	be	at	work?	
Evidence	of	consultation	with	institutions	
Media	reports	[positive/negative]	
Academic	commentaries	[support/criticism]	
7	 Does	the	sphere	of	policy	you	are	
assessing	(process,	programme,	politics)	
have	more	than	one	goal?	
Stated	policy	objectives	
Targeted	benefit	groups	
Data	in	meeting	or	failing	target	
Data	satisfying	target	group	
Changes	to	policy	objectives	as	a	result	of	consultation	
8	 Are	there	any	unintended	consequences,	
including	success	being	greater	than	
planned?	
Known	effect	on	electoral	prospects	
Data	in	meeting/failing/exceeding	target	
Media	reports	[positive/negative]	
9	 Does	the	policy	fall	short	of	meeting	the	
targets	that	were	set?	
Stated	policy	objectives	[met/failed]	
Data	in	meeting	or	failing	target	
Data	satisfying	target	group	
Media	reports	[positive/negative]	
10	 Are	you	assessing	more	than	one	policy	
realm	(process,	programmes	and	
politics)?		
Existence	of	other	competing/complementing	policies	in	HE	
Existence	of	other	competing/complementing	policies	in	other	realms	
(eg.	skills	and	training)	
Note:	some	codes	are	repeated	where	the	coding	addresses	more	than	one	question
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Appendix	C:	TIMELINE	OF	HEFCE	POLICIES	AND	INITIATIVES	AND	THE	WIDER	POLICY	CONTEXT	
Source	documents	are	available	in	the	National	Archives,	via	the	HEFCE	website	(circulars	are	number	followed	by	year	(01/07)	and	reports	and	other	
publications	are	year	followed	by	number	(28/2004).	These	were	accessed	on-line	between	2012-2018.		
Category	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	
	
	 Sir	Graeme	Davies	Chief	Executive	(1992–1995)		
Wider	policy	
context	
White	paper	
on	Higher	
Education	–	a	
New	
Framework	
(May	1991).	
	
Student	Loan	
Company	
founded	
1990/91.	
Conservative	Government	elected.	
	
Department	for	Education	and	Science	becomes	
Department	for	Education.	
	
Further	and	Higher	Education	Act	-	HEFCE	
created	(June	1992).	
	
Higher	Education	Act	1992	gives	polytechnics	
status	as	universities	and	hence	the	abolition	of	
the	binary	system.	
	
Research	Councils	assumed	by	OST	and	science	
budget	moved	to	OST.	
	
Science,	Engineering	and	Technology	White	
Paper:	Realising	our	Potential.		
	
Fielden	Report	on	libraries	review.	
	
	
UCAS	replaces	UCCA,	PCAS,	SCUE.	
HEFCE	 	 HEFCE	mission	statement	released	July	1992.	
	
DFE/	HEFCE	memorandum	of	understanding	on	
funding	HE.	
HEFCE	assumes	responsibility	for	funding	HE	
(April	1993).	
	
HEQC/HEFCE	joint	statement	on	quality	
assurance.	
	
Learning	and	
Teaching	
	 The	funding	of	teaching	policy	(1/92)	released	-	
core	plus	margin	method	continuing	
arrangements	of	UFC/PCFC.	
	
Quality	and	Assessment	Committee	established	
and	PIs	introduced.	
	
Continuing	education	policy	(18/93).	
	
Development	of	sector	wide	funding	method	
(greater	efficiency	as	numbers	increase).	
	
Policy	on	quality	assessment	method	(self-
assessment	by	discipline,	provision	of	data	sets	
Additional	student	numbers	and	special	
initiatives	policy	(2/94,	10/94).	
	
Policy	on	organisation	of	academic	year	
(M6/94).	
	
Policy	on	length	of	degree	courses	
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Category	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	
	
	 (3/93).	
	
Continuation	policy	to	provide	recurrent	funding	
for	minority	subjects	outside	formula	funding.	
	
Policy	to	convert	most	non	award	bearing	
education	to	award	bearing	courses,	thus	
included	in	core	funding	(from	1995-6)	
instigated.	
	
MaSN	introduced	to	control	student	numbers	
during	a	period	of	funding	consolidation	from	
1993-1996.		
(C1/94).		
	
Policy	on	no	additional	marginal	funding	
except	p/t	and	sub	degree	level,	CSN,	and	
control	of	MASN	(2/94)	maintaining	
intake	levels.	
	
Policy	on	funding	continuing	education	
(p/t	provision	now	eligible)	and	CVE	
activity	(9/94)	and	£60m	funding	over	4	
years.	
	
Agreement	on	units	of	assessment	for	
quality	monitoring	(14/94,	39/94).	
	
Non	formula	funding	of	minority	subjects	
-	institutions	can	bid	(29/94).	
	
Framework	for	quality	assessment	for	
1995-96	(33/94).		
Widening	
participation	
	 	 	 Introduction	of	revised	policy	on	access	
funds	(ug,	pg,	FE)	(29/94).	£3m	for	
projects	to	support	access	for	SEN	
students	in	93/94,	94/95	(8/94).	
	
Changes	to	how	p/t	are	counted	in	
funding	method	for	teaching	(38/94).		
Research	 	 RAE	1992	(changes	to	greater	selectivity	in	
research	funds	introduced.	Specific	guidance	on	
definition	of	quality.	Number	of	UoAs	reduced).	
	
RAE	funding	methodology	continues	from	UFC.	
Development	of	sector	wide	funding	method.	
Policy	on	funding	for	research	(dual	funding	
principle	7/93)	–	funding	methodology	includes	
QR	(quality),	GR	(generic),	DevR	(development).	
Policy	on	allocation	of	GR	grant	(16/94).	
	
RAE	1996	policy	(1/94).	
	
Policy	to	reduce	differences	in	units	of	
funding	in	similar	subjects.	Policy	on	
convergence	to	continue	to	96/97	(2/94).	
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Category	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	
	
	
Continuation	of	transitional	funding	
(31/94).	
Economy	and	
society	
	 	 HEFCE	commitment	to	build	on	regional,	
national	and	international	HE.	
	
Finance,	estate	
and	assurance	
	 Financial	memorandum	with	HEIS	established.	 Financial	memorandum	with	individual	
institutions	released.		
	
Capital	allocation	policy	and	estate	formula	
funds	(36/93).	
	
Non-formula	funding	for	museums	continuing	
but	under	review	(5/93).	
Policy	on	cost	centres	for	statistical	
returns	(6/94).	
	
Funding	capital	equipment	and	estate	
formula	funding	(13/94).	
	
Libraries	review	implementation	for	
research	in	humanities	(17/94).	
	
Library	capital	projects	bid	(18/94,	35/94).	
	
Bids	for	backlog	of	estate	maintenance	
projects	(22/94).	
Leadership,	
management	
and	governance	
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Category	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998	
	
	 Sir	Graeme	Davies	Chief	Executive	
(1992–1995)	
Sir	Brian	Fender	Chief	Executive	(1995–2001)	
Wider	policy	
context	
Disability	Discrimination	Act	1995	introduced.	
	
Severe	reduction	in	capital	funding	by	Secretary	of	
State	for	Education.	
	
Department	for	Education	becomes	Department	for	
Education	and	Employment.		
National	Committee	of	Inquiry	into	
Higher	Education	(Dearing)	
established	to	consider	funding	
sustainability	in	mass	HE	system	
(reduce	costs,	maintain	high	
participation,	find	alternative	
funding	structures).		
	
Publication	of	report	on	review	of	
postgraduate	education	(Harris	
report).	
	
Student	Loans	Act.		
New	Labour	Government	elected.	
	
Dearing	1997	-	recommends	students	
contribute	to	cost	of	university	
education	-	£20b	funding	gap	identified.		
	
New	Government	implements	many	
Dearing	recommendations.	
	
50%	participation	in	H	target	by	2010	
introduced.	
	
Harris	review	of	postgraduate	
education.	
	
QAA	established	-	HEFCE	no	longer	does	
quality	assurance	in	house.		
Dearing	Report	published	–	
Higher	Education	in	the	
Learning	Society.	
	
Teaching	and	Higher	Education	
Act	1998	–	introduction	of	
means	tested	tuition	fees	(£1k	
per	year).	
	
Student	maintenance	grant	
abolished	and	replaced	by	
loans.		
	
The	Learning	Age	Green	Paper	
(inc.	development	of	regional	
structures	and	links	between	HE	
and	regional	communities,	and	
Graduate	Apprenticeships).	
	
Government’s	comprehensive	
spending	review	–	additional	
funding	for	HE	announced.	
	
Regional	Development	Agencies	
created.	
	
Government	announces	an	
additional	£1.4billion	over	3	
years	for	research	(HEFCE	and	
Research	Councils).	
	
AHRB	set	up.	
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Category	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998	
	
	
Announcement	of	the	
University	Challenge	Fund.	
	
HEFCE	 Funding	for	ITT	students	now	the	responsibility	of	
the	TTA	(apart	from	access	funds)	as	well	as	data	
collection.	Provision	of	in-service	training	INSET,	to	
fall	to	TTA	from	1996-7.	
	
Government	informs	HEFCE	to	ensure	student	
numbers	do	not	exceed	planned	numbers	
(participation	rate	at	30%).	
Sector	required	to	deliver	efficiency	
gains	of	7.5%	over	three	years	due	
to	grant	reduction	in	real	terms	of	
£263m	to	1999-00.		
	
MASN	target	remains	unchanged.	
HEFCE	no	longer	does	quality	assurance	
in	house.	
	
Learning	and	
Teaching	
Funding	relationship	of	HE	in	FE	colleges	(1/95).	
	
Additional	places	for	core	proposals	initiative	(2/95).		
	
Policy	on	consolidation	of	MASNs	continues	but	can	
over-recruit	by	1.5%	-	up	by	0.5%	(6/95).	
	
Funding	for	p/t	student	numbers	weighted	in	favour	
of	science,	engineering	and	technology	(6/95).	
Revision	of	approach	to	calculation	of	AUCFs	for	p/t	
students	(19/95).	
	
Consolidation	on	some	non-formula	funding	into	core	
funding:	colleges	within	Uni	of	London,	
mainstreaming	funding	for	cont.	ed.,	funding	for	
accelerated	and	intensive	routes	(3/95).		
	
Funding	for	provision	of	non-award	bearing	cont.	ed.	
continues	to	1998-99	(4/95,	16/95).		
	
Development	funding	policy	for	CVE	to	1998-99	
(11/95).		
Policy	statement	on	equal	
opportunities	in	quality	assessment	
(M2/96).	
	
Revised	quality	assessment	method.	
	
Policy	on	consolidation	of	MASNs	
continues	but	can	over-recruit	by	2%	
-	up	by	0.5%	(2/96).	
	
Changes	to	method	of	calculation	of	
holdback	to	exclude	separate	
monitoring	of	core	proposal	
initiatives	or	Diploma	in	Social	Work	
places	sponsored	by	the	home	office	
(13/96).		
	
Changes	to	funding	method	for	
teaching	from	1998-9:	similar	
activities	to	be	funded	at	similar	
rates	(4	price	groups)	additional	
funding	for	p/t,	mature	and	non-
An	extra	2089	MASNs	allocated	(16/97).		
	
New	quality	agency	to	be	set	up	(QAA)	
following	final	report	of	Joint	Planning	
Group	for	Quality	Assurance	in	Higher	
Education	(3/97).	
	
Introduction	of	£3.5m	of	funds	over	
three	years	for	the	Teaching	and	
Learning	Technology	programme	(TLTP)	
(14/97).		
	
Changes	to	policy	on	holdback	of	HEFCE	
grant	to	measure	student	load	rather	
than	headcount	(19/97).	
Transfer	of	responsibility	for	
funding	some	healthcare	
profession	courses	from	HEFCE	
to	Department	for	Health	
(97/31).		
	
New	teaching	funding	method	
introduced	with	effect	from	
1998-99	(10/97,	98/09).	
Weighted	standard	recourse	
based	on	HEIs	existing	FTE	and	
compared	with	recourse	from	
previous	year.	Tolerance	band	
introduced.	Standard	price	for	
FTE	in	4	re-named	price	bands.	
And	takes	into	account	higher	
cost	of	types	of	students	such	as	
mature	and	p/t.	
	
Changes	to	allocation	of	
education	and	sports	related	
provision	to	price	bands	(38/98).		
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Category	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998	
	
	
Institutions	asked	to	identify	allocation	of	teaching	
funding	to	ug	and	pg	separately	(27/95).		
	
Fund	for	the	Development	of	Teaching	and	Learning	
phase	1	(29/95).		
	
Institutions	invited	to	give	up	student	numbers	in	
exchange	for	retaining	part	of	corresponding	grant	
(31/95).		
	
Review	of	provision	in	former	soviet	and	East	
European	Studies,	3	year	policy	to	part	fund	academic	
posts	(32/95).	
	
Unified	system	introduced	for	banding	courses	
(previously	UFC/	PCFC)	(18/95).	
traditional,	institutions	to	bid	for	
ASN	21/96).		
	
Fund	for	the	Development	of	
Teaching	and	Learning	phase	2	
(22/96).	
	
New	funding	method	to	take	
account	of	funding	specialist	
institutions	as	a	result	of	
recommendations	from	the	
Specialist	Institutions	Advisory	
Panel	(98/10).	
	
Funding	method	takes	account	
of	recommendations	in	Harris	
report.	
	
Additional	student	numbers	-	
6000	additional	FTEs	including	
1000	places	on	sub-degree	level	
(20/97)	(2932	were	allocated	at	
sub-degree	level).	
	
Changes	to	holdback	of	funding	
process	due	to	new	funding	
method	(98/38).			
	
Allocated	a	further	2354	MASNs	
(98/41).	
Widening	
participation	
Continuation	of	£3m	for	projects	to	support	access	
for	SEN	students	(2/95).	
Requirement	to	publish	institutional	
disability	statements	(8/96).		
	
£6m	initiative	to	1998-9	to	expand	
quality	provision	for	students	with	
learning	difficulties	and	disabilities	
to	1998-9	(9/96,	23/96).	
	
Minor	amendments	to	terms	and	
conditions	for	allocated	of	access	funds	
(18/97).		
	
Marginal	funds	for	additional	p/t	
numbers	of	5000.	
	
£1.5m	(1	year)	to	widen	
participation	in	HE	(regional	
partnerships	(98/35).		
	
DfEE	increases	funding	available	
for	access	funds	-	amendments	
include	funding	for	all	p/t	and	f/t	
students	inc.	students	with	
disabilities	(98/45).		
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Category	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998	
	
Institutions	to	produce	disability	
statements	as	a	result	of	
Disability	Discrimination	Act	and	
as	a	condition	of	core	grant	
(98/66).	
Research	 RAE	1996	guidance	on	criteria	for	assessment,	
submissions	and	panel	membership	(1/2/3/95).	
	
CR	funding	phased	out	and	transferred	to	QR	(6/95,	
10/95).		
	
UK	pilot	site	licence	initiative	set	up	and	piloted.	
Adjustment	in	the	way	changes	in	
QR	income	are	moderated	(4/96).		
	
Joint	research	equipment	initiative	
(JREI)	bids	for	funding	(9/96).	
New	funding	method	for	research	
established	(4/97)	in	relation	to	QR/	GR	
based	on	RAE	score	and	non-formula	
funding	initiatives.	UOAs	assigned	to	
bands	for	funding	and	introduction	of	
policy	factor.	DevR	dropped	from	
formula.		
	
FE	institutions	specifically	excluded	from	
QR	funding.	
£20m	Joint	Research	Equipment	
Initiative	(4/97)	(revised	to	
£23.5m).	
	
PGR	students	funded	through	
research	funding	model,	not	
teaching.		
	
	
Economy	and	
society	
	 Sino-UK	Higher	Education	
programme	of	collaboration	with	
China	begins.		
Restructuring	and	Collaboration	Fund	
(£10m	per	annum)	to	support	regional	
restructuring	of	institutions.	
	
Restructuring	and	Collaboration	
Fund	(£15m	per	annum)	to	
support	regional	restructuring	of	
institutions.	
	
Finance,	estate	
and	assurance	
Libraries	review	non-formula	funding	for	research	in	
humanities	(5/95,	14/95).	
	
Museums,	galleries	and	collections	non-formula	
funding	policy	(9/95).		
	
Equipment	and	estate	formula	funding	models	
combined	(7/95).	
	
		
Programme	of	investment	in	local	
and	metropolitan	area	networks	
MANs)	to	1997-98	(2/96).		
	
Revised	model	Financial	
Memorandum	–	increased	decision	
making	responsibility	for	institutions	
(5/96).	
	
Incorporation	of	capital	funds	within	
recurrent	grant	as	1996	budget	
statement	allocates	single	grant	
undifferentiated	between	recurrent	and	
capital	sums	(6/97).		
	
Revision	to	financial	memorandum	
between	HEFCE	and	institutions	–	in	
relation	to	short	term	borrowing	(15/97).	
	
Amendment	to	policy	on	cost	centres	–	
new	categories	introduced	(97/25).			
	
Guidance	on	Private	Finance	Initiative	
£30m	initiative	for	improving	
poor	estate	(97/22).		
	
£30m	initiative	for	refurbishing	
research	laboratories	(97/23).		
	
Introduction	of	requirement	for	
3	year	corporate	plans	with	
financial	strategy	for	institutions	
to	replace	annual	strategic	plans	
to	reduce	information	requests	
(98/13).		
	
Additional	MANs	funding	£7.5m	
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Category	 1995	 1996	 1997	 1998	
	
(PFI)	for	procurement	(97/28).	
	
Severance	pay	for	senior	staff	-	following	
The	Committee	of	Public	Accounts	report	
(7/97).	
	
for	2	years	98/17).		
	
Introduction	of	strategy	for	
costing	and	pricing	(JCPSG).	
	
Audit	code	of	practice	amended	
(98/28).		
	
£2.5m	available	over	3	years	to	
help	institutions	implement	
strategies	for	costing	and	pricing	
activities	(98/32).		
	
Publication	of	environment	
workbook	to	improve	
performance	on	environmental	
issues	(98/62).	
	
Policy	on	use	of	HEFCE	funds	in	
connection	with	overseas	
operations	(33/98).		
	
Publication	of	HEFCE	accounts	
direction	to	higher	education	
institutions	(34/98).		
Leadership,	
management	
and	governance	
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Category	 1999	
	
2000	 2001	 2002	
	
	 Sir	Brian	Fender	Chief	Executive	(1995–2001)	 Sir	Howard	Newby	Chief	
Executive	(2001–2006)	
Wider	policy	
context	
Fee	level	£1,025.	
	
Establishment	of	Institute	for	
Learning	and	Teaching	(to	set	up	
accreditation	scheme	for	HE	
teachers).	
	
Report	of	the	Performance	
Indicators	Steering	Group	
(Dearing	recommendation).	
	
Technology	Integration	Centre	
funded	by	JISC	provides	support	
to	academics.	
	
Government	sets	up	
Transparency	and	
Accountability	Review	of	
Research.	
	
Introduction	of	the	Euro.	
	
Bologna	Process	launched.		
	
Learning	and	Teaching	Support	Network	
introduced	(generic	and	24	subject	centres)	
–	managed	by	the	ILT	(£6.2m	per	annum)	to	
2004	(99/20).		
	
Freedom	of	Information	Act	2000.		
	
Science	and	Innovation	(Excellence	and	
Innovation)	White	paper	published.	
	
Race	Relations	(amendment)	Act	2000.	
	
Opportunity	Bursaries	announced	by	DfEE	
(£2k	per	student	from	low	income	families).	
	
David	Blunkett	Greenwich	speech	on	HE	-	
announcement	of	e-University	and	
Foundation	Degrees.		
	
Universities	UK	formed	(replaces	CVCP).	
	
	
New	Labour	Government	re-elected.		
	
Fee	level	£1,075.	
	
Special	Educational	Needs	and	Disability	
Act	2001.	
	
Equality	Challenge	Unit	(funded	by	UK	
funding	bodies)	founded.	
	
Aimhigher	campaign	launched	by	
Government.		
	
Department	for	Education	and	Skills	
replaces	DEE.	
Task	Group	(chaired	by	Sir	Ron	Cooke)	
reports	in	quality	and	standards	of	
learning	and	teaching	(02/15).	
	
Tuition	fee	level	£1,100.		
	
Government	Spending	Review	2002	
announced	additional	funding	to	
support	science,	engineering	and	
technology.	
	
Think	Tank	–	Higher	Education	Policy	
institute	established.		
	
HEFCE	proposes	to	Government	that	
MaSN	is	abolished.		
	
DES	states	young	homeless	people	are	
priority	for	support	funds.	
	
HEFCE	sets	target	to	reduce	special	
funding	and	concentrate	on	block	grant.		
HEFCE	 HEFCE	introduces	regional	
consultants	
HEFCE	introduces		national	co-ordination	
team:	National	Disability	Team	and	Action	
on	Access	Team,	National	Co-ordination	
Team,	Innovations	Team	
	
	 HEFCE	introduces	Enhancing	Student	
Employability	Co-ordination	Team	
	
Re-structure	of	HEFCE	to	include	4	
directorates	based	on	strategic	themes	
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Category	 1999	
	
2000	 2001	 2002	
	
HEFC	E	receives	nearly	£1b	in	additional	
funding	over	three	years,	10%	in	real	terms	
(additional	funding	for	pay,	expanding	
student	numbers	and	increase	access.		
	
	
Government	Spending	Review	2002	
announced	additional	funding	to	
support	recruitment,	retention	and	
development	of	staff	(£167m	over	2	
years).	
	
Learning	and	
Teaching	
Transfer	of	responsibility	for	
funding	HE	provision	by	FE	
colleges	from	FEFC	to	HEFCE	
(98/59).		
	
Ug	college	fees	for	Oxford	and	
Cambridge	now	part	of	HEFCE	
recurrent	grant,	not	DfEE	
(99/13).		
	
Teaching	Quality	Enhancement	
Fund	(£26m	1	year)	(99/26)	
merged	from	FDLT	and	TLTP	–	
allocated	by	formula	(FDLT	
continue	with	phase	3	in	1999-
2000).	
	
Funding	scheme	to	recognise	
and	reward	individual	academics	
launched	(99/26).	
	
£1m	per	annum	over	5	years	to	
expand	provision	for	teaching	
and	research	in	Chinese	studies	
(99/35).	
	
Options	for	funding	HE	in	FE	
Teaching	Quality	Enhancement	Fund	(£26m	1	
year)	(99/26).	
	
National	Teaching	Fellowships	introduced.		
	
Special	funding	to	support	minority	subjects	
to	2004	(to	include	former	Soviet	and	
Eastern	European	subjects)	£5m	per	annum	
(99/47).	
	
£9.5m	fund	to	help	FECs	develop	HE	(00/09).	
	
Performance	Indicators	in	HE	issued:	access,	
progression	&	completion,	efficiency	of	L&T	
and	research	outputs	(00/40).		
	
E-University	project	launched	-	£62m	over	3	
years	(00/43,	00/44).		
	
Funding	of	specialist	higher	education	
institutions	(00/51).	
	
Funding	of	students	in	some	private	
institutions	through	Dance	and	Drama	
Awards	Scheme.		
	
Code	of	practice	for	franchise	and	consortia	
Greater	links	between	HEFCE	and	LSC	to	
build	HE/FE	relations	–	to	increase	
participation	in	HE	to	50%	target.		
	
National	framework	of	qualifications	
based	on	national	standards	(Dearing	
recommendation)	–	new	QA	system	from	
QAA.		
	
Teaching	Quality	Enhancement	Fund	
(£32m	1	year)	(99/26).	
	
Foundation	degree	launched	–	bids	for	
ASNs	(10m)	(00/27).	
	
52,000	additional	student	places	(31,900	
funded)	(01/12).		
	
Hold	back	of	funding	for	over-
recruitment	to	MaSN	above	4%.		
	
Changes	to	funding	for	HE	qualifications	
awarded	by	external	bodies	introduced.		
	
AHRB	takes	over	responsibility	from	
HEFCE	for	museums	and	galleries	
funding.		
ASN	for	w/p,	deliver	foundation	degrees,	
support	new	Tech	Institutes	((01/54).	
	
New	Technology	Institutes	(consortia	of	
HEIs	and	FECs)	£25m	capital	funding	over	
2	years	(01/47).	
	
Student	premiums	in	funding	allocation	
confirmed	as:	part-time,	mature,	long	
courses.	Institutional	premiums	
confirmed	as:	London,	pensions,	
specialist	institutions,	small	institutions,	
old	and	historic	buildings	(02/18).		
	
Teaching	Quality	Enhancement	Fund	-	
£31m	per	annum	for	3	years	for	all	
institutions	(not	bid	for)	(02/24).		
	
Report	on	teaching	and	learning	
infrastructure	in	higher	education	
published	(2002/31).		
	
New	framework	for	quality	assurance	
brings	system	of	subject	review	to	a	close	
and	replaced	by	independent	audits	
conducted	by	QAA.	QAA	publishes	
Benchmark	statements	for	each	subject.	
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Category	 1999	
	
2000	 2001	 2002	
	
colleges	–	encourage	
partnerships	with	HEIs	and	
development	fund	(99/36).		
	
Premium	funding	introduced	for	
specialist	performing	arts	
institutions	(99/41).		
	
Allocation	of	additional	medical	
student	numbers	increasing	to	
2005	(99/42).		
	
Code	of	practice	on	in	directly	
funded	partnerships	-	HE	in	FE	
colleges	(99/63).	
	
Performance	Indicators	in	HE	in	
the	UK	introduced	(99/66/67).	
	
Conditions	applied	to	HEFCE	
grant	in	relation	to	charging	a	
fee	of	<	or	>	than	£1,025,	
imposed	by	Secretary	of	State	
(c11/99).		
	
	
arrangements	-	indirectly	funded	
partnerships	(FECs	and	HEIs)	(00/54).		
	
All	FE	colleges	networked	to	JANET.		
	
Two	new	medical	schools	set	up-first	for	
many	years.	Access	to	Medicine	programme	
set	up	at	Kings	College,	London.	HEFCE	
working	with	NHS	and	Department	for	
Health	to	recruit	additional	1,100	student	
places	annually.		
	
25000	ASNs	to	bid	for,	20743	allocated	
(99/56,	00/26).		
	
	
	
	
Third	phase	of	Teaching	and	Learning	
Research	programme	£10.5m.		
	
Additional	data	requirements	introduced	
to	understand	how	background	effects	
progression	(01/02).		
	
New	indicators	added	to	performance	
indicators	–	employment	of	graduates	6	
months	after	graduation.	
	
Approach	adopted	by	HEFCE	and	FEFC	(to	
become	Learning	and	Skills	Council)	in	
advising	on	applications	for	transfer	
between	FE	and	HE	published	(01/05).			
	
Changes	to	student	support	funding:	
Provision	for	funding	admin	costs,	
changes	to	management	of	funds	
following	introduction	of	Childcare	Grant,	
early	notification	of	minimum	allocations	
for	Hardship	and	Bursary	funding	(01/15,	
01/49).	
	
Set	of	PIs	about	the	employment	
outcomes	of	HE	produced	(01/21).		
	
Funding	available	for	the	development	of	
Graduate	apprenticeship	Frameworks	
(01/41).		
	
Changes	to	recurrent	grant:	increased	
formula	funding	for	wp,	revisions	to	
funding	ASNs,	transfer	of	student	
	
Performance	indicators	amended	to	
include	an	indicator	of	disability	(c	
13/2002).		
	
Review	of	indirect	funding	agreements	
and	arrangements	between	HE	and	FECS	
(c25/2002).			
	
JISC	introduces	plagiarism	advisory	
service.		
	
Second	phase	of	funding	for	FECs	to	
develop	HE	programmes	(£18.5m	to	
2003-04	(02/02).	
	
	23,000	ASNs.	Dept.	for	Education	and	
Skills	agree	no	maximum	student	number	
for	each	institution.	Funding	method	still	
limits	student	numbers	(02/11).		
	
ASN	bids	to	prioritise:	foundation	
degrees,	New	Technology	institutes,	new	
programmes	in	social	work	education	
and	training,	summer	schools,	
foundation	years	and	Ufi	activity	£22m	
(2002/39).		
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Category	 1999	
	
2000	 2001	 2002	
	
numbers	between	HEIs	and	FECs	(01/57).		
	
DFLT	phase	four	2002-05	(01/60).		
Widening	
participation	
£6m	to	develop	high	quality	
provision	for	students	with	
disabilities	over	3	years	(99/08).	
	
Funding	of	wp	for	under-
represented	groups	in	re-current	
grant	(99/13),	premiums	for	p/t	
and	mature	students,	fee	
remission	for	p/t	–	
disadvantaged	determined	by	
neighbourhood	types.	
	
35,000	ASNs	to	bid	for	(44928	
allocated)	(98/56).	
	
Disabled	students	to	be	included	
in	formula	funding	once	data	
returns	are	robust	(99/24).	
	
£7.5m	(1	year)	to	widen	
participation	in	HE	(regional	
partnerships	(99/24).	
	
Institutions	to	develop	OFFA	
plans	(99/24,	99/33).		
	
New	guidance	on	access	funds	
(99/50).		
	
	
Former	Access	Fund	now		three	discrete	
funds:	
Access	bursary	fund	for	mature	students	
(£14.69m	in	bursaries)	
Hardship	fund	
Fee	waiver	fund	for	part-time	students	
(00/28).	
	
Mainstream	disability	funding	–	recognition	
of	increased	costs	(£5m)	(c	7/00).		
	
Funding	for	University	for	Industry	places	(c	
28/00).		
	
Policy	statement	on	diversity	in	higher	
education	(00/33).	
	
Amendments	to	recurrent	teaching	grant:	
increased	allocations	for	wp,	transfer	of	
student	numbers	and	funding	between	
institutions	where	FECs	funded	directly	
through	HEIs	(00/34).		
	
Foundation	Degree	qualification	introduced	
£5m	(c	13/00).		
	
ASNs	and	funds	to	bid	for:-	
Widen	access	to	HE	–	postcode	premium	and	
state	schools	
Support	expansion	of	high	quality	in	L&T	
Deliver	foundation	degrees	
Funding	for	recruitment	of	students	from	
neighbourhoods	with	low	rates	of	
participation	increased	(01/29).	
	
Additional	fund	stream	for	3	years	to	
raise	aspirations	in	institutions	with	less	
than	80%	of	students	from	state	schools	
(01/29).		
	
Additional	funding	for	summer	schools	
(01/29).		
	
Changes	to	bursary/	hardship	funds	for	
students	with	partners	on	low	incomes	
and	students	with	a	previous	
qualification	applying	for	fee	waiver,	
unemployed	students	taking	taster	
modules	(c17/01).		
	
Opportunity	Bursaries	made	available	
following	broadening	of	Excellence	
Challenge	and	Excellence	in	Cities	
(01/15).		
	
National	Mentoring	Pilot	Project	initiated	
by	DfEE	and	co-sponsored	by	HEFCE	
Education	Access	Zone.		
	
	
Improving	infrastructure	provision	for	
disabled	students	funding	initiative	
£5.4m	over	3	years	-	supported	by	
national	team	(02/21).		
	
First	publication	of	data	on	students	
receiving	Disabled	Students	Allowance.	
	
Partnership	for	Progression:	
Rationalisation	of	existing	wp	policy	
allocation	of	funding	by	postcode.	Target	
setting	for	wp	condition	of	grant	from	
2003-04.	£60m	over	3	years	jointly	with	
LSC	(02/22,	2002/49).		
	
Pilot	Excellence	Fellowships	Awards	
Scheme	introduced	-	teachers	working	in	
schools	and	FECs	to	improve	access	(c	
04/02).		
	
W/p	strategies	and	action	plans	become	
a	condition	of	grant.		
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Support	graduate	apprenticeships	(00/39).		
	
5,000	summer	school	places	funded	by	DfEE	
for	summer	2000	as	part	of	Excellence	in	
Cities	Initiative	(EiC),	administered	by	HEFCE.	
	
Fee	waiver	fund	(12.36m)	for	students	who	
qualify	for	benefits	or	become	unemployed	
during	studies	(c	20/00).		
	
Research	 Third	round	of	Joint	Research	
Equipment	Initiative	(JFEI)	
(£22m).	
	
HEFCE	and	welcome	Trust	work	
together	to	develop	more	
strategic	approach	to	
infrastructure	funding	(3m	over	
2	years	in	matched	funding	for	
equipment	over	£200k	(c2/99).	
Revision	to	RAE	to	focus	on	applied	research	
and	ensuring	equality	of	opportunity	for	
researchers.	75%	of	panels	to	involve	
representatives	from	industry,	to	review	
research	outputs	other	than	publications.	
More	women	on	panels	(20%),	RAE	to	take	
account	of	circumstances	such	as	maternity	
leave.		
	
Higher	Education	and	Research	
Opportunities	(HERO)	portal	and	website	
introduced.		
	
Science	Research	Investment	Fund	(SRIF)	
funding	available	£600m	to	be	allocated	
by	formula	(01/11)	(joint	initiative	HEFCE,	
DfES,	Wellcome	Trust)	–	replaces	JIF	and	
JREI	(c	26/2002).	
	
New	style	PhDs	introduced	in	41	courses	
at	10	HEIs.		
End	of	GR	funding	policy	for	departments	
rated	1,	2,	3a	or	b.		Reduction	in	funds	
for	5,	4,3a	and	2.5%	increase	for	5*.	
	
Report	on	arts	and	humanities	research	
infrastructure	published	(2002/35).		
Economy	and	
society	
Initiation	of	third	stream	of	core	
funding	through	Higher	
Education	Reach-out	to	Business	
and	the	Community	Fund	up	to	
£22m	per	annum	to	be	made	
permanent	(99/16)	(HEROBC).		
	
Restructuring	and	Collaboration	
Fund	(£15m	per	annum)	to	
support	regional	restructuring	of	
institutions.	
Target	funding	of	£100m	per	annum	to	
support	links	with	business	and	communities	
(HEROBC).		
	
£5m	to	support	employees	of	SMEs	to	
participate	in	HE	as	Graduate	
Apprenticeships	(ASNs,	development	funds,	
fee	waivers)	(c	22/00).		
	
	
	
20	Business	Fellowships	introduced	
(01/06,	01/25)	funded	by	HEFCE	and	DTI.		
	
Policy	on	collaboration	between	HE	
providers	in	each	region	published	
(01/18).	
	
Higher	Education	Innovation	Fund	(HIEF)	
building	on	HEROBC	sits	alongside	
teaching	and	research	as	third	stream	
grant,	£80m	over	3	years	(0/22,	0/34).		
Benchmarking	tool	introduced	for	
assessing	contributions	to	region	(02/23).		
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2000	 2001	 2002	
	
	
First	set	of	maps	and	data	on	
regional	profiles	of	HE.			
	
Extension	of	international	
collaborations	includes	
partnership	with	USA	on	sharing	
policy	objectives.	
	
Principles	for	international	
activity	published	(c8/99).		
	
Guiding	principles	for	
international	activity	published	
(c	8/99).	
	
	 	
Higher	Education	Active	Community	
Fund	(HEACF)	announced	(£27m	for	3	
years)	for	14,000	student	volunteering	
opportunities	(01/42,	01/65).		
	
Additional	£10m	for	Restructuring	and	
Collaboration	Fund.		
	
Regional	Mission:	regional	contribution	
of	HE	launched	with	series	of	reports.		
	
	
Finance,	estate	
and	assurance	
£105m	initiative	for	improving	
poor	estate	over	3	years	(98/50).	
	
Key	Estate	Ratios	and	Estates	
data	Matrix	established	(99/18).	
	
Capital	infrastructure	fund	for	
learning	and	teaching	at	£90m	
1999-2002	–	allocated	by	
formula	(99/26).		
	
Capital	funding	for	1999-2002	
£150m	research	capital	projects	
(99/52	–	allocated	by	formula).	
	
Annual	corporate	plans	for	
institutions	replaced	by	three	
yearly	plan	(c3/99).	
Value	for	Money	Steering	Group	reports	on	
facilities	management	and	improving	the	
managements	of	support	services	in	HE	
(00/14).		
	
Review	of	burden	of	accountability	for	
institutions	leads	to	streamlining	requests	for	
information	and	data.	
	
Framework	for	institutional	reporting	arising	
from	Transparency	and	Accountability	
Review	published	and	TRAC	implemented	
(c17/00).			
	
Pathfinder	initiative	contributes	to	cost	of	
exploring	procurement	through	public-
private	partnerships.		
	
Guidance	on	risk	management	
introduced	following	review	of	
accountability	measures	(01/24).		
	
	
Project	capital	funding	round	2	-	£214m	
to	improve	capital	and	IT	infrastructure	
to	support	l&T	(£56m	to	improve	
provision	for	students	with	disabilities)	
2002-04	(01/48).		
	
Audit	code	of	practice	revised	(2002/26).	
	
New	web	facility	to	return	HESA	data	
launched	(2002/38).		
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HEFCE	seeks	annual	operating	statements	
from	institutions	on	annual	basis.	
Leadership,	
management	
and	governance	
	 Development	and	implementation	of	good	
management	practices	in	HE:	Good	
Management	Practice	Programme	(£10m	to	
2003)	(99/54).		
	
Spending	Review	announces	£50m	for	
investment	in	staff	–	Equal	Opportunities	
Action	group	set	up	with	sector	
representatives’	bodies,	funding	councils	and	
trade	unions.		
Funding	for	development	of	human	
resource	strategies	(allocated	in	
proportion	to	basic	recurrent	grant	
(01/16	£330m	over	3	years).	
HEFCE	Race	Equality	Scheme	introduced	
(2002/29).	
	
Management	of	security	services	in	high	
education	report	published	(2002/30).		
	
Advice	on	severance	payments	to	senior	
staff	amended	(c	21/2002).		
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Category	 2003	
	
2004	 2005	 2006	
	
	 Sir	Howard	Newby	Chief	Executive	(2001–2006)	
Wider	policy	
context	
Government	publishes	White	
Paper	‘The	Future	of	higher	
Education	–	allowing	for	fees	of	
up	to	£3,000.	
	
White	Paper	-	The	Future	of	
Higher	Education	-	proposes	
creation	of	Office	for	fair	
Access.		
	
Lambert	Review	on	business-
university	collaboration	
published	-	recommends	50%	
increase	in	funding	third	stream	
activities.	
	
Tuition	fee	level	£1,125.	
	
Institute	for	Learning	and	
Teaching	in	HE,	Learning	and	
Teaching	Support	Network	and	
National	Co-ordination	Team	
for	Teaching	the	Teaching	
Quality	Enhancement	Fund	
merge	to	become	Higher	
Education	Academy.	
	
250,000	ASNs	required	to	keep	
50%	participation	rate	on	
target.	Current	participation	
rate	43%.	
Higher	Education	Act	2004	-	variable	fees	up	
to	£3,000	per	year	introduced	by	
Government	from	2006.		
	
Maintenance	loans	re-introduced.	
	
Leadership	Foundation	created	(UUK,	SCOP,	
CUC)	0	pump	primed	by	HEFCE.		
	
Tuition	fee	level	£1,150.		
	
Schwartz	Admissions	to	Higher	Education	
Review	group	reports.		
	
Office	for	fair	Access	(OFFA)	established.	
	
Arts	and	Humanities	Research	Council	
established	(transition	from	AHRB).	
	
Establishment	of	Lifelong	Learning	
Networks.	
	
Government	Spending	review	2004	–	focus	
on	achieving	efficiencies	in	the	public	
sector.		
	
Publication	of	ten-year	Science	and	
Innovation	Investment	framework	(commits	
to	permanent	third	stream	funding	and	25%	
increase	in	funds	compared	to	HEIF2).	.	
	
New	Labour	Government	re-elected.	
	
Tuition	fee	level	£1,175.	
	
	
Tuition	fee	level	£1,200.	
	
Leitch	Review	of	Skills	report.	
	
OFFA	makes	£300m	per	annum	available	
for	HEIS	to	provide	bursaries.	
	
Supporting	Professionalism	in	
Admissions	report.	
	
Charities	Act	2006.	
	
White	Paper	‘Further	Education:	
Training	Skills,	Improving	Life	Chances’	
published.		
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	 Sir	Howard	Newby	Chief	Executive	(2001–2006)	
Foundation	Degree	Forward	(national	body)	
established.		
	
Gershon	review	of	efficiency	of	Government	
spending	departments	published.		
	
Davies	report	from	Higher	Education	
Research	Forum	reports	(relationship	
between	teaching	and	research).		
	
	
HEFCE	 Better	Regulation	Review	
Group	recommends	merging	
several	special	initiatives	into	
block	grant.		
	
HEFCE	revises	international	
strategy.		
	
HEFCE	role	to	secure	public	interest	
following	introduction	of	variable	fees	–	
announced	by	Sir	Howard	Newby,	Chief	
Executive.	Need	to	address	STEM	and	other	
strategically	important	subjects.		
	
Growth	in	student	numbers	exceed	planned	
growth	–	financial	consequences.	
	
Equality	Challenge	Unit	funding	extended	to	
2006.		
	
HEFCE	and	Sector	Skills	Development	
Agency	establish	memorandum	of	
understanding.		
Enhancing	Student	Employability	Co-
ordination	Team	ends	and	work	passed	
to	Higher	Education	Academy.	
	
Learning	and	
Teaching	
Policy	for	supporting	higher	
education	in	FECs	published	
(2003/16).	
	
Fund	for	Development	of	
Learning	and	Teaching	phase	5	
announced	£7m	(2003/46).	
First	National	Student	Survey	results	
published.		
	
Creation	of	Centres	for	Excellence	in	
Teaching	and	Learning	-	£315m	to	fund	CETLs	
over	5	years	in	response	to	White	paper’s	
intentions	to	reward	and	enhance	excellence	
National	Student	Survey	launched	as	part	
of	revised	quality	assurance	framework	
and	package	of	new	public	information	
on	teaching	quality	–	published	on	HERO.	
	
HERO	goes	live	to	the	public.		
	
New	condition	of	grant	required	by	
Secretary	of	State	for	Education	and	
Skills:	tuition	fees	charged	to	qualifying	
persons	on	qualifying	courses	do	not	
exceed	certain	amounts,	institutions	
comply	with	provisions	of	any	access	
agreement	in	force	as	approved	by	
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2004	 2005	 2006	
	
	 Sir	Howard	Newby	Chief	Executive	(2001–2006)	
	
First	pilot	of	National	Student	
Survey	of	recent	graduates.	A	
second	pilot	was	also	agreed	
due	to	need	for	external	
scrutiny.		
	
E-University	technical	platform	
in	place	with	portfolio	of	
courses	developed	for	launch	in	
Autumn	2003.	
	
Review	of	recurrent	teaching	
funding	method.	MaSN	
abolished	(2003/42).		
	
Transfer	of	dance	and	drama	
award	scheme	to	mainstream	
funding	(900	places)	(c	
09/2003).		
	
National	Teaching	Fellowship	
Scheme	expanded	as	proposed	
in	White	Paper.	Additional	
£1.5m	to	support	expansion	
from	20	to	50	Fellowships	per	
year	(Board	minutes	87th	mtg).		
	
Agreement	on	relationship	
between	OFFA	and	HEFCE	(88th	
Board	mtg).		
	
Supplementary	grants	agreed	
in	teaching	(2004/05).	
	
HERO	-	National	Teaching	Quality	
Information	(TQI)	website	launched	for	
annual	information	on	quality	and	standards	
of	teaching	and	learning	(2003/51).	
	
Extension	of	Teaching	Quality	Enhancement	
Fund	for	further	year	to	2006	(2004/18).		
	
Changes	to	core	teaching	funding	method	to	
include	compensation	for	increase	on	
employers’	contributions	to	the	Teachers’	
Pensions	Scheme		and	funding	for	rewarding	
and	developing	staff	incorporated,	plus	some	
subject	and	price	band	changes	,	10%	
premium	for	p-t	and	foundation	degrees	
(2004/24).		
	
UK	e-Universities	wound	up.	Remaining	
£62m	to	be	used	to	support	e-learning	policy	
through	the	HE	Academy	(94th	Board	mtg).		
	
Additional	funded	places	for	social	work	
programmes	–	additional	500	(c	24/2003).		
	
Continuation	of	transitional	funding	for	
Higher	Education	Academy.		
	
600	places	on	private	providers	of	dance	and	
drama	funded	through	HEFCE,	not	DfES.		
	
Additional	funding	of	£4.4m	to	contribute	to	
E-Learning	policy	and	strategy	
announced,	inc.	£33m	capital	formula	
funding	to	support	investment	in	e-
learning	(2005/12).	
	
Pathfinder	projects	to	embed	e-learning	
£8m.				
	
Review	of	funding	method	for	teaching	
to	be	implemented	in	2007-08	(2005/21).	
	
Roberts	review	of	strategically	important	
and	vulnerable	subjects	–	HEFCE	role	not	
to	be	prescriptive	but	manage	
interventions	(2004/24).		
	
Funding	for	minority	subjects	and	some	
inherited	leases	absorbed	into	
mainstream	teaching	grant.		
	
Substantial	revisions	to	HERO	site	(c	
04/2005).		
	
CETLs	launched.		
	
Streamlined	twin	track	approach	to	
distribution	on	ASNs	introduced	–	
regional	managed	growth	and	through	
SDF.		
	
£100m	for	awards	scheme	from	HEFCE	
and	Department	for	Health	for	200	new	
senior	lectureships	over	next	10	years.		
Director	of	Fair	Access	(c	15/2006).		
	
Changes	to	institutional	audit	by	QAA	
following	review	of	the	quality	assurance	
framework	introduced	(2005/35).		
	
Teaching	Quality	and	Enhancement	Fund	
(158.5m	over	3	years:	consolidates	
funding	for	learning	&	teaching	
strategies,	supporting	professional	
standards,	staff	and	student	
volunteering.	Support	development	of	
CETLs,	HEA,	national	Teaching	fellowship	
Scheme	(2006/11).	
	
Review	of	teaching	funding	method:	
implement	national	framework	for	
costing	of	teaching	based	on	TRAC	
methodology,	use	TRAC	to	establish	full	
costs	of	WP,	keep	funding	of	part-time	
under	review	(2006/12).	
	
Additional	capital	funding	for	learning	
and	teaching	2006-08	£95m	by	formula	
(2006/27).		
	
Review	of	the	Quality	assurance	
Framework	evaluates	TQI	and	NSS.	Re-
focus	of	TQI	site	on	needs	of	applicants	
and	advisers	and	removal	of	qualitative	
materials	provided	by	institutions	
(2006/45).		
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Category	 2003	
	
2004	 2005	 2006	
	
	 Sir	Howard	Newby	Chief	Executive	(2001–2006)	
for	new	medical	schools	from	
2002-03	to	2007-08	(88th	Board	
mtg).		
	
	
	
costs	of	new	consultants’	contract	for	clinical	
academic	staff	(92nd	Board	mtg).		
	
QAA	contract	renewed	to	deliver	revised	
quality	assurance	framework	(94th	Board	
mtg).		
	
Price	group	changes	for	media	studies	
and	sports	sciences	(98th	Board	mtg).		
	
26,000	ASNs	for	2005-06	(2005/14).		
	
	
FECs	to	publish	data	on	TQI	website	(c	
09/2006).		
	
Additional	dental	student	numbers	
announced	(c	09/2005).		
	
Additional	medical	student	numbers	
announced	(c	25/2005).	
	
HEIs	to	consult	with	HEFCE	when	
considering	closure	of	strategically	
important	and	vulnerable	subjects	to	
replace	formal	notice	period	(c	17/2006).		
	
£18m	partnership	programme	to	support	
STEM	initiatives	announced.		
	
£4.5m	programme	to	promote	language	
studies.		
	
Professional	Standards	framework	for	
teaching	and	supporting	student	learning	
published	(104th	Board	mtg).		
	
Train	to	Gain	pathfinders	agreed	(109th	
Board	mtg).	
	
30,000	ASNs	for	2006-07	to	be	allocated	
using	new	funding	method.	
Widening	
participation	
Revision	to	method	for	
calculating	wp	funding	which	
will	take	into	account	prior	
educational	achievement	and	
New	w/p	approach	by	HEFCE	to	focus	on	
embedding	w/p	in	strategic	plans	rather	than	
submission	of	strategies	as	condition	of	
grant.	(96th	Board	mtg).	
Disability	funding	becomes	part	of	core	
funding	and	enhanced	funding	for	2005-6	
(c	02/2005).		
	
Uplifted	part-time	premium	and	
additional	£40m	over	2	years	to	reduce	
deterrents	for	financially	disadvantaged	
students	(103rd	Board	mtg).		
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Category	 2003	
	
2004	 2005	 2006	
	
	 Sir	Howard	Newby	Chief	Executive	(2001–2006)	
geodemographics	(2003/14).	
	
Additional	summer	schools	
funding	confirmed	for	3	years	at	
£4m	per	annum	(2003/14).		
	
Additional	funding	for	specialist	
summer	schools	(£1.5m)	(c	
13/2003).		
	
HEFCE	is	successful	in	bid	for	
£9.4m	European	Social	Fund	
under	ESF	Objective	3,	Lifelong	
Learning.	HEIs	invited	to	bid	
under	Aimhigher:	Partnerships	
for	Progression	initiative	for	
additional	4,500	summer	school	
places	(2003/18).	
	
Foundation	degree	Forward	
established	–	national	body	to	
support	development	and	
validation	of	foundation	
degrees.			
	
Special	funding	£5.5m	over	2	
years	to	support	teaching	
disabled	students.		
	
End	of	‘aspiration	funding	
premium’	to	HEIs	with	<80%	of	
students	from	state	schools.		
	
	
Partnerships	for	Progression	and	Excellence	
Challenge	merged	to	form	Aimhigher.		
	
Summer	schools	funding	integrated	with	
Aimhigher.		
	
Additional	full-time	and	part-time	foundation	
degree	places	and	development	of	new	
programmes	£5.5m	(2003/48).	Greater	
emphasis	on	allocation	by	region.		
	
20,000	ASNs	for	2004-05	(2004/12).		
	
7,185	new	places	at	foundation	degree	level	
funded	as	special	initiative	for	2	years	
(2004/15).	
	
Changes	to	funding	method	for	w/p	–	inc.	
students	already	holding	a	degree	given	zero	
weighting	(ELQ).	
	
Funding	for	wp	changed	to	be	based	on	
method	that	weighs	ug	new	entrants	
according	to	young	HE	participation	by	ward	
and	average	educational	achievement	by	
ward.	Formula	funding	split	20%	for	wp,	80%	
improving	retention.		
	
New	price	group	weightings	introduced.		
	
£1m	over	5	years	available	to	Aimhigher	to	
support	regional	health	specific	strands	(c	
HEFCE	announces	equality	in	funding	
part-time	students	and	additional	£40m	
with	DfES	over	2	years.	
	
Rubin	report	on	impact	of	variable	tuition	
fees	on	part-time	students.		
	
Funding	guarantees	for	Partnerships	for	
progression	and	Excellence	Challenge	
programmes	end,	Aimhigher	
partnerships	at	area	and	regional	levels	
become	responsible	for	allocation	and	
distribution	of	funds	to	partners	
(2006/02).	
	
Funding	for	Supporting	Professionalism	
in	Admissions	Programme.		
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Category	 2003	
	
2004	 2005	 2006	
	
	 Sir	Howard	Newby	Chief	Executive	(2001–2006)	
	 06/2004).		
	
£7m	for	national	dissemination	of	innovation	
and	good	practice	in	w/p	(c	07/2004).	
	
W/p	strategies	no	longer	a	condition	of	grant	
due	to	additional	requirements	from	OFFA	(c	
21/2004).		
Research	 SRIF	round	two	funding	-	£845m	
(2003/06).	
	
£20m	Research	Capability	Fund	
to	support	research	in	specific	
emerging	subject	areas	such	as	
social	work,	art	&design,	media,	
dance	&	performing	arts	and	
sports-related	studies.		
	
Roberts	report	on	review	of	
future	of	research	assessment	
published.	Recommendations:	
expert	judgement,	frequency	of	
assessment,	research	
competencies,	assessment	
burden,	quality	profiles,	panel	
structure,	best	fir	for	subjects,	
PIs,	joint	submissions	(2003/22).	
	
Additional	£20m	provided	to	
support	‘very	best’	departments	
with	5*	ratings	in	1996	and	2001	
RAEs.		
	
Additional	funding	provided	to	support	‘very	
best’	departments	with	5*	ratings	in	2001	
RAE.		
	
Capacity	funding	£17.5m	to	support	research	
in	emerging	subject	areas:	nursing,	subjects	
allied	to	medicine,	social	work,	art	&	design,	
communication,	cultural	and	media	studies,	
drama,	dance,	performing	arts,	sports	
related	subjects.		
	
Format	on	next	RAE	announced	as	a	result	of	
Roberts	Review	of	research	assessment.			
	
Science	and	Innovation	Awards	launched	–	
funded	by	EPSRC	and	HEFCE.		
	
Research	Libraries	Network	established.		
	
Promising	Researcher	Fellowship	Scheme	-	
£10m	over	2	years,	allocated	as	part	of	core	
grant	–	restricted	dependent	upon	RAE	
success	(2004/03).	
	
SRIF	round	3	£500m	a	year	from	2006-08	
Changes	to	the	funding	of	postgraduate	
research	students	introduced	–	not	
included	in	teaching	funding	method	but	
in	new	single	support	stream	within	
funding	for	research.		
	
Research	capability	fund	(established	
2003)	to	continue	to	2008-09	(c	
29/2005).		
	
Special	funding	stream	allocated	as	
research	libraries	‘access	strand’	
discontinued	and	funds	returned	to	
mainstream	QR	(98th	Board	mtg).		
38	new	Clinical	Senior	Lectureship	
Awards	announced	for	2006	up	to	200	
posts	over	5	years.		
	
Third	round	of	SRIF	announced	-	£903m	
over	3	years.		
	
New	element	of	recurrent	funding	for	
research	introduced	to	provide	
additional	money	to	institutions	
undertaking	research	funded	by	
charities.	£135m	in	2006-07	and	£180m	
in	2007-08	(c	16/2005).	
	
Research	Information	Network	
operational.		
	
Simplified	process	for	Overseas	Research	
Students	Awards	Scheme	(c	15/2005,	
21/2005).		
	
Policy	to	publish	research	degree	
qualification	rates	(c	10/2006,	2007/29).		
	
Science	and	Innovation	Awards	third	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
381				
Category	 2003	
	
2004	 2005	 2006	
	
	 Sir	Howard	Newby	Chief	Executive	(2001–2006)	
Review	of	research	funding	
method	and	agreement	that	a	
formulaic	approach	would	be	
preferable.	Funding	for	4	rated	
departments	to	focus	on	
improvement	(2003/38).		
	
Publication	of	recovering	the	full	
economic	cost	of	research	and	
other	activities	(c	05/2003).		
	
Continuation	of	£4.4m	for	
‘access’	strand	of	Research	
Support	Libraries	Programme.		
announced	(c	15/2004).		
	
£2m	provided	for	veterinary	research	in	joint	
initiative	with	Department	for	Environment,	
Food	and	Rural	Affairs.		
	
Revision	on	QAA	code	of	practice	on	
postgraduate	research	degree	programmes	
to	link	minimum	standards	of	provision	to	
grant	(95th	Board	mtg).		
	
	
round	with	EPSRC	(£31m).	
	
Language	Based	area	Studies	Initiative	
launched	with	AHRC.	
	
Veterinary	Training	Research	Initiative	
extended	for	2	years	to	2008	through	
partnership	with	Department	for	
Environment	Food	and	Rural	Affairs.		
	
Introduction	of	metrics	to	monitor	
sustainability	of	research	base.					
	
Revision	to	QAA	code	on	practice	to	
include	minimum	standards	for	
postgraduate	research	degree	
programmes	(c	18/2004).	
	
Criteria	and	working	methods	for	RAE	
2008	announced.	
Economy	and	
society	
HEIF	consolidated	as	permanent	
third	stream	of	funding.	HEIF2	
£187m	over	3	years	–	
collaboration	between	
institutions	a	major	feature	
(2003/34).	
	
HEIF2	initiates	network	of	20	
Knowledge	exchanges	funding	
for	5	years	(2003/34).	
	
Strategic	Development	Fund	
launched,	replacing	the	
Second	Round	of	Higher	Education	Active	
Community	Fund	(HEACF	2)	launched	-	£10m	
over	2	years	(2004/19).		
	
Knowledge	Transfer	Capability	Fund	£12m	
over	2	years	(2005/05).		
	 HEIF	3	£238m	over	2	years	–	formula	
funding	allocation	(including	
continuation	of	centres	for	Knowledge	
Exchange	to	be	informed	by	annual	
survey	of	interaction	between	HE,	
business	and	the	community	(2005/36,	
46,	2006/30).		
	
Changes	to	SDF	introduced	in	
application,	approval	and	monitoring	
process	(2006/15).		
	
Pilot	Beacons	for	Public	Engagement	
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Category	 2003	
	
2004	 2005	 2006	
	
	 Sir	Howard	Newby	Chief	Executive	(2001–2006)	
Restructuring	and	Collaboration	
Fund	£30m	per	year	over	3	
years	(2003/28).	
Initiative	launched	-	£8m	over	4	years	
(2006/49).		
	
Early	work	on	demonstrating	
improvement	of	knowledge	exchange	
interactions	towards	demonstrating	
improved	impact.		
	
Move	towards	predictable	funding	
allocations	for	third	stream	activities	–	
substantially	formula	based.	
	
HEFCE	Olympics	Strategy	agreed	(107th	
Board	mtg).		
Finance,	estate	
and	assurance	
Annual	Monitoring	Statement	
and	Corporate	Planning	
Statement	replace	Annual	
Operating	Statement	(2003/19).	
	
£494m	allocated	to	improve	
capital	and	IT	infrastructure	to	
support	L&T	(£117m	of	which	is	
to	improve	provision	for	
students	with	special	needs	and	
£60m	for	improvement	of	
science	and	engineering	labs		-	
capital	project	round	3	for	2004-
06(2003/26).		
	
Model	financial	memorandum	
between	HEFCE	and	HEIs	
revised	and	new	model	
published	(2003/54).		
Private	Finance	Initiative	guidance	revised	
(2004/11).		
	
Costs	of	accountability	substantially	reduced	
from	£250m	per	annum	in	2000	to	£211m	in	
2004.	New	Code	of	Practice	for	audit	and	
accountability	comes	into	effect.		
	
International	report	jointly	sponsored	
between	HEFCE	and	OECD	suggests	more	
collaborative	approach	is	needed	between	
institutions	and	policy	makers	–	‘On	the	
edge:	securing	a	sustainable	future	for	higher	
education’.		
	
Reimbursement	of	inherited	lease	liabilities	
reviewed	and	will	cease	within	5	years.		
	
Income	reported	under	TRAC	as	well	as	
Launch	of	HEFCE	sustainable	
development	initiative	(2005/01).	
Institutions	to	provide	a	framework	
setting	out	long	term	sustainability	
management	(c	28/2005).	
	
Space	Management	Group	reports	on	
efficient	and	sustainable	space	
management,	inc.	space	costs	and	
drivers	(2005).		
	
Proposal	to	collect	accountability	
information	in	a	‘single	conversation’	
with	HEIs	–	piloted	in	2006and	role	out	in	
2007	(2006/07).		
	
Changes	to	way	in	which	grants	are	paid	
for	Project	capital	and	SRIF	funding	
introduced	to	combine	funding	for	
Capital	funding	for	learning	&teaching,	
research	and	infrastructure	funds	2006-
08.	
	
Space	Management	Group	reports	on	
promoting	space	efficiency	and	impact	
on	space	of	future	HE	changes	(2006).		
	
HEFCE	grant	adjustments:	withholding	of	
grant	to	institutions	that	exceed	contract	
range,	do	not	deliver	growth	in	student	
numbers,	under-recruit	against	CFTEs	for	
medicine	and	dentistry	(2006/19).	
	
Changes	to	the	model	financial	
memorandum	introduced:	a	new	system	
for	protecting	the	exchequer	interests		to	
provide	greater	accountability	and	
reducing	administrative	burden,	
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Category	 2003	
	
2004	 2005	 2006	
	
	 Sir	Howard	Newby	Chief	Executive	(2001–2006)	
	
Changes	in	HEFCE	approach	to	
promoting	Public/	Private	
Partnership	(PPP)	and	Private	
Finance	Initiative	(PFI)	projects	
(c	07/2003).	
	
£400k	3	year	research	project	to	
help	HEIs	understand	business	
benefits	for	effective	
management	of	space.		
	
Revision	to	TRAC	methodology	
to	activity	and	project	level	(88th	
Board	mtg).		
costs.		 learning	&	teaching	and	research	(c	
03/2005).		
	
	
	
accounting	for	impact	of	Financial	
Reporting	Standard	(retirement	benefits)	
come	into	effect	(c	12/2006).		
	
HEIs	receive	formal	risk	assessments.		
	
Capital	funding	for	directly	funded	FECs	
(£22m)	allocated	(c	11/2005).		
	
HEIs	asked	to	consider	use	of	shared	
services	(c	20/2006).		
	
Leadership,	
management	
and	governance	
HESA	staff	data	used	as	basis	for	
calculating	‘golden	hello’	
allocations	2003/04)	–	aimed	at	
shortage	subject	areas	(c	
19/2003).		
	
Race	equality	monitoring	
introduced	(89th	Board	Mtg).	
	
Advice	on	severance	payments	
to	senior	staff	amended	(c	
15/2003).		
		
	
	
Consolidation	of	rewarding	and	developing	
staff	funding	into	core	teaching	grant	
(2004/03).	
	
Leadership,	Governance	and	Management	
Fund	-	£10m	over	3	years	(2004/26).		
	
Supporting	Professional	Standards	Fund	(for	
2	years)	launched.		
	
Guidance	on	mergers	published	(2004/09).		
	
HEFCE	Institutional	Support	Strategy	agreed	
(90th	Board	mtg).		
	
New	JISC	Strategy	2004-06	agreed	(91st	
Board	mtg).		
Policy	statement	on	sustainable	
development	in	HE	(2005/28).	
	
Self-assessment	tool	for	people	
management	in	HEIs	implemented	–	to	
be	phased	in	over	3	years	to	2008.	To	be	
used	to	mainstream	funding	under	
Rewarding	and	Developing	Staff	Initiative	
(c	17/2005).		
Issue	of	the	higher	education	workforce	
framework	(2006/21)	–	with	a	view	to	
mainstream	funds	from	Rewarding	and	
Developing	Staff	initiative.	Role	of	HEFCE	
will	become	less	directive.		
	
Equality	Challenge	Unit	reviewed	with	a	
new	remit	to	include	students	as	well	as	
staff	for	embedding	equality	in	the	
sector.		
	
Single	Equality	Scheme	published.		
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Category	 2007	
	
2008	 2009	 2010	
	
	 Prof	David	Eastwood	Chief	Executive	(2006–2009)	 Sir	Alan	Langlands	Chief	
Executive	(2009–2013)	
	 	 	 	 	
Wider	policy	
context	
Sainsbury	Review	of	Science	
and	Innovation.		
	
Variable	fees	introduced	-	
£3,070.	
	
HEIDI	database	launched.	
	
Burgess	report	Beyond	the	
Honours	degree	published.	
	
Department	of	Innovation,	
Universities	and	Skills	replaces	
some	of	DES	functions.	
	
Further	Education	and	Training	
Act	
Government’s	Public	Sector	Agreement	
workforce	qualification	target	announced.	
	
Government	White	Paper	–	Innovative	
Nation		
	
Government	policy	framework	set	out	in	‘A	
New	University	Challenge’	
	
Government	launches	£200m	matched	
funding	scheme	for	voluntary	giving.		
	
Global	financial	crisis.	
	
Browne	Review	launched	(review	of	HE	
funding	and	student	finance	in	context	
of	global	recession).		
	
Higher	Education	Framework	“Higher	
Ambitions:	the	future	of	universities	in	
the	knowledge	economy”	published.		
	
Spending	review	-	Secretary	of	State	
announces	efficiency	savings	of	£180m	
required	to	be	delivered	in	HE.		
	
Global	financial	crisis	continues.		
	
Unleashing	Aspiration:	Panel	on	fair	
access	to	the	professions	report	
	
	
New	Conservative/	Liberal	Democrat	
Coalition	Government.	
	
Equality	Act	2010.	
	
Browne	Independent	Review	of	Higher	
Education	Funding	and	Student	Finance	
published.	
	
University	Modernisation	Fund	
announced	by	Secretary	of	State	
(£270m)	–	to	increase	access	and	
increase	efficiency/	reduce	costs.		
	
Government	Coalition	Programme	
published	–	intention	to	publish	more	
information	on	costs,	graduate	earnings	
and	student	satisfaction	on	individual	
courses.		
	
BIS	announces	National	Scholarship	
Programme	(student	premium).	
	
Local	Enterprise	Partnerships	
established	(to	replace	RDAs).		
	
Adrian	Smith	report:	One	step	beyond:	
making	the	most	of	postgraduate	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
385				
Category	 2007	
	
2008	 2009	 2010	
	
education.	
HEFCE	 HEFCE	becomes	principle	
regulator	for	HE	under	the	
Charities	Act	2006.	
	
HEFCE	International	
Collaboration	team	dissolved.	
HEFCE	regional	teams	replaced	by	three	
institutional	teams	
	 Spending	Review	2010	-	HEFCE	funding	
reduced	by	£180m	and	then	a	further	
£135m.		
	
HEFCE	becomes	principal	regulator	of	
HEIs	that	are	exempt	charities.		
Learning	and	
Teaching	
33,000	ASNs	+	16,000	
(foundation,	co-funded)	over	2	
years	(2007/06).	
	
Policy	on	performance	
indicators	–	transfer	of	
indicators	to	HESA	(2007/14).		
	
Changes	to	HESA	survey	–	
required	to	report	students	on	
non-standard	years,	monitoring	
ASN	targets,	monitoring	
contract	range	(c	15/2007).		
	
Funding	to	sustain	chemistry,	
physics,	chemical	engineering	
and	mineral,	metallurgy	and	
materials	engineering	-	£75m	
over	3	years	(c	13/2007).		
	
Flexible	learning	pathways	pilots	
introduced	–	2	year	fast	track	
honours	degrees,	part-time	
study	options.	
	
Allocation	of	funding	for	
teaching	reviewed:	introduction	
Policy	published	on	phasing	out	of	funding	
for	ELQs	(with	exemptions	for:	those	in	
receipt	of	DSA,	ug	medicine,	dentistry,	
nursing,	veterinary	science,	all	teacher	
training,	foundation	degree).	Additional	
funding	available	for	part-time	(2008/13).		
	
Funding	method	adjusted	to	take	account	of	
ELQS	(2008/12,	c	07/2008).		
	
10,000	ASNs	(half	of	which	for	foundation	
degrees)	(2008/12,	c	04/2007).		
	
5,000	ASNs	on	a	co-funded	basis	with	
employer	engagement	(c	03/2007).		
	
Allocation	of	ASNs	to	be	through	processes	
of	the	SDF	(40,000	places)	119th	Board	mtg).		
	
Increased	funding	for	under-represented	
groups	most	at	risk	or	non-completion	and	
additional	medical	and	dental	student	
numbers	(2008/12).	
	
Phase	3	of	the	Quality	Assurance	Framework	
policy	–	revisions	to	methods	used	by	QAA	
for	auditing	collaborative	provision,	
40,000	ASNs	for	2009-10,	2010-11	–	to	
meet	policy	areas:	to	meet	SDF	plans,	
foundation	degrees,	strategically	
important	subjects,	STEM,	healthcare	
priorities,	areas	for	new	HE	provision	
(and	cross	cutting	themes)	–	distribution	
through	SDF	(c	05/2008).		
	
ASN	for	2009-10	amended	to	10,000	
following	Secretary	of	State	statement	in	
Parliament	(c	32/2008,	130th	Board	mtg).		
	
10,000	ASNs	on	a	co-funded	basis	with	
employer	engagement	(c	03/2007).		
	
Institutions	instructed	to	retain	2008-09	
recruitment	levels	+	10,000	ASNs	or	else	
over	recruitment	will	result	in	claw	back	
of	HEFCE	funds	to	the	Treasury	to	meet	
consequent	unanticipated	student	
support	costs	(2009/8).		
	
Destination	of	leavers’	survey	extended	
to	FECs.	
	
Institutions	to	report	on	use	of	Diploma	
Supplement	in	annual	monitoring	
10,000	ASN	places	–	priority	given	to	SIVS	
and	health	(c	22/2009).	
	
Student	number	control	specifications	
published	–	setting	specific	numbers	for	
institutions	(2010/08).		
	
Policy	guidance	for	HEIs	that	over-recruit	
to	ensure	that	there	is	no	overall	fee	
income	advantage	to	institutions	(c	
11/2010).		
	
Teaching	grant	reduced	through	
withdrawal	of	funding	for:	old	and	
historic	buildings,	accelerated	and	
intensive	taught	postgraduate	provision	
in	price	group	D,	phasing	out	additional	
support	for	foundation	degrees	
(2010/08,	131st	Board	mtg).		
	
HEAR	introduced.		
	
Policy	on	strategically	important	and	
vulnerable	subjects	reviewed	and	aligned	
in	light	of	government’s	New	Industry,	
New	Jobs,	Higher	Ambitions,	and	Skills	
for	growth	agendas	(2010/09).		
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of	targeted	allocations	to	
contribute	towards	additional	
costs	of	foundation	degrees,	old	
&	historic	buildings	and	part-
time	study,	counting	modules	
completed	to	support	flexible	
study	patterns,	use	data	from	
TRAC	to	understand	cost	of	
teaching	(2007/23).		
	
Recurrent	grant	changes	
introduced:	revisions	to	funding	
ASNs,	w/p,	transfer	of	student	
nos.	and	funding	between	
institutions,	changes	to	
additional	funding	for	high	cost	
and	vulnerable	science	subjects	
(2007/32).		
	
Implementation	of	new	method	
of	review	for	HE	in	FECs	
(Integrated	Quality	and	
Enhancement	Review	with	QAA.	
	
New	policy	on	funding	HE	in	
FECs	announced	with	pilot	
scheme	(c	27/2007,	115th	Board	
mtg).		
	
Re-launch	of	TQI	(HERO)	site	to	
take	into	account	improvements	
as	a	result	of	feedback	(c	
08/2007).			
	
Re-profiling	of	learning	and	
improved	communication	between	QAA	and	
other	reviewing	agencies	(2008/21).		
	
New	credit	framework	and	guidelines	
published	by	QAA.		
	
Policy	on	approach	towards	strategically	
important	subjects:	STEM,	Middle	Eastern,	
former	Soviet	Union	and	Central	Asian	
studies,	Japanese,	Chinese	and	other	Far	
eastern	languages,	Eastern	Europe	and	Baltic	
Region	studies,	MFL,	quantitative	social	
science	(2008/38).		
	
NSS	results	published	on	new	Unistats	
website	(replaces	TQI	website)	and	
developed	by	UCAS	(c	19/2007).		
	
NSS	extended	to	include	students	studying	at	
FECs	(c	28/2007).		
	
Small	and	specialist	premiums	of	less	than	
10%	added	to	institutions	mainstream	grants	
–	some	institutions	to	recruit	more	to	remain	
within	contract	range.		
	
Land	based	studies	no	longer	considered	
vulnerable	subject.		
	
Pilot	for	open	educational	content	£5.7m	
(123rd	Board	mtg).		
statements	as	part	of	Bologna	Process.		
	
£5.7m	pilot	programme	established	to	
develop	digital	repository	of	learning	
materials	–	start	of	major	project	to	
creative	digital	bank	of	open	educational	
material	by	2013.	
	
Publication	of	policy	on	supporting	
higher	education	in	further	education	
colleges	(2009/5).			
	
£25m	for	very	high	cost	laboratory-based	
subjects	become	permanent	recurrent	
target	allocation	in	recurrent	grants	
(2009/8).	
	
Revision	of	approach	to	e-learning	
strategy	and	policy	–	enhancing	learning	
and	teaching	through	the	use	of	
technology	published	(2009/12).		
	
Policy	for	engaging	with	institutions	that	
demonstrate	unsatisfactory	management	
of	quality	of	learning	opportunities	and/	
or	academic	standards	as	established	by	
QAA	audit	published	(2009/31).		
	
Policy	in	funding	partial	completion	
through	introduction	of	flexible	study	
measure	published	(c	12/2009).		
	
Online	Learning	Task	Force	established	to	
help	HE	sector	maintain	and	extend	
position	as	world	leader	in	online	
	
New	policy	on	quality	assurance	system	
for	institutional	audit	published	
(2010/17).		
	
£10m	to	support	movement	of	3000-
6000	students	provision	to	SIVS	(science,	
technology,	engineering,	maths	and	
MFLs)	through	University	Modernisation	
Fund	(c	06/2010).		
	
20,000	ASNs	provided	for	through	
University	Modernisation	Fund.	Funded	
for	first	year	but	HEIs	expected	to	fund	
remaining	2	years	of	study	through	
efficiency	savings	(£250m	(which	
includes	£10m	for	students	noted	above		
(c	08/2010).	
	
University	Modernisation	Fund	reduced	
from	£270m	to	£152m.	Reduction	in	
baseline	of	£82m	–	found	through	
reduction	in	teaching	block	grant	and	
teaching	capital	(c	14/2010).		
	
Institutions	to	develop	employability	
statements	for	Unistats	website	(c	
12/2010).		
	
Changes	to	conditions	of	grant	for	co-
funded	ASN	places	to	align	with	ASNs	
though	mainstream	teaching	funding	
method	(c	20/2010).		
	
Changes	to	HESES	and	HEIFES	
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teaching	grant	to	take	account	
of	tuition	fees	from	Student	
Loans	Company	to	be	paid	in	
two	tranches	in	Feb	and	May	(c	
07/2007).		
	
High	cost	laboratory	based	
subjects	to	receive	£75m	time	
limited	funding	to	support	
strategic	and	vulnerable	
subjects	(111th	Board	mtg).		
	
HEFCE	funding	of	Prime	
Minister’s	Initiative	on	
International	Education	£750k	
for	4	years	(114th	Board	mtg).		
	
£1m	support	for	Islamic	Studies	
support	(116th	Board	mtg).		
technology.	
	
HEFCE,	HEA,	NUS	joint	funding	of	student	
engagement	project.		
	
Changes	to	funding	method	with	
targeted	allocation	to	support	teaching	
enhancement	and	student	success	(125th	
Board	mtg).		
	
Graduate	internships	scheme	introduced	
-	£13.6m,	8,500	places	(131st	Board	mtg).		
introduced:	inclusion	of	information	to	
monitor	student	number	control,	co-
funded	employer	provision,	amendment	
to	definition	of	student	completion	(c	
10/2010).		
	
	
	
Widening	
participation	
Guidance	on	higher	education	
outreach:	targeting	
disadvantaged	learners	
(2007/12).		
	
Summer	Schools’	programme	
extended	to	2010.		
	
With	DFE,	implemented	
programme	to	assist	institutions	
with	engaging	with	new	
diplomas	for	14-19	year	olds.			
	
Aimhigher	funding	extended	to	
2011	to	target	lower	socio-
Policy	published	on	widening	participation	
and	fair	access	research	strategy.	Themes	to	
include:	better	links	with	schools	and	
colleges,	partnerships	between	HEIs	and	
communities,	HEIs	to	submit	wp	strategic	
assessments	(2008/10).		
	
£1m	over	three	years	to	fund	projects	to	
disseminate	good	practice	in	student	
retention	(c	08/2008).		
	
£21m	Aimhigher	Associates	Scheme	
announced.		
Policy	on	HEFCE	support	for	disabled	
students	published.	Will	continue	to	fund	
additional	costs	through	mainstream	
disability	allocation	and	fund	specialist	
disability	support	services	through	Action	
on	Access,	HEA	and	Equality	challenge	
Unit	(2009/49).	
	
Framework	for	the	submission	of	w/p	
strategies	published	(2009/01).	
	
Changes	to	funding	method	to	improve	
support	for	teaching	enhancement	and	
w/p.	Combined	funding	for	improving	
retention,	learning,	teaching	and	
	
		
	
	
	
	
	
388	
Category	 2007	
	
2008	 2009	 2010	
	
economic	groups,	areas	of	
deprivation,	care	leavers,	SENs.	
assessment	strategies,	teaching	informed	
and	enriched	by	research	to	create	new	
targeted	allocation	to	support	teaching	
enhancement	and	student	success	
(TESS).	Increased	funding	to	recognise	
costs	of	working	with	schools	in	most	
disadvantaged	areas.	Incorporated	into	
funding	methods	from	2009-10	
(2009/30).		
Research	 Recurrent	grants	methodology	
revised	to	include	business	
research	and	charity	elements	
(2007/06).		
	
Review	of	Research	Information	
Network	leads	to	additional	
funding	of	£2.4m	to	2011.		
	
£6m	transitional	funding	for	8	
medical	schools	to	build	
research	capacity.	
	
New	arrangements	for	Overseas	
Research	Students	Awards	
Scheme	(c	12/2007).		
	
Policy	on	open	access	to	
research	publications	agreed	
(112th	Board	mtg).		
	
Policy	on	encouraging	research	
collaboration	at	strategic	level	
between	HEIs	agreed	(114th	
Board	mtg).		
RAE	2008	to	use	quality	profile.	
	
RAE	2008	results	published.		
	
Announcement	of	framework	for	REF	as	a	
single	unified	framework	for	assessing	and	
funding	research	across	all	disciplines	using	
bibliometric	techniques	and	assessing	impact	
(c	13/2008,	34/2008).		
	
Funding	terminated	for	the	Overseas	
Research	Students	Awards	Scheme	from	
2010.		
	
HEFCE	and	Research	Councils	launch	revised	
UK	Concordat	and	Code	of	Practice	for	
researchers.		
	
Policy	on	purpose	and	funding	of	QR	revised	
(120th	Board	mtg).		
£25m	of	SRIF	funding	from	2010-11	
brought	forward	due	to	pre-budget	
measures	(c	35/2008).		
	
Recurrent	grant	for	research	based	on	
quality	profile	outcomes	of	RAE2008	
(125th	Board	mtg).	
	
Funding	element	for	‘best	five	star’	
departments	discontinued	(125th	Board	
mtg).		
	
ORSAS	funding	ceases	(c	18/2008).		
	
Recurrent	research	grant	weightings	for	
activity	amended	to	favour	more	
research	concentration.	Enhanced	
funding	for	geography	and	psychology	to	
fit	with	STEM	disciplines	(2010/08).		
	
Publication	of	REF	design	–	configuration	
of	panels,	method	for	assessing	impact,	
weightings	between	outputs,	impact	and	
environment	(c	04/2010).		
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Economy	and	
society	
Policy	on	HE	education-business	
and	community	interaction	
produced	(2007/17).		
	
Strategic	Development	Fund	
processes	and	operation	of	the	
fund	revised	(2007/22).		
	
Publication	of	strategy	on	
employer	engagement	to	
support	flexible	learning	in	the	
workplace.		
	
Beacons	for	Public	Engagement	
funded	from	2007	for	4	years.		
HEIF	4	announced	(from	2008-11	£396m)	
(2008/02).		
	
HEIF	funding	to	be	incorporated	into	
recurrent	grant	allocations	to	support	all	
forms	of	knowledge	exchange	(2008/12).		
Programme	for	development	and	employer	
co-funding.	Move	towards	performance	as	
basis	for	allocation	of	funds	(£100m).		
	
SDF	funding	re-focussed	to	prioritise	
employer	engagement,	New	University	
Challenge	(c	18/2008).	
	
Announcement	that	there	will	be	no	more	
funding	for	employer	engagement	activities	
(c	36/2008).		
Final	allocation	of	£8m	for	Centres	for	
Knowledge	Exchange	for	2008-09	
(2008/02).	
	
Publication	of	policy	on	sustainable	
development	in	higher	education	
(2009/3).		
	
Economic	Challenge	Investment	Fund	
announced	–	as	part	of	employer	
engagement	programme	-	£25m	of	
matched	funding	as	a	reprioritisation	of	
SDF	for	one	year	(c	03/2009,	109th	Board	
mtg).	
Guiding	principles	for	international	
activity	amended	as	a	result	of	
allegations	of	irregularities	in	the	use	of	
funds	for	international	travel	and	
published	(c	21/2010).		
	
Review	of	funding	for	museums	and	
galleries	(134th	board	mtg).		
Finance,	estate	
and	assurance	
Space	Management	Group	
guidance	published	(2007/30).		
	
New	capital	investment	
framework	published	–	moves	
away	from	project	based	
methods	to	evaluation	of	longer	
term	sustainability	(c	11/2007,	
21/2007).		
	
HEFCE	assurance	review	
launched	–	every	5	years	(c	
25/2006).		
	
Funding	for	Proc-HE	ceased.	
Procureweb	continued	funding	
with	management	transferred	
Single	conversation	process	implemented	for	
all	institutions	following	pilot	(2008/31,	c	
15/2008).		
	
New	accountability	framework	comes	into	
effect	linked	to	assessment	of	institutional	
risk	(2007/11).		
	
Framework	of	VAT	partial	exemption	
methods	becomes	operational.	
	
Capital	Investment	Fund	(by	formula)	-	
£1,085m	as	Learning	&	Teaching	Capital	
Investment	Fund	and	£1,276m	Research	
Capital	Investment	Fund	for	3	years	
(permanent	mainstream)	(2008/04).	
	
Capital	funding	for	directly	funded	FECs	
put	on	hold	(c	12/2008).		
	
Revolving	Green	Fund	£5m	to	support	
carbon	saving	projects	(c	04/2009).		
	
Institutions	asked	to	re-examine	capital	
investment	plans	to	bring	forward	
further	expenditure	to	2009-10	to	enable	
HEFCE	to	bring	forward	£200m	of	capital	
funding	(c	05/2009).		
	
£9.8m	support	for	HE	libraries	for	Phase	
2	of	UK	Research	Reserve	launched.		
Policy	on	carbon	reduction	target	and	
strategy	for	higher	education	published	
(2010/01).		
	
£20m	to	deliver	efficiency	and	value	for	
money	through	shared	services	through	
University	Modernisation	Fund	(c	
07/2010).	
	
£5m	of	above	funding	to	establish	an	e-
Procurement	Fund	and	£1m	to	develop	
e-Marketplaces	(c	16/2010).		
	
Capital	Investment	Framework	
assessment	arrangements	published.	
New	areas	to	be	addressed	–	reducing	
carbon	emissions	and	improving	space	
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to	JISC	(c	05/2007).		 Capital	Investment	Framework:	securing	
value	for	money	guidance	issued	(c	09/2008).		
	
Matched	funding	scheme	for	voluntary	giving	
to	run	for	3	years	and	administered	by	HEFCE	
(c	11/2008).		
	
HECFE	introduces	new	KPI	and	to	include	
reduction	in	carbon	emissions	as	factor	in	
capital	funding	allocations.		
	
Revolving	Green	Fund	announced	-	£30m	for	
carbon	saving	projects	(c	20/2008).		
	
Following	pre-budget	report	by	the	
Chancellor	to	address	current	economic	
position,	HEIs	asked	to	bring	forward	capital	
spending	from	2010-11	(c	35/2008).		
usage	(c	19/2010).		
	
Revisions	to	HEFCEs	Accounts	Direction	
introduced	(c	19/2010).		
	
Changes	to	the	Financial	memorandum	
with	HEIS	introduced	(c	18/2010).		
Leadership,	
management	
and	governance	
Policy	on	Equality	Scheme	
launched	to	promote	race,	
disability	and	gender	equality	
(2007/1).		
	
Further	funding	of	Leadership	
Foundation	until	2012	(4.5m).		
	
Leadership,	Governance	and	
management	Fund	extended	to	
2010	with	£10m	(c	26/2007)	in	
partnership	with	Leadership	
Foundation	(funding	for	
Foundation	extended	to	2012).		
	 Publication	of	policy	and	process	for	
developing	new	HE	centres	or	university	
campus	–	in	the	light	of	Government	
policy	framework	set	out	in	‘A	New	
University	Challenge’	published	March	
2008	(2009/	7).	
	
Amendments	to	policy	on	severance	
payments	to	senior	staff	in	HEIs	
published	(c	06/2009).		
	
Announcement	of	additional	access	to	
Leadership,	Governance	and	
Management	Fund	to	support	projects	to	
deliver	‘leading	transformational	change’	
in	current	economic	climate	(c	07/2009).		
Leadership,	Governance	and	
Management	Fund	ends	(c	13/2010).		
	
HE	Workforce	Framework	(revised	
guidance)	published	(2010/05).		
	
Equality	Challenge	Unit	funding	extended	
for	5	years.		
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Category	 2011	 2012	 2013	 2014	
	
	 Sir	Alan	Langlands	Chief	Executive	(2009–2013)	 Prof	Madeleine	Atkins	Chief	
Executive		(2014–Present)	
Wider	policy	
context	
White	Paper	‘Students	at	the	
Heart	of	the	System’	
published	(shift	in	funding	
from	HEFCE,	introduction	of	
competition	through	
dynamism,	core	and	margin	
and	AAB,	HEFCE	as	lead	
regulator	and	promotion	of	
interests	of	students).	
	
Regulatory	Partnership	group	
established	by	HEFCE	and	
Student	Loans	Company.			
	
Subject	centres	in	LTSN	close.	
	
Opening	doors,	breaking	
barriers:	a	strategy	for	social	
mobility	published.	
	
Charities	Act	2011.	
Participation	rate	49%.	
	
New	tuition	fee	levels	allows	institutions	to	
charge	up	to	£9,000.	
	
Very	significant	reduction	in	the	number	of	
new	part-time	entrants.		
	
Regional	Development	Agencies	abolished.		
	
Changes	to	HEFCE	organisational	structure	
in	light	of	new	funding	arrangements.		
	
New	framework	between	HEFCE	and	BIS	
introduced.		
	
JISC	becomes	an	independent	organisation.		
	
Participation	rate	drops	to	43%.		
	
Spending	Review	2013.		
	
Introduction	of	EU	VAT	directive	
implemented	by	Finance	Act	2012	
to	allow	for	establishment	of	cost	
sharing	groups	to	provide	VAT-
exempt	services	to	member	
organisations	–	HEFCE	guidance	for	
HEIs.		
	
Government	announces	changes	to	
National	Scholarship	Programme.	
Government	Science	and	Innovation	
Strategy	announced.	
	
Government	announces	£200m	in	match	
capital	funding	for	science	and	
engineering.	
	
	
HEFCE	 BIS-SLC-HEFCE	forum	
established	for	joint	policy	
interests.	
HEFCE	announces	change	of	focus	to	invest	
on	behalf	of	students	costs	that	cannot	be	
covered	by	tuition	fees	alone	and	to	provide	
opportunities	for	participation.		
HEFCE	asked	to	take	on	regulatory	
oversight	role	as	part	of	programme	
of	higher	education	funding	and	
regulatory	reform.		
	
HEFCE	given	responsibility	for	
operating	new	system	of	specific	
course	designation	for	alternative	
Launch	of	data	maps	of	higher	education	
provision.		
	
New	student	number	control	system	
introduced.		
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providers	and	extending	SNC	to	
alternative	providers.		
	
HEFCE	produces	strategic	statement	
on	its	role	in	the	student	interest.	
	
Government	asks	HEFCE	to	review	
participation	at	postgraduate	level.	
Learning	and	
Teaching	
20,000	ASNs	on	a	co-funded	
basis	with	employer	
engagement	-	part	of	
Workforce	development	
programme	(c	03/2007).		
	
10,000	FTE	additional	places	
agreed	(138th	Board	mtg).		
	
Changes	to	HESES	and	HEIFES	
introduced:	clarification	of	
treatment	of	foundation	years	
(c	10/2010).	
	
All	elements	of	teaching	grant	
(with	exception	of	w/p	and	
improving	retention)	subject	
to	4.28%	cash	reduction.	UMF	
withdrawn	(2011/07).		
	
Further	allocation	of	funding	
to	support	moving	FTEs	to	
SIVS	(2011/11).	
	
Policy	on	provision	of	
information	about	higher	
New	funding	regime	comes	into	practice	–	
HEFCE	T	mainstream	funding	begins	to	
decrease	and	publicly	funded	loads	
introduced.		
Policy	on	allocation	of	margin	places	
published	(portfolio/	performing	arts	
subjects	can	opt	out	of	AAB+	and	core/	
margin	process,	exclusion	of	SIVS	from	
calculation	of	margin,	student	number	limit	
to	be	equal	to	at	least	20%	of	limit	for	2011-
12	(2011/30).		
	
Students	with	entry	qualifications	=	or	>	that	
AAB	no	longer	included	in	SNC.		
Margin	of	20,000	places	created	by	reducing	
‘core’	residual	SNC	–	only	redistributed	to	
institutions	charging	less	than	£7,500.	
	
Focus	on	supporting	MFL	as	part	of	SIVS	
policy.		
	
First	set	of	KIS	data	publically	available.		
	
NSS	to	introduce	question	on	student	
satisfaction	with	Students’	Union	(25/2011).		
	
More	student	places	freed	from	
control,	5,000	margin	places	
available.	Students	with	entry	
qualifications	=	or	>	ABB	(high	
grades	policy)	no	longer	included	in	
SNC,	Revised	list	of	exempt	
qualifications,	top	up	students	from	
foundation	no	longer	count	towards	
SNC	(12/2012,	30/2012).		
	
NSS	introduces	new	survey	asking	
for	student	intentions	following	
graduation	(24/2012).		
	
Destinations	of	Leavers	from	Higher	
Education	survey	in	further	
education	colleges	–	colleges	to	fund	
survey	themselves	from	2014-15	
after	transition	year	of	funding	
(28/2012,	08/2013,	26/2013).		
	
Funding	for	new-regime	students	in	
high	cost	subjects	extended	to	more	
subjects	in	price	group	C	and	
consolidates	funding	for	PGT	
(2013/05).	
New	allocation	of	funding	for	students	
taking	study	abroad	(in	our	out	of	
Erasmus	Scheme)	to	support	participation	
in	exchange	programmes	(14/2013).		
	
Changes	to	SNC:	HEIS	recruiting	
significantly	below	SNC	loose	places	and	
will	be	re-allocated,	application	process	
for	new	publicly	funded	providers	to	
apply	for	student	numbers	from	2015-16,	
high	grades	policy	extended	to	include	
certain	combinations	of	qualifications	
(2013/20).		
	
£20m	reduction	In	recurrent	teaching	
funding	grant-	but	balanced	by	increase	in	
capital	L&T	grant	of	£20m	(04/2014).	
	
Recurrent	grant	to	support	an	increase	of	
up	to	30,000	full-time	places,	absorption	
of	the	Access	to	Learning	Fund	and	
support	for	a	National	Collaborative	
Outreach	Network	(£25m)	so	reduction	of	
5.85%	in	most	teaching	grants	with	the	
exception	of	high	costs,	wp	and	specialist	
institutions.	Recalculated	funding	
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education:	establishment	of	
KIS	and	provision	of	data	
available	from	NSS	and	DLHE	
surveys,	institutions	to	
provide	wider	information	
sets	(2011/18).		
	
Student	number	control	policy	
for	2011-12	published,	
maintained	SNC	level	at	2010-
11,	deduction	of	UMF	places	
(c	02/2011,	26/2011).		
	
Subject	level	graduate	salary	
information	to	be	provided	on	
Unistats	website	(c	03/2011).		
	
HESES	and	HEIFES	surveys	
merged	(17/2011).	
	
KIS	methodology	approved	
(104th	Board	mtg).		
	
Publication	of	KIS	technical	
guidance	(23/2011).		
	
New	quality	assurance	
arrangements	come	into	
force.		
	
Guidance	on	definitions	of	‘old	
regime’	and	‘new	regime’	
students	announced	
(24/2011).		
	
Funding	for	co-funding	with	employers	
phased	out.		
	
Workforce	development	no	longer	a	policy	
priority.		
	
Revision	to	policy	on	KIS	data	–	now	to	be	
provided	on	new	UNISTATS	web-site,	not	on	
institutions	web	site	(16/2012).		
	
Changes	to	HESES	and	HEIFES	data	collection	
to	no	longer	account	for	non	HEFCE	funded	
students	(15/2012).		
	
Final	policy	on	KIS	and	Unistats	published	
(2012/15).	
	
Conformation	of	policy	for	SNC	funding	from	
2013-14,	inc:	support	for	high	cost	subjects,	
transitional	approach	to	support	PGT	
provision,	TACT	approach	to	inform	future	
funding,	part-time	support	only	in	high	cost	
subjects,	SIVs	support	.	Calculation	of	
reduction	in	grant	due	to	excess	recruitment	
(2012/17,	19).	
	
Changes	to	SIVS	policy	to	support	any	
discipline	considered	to	be	vulnerable	(144th	
Board	mtg).		
	
New	risk-based	approach	to	QA	agreed	to	
target	QAA	efforts,	tailor	external	review	to	
provider,	and	ensure	transparency	
(2012/27).	
	
	
Amendments	to	ILR	funding	
calculation	method	for	FECs	
(06/2013).	
	
Transitional	arrangements	for	
financial	arrangements	for	students	
taking	year	abroad	with	new	
financial	arrangements	from	2014-
15	–	new	regulated	fee	limit	of	15%	
of	fee	in	Erasmus	scheme	or	30%	
outside	scheme	(14/2013).	
	
Revision	to	HEFCE	policy	for	
addressing	unsatisfactory	quality	in	
institutions	in	line	with	start	of	risk-
based	Higher	Education	Review	
method	(15/2013,	29/2013).		
	
Update	to	the	KIS	‘widget’	
(17/2013).		
	
£25m	for	pilot	projects	to	test	
options	for	finance	and	activity	
aimed	at	stimulating	progression	
into	PGT	(2013/13).		
	
Introduction	of	HEAPES,	survey	of	
students	on	courses	provided	by	
alternative	providers	(2013/14).		
	
Modified	version	of	TRAC(T)	
methodology	introduced.		
	
allocations	for	old-regime	students	and	
revised	scaling	factor	(04/2014,	2014/27).	
	
Funding	for	national	facilities	and	
initiatives	(special	funding)	reduced	by	
£13m	(04/2014).	
	
Higher	Education	Access	Tracker	(HEAT)	
rolled	out	(04/2014).	
	
Student	Opportunity	Fund	reduced	by	
5.85%	(04/2014).	
	
Institutions	to	provide	more	transparent	
information	on	income	and	expenditure	
to	students	as	part	of	Government’s	
supporting	public	accountability	initiative	
(06/2014).	
	
Institutions	given	increased	flexibility	to	
recruit	above	SNC	by	6%.	Exceptions	list	
expanded	(2014/05).		
	
Guidance	on	providing	information	for	
prospective	postgraduate	taught	students	
((10/2014).	
	
NSS	results	dissemination	web-site	
changed	and	is	managed	by	Texuna	
Technologies	Ltd	(16/2014).	
	
£50m	in	matched	funding	to	enable	
10,000	PGT	students	to	receive	£10k	
contribution	to	cost	of	studies	as	part	of	
Postgraduate	Support	Scheme	(32/2014).	
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	 20,000	margin	places	agreed	for	2012-13	and	
policy	for	applications	to	the	margin	agreed	
(142nd	Board	mtg).		
	
High	cost	funding	for	media	and	sports	
studies	discontinued	(144th	Board	mtg).		
	
	
	
Quality	Assessment	Review	initiated.		
	
ELQ	policy	relaxed	for	some	STEM	
subjects	(154th	Board	mtg).		
	
Institutions	with	<1000	STEM	FTEs	can	
enter	competitive	element	of	STEM	
teaching	and	capital	fund	(161st	Board	
mtg).	
	
Agricultural	technology	and	some	sports	
science	to	be	included	in	STEM	
classifications	(161st	Board	mtg).		
Widening	
participation	
Grant	letter	to	HEFCE	requests	
top	priorities	for	target	
funding	are	supporting	wp	
and	fair	access	and	ensuring	
adequate	provision	for	
strategically	important	and	
vulnerable	subjects.		
	
National	Scholarship	
Programme	allocations	
announced	–	to	be	matched	
funding	by	institutions	(£300m	
over	3	years)	to	support	
students	with	household	
income	<£25k	(13/2011).	
	
Aimhigher	funding	ends.		
	
‘Opportunity,	choice	and	
excellence	in	HE’	published	
Changes	to	widening	participation	strategic	
assessments	(WPSAs)	to	interim	wp	strategic	
assessments	to	identify	key	priorities	for	
2012-13		-	in	preparation	for		new	approach	
where	strategies	will	need	to	provide	a	
framework	of	accountability	for	funding	
(11/2012).		
	
National	Scholarship	Programme	as	‘student	
premium’	to	benefit	students	from	
disadvantaged	backgrounds	(£50m	in	2012,	
£100m	in	2013	£150m	in	2014.	Institutions	
expected	to	match	funding	to	100%	if	
charging	>£6k	fee,	or	50%	if	less	(2011/10).		
	
	 Joint	guidance	from	HEFCE	and	OFFA	on	
production	of	integrated	WPSSs	and	
access	agreements	(31/2013).		
	
Funding	allocations	for	National	
Scholarship	Programme	calculated	by	
new	method	focussed	on	institutions	with	
higher	proportion	from	low-income	
backgrounds,	institutional	financial	
contributions	will	only	be	required	from	
those	with	an	access	agreement,	part-
time	students	eligible	(2013/02).		
	
National	Scholarship	Programme	
reduction	in	funding	to	£50m	–	rules	
relating	to	use	of	funds	amended	
accordingly	(32/2013).	
	
£25m	funding	of	National	Outreach	
Network	(called	National	Networks	for	
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(2011/22).		 Collaborative	Outreach	(NNCO)	for	FE	and	
HE	–	£22m	over	2	years	-	£3m	for	a	
national	tracking	system	(20/2014).		
Research	 Recurrent	research	grant	
reduced	by	1.1%	(2011/07).		
	
	
	
Discontinuation	of	research	activity	survey	–	
calculation	of	funding	of	QR	in	relation	to	
research	degree	programme	supervision	
fund	and	charity	support	provision	–	using	
HESA	data	to	inform	funding	elements	(c	
10/2010,	19/2011).	
	
Institutions	to	submit	code	of	practice	on	fair	
and	transparent	selection	of	staff	for	REF	
submission	(27/2011).		
	
Shift	from	mainstream	QR	to	RDP	supervision	
funding	of	£35m.	2*	RAE	research	no	longer	
funded	(03/2012).		
	
£120m	to	support	PGT.	
	
£240m	to	support	PGR	with	investment	
targeted	on	the	basis	of	quality	of	research.		
	
New	approach	to	measuring	rates	of	
qualification	from	research	degree	study	
published	(2012/10).		
	
Additional	allocation	of	research	capital	fund	
(£100m)	over	3	years	to	support	research	
facilities	(research	infrastructure	fund)	
(2012/12).		
	
Publication	of	statement	on	standards	and	
integrity	in	UK	research	by	HEFCE,	
UK	Research	Partnership	Investment	
Fund	(additional	allocation	of	
research	capital	funding	(£80m)	
(2012/31).		
	
HEIs	eligible	for	HEFCE	research	
funding	to	comply	with	research	
integrity	concordat	published	by	
Universities	UK	(2012/32,	21/2013).		
	
Compliance	with	the	Concordat	to	
Support	Research	Integrity	made	
condition	of	HEFCE	grant	(153rd			
Board	mtg).	
	
Implementation	of	an	open	access	
framework	in	post-2014	REF	
(2013/16,	2014/07).		
	
	
First	REF.		
	
Publication	of	intended	use	of	impact	
case	studies	submitted	to	REF	2014	
(26/2014).		
	
UKPISG	agree	current	set	of	research	
UKPIs	are	discontinued	and	new	UKPIs	to	
be	developed	(21/2014).	
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Universities	UK,	Research	Councils	UK,	
Wellcome	Trust	and	Government	
departments.		
	
Economy	and	
society	
HEIF	funding	levels	
maintained	(2011/07).		
	
HIEF	funding	for	2011-15	
announced	-	£2150m	per	year.	
New	policy	on	HEIF	published	
–	funding	calculated	on	
performance	metrics	only,	
funding	for	staff	numbers	as	a	
measure	discontinued,	double	
weightings	for	income	from	
small/	medium	sized	
companies,	max	cap	of	
£2.85m	to	any	institution	
(2011/16,	c	04/2011).	
New	Catalyst	Fund	launched	to	replace	
Strategic	Development	Fund	(143rd	Board	
mtg).	
	
Catalyst	funding	available	for	projects	to	
enhance	HE’s	contribution	to	economic	
growth	(£50m).		
£5m	of	Catalyst	Fund	to	support	
NUS	Students’	Green	Fund	to	2015	
(2013/12).		
Bids	for	Catalyst	funding	for	universities	
as	anchors,	technical	education	at	higher	
levels,	innovative	knowledge	exchange	
developments	in	specialist	institutions	
(2014/21).			
Finance,	estate	
and	assurance	
Capital	Investment	Fund	(CIF2)	
£49m	for	Learning	and	
Teaching	Capital	Investment	
Fund	(1	year)	and	£549m	
Research	Capital	Investment	
Fund	(4	years)	(2011/08).	
Note:	reinstatement	of	
funding	withdrawn	in	June	
2010.		
	
Capital	funding	for	directly	
funded	FECs	£6.3m	over	2	
years	(10/2011).		
	
Revolving	Green	Fund	phase	2	
Research	Capital	Investment	Funding	(RCIF2)	
brought	forward	from	2012-13	to	2011-12	
(01/2012).			
	
Moderation	funding	to	smooth	changes	no	
longer	provided	(03/2012).	
	
Special	funding	initiatives	reduced	from	
£208m	to	£125m.	Shift	to	channel	more	
funding	through	core	routes	(03/2012).		
	
Capital	Investment	Fund	2	for	L&T	increased	
from	£49m	to	£52.5m	(05/2012).	
	
Publication	of	review	of	institution-specific	
Second	L&T	Capital	Investment	Fund	
(TCIF2)	£33m	(2013/08)	as	part	of	
CIF	(Capital	Investment	Framework).	
	
RCIF2	increased	by	£3m	(2013/08).	
	
Revision	to	TRAC	following	
consultation	to	streamline	
requirements	for	reporting	for	all	HE	
providers	in	receipt	of	HEFCE	
funding.	Strong	objection	to	using	
TRAC	for	transparency	of	
information	for	students	(2013/09).	
	
£250,000	funding	for	developing	and	
Revision	to	financial	memorandum	
between	HEFCE	and	HEIs	to	
accommodate	requirements	to	manage	
risk	around	financial	commitments	and	
other	minor	amendments	–	now	called	
Memorandum	of	Assurance	and	
Accountability	(2013/21,	2014/09,	
2014/12).			
	
£200m	fund	for	investment	in	STEM	
science	and	teaching	facilities	(to	be	
matched	funding	by	institutions)	
(02/2014).	
	
Increase	of	£20m	additional	capital	for	
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funding	announced	(£10m	per	
annum	for	2	years	–	projects	
that	reduce	carbon	emissions	
(16/2011).	
	
JISC	reviewed	138th	Board	
mtg).		
	
Policy	for	extrapolation	of	
funding	adjustments	agreed	
(139th	Board	mtg).	
funding	in	light	of	new	funding	arrangements	
(2012/16).			
	
Revolving	Green	Fund	phase	3	(£20m)	
(29/2012).	
	
Receipt	of	capital	funding	conditional	upon	
satisfactory	carbon	management	plans	and	
improved	environmental	performance.		
	
Change	to	the	financial	memorandum	to	
require	HEIs	receiving	research	grants	from	
the	Council	to	comply	with	terms	of	a	
Research	Integrity	Concordat	(146th	Board	
mtg).	
	
disseminating	good	practice	in	
shared	services	(27/2013).			
	
	
learning	and	teaching	(TCIF2)	(03/2014).		
	
New	financial	commitments	threshold	
introduced	(11/2014).		
	
Fourth	round	of	Revolving	Green	Fund	
(RGF4)	provided	in	partnership	with	Salix	
Finance	Ltd	-	£34m	to	achieve	cost	
savings	and	reduce	carbon	emissions	
(18/2014).	
	
Sustainable	development	framework	
introduced	(162nd	Board	mtg).		
Leadership,	
management	
and	governance	
Revised	policy	for	addressing	
unsatisfactory	quality	in	
institutions	after	changes	to	
institutional	review	(2011/36).		
	
Shared	strategy	for	
relationship	management	
between	HEFCE	and	
institutional	governing	bodies	
(12/2011).	
	
Collaboration,	alliances	and	mergers	in	HE	
guidance	published	(22/2012).		
	
Innovation	and	Transformation	Fund	–	joint	
LFHE.	HEFCE	initiative	to	support	efficiencies	
in	HE	(£1m	over	2	years).		
	
HEFCE	Equality	and	Diversity	Scheme	2012-
14	announced	(2012/03).		
	
	 First	register	of	higher	education	
providers	published	on-line	(19/2014).		
	
	 	
		
	
	
	
	
	
398	
	
Category	 2015	 2016	 2017	 2018	
	
	 Prof	Madeleine	Atkins	Chief	Executive		(2014–2018)	 	 	
Wider	policy	
context	
Conservative	Government	
elected.	
	
BIS	introduces	new	controls	
and	standards	for	alternative	
providers.	
	
Government	intends	to	
introduce	a		
Teaching	Excellence	
Framework.	
	
Green	paper	on	HE	to	announce	
closure	of	HEFCE	and	creation	
of	Office	for	Students,	Teaching	
Excellence	Framework,	
enhanced	WP,	student	
protection,	implications	for	
research	(consultation	to	run	to	
2016).	
	
Nurse	Review	Report	on	
research	funding	structure.		
	
Counter-Terrorism	and	Security	
Act	2015.	
17	per	cent	funding	reduction	in	real	
terms	for	BIS.	
	
The	HE	White	Paper:	Success	as	a	
Knowledge	Economy:	Teaching	Excellence,	
Social	Mobility	&	Student	Choice	
published	May	2016.	
	
The	Higher	Education	and	Research	Bill	
2016-17	had	its	first	reading	in	the	House	
of	Commons	19th	May	2016.	
	
	
Stern	Review	of	Research	excellence	
Framework.	
	
Sainsbury	Review	of	skills	pathways	and	
qualifications.	
	
McMillan	Review	–	international	
competitiveness	of	UK	university	
technology	transfer	practice.	
	
Conservative	Government	re-
elected.	
	
Higher	Education	and	Research	Bill	
2016-17	agreed	by	House	of	
Commons	and	House	of	Lords	and	
receives	Royal	Assent	May	2017.	
	
Institute	of	Apprenticeships	and	
Technical	Education	announced	in	
Bill.	
	
UUK	Bell	Review	of	sector	agencies	
recommends	merger	of	Leadership	
Foundation,	HE	Academy	and	
Equality	Challenge	Unit.	
	
Government	launches	industrial	
strategy	to	boost	productivity	and	
earning	power.		
	
Government	sells	part	of	student	
loan	book.	
Office	for	Students	launched.	
	
UKRI	launched.	
	
HESA	data	to	be	replaced	by	Data	
Futures	(providing	in	year	analysis)	2019-
20.	
	
Increase	in	fee	cap	to	£9,250.	
	
Advance	HE	launched	–	merger	of	HEA,	
Equality	Challenge	Unit	and	Leadership	
Foundation.	
	
	
	
	
	
HEFCE	 Spending	review:	HEFCE	to	
make	savings	of	£120m	by	
2019-20	in	teaching	grant	as	
part	of	Government	measures	
to	bring	down	public	debt,	but	
HEFCE	reports	to	DfE,	not	BEIS	(July	2016).	
	
Year	one	of	Teaching	Excellence	
Framework.	
	
Year	two	of	Teaching	Excellence	
Framework.		
	
	
‘Transition’	of	formula	finding,	QA	and	
regulator	responsibilities	to	OfS.	
	
‘Transition’	of	formula	finding	to	RCUK.	
Year	three	of	Teaching	Excellence	
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protect	high	cost	subjects.	
	
Counter	Terrorism	Act	and	
Security	Act	2015	-	HEFCE	
becomes	HE	regulator.	
Framework.	
Learning	and	
Teaching	
Simplification	of	recurrent	
teaching	funds	method	and	
processes:	no	longer	3	stage	
recalculation	process,	will	be	
informed	by	previous	year’s	
student	numbers,	main	
allocation	for	high-cost	subjects	
and	supplementary	allocation	
for	London	weighting,	
transitional	allocation	on	
forecasts	of	old-regime	students	
to	be	phased	out,	changes	to	
price	groups	for	ITT	leading	to	
QTS	(30/2013,	29/2014).		
	
SNC	removed	from	HEFCE	
funded	providers.	
	
Publicly	funded	further	
education	and	sixth-form	
colleges	invited	to	become	
directly	funded	by	HEFCE	
(2014/11).		
	
£1m	to	support	projects	in	
evaluating	measures	of	learning	
gain	(04/2015).		
	
Amendments	to	KIS/	NSS	data	
Loan	scheme	for	PGT	students	introduced,	
up	to	£10,000.		
	
Reduced	overall	funding	of	HEFCE	grant	of	
£150m	for	2015-16	for	recurrent	grants	
(03/2016).		
	
Teaching	recurrent	funding	reduced	by	
£21m	–	STEM	remains	a	priority,	new	
stream	of	funding	for	geographically	
focussed	national	outreach	programme	
£30m	2016-17,	£60m	2017-18	to	meet	PMs	
goal	of	100%	increase	in	participation	from	
disadvantaged	backgrounds	(03/2016).		
	
Revised	operating	model	for	quality	
assessment	–	consistent	with	European	
Standards	and	Guidelines	–	more	tailored	
to	institution’s	context.	Six	year	reviews	to	
be	replaced	by	Annual	Provider	Review	
light	touch	reviews,	with	more	power	to	
intervene	(2016/03,	c13/2016,	13/2016,	
18/2016,	25/2016,	2016/29).		
	
T	funding	of	£80m	by	2019-20	required	to	
support	the	transfer	of	subjects	allied	to	
medicine	from	DoH	to	BIS	(71st	Board	
meeting).		
	
DADF	Phase	2:	funding	to	stimulate	
development	of	degree	
apprenticeships	(£5m	for	2017-8)	
(6/2016).	
Changes	to	KIS	such	that	it	becomes	
Unistats	Data	Collection,	some	
changes	to	data	set	to	
accommodate	CMA	advice	
(04/2017).	
Changes	to	question	set	for	NSS	to	
accommodate	TEF	and	alternative	
providers	now	required	to	
participate	(30/2016).		
HEFCE	becomes	responsible	for	
supporting	students	completing	ug	
courses	in	nursing,	midwifery	and	
some	allied	health	professions	
professional	registration	through	HE	
finance	system	(£32m)	(06/2017).		
£20m	announced	for	an	institute	of	
national	focus	to	improve	digital	
skills	provision	at	levels	6&7	for	
2017-19	(08/2017).	
Changes	to	supporting	PGT	students	
revised	(£1,100	supplement	for	high	cost	
subjects	re-considered)	(2016/39).		
	
Catalyst	Fund:	Focus	on	tackling	religious-
based	hate	crime	affecting	students	
(3/2018).	
		
Health	Education	Challenge	Fund	-	£200k	
(2018/02).	
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collection	–	lowered	headcount	
threshold	fort	publication	of	
student	level	data	to	10	
(11/2015,	12/2015).		
	
HESA	CACHED	programme	–	
new	way	of	presenting	and	
using	HESA	data.	HEFCE	to	use	
data	in	regulatory	role	(196th	
Board	minutes).	
	
Guidance	on	reporting	students	
in	data	returns	for	HE	providers	
offering	courses	through	
partnership	arrangements	
(18/2015).		
	
HE	at	FECs,	6th	form	colleges	and	
alternative	providers	to	be	
included	in	UK	performance	
indicators	(17/2015).		
	
Steps	to	Postgraduate	Study	–	
on-line	decision	making	tool	
launched.	
	
£150m	in	teaching	grant	savings	
from	no	increase	in	expected	
student	numbers,	reduction	in	
£10m	for	Catalyst	Fund,	grant	
reductions	for	HEIs	that	over-
recruited	against	SNC	in	2014-15	
(19/2015).	
	
Scaling	factor	for	high	cost	
£8	million	Degree	Apprenticeships	
Development	Fund	(DADF)	for	programmes	
ready	for	2017-18	(c06/2016).	
Recurrent	funding:	maintaining	in	real	
terms	the	total	teaching	grant	budgets	for	
main	high-cost	subject	allocation	and	for	
the	targeted	allocation	for	very	high-cost	
STEM	subjects	(physics;	chemistry;	
chemical	engineering;	and	mineral,	
metallurgy	and	materials	engineering).	The	
amount	of	recurrent	teaching	grant	
continues	to	decline,	predominantly	as	a	
result	of	the	continuing	phase-out	of	
funding	for	old-regime	students	(those	
students.	The	supplement	for	old-regime	
students	declines	by	£54	million	from	£91	
million	in	2015-16	to	£37	million	in	2016-
17.	(2016/09).	
Changes	to	KIS	data	collection	(9/2016)	
DADF	Phase	1:	funding	to	stimulate	
development	of	degree	apprenticeships	
(£3m	for	2016-17)	(6/2016).	
Revised	operating	model	for	quality	
assessments	following	introduction	of	TEF.	
TEF	year	2	guidance	announced	(2016/32).	
HEFCE	Board	consider	revisions	to	T-
funding	strategy	to	target	funding	on	
sector	priorities	(access,	student	success,	
Principles	for	selection	of	UK	
performance	indicator	factors	
(16/2017).	
T	recurrent	grant	reduced	by	£40m.	
£32m	to	support	students	on	
nursing,	midwifery	and	other	
medicine	aligned	courses.	£60m	for	
national	collaborative	outreach	
programme.	£40	(2016-17	and	2017-
18)	for	student	premiums	(f/t,	p/t,	
disabled	students	(especially	mental	
health)	–	doubled	funding	
(2017/05).	
Catalyst	Fund:	focus	on	closing	the	
skills	gap	and	supporting	the	
industrial	strategy	through	
curriculum	development	(24/2017).	
	
NSS	to	include	questions	on	
effectiveness	of	students’	unions	in	
supporting	students	with	their	
studies	(09.11.2017	Board	minutes).		
Expansion	of	undergraduate	medical	
education	places:	call	for	bids	for	
places	(2017/20).	
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Category	 2015	 2016	 2017	 2018	
	
funding	of	new	regime	students	
reduced	and	scaling	factor	for	
London	students	reduced,	
allocations	related	to	student	
opportunity	fund	for	disabled	
students	reduced	by	2.4%	-	to	
make	further	savings	(19/2015).	
	
Funding	for	employer	co-funded	
old	regime	students	ceases	
(157th		Board	mtg).		
	
£50m	for	PGR	provision	(163rd	
Board	mtg).		
	
Additional	measures	introduced	
for	the	control	and	standards	of	
alternative	providers	(164th	
Board	mtg).	
	
£1.5m	available	for	
development	of	conversion	
courses	in	engineering	
(25/2015).	
	
Learning	Gain	programme	
funding	extended	extension	of	
the	programme	budget	to	
£4million,	2015-16	to	2017-18	
(169th	Board	minutes).		
	
Changes	to	NSS	proposed	
including	new	questions	on	
student	engagement	(169th	
Board	minutes).	
progression	to	PGT),	reduce	data	reporting,	
need	for	value	for	money	and	funding	
quality	(Board	mtg	11.05.2016).		
Catalyst	Fund	-	focus	on	innovations	in	
L&T:	addressing	barriers	to	student	
success,	student	save	guarding	
(20/201636/2016).	
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Category	 2015	 2016	 2017	 2018	
	
	
Consultation	on	new	QA	system	
in	line	with	TEF.	
Widening	
participation	
National	Scholarship	
Programme	ceases	as	
undergraduate	support	
programme	with	re-focus	to	
support	postgraduate	students	
from	dis-advantaged	
backgrounds	(24/2013).		
	
Phased	in	changes	to	Disabled	
Students	Allowance.		
	
New	set	of	principles	for	UKPIs	-	
includes	increased	WP	and	
research	UKPIs	(31/2015).	
	
WP	indicator	based	on	National	Statistics	
Social	Economic	Classifications	4-7	to	be	
discontinued	in	UK	performance	indicators	
and	will	be	revised	(17/2015).		
	
Recurrent	grant	new	stream	of	funding	for	
geographically	focussed	national	outreach	
programme	(NCOP)	£30m	2016-17,	£60m	
2017-18	to	meet	PMs	goal	of	100%	
increase	in	participation	from	
disadvantaged	backgrounds	and	white	
males,	as	well	as	double	proportion	of	
students	from	disadvantaged	backgrounds	
and	ethnic	minority	groups	(03/2016).	
Scope	revised	to	include	increasing	
inclusivity	(27/2016).	
	
Formula	driven	grants	for	WP	reduced	
budget	to	£54m	from	£68m	(03/2016).		
	
Disabled	students	funding	doubles	to	£40m	
-	with	different	funding	weightings	to	
improve	provision	for	disabled	students	in	
2016-17	to	£40	million.	The	increase	is	to	
support	institutions	to	meet	the	rapid	rise	
in	the	number	of	students	reporting	
mental	health	problems	and	to	transition	
towards	an	inclusive	social	model	of	
support	for	disabled	students.	(03/2016,	
2016/06,	2016/09).	
Formula	based	widening	access	
targeted	allocation	discontinued,	
now	included	in	NCOP	(2016/39).		
	
Student	premium	for	disabled	
students	and	students	from	
disadvantaged	backgrounds	to	
include	POLAR	quintiles	1	and	2	and	
part-time	students	(2016/39).			
Discontinued	formula	based	
widening	access	targeted	allocation	
in	recurrent	funding	(2017/05).	
Changes	to	POLAR4	classification	
introduced	(2017/29).		
	
	
Research	 Research	partnership	 Fourth	round	of	UK	Research	Partnership	 Methodology	for	QR	Research	 UK	Research	Partnership	Investment	Fund	
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Category	 2015	 2016	 2017	 2018	
	
investment	Fund	3rd	round	
(£100m)	(2013/35,	2015/33).		
	
Parameters	of	research	funding	
method	reviewed	in	light	of	REF	
2014	results.	Funding	for	QR	
disaggregated	according	to	how	
sub-profiles	contributed	to	
overall	quality	profile,	STEM	
adjustments	and	removal	of	
STEM	protection,	increase	
relative	quality	rating	between	
4*	and	3*	from	3:1	to	4:1	
(03/2015).		
	
£52m	savings	from	one-off	
transitional	research	allocations	
which	are	no	longer	provided	
(19/2015).	
	
Changes	to	policy	on	open	
access	in	next	REF	(20/2015).		
	
Removal	of	cap	on	supervision	
funding	rates	per	student	(164th	
Board	mtg).		
	
New	set	of	principles	for	UKPIs	-	
includes	increased	WP	and	
research	UKPIs	(31/2015).	
Investment	Fund	(UKRPIF)	£200m	of	
matched	funding	over	2	years	(2014/17).		
	
2016-17	recurrent	grant	for	research	(QR)	
increased	by	£20m	to	£1070m.	Other	
research	recurrent	streams	remain	at	the	
same	level	(03/2016).	
Open	access	policy	for	REF	updated	
(32/2016,	2016/35).	
	
	
Degree	Programme	supervision	
funding	changes	to	take	account	of	
supervision	across	dual	institutions	
(34/2016).	
	
Change	in	method	for	counting	PGR	
students	that	inform	RDP	
supervision	to	include	only	year	1-3	
(p/t	1-6)	(34/2016).		
	
Increase	in	mainstream	research	
funding	of	£17m	to	include	
allocation	from	Global	Challenges	
Research	Fund	and	further	£11m	in	
October	(24/2017).		
	
Initial	decisions	on	REF2021	
framework	published	(33/2017/	
REF2017/01).	
	
Catalyst	Fund:	focus	on	supporting	
mental	health	and	wellbeing	for	
postgraduate	research	students	
(40/2017).		
	
REF	procedural	guidance	published	
October	2017	(2017/25).		
(£220m	in	2020-21)	–	research	capability	
funding	6th	round	(2017/05).	
	
Economy	and	
society	
HEIF	funding	extended	for	
further	year	with	£10m	
supplement.	£150m	for	main	
funding	method	(03/2015,	
HEIF	£160m	for	2016-17.	New	approach	to	
annual	allocations	and	annual	modifier	
(2016/16,	176th	Board).	
	
£100m	announced	to	incentivise	
university	collaboration	in	research	
commercialisation,	based	on	HIEF	
methodology	called	Connecting	
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Category	 2015	 2016	 2017	 2018	
	
05/2015).		 	 Capacity	Fund.	£15m	formula	
funding	for	2017-18	and	£85m	
competitive	projects	2017-21	
(2017/03).	
	
Recurrent	funding	for	Knowledge	
Exchange	Fund	remains	at	£160m	
(2017/05).	
	
Catalyst	Fund:	focus	on	tackling	hate	
crime	and	online	harassment	on	
campus	(20/2017).		
	
HEIF:	additional	funding	for	
knowledge	exchange	to	deliver	
Government’s	industrial	strategy	
£40m	2017-18	plus	£25m	recurrent	
funding	(25/2017,	(2017/24)).		
	
HEIF:	Connecting	capability	fund	
(second	round)	from	existing	
funding	(34/2017).		
Finance,	estate	
and	assurance	
Changes	to	financial	reporting	to	
model	SORP	practices	
(02/2015).		
	
Changes	to	methodology	for	
formula	teaching	and	research	
capital	allocations	(09/2015).		
Review	of	institution	specific	funding	–	new	
criteria	introduced	(06/2015).		
	
Changes	to	the	Memorandum	of	Assurance	
and	Accountability	0	triggers	for	Exchequer	
interest	repayment	(15/2016).	
	
Re-development	of	value	for	money	
reporting	to	recognise	changing	landscape	
for	HE	regulation	and	policy	(aliens	with	
Diamond	Review)	(23/2016).	
Museum,	galleries	and	collections	review	
Capital	Investment	Framework	
funding	for	2017-18	announced	
based	on	previous	funding	
methodology	(£135m	for	teaching,	
£189m	for	research)	(07/2017).		
	
Change	to	institutional	financial	
statements	to	include	corporate	
governance	and	internal	control	
(27/2017).	
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Category	 2015	 2016	 2017	 2018	
	
£10.7m.	 	
Leadership,	
management	
and	governance	
Prevent	duty:	Monitoring	
Framework	for	the	higher	
education	sector	(2015/32)	
	
Colleges	given	opportunity	to	
enter	into	a	direct	funding		
relationship	with	HEF	
CE	for	2016-17	(169th	Board	
minutes).	
Revised	framework	for	Prevent	duty	
(2016/24).	
Changes	to	framework	for	
monitoring	of	Prevent	duty	in	higher	
education	in	England	produced	for	
2017	(2017/10).		
	
HEFCE	publishes	guidance	on	
severance	pay	and	remuneration	of	
senior	staff	(June	2017).	
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Appendix	D:	PERCEPTIONS	OF	CETL	PARTICIPANTS,	
PRACTITIONERS	AND	PVCs	
The	perceptions	of	CETL	participants,	practitioners	and	PVCs	for	Learning	&	Teaching	are	
collated	from	the	statistical	data	provided	in	the	summative	report,	and	provide	some	
insight	into	how	the	CETL	programme	was	viewed	(see	Chapter	6).	(SQW	2011)	©HEFCE	
	 Pro-Vice-Chancellors	 %	strongly	
agree	or	agree	
%	strongly	
disagree	or	
disagree	
B1	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	we	have	improved	teaching	and	
learning	practice	in	our	institution	
67%	 7%	
B2	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	we	have	introduced	(or	
improved)	processes	for	recognising	and	rewarding	staff	excellence	
in	teaching	and	learning	
54%	 7%	
B3	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	staff	in	our	institution	now	have	
more	time	and	opportunity	to	reflect	on	their	teaching	
47%	 7%	
B4	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	we	have	better	facilities	for	
teaching	at	our	university	
53%	 7%	
B5	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	we	have	increased	
opportunities	for	better	staff-student	interaction	at	our	institution	
46%	 7%	
B6	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	we	have	developed	innovative	
approaches	to	teaching	and	learning	at	our	institution	
53%	 7%	
B7	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	staff	at	our	institution	have	
more	opportunities	to	engage	in	pedagogical	research	and	
scholarship	
40%	 7%	
B8	 If	your	institution	is	involved	in	more	than	one	CETL,	as	host	and/or	
partner,	please	say	to	what	extent	these	CETLs	have	worked	well	
together	to	benefit	your	institution	as	a	whole	
20%	 -	
C1	 Whether	or	not	you	are	directly	involved	in	a	CETL,	are	you	aware	of	
any	developments	within	specific	subject	areas	that	have	arisen	
from	the	CETL	programme?	
47%	Yes	
40%	No	
-	
D1	 Good	practice	and	innovation	in	learning	and	teaching	have	been	
shared	between	CETLs	and	non-CETL	institutions	
73%	 13%	
D2	 CETLs	have	contributed	to	improvements	in	student	retention,	
achievement	and	employability	
33%	 13%	
D3	 There	has	been	effective	working	between	CETLs,	the	Higher	
Education	Academy	and	other	organisations	and	networks	to	
develop	and	disseminate	findings	and	good	practice	more	widely	
60%	 13%	
D4	 The	level	of	collaboration	between	and	across	CETLs	has	been	good	 40%	 7%	
E3	 Reflecting	on	the	CETL	programme	as	a	whole,	do	you	agree	that	
the	approach	take	to	developing	and	funding	the	programme	was	
the	most	effective	way	to	recognise	and	disseminate	excellence	in	
teaching	and	learning	in	HE?		
37%	 33%	
F1	 We	have	put	formal	processes	in	place	for	reviewing	CETL	impacts	
and	incorporating	the	results	into	our	institutional	planning	
53%	 -	
F2	 Developments	arising	from	our	CETL	are	reflected	in	our	
institution’s	strategic	and	operational	plans	and	embedded	in	our	
ongoing	processes	and	activities	
53%	 -	
F3	 Teaching	and	learning	have	a	higher	status	and	profile	in	our	
institution	as	a	result	of	the	CETL	
40%	 -	
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	 Pro-Vice-Chancellors	 %	strongly	
agree	or	agree	
%	strongly	
disagree	or	
disagree	
F4	
	
Now	that	external	CETL	funding	has	ceased,	our	institution	is	
providing	internal	resources	to	support	further	innovation	in	
learning	and	teaching	
60%	 -	
F5	 Our	institution	provides	resources	for	staff	development	to	embed	
new	approaches	in	teaching	and	learning	
60%	 -	
F6	 Our	institution	is	continuing	to	collaborate	with	CETL	partners	and	
other	non-CETL	institutions	to	support	the	development	of	teaching	
and	learning	
34%	 13%	
	
	 Participants	and	practitioners	responses	 %	CETL	
employees	
%	non-CETL	
employees	
B1	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	my	overall	teaching	and	learning	
has	improved	
91%	 69%	
B2	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	my	excellence	in	teaching	and	
learning	has	been	recognised	via	promotion	or	some	other	form	of	
recognition	and	reward	
63%	 28%	
B3	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	I	have	had	more	time	and	
opportunity	to	reflect	on	my	teaching	
70%	 33%	
B4	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	I	have	developed	innovative	
approaches	to	teaching	and	learning	
90%	 68%	
B5	 As	a	result	of	the	CETL	programme,	I	have	had	opportunities	to	
engage	in	pedagogical	research	and	scholarship	
81%	 60%	
C1	 The	CETL	programme	has	contributed	to	improved	teaching	and	
learning	practice	in	my	institution	
92%	 74%	
C2	 The	CETL	programme	has	encouraged	my	institution	to	recognise	and	
reward	staff	for	excellence	in	teaching	and	learning		
64%	 47%	
C3	 The	CETL	programme	has	resulted	in	more	time	and	opportunity	to	
reflect	on	teaching	in	my	institution	
69%	 53%	
C4	 The	CETL	programme	has	contributed	to	the	adoption	of	innovative	
approaches	to	teaching	and	learning	in	my	institution	
86%	 75%	
C5	 The	CETL	programme	has	resulted	in	more	opportunities	to	engage	in	
pedagogical	research	and	scholarship	at	my	institution	
87%	 68%	
C7	 The	CETLs	in	which	we	are	involved	have	worked	well	together	to	
benefit	our	institution	as	a	whole	(for	respondents	whose	institutions	
are	involved	in	more	than	one	CETL)	
34%	 42%	
D1	 Whether	or	not	you	are	or	have	been	involved	in	a	CETL.	Are	you	
aware	of	any	developments	within	specific	subject	areas	that	have	
arisen	from	the	CETL	programme?	
76%	Yes	
5%	No	
56%	Yes	
24%	No	
E1	 Good	practice	and	innovation	in	teaching	and	learning	have	been	
shared	between	CETLs	and	non-CETL	institutions	
61%	 51%	
E2	 CETLs	have	contributed	to	improvements	in	student	retention,	
achievement	and	employability	
76%	 35%	
E3	 There	has	been	effective	working	between	CETLs,	the	Higher	
Education	Academy	and	other	organisations	and	networks	to	develop	
and	disseminate	CETL	activities	and	good	practice	more	widely	across	
the	sector	
56%	 42%	
E4	 The	level	of	collaboration	between	and	across	CETLs	has	been	good	 51%	 22%	
	
